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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the regulation of private native forestry in two Australian jurisdictions:
NSW and Tasmania. Private forests have long been the forgotten forests - a neglected aspect of
forest policy in Australia. Appropriate supervision of private native forestry (PNF) is important
because private forests are home to much threatened biodiversity, and as they make up a
significant proportion of the total area of native forests in NSW. PNF also makes a substantial
contribution to total timber production in NSW.
Research was conducted into the administration of environmental laws applying to PNF in
NSW between 1997-2002 in order to assess the regulatory framework and to discern patterns
of administrative behaviour. The thesis asked “Were NSW environmental laws applying to
PNF effectively implemented and enforced?” The hypothesis that much PNF in NSW is
“under-regulated” in practice was explored.
To examine these questions, a thorough review of all relevant legislative provisions and case
law was conducted. The Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 and the Threatened Species
Conservation Act 1995 and their implementation in relation to PNF were examined in particular.
Defects in the legislative framework applying during the study period were revealed. The
applicable law was found to be complex, and highly fragmented, with responsibility spread
across many agencies. Over 100 interviews with agency staff at head office and regional offices
were undertaken. Other information was obtained from internal documents and through
requests under the Freedom of Information Act. The broader context was addressed by reviewing
theoretical literature in environmental law, with an emphasis on the regulatory theory literature.
Some regulatory failures stemmed from inadequate implementation of the legislation. It was
found that PNF was infrequently regulated under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act, primarily
due to a problematic exemption for specified types of PNF. In the North Coast and Hunter
regions the exemption was claimed by 100% of PNF operations (on land tenures where it was
available). PNF was found to be infrequently regulated by local government under Local
Environment Plans (64.5% of 107 local governments did not regulate PNF in the main rural
zone). The safety net mechanism of licensing under the Threatened Species Conservation Act was
infrequently applied with only five licences granted for PNF. Regarding law enforcement, a low
level of prosecution activity was found to have taken place.
The findings support the proposition that in practice NSW law was inadequate to ensure
ecologically sustainable forest management, due to the poorly designed and integrated statutory
framework. They also provide some evidence to support the proposition that the applicable
laws were generally implemented with a light touch, generally expressing a laissez faire approach
to PNF in most regions (with some exceptions). These findings suggest there is a pressing need
for reform of the regulatory framework in NSW, if standards of ESFM are to be achieved.
Thus any future exemptions must be of narrow application. Further, a more pro-active
approach to ensuring compliance with legislative requirements is necessary.
While the results suggest regulatory failure, they do not constitute grounds for wholesale
replacement of regulation with other mechanisms such as self-regulation and incentives
payments. Issues of compliance and enforcement as well as adequacy of funding are crucial to
choices of policy instrument for biodiversity conservation on private land.
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Chapter One

THE LAW AND PRIVATE NATIVE FORESTRY

INTRODUCTION1
One of the key questions in the field of environmental law today is how to increase the
law’s effectiveness in providing guidance and solutions to environmental problems. In
view of mounting evidence of environmental damage, we must examine the extent to
which the law is assisting the attainment of ecological sustainability.2 The severity of land,
soil and water degradation and loss of biological diversity has been documented by
numerous reports including the Commonwealth and New South Wales State of the
Environment Reports.3 The impacts of these problems, combined with the steady growth of
Australia’s obligations for environmental protection under international law make it
imperative to investigate whether domestic legislative responses are adequate and
effective.4
Both the international literature and domestic journals are replete with concerns about
the implementation and operation of environmental laws in practice.5 A second aspect of

Sections of this Chapter were published as Prest, J. (2004) “The Forgotten Forests: The Regulation of Forestry on
Private Land in NSW”, in Lunney, D. (ed.) Conservation of Australia’s Forest Fauna, Royal Zoological Society of NSW,
Mosman, NSW.
2 Dovers, S. (1999) “Adaptive policy, institutions and management: challenges for lawyers and others”, 8(2) Griffith
Law Review 374-393.
3 Australian State of the Environment Committee (2001) Australia: State of the Environment: Independent Report to the Commonwealth
Minister for the Environment and Heritage, CSIRO Publishing, Collingwood, Vic; New South Wales Environment Protection
Authority (2001) New South Wales State of the Environment, EPA, Chatswood.
4 At present there is no binding international instrument specifically related to the conservation of temperate forests.
However, there are at least eleven international conventions of general application with a bearing on forest
management including the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, Done at Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, ATS
1993 No.32; 31 ILM 818 (1992), in force 29.12.93, (signed for Australia 5.6.92, ratified by Australia 18.6.93;
Framework Convention on Climate Change 31 ILM 849 (1992); UN Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage, 23 November 1972, 11 ILM 1367 (Done at Paris, entered into force 17.12.75); Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 3.3.1973, 27 UST 1087, 993 UNTS 243; more generally
see Boer, B. Ramsay, R., Rothwell, D. (1998) International Environmental Law in the Asia Pacific, Kluwer Law, the
Hague; Mason, A. (1996) “The Influence of International and Transnational Law on Australian Municipal Law”, 7
Public Law Review 20.
5 Guningham, N. Sinclair, D. (2002) Leaders and Laggards: Next-Generation Environmental Regulation, Greenleaf Publishing,
Sheffield, UK, 224pp; Hawkins, K (1984) Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution, Clarendon
Press, Oxford; Latin, H, (1992) "Why Agencies Seldom Do What Regulatory Laws Require: Some Lessons from the
Superfund Fiasco", in Gerard Rowe & Steven Seidler, (eds.) 3 Australian Fulbright Series: Contaminated Sites in Australia:
Challenges for Law and Public Policy, pp.66-76; Yaffee, Stephen (1982) Prohibitive Policy : Implementing the Federal Endangered Species
Act, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts; Farrier, D. (1996) Implementing the In-Situ Conservation Provisions of the
United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity in Australia: Questioning the Role of National Parks 3(1) Australasian
Journal Natural Resources Law and Policy 1-24; Christoff, P. (1994) Pollution Control and Implementation Deficit: Assessing the Victorian
EPA, Working Paper for Administration, Compliance and Governability Program, RSSS, ANU; Hannam, I (1994)
“Implementation and Enforcement of the Protected Land Provisions of the NSW Soil Conservation Act 1938”, paper
presented to ACEL Defending the Environment Conference, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 7-8 May, 22pp; Bridgstock, M.;
1

interest in questions of implementation involves the study and use of third party open
standing provisions in modern environmental statutes in Australia.6 The task of
implementing and enforcing environmental laws is now undertaken by a disparate band
of public interest litigants and environmental lawyers as well as public authorities.7 The
duty to implement environmental laws is no longer conceived as the sole responsibility of
the regulatory state.
Nevertheless, the perennial question remains, of whether environmental laws are
providing an adequate contribution to the achievement of environmental conservation in
the field in Australia. In 2003, Professor Bates, writing on the role of the law in natural
resources management declared that “[t]he law as set down in legislation does not always
reflect what happens in practice.”8 In the same volume, Professor Bonyhady advanced
similar observations, more forcefully, in a paper entitled “The Disappointment of the
Law”. He referred to “the gulf between the law and practice”.9 These sources suggest
researchers need to pursue questions of the contribution of environmental laws to the
achievement of conservation goals.

Heath, B.; Sheumack, M.; Lowe, I. (1999) “The Working of Environmental Protection Legislation in the Regulation of the
Used Oil Industry in Queensland”, 16(2) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 109.
6
These provisions are particularly evident in NSW legislation, including: National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974, s.176A,
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, s.123; Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995, s.147; Native Vegetation
Conservation Act 1997, s.63(2); Native Vegetation Act 2003, s.41(2). Consider also Environment Protection and Biodiversity
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth), s.487.
7 Johnson, J. (1998) “Civil Enforcement of Environmental Laws in Australia”, 5th International Conference of the
International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (INECE), Monterey, California,
November, Vol. 1, pp. 435 – 444; ANEDO (various) Impact (Journal of the Australian Network of Environmental
Defender’s Offices), EDO NSW, Sydney; Turner, T. (2002) Justice on Earth, Earthjustice, Oakland, CA.;
Environmental Law Institute (USA) (1993) Practical Approaches to Implementing Environmental Laws: Getting to Here from
There, ELI, Washington DC, at 1. These concerns are taken up in Australia by the Environmental Defenders’ Office,
in the USA by Earthjustice, and internationally by E-LAW the Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide. In Europe,
IMPEL, the European Union Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law is an
informal Network of the environmental authorities of the Member States with objectives including to ensure a more
effective
implementation
and
enforcement
of
environmental
legislation
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/impel/). Also in Europe, a framework for reporting on environmental
law implementation is enshrined in a 1991 “reporting directive”.
8 Bates, G. (2003) “Legal Perspectives”, ch.11 in Dovers, S., Wild River, S. (eds.) Managing Australia’s Environment,
Federation Press, Sydney, at 255.
9 These comments were made specifically in relation to the Western Lands legislation in NSW. Bonyhady, T., (2003)
“The Disappointment of the Law”, ch. 19 in Dovers, S., Wild River, S. (eds.) Managing Australia’s Environment,
Federation Press, Sydney, 463-471 at 464.

BIODIVERSITY,

VEGETATION CLEARANCE AND OFF-RESERVE FOREST

CONSERVATION

It is well known that one of Australia’s most pressing environmental problems is the
conservation of its unique biological diversity.10 A key issue in that field is the
preservation of threatened species and ecosystems within forests used for timber and
pulp production.11 Although forests are among the least extensive ecosystems in
Australia in terms of sheer area, they are highly significant in terms of their biodiversity.12
A related aspect of biodiversity conservation policy concerns questions of conservation
in the ‘off-reserve’ or non-park context, outside formal nature reserves. There is much
evidence to suggest a pressing need for ecologically sustainable management of privately
held land in Australia. This is crucial in New South Wales which has 87% of its native
vegetation on privately held land.13 The National Forest Inventory found that almost 70
per cent of Australian native forests14 are under private sector management, on freehold
or leasehold land.15
As long ago as 1990, the ecologist Professor Harry Recher observed that: “wildlife
management and conservation, if it is to succeed, must be extended to all land, regardless
of tenure, and despite arbitrary political boundaries or bureaucratic divisions.”16 More
than a decade later, state and local governments are increasingly recognising the
importance of off-reserve conservation. Traditional conservation strategies emphasising
biodiversity protection in State-owned national parks and reserves are being

Australian State of the Environment Committee (2001) Australia: State of the Environment: Independent Report to the
Commonwealth Minister for the Environment and Heritage, CSIRO Publishing, Collingwood, Vic.
11 Lindenmayer, D. (1996) Wildlife and Woodchips: Leadbeater’s Possum: A Test Case for Sustainable Forestry, UNSW Press,
Sydney, 156pp.; Norton, T., and Dovers, S. (eds.) (1994) Ecology and Sustainability of Southern Temperate Ecosystems,
CSIRO Publishing. Melbourne; Norton, T.W.; Lindenmayer, D. (1999) “Future Directions for Biodiversity
Conservation in Managed Forests: Indicator Species, impact studies and monitoring programs”, 115(2-3) Forest
Ecology and Management 277-287.
12 State of the Environment Advisory Council (eds) (1996) Australia: State of the Environment Report, an independent report to
the Commonwealth Minister for the Environment, CSIRO Publishing, Melbourne, at p.4-27.
13 EPA NSW (2000) State of the Environment Report, Table 6.9, citing Pressey, R., Hager, T., Ryan, K., Schwartz, J., Wall,
S., Ferrier, S., Creaser, P. (2000) “Using Abiotic Data For Conservation Assessment Over Extensive Regions:
Quantitative Methods Applied Across NSW” 96 Biological Conservation 55-82.
14 The National Forest Inventory (NFI) defined ‘forest’ as “an area that is dominated by trees having usually a single stem and a
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mature or potentially mature stand height exceeding 2 metres and with existing or potential crown cover of overstorey strata about
equal to or greater than 20 per cent.” National Forest Inventory (1998) Australia’s State of the Forests Report 1998, Bureau
of Rural Sciences, Canberra, p.30.
15
16

Ibid at 35.
Recher, H. (1990) “Wildlife Conservation in Australia: State of the Nation” 26 Australian Zoologist 5-11. Benson similarly
argues, “In an ideal world we would manage the landscape ‘ecosystem by ecosystem’ rather than by land tenure.” Benson,
J. (1998) Setting the Scene: The Native Vegetation of New South Wales, Background Paper No.1, Native Vegetation Advisory
Council, Sydney at 34.

supplemented by a new consensus of domestic ecological experts and of international
law17 regarding the need for in-situ conservation across the landscape.18
The clearance, destruction and modification of habitats is acknowledged to be the major
threat to Australia’s terrestrial biodiversity.19 The focus of recent academic and popular
debate about vegetation (habitat) conservation on private land has been responses to
broad-acre vegetation clearing for agriculture, particularly in Queensland and NSW.
These concerns have not been misplaced. Although the annual rate of native vegetation
clearing may have recently declined, the clearing has been on such a scale that in 1999
Australia was estimated to be amongst the world’s ten worst offenders for destroying
vegetation.20
In spite of the importance of vegetation clearing, there remain other areas of off-reserve
biodiversity conservation which need to be considered by law and policy makers. An
important but neglected component of both forestry and off-reserve biodiversity
conservation policy involves the question of managing ecological impacts of commercial
forestry activities within privately held native forests, i.e. private native forestry (PNF). 21
Forests and woodlands are home to over half of Australia’s species of terrestrial fauna,
and three-quarters of its flora species.22 Forests support many species that are under

UN Biodiversity Convention, Article 8(c) (United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, Done at Rio de Janeiro, 5 June
1992, ATS 1993 No.32; 31 ILM 818 (1992), in force 29.12.93, (signed for Australia 5.6.92, ratified by Australia
18.6.93).
18 Sivertsen, D. (1995) “Habitat Loss – Its Nature and Effects – including case studies from NSW”, in Bradstock, R.
et.al., Conserving Biodiversity: Threats and Solutions, Surrey Beatty and Sons, Sydney, 29-42; Papps, D., Wilson, P. (1995)
“Biodiversity Conservation in NSW: the Role of the National Parks and Wildlife Service” in Bradstock, R. et.al.,
Conserving Biodiversity: Threats and Solutions, Surrey Beatty and Sons, Sydney, 391-409 at 400; Thackway, R., Stevenson,
P. (eds.), (1989) Nature Conservation Outside Reserves, ANPWS Report Series No.11, Canberra, ANPWS; Meyers, N.
Mittermeier, R, Mittermeier, C., da Fonseca, G., Kent, J. (2000) Biodiversity Hotspots for Conservation Priorities,
Nature, 24 February, 853-858.
19 Williams, J., Read, C., Norton, A., Dovers, S., Burgman, M., Proctor, W. and Anderson, H. (2001) Biodiversity:
Australia State of the Environment Report 2001 (Theme Report), CSIRO Publishing on behalf of the Department of the
Environment and Heritage, Canberra; Commonwealth State of the Environment Advisory Council (eds.), (1996)
Australia: State of the Environment Report, an independent report to the Commonwealth Minister for the Environment,
CSIRO Publishing, Melbourne, at p.10-13.
20 Benson, J. (1998) Setting the Scene: The Native Vegetation of New South Wales, Background Paper No.1, Native Vegetation
Advisory Council, Sydney; Stevens, H. (2001) Declining Biodiversity and Unsustainable Agricultural Production- Common
Cause, Common Solution, Research Paper No.2 (2001-2002), Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 41pp;
Environment Australia (1999) National Framework for the Management and Monitoring of Australia’s Native Vegetation,
Environment Australia, Canberra; Lee, E., Baird, M., Lloyd, I. (1998) “State Environmental Planning Policy No.46 –
Protection and Management of Native Vegetation”, 15(2) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 127.
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21 The shorthand ‘private native forests’ is used to refer to indigenous, non-industrial (i.e. non-plantation) forests on privately held

(i.e. leased or owned) land.
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National Forest Inventory (1998) Australia’s State of the Forests Report, Bureau of Rural Sciences, Canberra, pp. 76-77.

long-term threat of extinction.23 At the same time there is great concern about the
environmental (and economic) sustainability of forestry, both in Australia24 and
internationally.25 That concern was noted and considered at length in the National Forest
Policy Statement (NFPS) of 1992, signed by State and Territory Governments.26 A number
of Australian scientific authors (as well as the Resource Assessment Commission)27 have
found that intensive logging operations may in various ways pose a long-term threat to
biodiversity, particularly in old-growth forests and forests which often are the habitat of
threatened species.28 The issue of sustainability received detailed attention in the National
Forest Policy Statement of 1992 which stated that “maintaining this native forest estate in
Australia will necessitate sustainable forest management on both public and private
forested lands.”29
There are a number of other reasons for the importance of study of private native forests
and the forestry that takes place within them.30 Some private forests contain remnants of
uncommon forest ecosystems that are important to the creation of a Comprehensive,
Resource Assessment Commission (1992) Forest and Timber Inquiry: Final Report, AGPS, Canberra, Vol.2A, p. J-13.
The RAC also stated: “the long term persistence of a number of threatened species may be placed at risk by current
silvicultural practices.” (Vol. 2A, p. J-13).
24 Lindenmayer, D. (1996) Wildlife and Woodchips: Leadbeater’s Possum: A Test Case for Sustainable Forestry, UNSW Press, Sydney,
156pp.; Norton, T., and Dovers, S. (eds.) (1994) Ecology and Sustainability of Southern Temperate Ecosystems, CSIRO Publishing.
Melbourne; Norton, T.W.; Kirkpatrick, J.B. (1995) “Sustainable Forestry – the Urgency to Make the Myth a Reality”, in
Bradstock et.al. (eds.) Conserving Biodiversity: Threats and Solutions, Surrey Beatty & Sons Ltd, Sydney, at 240-248; Lindenmayer, D.
(1999) “Future Directions for Biodiversity Conservation in Managed Forests: Indicator Species, impact studies and
monitoring programs”, 115(2-3) Forest Ecology and Management 277-287; Recher, H. (1992) “Paradigm and Paradox: Sustainable
Forest Management”, in Rowland, M. (1992) Sustainable Forest Management, Proceedings of a Seminar, University of Newcastle,
Sponsored by Institute of Foresters and Board of Environmental Studies, at 14; McDonald, J. (1999) “Regional Forest
(Dis)Agreements: The RFA Process and Sustainable Forest Management” 11 Bond Law Review 295; Barker, M. QC,
Bennett, M. (2000) “In Search of Sustainability: Forestry Law and Policy in Western Australia”, Environmental Defender’s
Office (WA), internet published at (http://www.edowa.org.au/publications/articles/index.html); ESD Committee WA:
Report of the Standing Committee on Ecologically Sustainable Development in Relation to the Management of and Planning for the Use of
State Forests in Western Australia – The Sustainability of Current Logging Practices. Undated (late 1990s). Parliamentary Printer,
Perth.
25 Von Gadow, K.; Pukkala, T.; Tome, M.; (eds.)(2000) Sustainable Forest Management, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 368
pp.; Honadle, G. (1993) “Institutional Constraints On Sustainable Resource Use: Resource Overexploitation Is Not
Just An Attitude Problem And Conservation Education Is Not Enough”, in Aplet, J., Olson, A. (eds) Defining
Sustainable Forestry, Washington, Island Press, at pp.90-119.
26 Commonwealth of Australia (1992) National Forest Policy Statement: A New Focus for Australia’s Forests, AGPS,
Canberra.
27 Resource Assessment Commission (1992) above n 23.
28 Gibbons, P., Lindenmeyer, D. (2002) Tree Hollows and Wildlife Conservation in Australia, CSIRO Publishing, Melbourne;
Gibbons, P., Lindenmeyer, D. (1997) Conserving Hollow-Dependent Fauna in Timber production Forests, NSW NPWS,
Hurstville; Lindenmayer, D. (1996) Wildlife and Woodchips: Leadbeater’s Possum: A Test Case for Sustainable Forestry,
UNSW Press, Sydney; Lindenmayer, D. (1993) Wildlife Corridors and the Mitigation of Logging Impacts on Fauna in Wood
Production Forests in South Eastern Australia, Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, ANU, Canberra;
Lindenmayer, D. (1999) “Future Directions for Biodiversity Conservation in Managed Forests: Indicator Species,
Impact Studies And Monitoring Programs”, 115(2-3) Forest Ecology and Management 277-287; Gibbons, P. and
Lindenmayer, D. (1997) “A review of prescriptions employed for conservation of hollow dependent fauna in wood
production forests of eastern Australia”, in Hale and Lamb (eds.) Conservation Outside Nature Reserves, Centre for
Conservation Biology, University of Queensland at 497-505.
29 NFPS, above n 26 at p.6.
30 More detail is provided at p.122 et. seq. regarding thc ommercial and conservation significance of private native
forests.
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Adequate and Representative nature reserve system, a policy objective adopted by
Commonwealth and State Governments in the Regional Forest Agreements process. In
NSW, there were 56 such forest-types identified as a conservation priority on private
land in the Upper North East of NSW and 85 such forest types as a priority on private
land in the Lower North-East.31
At the same time, in parts of NSW and Tasmania, PNF is now producing a substantial
proportion of certain forms of timber production. Restrictions on timber supply from
public land due to increased levels of reservation of public native forests under the NSW
Regional Forest Agreements has generated additional pressure to fell timber within
private native forests. There is evidence that in late 2000, in North East NSW, PNF
contributed between 1/3 to as much as 1/2 of total sawlog production.32
However, there is comparatively little known at this stage about the sustainability of
forestry on private lands. The NFPS contained an aspirational “Vision” statement that
endorsed the use of forests and forest resources “in an efficient, environmentally
sensitive and sustainable manner”. The NFPS declared that henceforth the combined
goal of Australian governments was to see that:
“Private forests are managed in an ecologically sustainable manner and in close cooperation with
public forest managers, to complement the conservation and commercial objectives of public
forests.”33

Yet a decade or more later, the key question is whether that aspirational vision has come
any closer to becoming a reality. Whilst this thesis does not concentrate on ecological
questions, it focuses on the adequacy of legislative and institutional arrangements for the
attainment of sustainability, and on the implementation of environmental laws. The
objective here is to contribute to debates over the effectiveness of environmental laws
and debates regarding the impact of laws for biodiversity conservation on private lands34
by inquiring into one particular aspect of that subject. In simple terms, the thesis asks “In

Commonwealth of Australia and State of NSW, Regional Forest Agreement for North East NSW (Upper NE and Lower
NE) (the Commonwealth, Canberra, 2000)(hereafter ‘NE RFA’), Table 1 “Percentage Reservation Status of Forest
and Non-Forest Ecosystems in the Upper NE Region based on Vegetation Modelling to Establish the pre-1750
extent of Forest Ecosystems in the Region”, contained in Attachment 1(a): Comprehensive, Adequate and
Representative Reserve System for Upper NE Region, pp.41-63.
32 Interview, Mr B. Attwood, Vegetation Resource Manager, Northern Region, DLWC, in person, Grafton Office,
23.11.00. Notes on file; See Chapter Six.
33 NFPS above n 23 at. 3.
34 Productivity Commission (2003) Inquiry into Impacts of Native Vegetation and Biodiversity Regulations (commenced April
2003), Productivity Commission, Canberra.
31

recent years, have environmental laws been able to effectively regulate forestry on private
lands, so that policy objectives of sustainability are implemented?”

ORIGIN OF THE RESEARCH TOPIC

The inspiration for this research project arose from earlier work conducted by the author
in the mid 1990s at the ANU. That project involved an investigation into the NSW
National Parks and Wildlife Service’s (NPWS) administration of endangered species
licensing provisions of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974. Specifically it examined
the practice of granting licences to regulate the impacts of forestry on endangered species
within publicly-owned native forests.35 During the course of that study, the author
discovered – as an incidental finding - that attempts by the NPWS to regulate the impact
of the native forest logging industry on private lands appeared to be haphazard,
superficial, and perhaps unlawful.36
It was found that the NPWS had authorised only a handful of private native forestry
(PNF) operations in NSW (nine in total) between the period 1991-1995. Further, it had
done so by the somewhat dubious means of issuing authorities under section 171 of the
National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974

37

- a section arguably never intended for such a

purpose, and more frequently applied to authorise the unintended side-effects of feral
animal control programs on native species.38 Section 171 authorities were an “authority
to take or kill, etc.” that could be issued by the Director-General to “any person” to “(a)
take or kill …(i) animals within a national park, [etc]” or “(ii) protected fauna outside a
park,…[etc]”.39
The approach of issuing authorities was adopted rather than granting “general licences to
take or kill endangered fauna” under s.120 of the Act, the means more commonly
applied to authorise other destructive activities. The application of such licensing
requirements in the NPW Act to Crown agencies such as the Forestry Commission had

Prest, J. (1995) Licensed to Kill: Endangered Fauna Licensing Under the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW) Between
1991-1995, Occasional Paper, Australian Centre for Environmental Law, Australian National University, Canberra..
36 Ibid.
37 Timber Industry (Interim Protection) Act 1992 - Report to Parliament, January 1994, p.5; Also, NPWS (1994) List of
Licences Issued, 17.7.94.
38 National Parks and Wildlife (Amendment) Act 1989, Second Reading Speech, Hansard, 21.9.88, p.1676.
39 Section 171 in its present form enables the Director-General to authorise persons to harm animals or protected
fauna or to pick native plants. Reprint No.13, 4 March 2003.
35

been put beyond doubt by the Endangered Fauna (Interim Protection) Act 1991 which
codified the Land and Environment Court’s 1991 interpretation of the NPW Act in
Corkill v Forestry Commission (the Chaelundi case).40
It appeared that the regulatory approach of issuing s.171 authorities to PNF operations
was most probably selected due to agency resource constraints and to avoid imposing
fauna impact statement (FIS) requirements associated with the endangered fauna
licensing regime on the PNF industry. Although there was no discussion of the approach
taken in any of NPWS’s publicly-available internal or external regulatory documentation,
this conclusion was consistent with the broader research results of the project which
revealed a strategy to avoid imposing FIS requirements by granting ‘temporary’ rather
than conventional ‘general’ licences. 41 The application of temporary licensing by NPWS
for public forestry facilitated an exemption from FIS requirements.

HYPOTHESES
Thus a preliminary hypothesis for this research project emerged from the author’s earlier
research. It was that although PNF in NSW in the past may have been subject to formal
statutory controls, the industry was not at that time subject to substantial regulatory
supervision in practice. A primary objective of undertaking the present research was to
investigate whether and how PNF regulation in NSW had changed since 1994. The
preliminary research hypothesis was lent support by the release of the 1995 NSW State of
the Environment Report, which suggested “[s]ignificantly fewer external [regulatory] controls
apply to logging of privately-owned forests [than on public land forestry].”42
Among the working hypotheses that emerge from the background information about the
PNF industry is that the legislation applicable to the PNF industry may be inadequate for
the industry to actually achieve ESFM. There is a preliminary picture that the applicable
legislation in NSW is inadequately implemented, leaving the industry in practice either
substantially unregulated or under-regulated, despite the formal application of various
laws. These working hypotheses are further explored in Chapters 4 and 5 where
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Corkill v Forestry Commission (1991) 73 LGRA 126; Forestry Commission v Corkill (1991) 73 LGRA 247.

Prest, J. (1995) Licensed to Kill: Endangered Fauna Licensing Under the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW) Between
1991-1995, Occasional Paper, Australian Centre for Environmental Law, Australian National University, Canberra.
42 EPA NSW (1995) New South Wales State of the Environment 1995, EPA, Chatswood, NSW at 363.
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background material describing the nature of the PNF industry in NSW and attempts to
regulate it to date are presented.

EXISTING LITERATURE ABOUT PNF IN AUSTRALIA
The existing literature about the adequacy of PNF regulation and in particular the
application of environmental laws in NSW to PNF is very sparse. Private native forests
in Australia have been the forgotten forests, often placed in the ‘too-hard basket’ by
policy-makers, legislators, conservationists and professional foresters.43 Private forests
have typically been perceived as less significant in both conservation and economic terms
than public forests. As Dr. Hannam of the former Department of Land and Water
Conservation (NSW) observed: “the majority of political interest, financial and human
resources are heavily biased towards the public forest area.”44 Yet private forests may be
of greater conservation and economic significance than is often realised. Those
dimensions are explored in Chapter Five.
Due to the focus on public forests, there is a substantial information gap surrounding
both private native forests and PNF throughout much of Australia.45 The Resources
Assessment Commission (RAC) stated in the final report of its Forest Inquiry of 1992:
Very little is known about the extent and condition of private native forest and the management practices that are
followed. There is a poor understanding of the economic and other forces that may be affecting decisions of
private land owners in matters such as the frequency of logging, conservation management, and whether to
regenerate cleared areas...46

Across Australia as a whole, governments have tended not to perceive private native
forests as a resource potentially subject to their direction, if not control. Thus with some
exceptions, notably Tasmania,47 governments have not made a serious effort to
systematically gather commercial or ecological data that would enable improved decisionCatalogue research conducted after the selection of title for this thesis suggested that the term “the forgotten
forests” had been applied in another forestry context in Australia by Calder, M., Calder, J. (1994) The Forgotten Forests:
A Field Guide to Victoria's Box and Ironbark Country, Victorian National Parks Association, 120pp. Despite this, the
author remains of the opinion that the term “the forgotten forests” is an appropriate title for a study of PNF in
NSW. Calder & Calder is now in a 2nd edition as Victoria's Box-Ironbark Country: A Field Guide) on the basis that the
Box and Ironbark forests are no longer the forgotten forests following the creation of a number of national parks.
See also The Age (2001) Editorial “The forgotten forests' last stand”, 30/08/2001.
44 Hannam, I. (1995b) “Environmental Law and Private Property Management in New South Wales”, paper presented
to 2nd Annual Defending the Environment Conference, Australian Centre for Environmental Law, University of Adelaide,
20-21 May 1995, Published Conference Proceedings, 223-250.
45 There is far less of an information gap surrounding plantations and farm wood lots eg. see: Race, D. (1999)
“Regional Farm Forestry Industries: Potential Dimensions and Possible Outcomes” 62(2) Australian Forestry 182192.
46 Resource Assessment Commission (1992) above n 23, Vol 1, p.495-6.
47 Private Forests Tasmania, (2001) Annual Report 2000-01, PFT, Hobart.
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making and forest management. The volume of both official documentation and
secondary literature addressing private forest management and regulation is far smaller
than that on the subject of public native forest management, or even that concerning
plantation forestry and farm forestry. As most of the attention of interest groups,
commentators and policy makers has focussed on the management of publicly-owned
forests, a data gap surrounding private forests has inevitably developed.48
Nevertheless, over the past two decades in Australia, questions of adequacy of
management and protection of private forests have slowly become more prominent with
government, environmentalists, and foresters showing greater interest.49 As Dargavel and
Moloney (1998) wrote, “there are signs of change”.50
The management of private forests was considered by a number of government inquiries
in the early 1990s. As we have seen, whilst the RAC (1992) gathered and presented
existing basic information about timber production from private forests, it acknowledged
the reality of numerous data gaps about private forestry. PNF was considered and
discussed at some length in the National Forest Policy Statement, in the NSW State of the
Environment reports since 1995, and the National Forest Inventory published in 1998.51
During the process of preparing the Regional Forest Agreements (RFAs), between 1997
and 2001, both State and Commonwealth governments considered the economic and
environmental importance of PNF. Many of the background reports produced for the
various RFAs contained chapters dealing with PNF, publicly-owned forests. Important
research findings were presented regarding aspects of PNF, including the extent of the
timber resource,52 the environmental importance of private forests;53 intentions of private
A search of thesis databases was conducted online at the Australian Digital Theses Program at internet URL
<http://adt.caul.edu.au>; the Kinetica National Bibliographic Database <http://search.kinetica.nla.gov.au> which
searches the catalogues of all Australian universities. Other searches were conducted of University of Wollongong,
Melbourne, Sydney and ANU library catalogues. These searches conducted in April 1998 and October 2003 did not
reveal any doctoral research on the question of private forestry regulation in NSW, or other Australian jurisdictions.
49 ANU researchers have been conducting a research and forest management project in the SE forests of NSW aimed
at improving PNF management in that region and “establishing a native forest management culture… that is
sensitive to sustainability.” Bauhus, J. (ANU Forestry) (2000) “Private Native Forest Management in South East
NSW: Challenges, Opportunities and Approaches”, Socio-Economic Research to Support Successful Farm Forestry, 2000
Research Colloquium Program, with support by the CRC for Sustainable Production Forestry and the Joint Venture
Agroforestry Program, Monday 28th February 2000, ANU, Canberra.
50 Dargavel, J.; Moloney, D. (1998) “Private Native Forests: Are we doing enough?” 293-300 in Dyason, R., Dyason,
L., Garsden, R. (eds.), Plantation and Regrowth Forestry: A Diversity of Opportunity, Australian Forest Growers Biennial
Conference Proceedings, Lismore, NSW, 6-9 July 1998.
51 National Forest Inventory (1998) Australia’s State of the Forests Report 1998, Bureau of Rural Sciences, Canberra.
(“NFI”)
52 A significant amount of research work has been performed on the extent and nature of private forests as part of the
National Forest Inventory (1998) above n 22.
48
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Environment Australia (1999) Identification, Assessment and Protection of National Estate -Part A Natural Values: Upper North Eastern
NSW CRA Region, a Project Undertaken for the Joint Commonwealth NSW Regional Forest Agreements Steering Committee As

native forest owners54 and the legal and institutional framework for ecologically
sustainable forest management (‘ESFM’) within private forests.55 Comparative viewpoints
are also available from a body of international literature addressing private forestry
issues,56 particularly from Europe,57 the United States,58 and neighbouring New Zealand.59

THE SEARCH FOR SUSTAINABILITY IN PRIVATE NATIVE FORESTS
Broader concerns about environmental sustainability in forestry are likely to form a
backdrop to future development of law and policy for PNF. Although considerable work
has been done to investigate the sustainability of public forestry, there has been little
investigation of the sustainability of private forestry. Ongoing, chronic disputation over
the ecological impacts of public forest management has led to the adoption of goals of
ESFM by state and Commonwealth governments. The interesting question is whether
those goals have yet been translated into reality in relation to private native forests.60
The picture of NSW private forests as the forgotten forests is slowly changing. The
commercial importance of private forests was underlined in the mid to late 1990s when
Part of the NSW Comprehensive Regional Assessments, project numbers NA 59/EH, NA 65/EH, February, joint publication of
RACAC & Forests Task Force, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Sydney and Canberra.

Northern NSW Forestry Services & Bureau of Rural Sciences (1999) Private Forest Management Intent Survey: Northern
NSW CRA Regions, a report undertaken for the NSW CRA/RFA Steering Committee, Project # NA 47/ES,
Resource and Conservation Assessment Commission (NSW), Sydney.
55 Independent Expert Working Group (1998) Assessment of Management Systems and Processes for Achieving Ecologically
Sustainable Forest Management in NSW, A report undertaken for the NSW CRA/RFA Steering Committee, Project
No. NA 18/ESFM, Resource and Conservation Division, Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (NSW) and
Forests Taskforce, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (Cth), RACAC, Sydney.
56 Bass, S.; Hearne, R. (1997) Private Sector Forestry: A Review of Instruments for Ensuring Sustainability, International Institute
for Environment and Development, London, UK, 70 pp; Teeter, L., Cashore, B. and Zhang, D. (eds.) (2003) Forest
Policy For Private Forestry: Global And Regional Challenges, CAB International, Wallingford, UK, 307 pp.
57 Grayson, A. J. (1993) Private Forestry Policy in Western Europe, CAB International, Wallingford, UK, 329 pp; Lindstad,
B.H.(2002) A Comparative Study Of Forestry In Finland, Norway, Sweden, And The United States, With Special Emphasis On
Policy Measures For Nonindustrial Private Forests In Norway And The United States, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest
Service, Pacific Northwest Research Station, General Technical Report #PNW-GTR-538, Portland, Oregon, 35
pp.; Stjernquist, P. (1973) Laws In The Forests: A Study Of Public Direction Of Swedish Private Forestry, Gleerup, Lund. See
also Notlfox Nordic Forestry database at <http://noltfox.metla.fi/nordic.htm>.
58 Best, C. (2001) America’s Private Forests: Status and Stewardship, Island Press, Washington, 268pp; Jenkins, M., Smith, E.
(1999) “Opportunities for Private Timber Owners in Sustainable Forestry”, Ch.7 in The Business Of Sustainable
Forestry: Strategies For An Industry In Transition, Island Press, Washington, D.C., 350pp; Washburn, M.; Jones, S.J.;
Nielsen, L.; MacArthur Foundation (1999) The Business Of Sustainable Forestry Case Study - Nonindustrial Private Forest
Landowners: Nonindustrial Private Forest Landowners: Building The Business Case For Sustainable Forestry, Island Press,
Washington, D.C.; Ellefson, P.; Cheng, A.; Moulton, R. (1997) “Regulatory Programs and Private Forestry: State
Government Actions to Direct the Use and Management of Forest Ecosystems”, 10 Society and Natural Resources 195209.
59 Ministry of Forestry New Zealand (1997) Indigenous Forestry: Sustainable Management: A Guide to Plans and Permits, MAF
Indigenous Forestry Unit, 38pp.; Walker, L., Cocklin, C., LeHeron, R. (2000) “Regulating for environmental
improvement in the New Zealand forestry sector” 31 Geoforum 281-297; Wilson, G.A. (1994) “Woodchipping of
indigenous forest on private land in New Zealand, 1969-1993”, 32(2) Australian Geographical Studies 256-273;
Griffiths, A.(1998) “Sustainable management of private native forests in New Zealand: what's in it for the
landowner?” 42(4) New Zealand Forestry 13.
60 ESFM was first adopted as a goal by Australian governments in the NFPS, above n 45 at 25. See also:
Commonwealth of Australia (1997) First Approximation Report for the Montreal Process, DPIE, Canberra. See further
Australian reports to United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development’s Intergovernmental Forum and
Panel on Forests (IPF).
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substantial restrictions were placed on timber supplies from public forests (see further,
Chapter Five). Also, the importance of private forests to the attainment of broader
conservation goals - such as adequate representation of all forest ecosystem types within
formal and informal reserves - is becoming gradually recognised.61
Questions of the adequacy of institutional and policy responses to questions of ESFM in
private forestry are now receiving greater attention.62 Since the mid 1990s, environmental
groups in NSW have participated more actively in debate about PNF. This entailed
membership of government panels such as Regional Vegetation Management
Committees and Reference Groups reviewing PNF law. They have participated in debate
over PNF law and policy by direct lobbying and campaigning in the media, Parliament
and on the internet.
If issues of achieving timber production within the framework of ESFM are not
addressed, it is likely that conflicts over management of native forests will spread to
private forests.63 In NSW, litigation has not yet been initiated by NGOs over compliance
of the PNF industry with applicable environmental laws, despite liberal open standing
rules.64 By contrast, in Victoria and Tasmania, there has been a number of planning
appeals by local governments, local residents and NGOs over the likely impact of PNF
and plantation developments.65
Differences of opinion over the attainment of goals of ecologically sustainable forestry
are likely to influence future law reform efforts for Australia’s private native forests. With
this growing debate, issues of PNF and PNF regulation are gradually gaining greater
attention.

Kanowski, P. (2001) “Forest Policy in an Era of Environmental Consciousness”, in Country Conferences Pty Ltd (ed.) 2nd
Australasian Natural Resources Law & Policy Conference (Focus on Forestry), 8-9 March 2001, Perth, W.A, 4-15 at 12.
62 NFPS (1992) above n 23, Resource Assessment Commission (1992) above n 20.
63 Bauhus, J. (2000) above n 14.
64 National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974, s.176A, Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, s.123; Threatened Species Conservation
Act 1995, s.147; Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997, s.63(2); Native Vegetation Act 2003, s.41(2).
65 Friends of the Earth v STY Afforestation Pty Ltd, Victorian AAT Planning Division, Appeal No.1994/47834, 6 October
1995, Unreported; Tomlinson & Liebscher v East Gippsland Shire Council [1998] VCAT 111 (20 July 1998) Victorian
AAT Planning Division ; Toora Primary Industries & North Forest Products v Tasman Council 1997] 103 TASRMPAT (27
May 1997). McDonald v Meander Valley Council [2000] TASRMPAT 124; F. Giles, J. Weston & T. Dudley v Break O’Day
Council & T. Denney TASRMPAT No. J115/2001 (referred to as ‘Dudley’). 23 July 2001. Bendall v Meander Valley
Council & Kelly 1996] 178 TASRMPAT (2 August 1996), DC Booth v Break O’Day Council 1996] 111 TASRMPAT (15
May 1996).
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS
As has been observed elsewhere, environmental laws are at risk of becoming mere words
unless accompanied by sufficient implementation and enforcement.66 With such
observations in mind, this thesis presents the results of an extensive inquiry into the
application and implementation of environmental laws in relation to PNF in NSW.
Preliminary sources reviewed earlier in this Chapter raised the need for investigation of
questions of adequacy of legal frameworks and adequacy of implementation of the law.
These sources suggested several working hypotheses. Firstly, that the legislation
applicable to the PNF industry is inadequate; and secondly that the legislation that does
apply is inadequately implemented, leaving the industry either largely unregulated or
under-regulated, despite the formal application of various laws.
Consequently, this thesis is an account of a detailed inquiry conducted into the nature
and extent of regulation of the PNF industry in NSW between 1997 and 2002. The first
main research questions were as follows: Precisely which regulatory controls applied to
PNF in NSW during the study period, and in what circumstances did various different
configurations of provisions apply?
This Chapter has also commented on the lack of information about whether existing
laws were being applied diligently or effectively to the PNF industry. Thus the thesis
progresses to ask “Were NSW environmental laws applying to PNF effectively
implemented and enforced during the study period?” The hypothesis that much PNF in
NSW may be ‘under-regulated’ in practice is explored.
These primary research questions prompt a number of subsidiary questions. Was the law
sufficient to encourage, enable and require ESFM and biodiversity protection? What
effort has been made by regulatory authorities to apply and enforce habitat conservation
and threatened species laws on private land? What was the approach of other agencies to
other categories of environmental law applying to PNF in NSW?
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Environmental Law Institute (USA) (1993) Practical Approaches to Implementing Environmental Laws: Getting to Here from
There, ELI, Washington DC, at 1.

Questions considered later in the thesis include the following: How can the legal and
institutional framework for regulation of PNF in NSW be improved? What are the
broader implications, if any, for the application of environmental laws to activities on
private lands? Are there implications for the application of other environmental laws in
similar contexts involving limited scientific information, where small-to-medium sized
enterprises often dominate the structure of industry?

OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS
Part I explores the theoretical literature contextually relevant to the case study, and
presents necessary background information regarding the private native forestry (PNF)
industry, the subject of the case study. Chapters Two and Three present and discuss
theoretical questions from the literature on regulation and self-regulation. These
questions are relevant to questions of law reform for PNF because of the broader
regulatory literature that takes issue with the application of traditional regulatory
approaches to environmental protection. Chapter Four examines questions arising from
the literature about biodiversity conservation law and policy on private land. It poses the
question: “What are the implications of recent suggestions that the application of
environmental regulation on private land be restricted?” Chapter Five presents relevant
background data about the PNF industry in NSW and considers existing information
about the environmental values of private forests. Available literature about the
implementation of applicable laws is also reviewed, in order to develop the research
hypotheses.
Part Two describes and discusses the legal framework applicable to PNF in NSW and
presents the findings of empirical research carried out into the administration of these
laws. Chapter Six sets out the provisions of the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997
(‘NVCA’), the main statute relevant to PNF in NSW during the study period.67 Chapters
Seven and Eight present the findings of research into the administration and
enforcement of the NVCA as it applied to PNF in NSW. Chapter Nine outlines the
application of provisions of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 relevant to
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That Chapter addresses the NVCA as the legislation in force during the study period, and indeed during the period
of final corrections to this manuscript in March 2005. The NVC Act 1997 is to be repealed and replaced by the
Native Vegetation Act 2003 at some stage during 2005. However, at 31.3.05, the NVCA remained in force and the
NV Act 2003 had not yet commenced. (Source: NSW Parliamentary Counsel’s website www.legislation.nsw.gov.au).

PNF, and presents findings regarding their administration and enforcement by local
government. Chapter Ten describes the application of the Threatened Species Conservation
Act 1995 (TSCA) and National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NPWA) to PNF in NSW. It
presents research findings regarding the implementation and enforcement of the TSCA
in relation to PNF activity.
Part Three sets out the legal framework applicable to PNF in Tasmania. Chapter Eleven
explains the law affecting forestry operations on privately owned land in Tasmania,
explaining the operation of the Forest Practices Code, and Forest Practices Act 1985 (Tas), and
their relationship to the Resource and Land Management Planning System. It also
presents and discusses the findings of selective research into the application of
Tasmanian laws to the PNF industry.
Part Four discusses policy options for law reform and draws a number of conclusions
and makes some recommendations. Chapter Twelve discusses law reform options for
PNF in NSW. It does this by comparing the laws applying to PNF in NSW with those in
Tasmania. Chapter Thirteen discusses links between the research findings and wider
theoretical debates in the field of environmental regulation. In particular, debates about
the appropriate role of conventional regulatory techniques to achieve conservation
objectives on private land are reviewed in light of the case study research, in order to
form a picture of an ideal mix of regulatory, self-regulatory, motivational and economic
instruments for the PNF context.

JURISDICTIONS ANALYSED
New South Wales and Tasmania were selected as jurisdictions for the study of regulation
of PNF for several reasons that are further elaborated below. With two States under
examination, a comparative approach was possible. Further, NSW was selected because
there is a clear lack of information regarding the adequacy of regulation of PNF in that
State. In 1995, Dr Hannam of the NSW Department of Land and Water Conservation
summarised the situation: “there is, by comparison [with State forests], a poor
understanding of the sociological characteristics of private-property forestry, a poor

policy basis, and only a very limited amount of research information.”68 There is virtually
no available data relating to the application and administration of environmental laws
applying to PNF. The data gap regarding the application of the law reflects broader data
gaps regarding PNF in general.69
NSW was also selected as the subject of the study for reasons of logistical convenience,
in that the regulatory agencies (and their staff) forming the subject of much of the study
were relatively accessible to the researcher. Other reasons for the selection of NSW
arose from preliminary information suggesting that the commercial and conservation
importance of private forests in that State were significant. These reasons are canvassed
in more detail below.
Tasmania was selected as an ideal jurisdiction to enable a comparative approach. It has a
highly specialised regulatory apparatus applicable to PNF, which provides a useful point
of contrast to NSW. Secondly, the sheer importance of PNF to the overall native-forest
logging industry in Tasmania, with private forests accounting for 57.6 per cent of the
total area of native-forest logging operations in 2000-2001, made it a crucial jurisdiction
to study in order to gain at least a partial picture of the regulation of PNF in Australia.70
Further, Tasmania provides a crucial point of comparative reference in terms of
regulatory policy for PNF in NSW. This is particularly because it applies a system
embodying many elements of industry self-regulation. For reasons of space and research
time available, questions surrounding the implementation of Tasmanian laws applying to
PNF were considered selectively.

Hannam, I. (1995b) “Environmental Law and Private Property Management in New South Wales”, paper presented
to 2nd Annual Defending the Environment Conference, Australian Centre for Environmental Law, University of Adelaide,
20-21 May 1995, Published Conference Proceedings, p.225.
69 There are a number of reasons for this lack of data relating to PNF. One of the key factors in NSW is that there is
no overarching agency with a responsibility to collect information relating to private forests, in contrast to public
forests (administered by NSW State Forests). Although NSW law already contains a requirement that all timber
coming from PNF operations be branded or marked as coming from private property (Forestry Regulation 1999
(NSW), cl. 61) and previously sawmill returns including private property data were compiled by the Forestry
Commission, it is difficult to establish whether these statistics are still being compiled or whether they are reliable.
McElhinny, C. (2000) Private Native Forest Inventory Within the Context of a Continental Sampling Framework, Discussion
paper prepared for National Forest Inventory Steering Committee, Department of Forestry, ANU, Canberra casts
doubt on the reliability of sawmill return data. The second fact is the sheer physical remoteness of many areas of
private forest, creating difficulties in access and monitoring. Thirdly, the very fact that these forests are on private
property leads to additional difficulties in gaining access to information.
70 This figure was actually down from 59.25% in 1999-2000). Forest Practices Board Tasmania (2001) Annual Report
2000-01, p.13; Forest Practices Board Tasmania (2000) Annual Report 1999-2000, Forest Practices Board, Hobart,
p.14.
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The emphasis of this thesis is on the regulation of commercial saw-logging and pulplogging operations within native forests that occur on privately-owned land within NSW.
PNF within the Western and Central Divisions of NSW (see map, Appendix 5.2) is not
addressed in detail.71 Most of the research regarding implementation of legislation was
focussed on North-East NSW, as that area is the main centre of PNF activity. The thesis
is not a study of the regulation of ‘farm forestry’ or timber plantations on privatelyowned land, firewood logging, or charcoal logging. The important but complex topic of
plantation activity - regulated under the Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999 (NSW) is
not addressed. Nor does the discussion cover the applicable law relating to taxation and
investment issues regarding PNF, the law applying to the use of chemicals, or non-pointsource water pollution from forestry operations.

Terminology
For clarity it is necessary at this point to briefly set out the definitions of key terminology.
The shorthand ‘private native forests’ is used to refer to indigenous, non-industrial (i.e.
non-plantation) forests on privately-held (i.e. leased or owned) land. Private native
forestry (or PNF) refers to forestry activity within such native forests. It involves the
management of indigenous native forest, as opposed to plantation forestry involving the
establishment and management of artificially-planted plantations. In some instances, the
link between native forest logging and plantation establishment is so close, that reference
to plantation activities becomes necessary. For example, in Tasmania and parts of NSW,
it is not an uncommon practice to log (by clearfelling) an area of native forest and
convert this to a plantation of native hardwood or exotic softwood tree species. This
thesis does not attempt to provide a thorough discussion of regulation of the plantation
forestry sector as that task would have been outside the feasible scope of this thesis.72
In this thesis, some care is taken to distinguish ‘forestry’ and ‘logging’. Forestry includes a
wide range of forest activities besides typical silvicultural management activities (logging,
roading, burning, spraying) including harvesting of non-wood forest products. The term
‘logging’ is narrower and includes the felling and removal of timber. For the purpose of
consistency, the term ‘private forestry’ is applied to describe both forest management
tasks and logging.
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Appendix 5.2 contains a map indicating the boundaries of the Western, Central and Eastern Divisions in NSW.
Plantation activity is not considered in detail partly because the emphasis of this thesis is on regulating the
environmental impacts of

The term ‘private land’ is used to refer to either freehold or leasehold land. Leasehold
land may be logged by the lessee, subject in some cases to constraints posed by lease
conditions. Included in the category of privately-held land (as opposed to privatelyowned land), are Crown timber lands granted under the Crown Lands Act 1989 (NSW)
and Crown leasehold land.73
Another key term employed in this thesis is ecologically sustainable forest management
or ESFM. This term has become somewhat hackneyed, and tends to be applied by
virtually all participants in forest debates in order to support their view of forest
management. In other words, everyone seeks to claim that their version of forestry
involves ESFM, whilst it may be the case that very little forestry on the ground
unequivocally matches that definition. Thus the term ESFM is a difficult one to define in
an exclusive sense. Several ideal type definitions were proposed in the National Forest
Policy Statement of 1992 which suggested that ESFM fundamentally involves three
requirements: “ecologically sustainable forest management […] entails the maintenance
of the ecological processes that sustain forest ecosystems, the conservation of the
biological diversity associated with forests (particularly endangered and vulnerable
species and communities), and the protection of water quality and associated aquatic
habitats.”74
Another term employed is ‘ecologically sustainable’ and ‘principles of ecologically
sustainable development’ (‘ESD’). A definition of the principles of ESD is provided in
the Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991 (NSW). It includes four principles
of decision-making: the ‘precautionary’ principle, the principle of ‘intergenerational
equity’, the principle of ‘improved valuation, pricing and incentive mechanisms’—
namely, that environmental factors should be included in the valuation of assets and
services. A final and often overlooked principle set out in NSW legislation within the
definition of ESD is the proposition that “the conservation of biological diversity and
ecological integrity should be a fundamental consideration”.75
These categories are discussed in detail in Environmental Defender’s Office, Farrier, D., Byron, N. (1992) A Review
of the Legislative and Regulatory Framework Affecting Forest Management on Private and Leasehold Lands, Consultants’ Report
to the Resource Assessment Commission, Forest and Timber Inquiry, Report No. FTC92/20, RAC, Canberra, at
pp.11-12.
74 NFPS (1992) above n 23 at p.6, 2nd edition.
75 Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991 (NSW), s.6(2)(c). However the difficulty is in moving beyond such
general legislative exhortations towards legislation which sets out obligations in a more specific manner. See
discussion at p.Error! Bookmark not defined..
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DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH TASK
The research task was made challenging by the paucity of comprehensive primary or
secondary sources documenting the PNF industry. In particular there was an almost
complete lack of published material concerning the question of the compliance of the
PNF industry with environmental laws.76
The primary step of the investigation involved description of the legislative provisions
applicable to the industry, and in what circumstances. That task in itself was a
considerable undertaking – given the layers of laws applying to PNF in NSW that had
built up incrementally over time.
The next aspect of the research task involved investigating implementation of
environmental laws. This entailed politely requesting, and later, persistently seeking,
information and documentation relating to the application of environmental legislation
to the industry. It required a large number of interviews, and review of a wide range of
legal and inter-disciplinary sources, seeking the available fragments of information that
had been published regarding the industry. One of the problems encountered was the
political sensitivity aroused by seeking information directed at a research hypothesis of
under-implementation of environmental laws.77

METHODOLOGY
By focussing on the law applying to PNF in NSW and Tasmania, this thesis relies to a
large extent upon a ‘case study’ approach to research.78 This method is accepted in
sociology, criminology and the social sciences generally as a legitimate approach.79 The
empirical approach associated with case study research is especially appropriate in this

That deficit has been partly filled by the publication of selected results of this thesis as Prest, J. (2004) “The
Forgotten Forests”, in Lunney, D. (ed.) Conservation of Australia’s Forest Fauna, 2nd edition, Royal Zoological Society
NSW, Mosman, NSW.
77 The response sometimes was that the data did not exist, or was not available; that to make it available was not in the
public interest, and that a request for it under Freedom of Information legislation was inappropriate. Other officers
hinted that they wished to talk more about the subject but were not in a position to provide greater details, or
provided information only on condition of anonymity. See further Chapter One.
78 Ogus, A. (1994) Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, Clarendon Press, Oxford, at p.vii.
79 Yin, R. (1994) Case Study Research, Design and Methods, 2nd ed. Sage Publications, Newbury Park, Hamel, J (1993) Case
study method, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA.
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particular area where so little is known about the law in action. In cases such as this, the
application of a priori rules either from the received wisdom of the discipline, from grand
theory or from speculation in the abstract cannot provide the same level of insight as
case-by-case analysis.80 A case study approach is ideal in instances such as the present
where the researcher is “exploring complex social phenomena that require working with
people and real life experiences and where the researcher seeks to understand the
research problem by reflecting, probing, understanding and revising meanings, structures
and issues”.81
Nevertheless, this approach has some important limitations. Although a case study
provides a useful point from which to discuss broader theoretical questions of regulatory
policy, it is a mistake to over-generalise from the findings. They cannot support
subsequent attempts to extract grand rules of theory from the data. At best, case studies
raise particular issues that should be considered in future research. For these reasons, an
important aspect of writing this thesis has involved review of the broader contextual and
theoretical literature concerning environmental regulation and the literature regarding
policy instruments for off-reserve biodiversity conservation.
As explained above, the initial idea of researching regulation of PNF in NSW was
formulated during the course of an earlier research project in 1994-5 into the
administration of the Endangered Fauna (Interim Protection) Act 1991 (EFIP Act). In this
thesis, a three-stage process was undertaken in order to explore the question of PNF
regulation in an appropriate context. Stage One involved a legal search and a literature
review to clarify the research problem originally identified. In more detail, that research
had several aspects – (a) review of the applicable law, (b) review of literature specifically
relating to regulation of private forestry, as well as (c) review of the literature concerning
environmental regulation on private land and the future of the regulatory approach itself.
In addition to a review of the literature, Stage One also involved (d) clarifying key
research issues through pilot interviews.
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Stage Two involved the collection of data regarding administration of the law applying to
PNF in NSW. Stage Three involved review of these results against the broader
theoretical literature, and flowing from this the development of options for law reform
and the making of observations about regulatory policy for off-reserve biodiversity
conservation.
In reviewing the current law applying to PNF, the preliminary steps involved clarification
of the structure, mechanism and detail of the law applying to PNF in both NSW and
Tasmania. A thorough review was conducted of all relevant legislative provisions and
case law, as well as independent commentary on the operation of legislation, including
loose-leaf services. A further source was review of Departmental publications and
internal documents that discussed and explained the application of the legislation.
In exploring the broader literature regarding PNF, an exhaustive search was conducted
including computer database search of documents, newspapers, and articles. Further
searches were conducted using internet search techniques and on-line databases of legal
periodicals and the social science literature, including internet-based library catalogues.82
This enabled detailed review of articles specifically referring to forestry on privatelyowned land in NSW, Tasmania, and a number of other jurisdictions with substantial
private forestry activity, including the United States of America, New Zealand, Japan and
Scandinavia.
In exploring the literature on regulatory policy and off-reserve conservation policy and
the law, an extensive review of recent Australian and United States environmental law
literature was conducted through similar search techniques to those outlined above in
order to obtain relevant commentary in the fields of biodiversity conservation and the
law, forestry regulation, and policy instruments for off-reserve conservation.
Another broad field of literature reviewed included the theoretical literature on the
sociology of law, socio-legal studies, environmental law enforcement and compliance,
environmental crime, criminology, and regulatory theory, particularly concerning debates
over the future of conventional regulation and self-regulation. This thesis is mainly
82

Libraries visited for the purpose of research included Wollongong University Library, National Library of Australia,
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Australian National University law library, University of Tasmania law library, University of Canterbury law library
(Christchurch NZ).

concerned with questions of conventional direct regulation. This is not to ignore the
significance of self-regulation and other forms of indirect, privatised and nongovernmental forms of regulation. Nevertheless it has been considered necessary to place
the focus on questions raised by the operation of conventional regulatory models (i.e. the
operation of legislation). This is because analysis of the actual record of the effectiveness
and implementation of environmental legislation is a necessary pre-condition for
conducting adequately informed studies of the broader context of questions surrounding
the ‘reinvention of regulation’ and the appropriate mix of formal and informal modes of
regulation to address social problems.
The second stage of the research project was based on empirical research concerning
particular questions about the administration of legislation. Such work had not been
previously conducted in NSW. In order to determine how the law was being applied in
practice during the study period (January 1998 - December 2002),83 a variety of
investigative techniques were employed. Primary documentary source material examined
included licences and lists of consents, as well as correspondence and both internal and
published reports produced by the Departments administering the legislation in NSW
and Tasmania. A primary aim was a search for the number of exemptions, consents and
licences granted for the PNF industry in various regions of NSW. Collecting this
information was important to enable testing of the hypothesis that PNF in NSW was
under-regulated during the study period. In some instances this search was facilitated
because three of the main Acts specifically provide for access by the public to statutory
registers of licences and consents.84 In relation to local government’s administration of
the law, a combination of techniques was used in order to obtain data, including review
of documents at the Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (DUAP) (as it then
was)85 in Sydney, and review of Local Environmental Plans on the Australasian Legal
Information Institute internet site (‘Austlii’). These sources were checked and elaborated
83
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The opening point of the study period, January 1998, coincides with the date of commencement of the NVC Act.
The closing date of December 2002 was selected as it was not feasible to continually update or check the currency
of all research findings beyond that date. Where possible information since that time has been checked or updated
to include changes up to September 2003. In some cases the data collected is older, particularly in relation to a
survey of North Coast local governments (councils) which was conducted in October 1999.
Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW), Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (NSW), Protection of the
Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW). In the case of the latter Act, the NSW EPA provides a searcheable internet
database.
During the course of the research and writing of this thesis the Department of Urban Affairs and Planning was
initially re-badged as Planning NSW and later was incorporated within the Department of Infrastructure, Planning
and Natural Resources on 29 May 2003, following the re-election of the Carr Government, by means of merging it
with the Department of Land and Water Conservation (DLWC) to form the Department of Infrastructure, Planning
and Natural Resources (DIPNR).

upon using interviews with strategic planners, in some cases confirmed by writing to
Council.

Access to information
In a number of instances obtaining information about implementation of the legislation
proved difficult. There are a number of reasons. First, the subject involves the regulation
of activities on private property. This inherently raises issues about respect for the rights
of private property owners and particularly about intrusions into what are often
considered to be the private financial and business affairs of others. Secondly, in some
cases the data does not exist in a readily-accessible form. In these cases it exists only in
raw form across a number of files within regional offices, and has not been systematically
compiled, digested or recorded by the responsible agencies. Third, agencies were in many
cases reluctant to divulge detailed information about the implementation of laws in
relation to PNF due to the political sensitivity of the information. For agency staff to
impart particular information to the researcher may have revealed that the legislation was
being administered in accordance with ‘real world’ policies that to some extent diverged
from a strict reading of ‘ideal world’ statutory objectives. More specifically, there was a
political sensitivity associated with the hypothesis that a choice was being made by
relevant agencies not to even attempt to regulate PNF, not to engage with the industry,
but instead to allow a significant proportion of the industry to remain effectively
unregulated in practice, despite the formal application of legislation to PNF.
Data was initially requested from DLWC and NPWS regarding the total number of
consents and licences granted for PNF, as well as a number of associated questions.
However these inquiries were refused on several occasions. Therefore, in order to obtain
detailed information relating to the administration of NSW legislation, such as the
number of authorities and permits granted, and the reasons if any for decision-making, it
was considered necessary to file requests under the Freedom of Information Act 1989
(NSW).86
This research method presented its own particular difficulties, including the associated
workload, cost, delay, and the refusal to grant access to certain documents. In fact, it was
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Appendix 5.4 contains copies of the requests as subsequently modified by the author in order to narrow their scope
to accommodate Departmental requests. Note that this research strategy was not supported or endorsed by the
candidate’s academic supervisor, Prof. Farrier.

communicated to the researcher by agency staff that the lodgement of an FOI request
was considered an unwelcome and ‘unsporting’ act, presumably because it involved a
refusal to accept assurances that the information was not available.87
The response to both requests was an initial reluctance to process them at all, (and
refusal to comply with statutory deadlines) despite subsequent reductions in their scope,
and an eventual refusal of access to documents on the spurious grounds of ‘adverse
diversion of agency resources’. In more detail, access was refused on the basis that the
documents concerned were exempt from the Act as they allegedly contained “matter the
disclosure of which…could reasonably be expected…to have a substantial adverse effect
on the r performance by an agency of the agency's functions”.88 A request was made to
consider these decisions under internal review,89 but these reviews did not lead to an
overturning of the decisions concerned.90 Difficulties arose in challenging such decisionmaking, due to the archaic state of the administrative law review system in NSW –
relative to the Commonwealth or the A.C.T. - prior to the commencement of the
Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) in October 1998.91 (It was not
economically feasible to pursue the DLWC FOI request. At that stage the only form of
review available was judicial review in the District Court. With advice from an ANU
expert on FOI this option was not pursued given the possible magnitude of a costs order
upon an adverse finding.92)
So far as the NPWS FOI request was concerned, following an initial meeting with NPWS
head office staff to resolve the issue and despite a subsequent narrowing of the scope of
the request, NPWS continued to refuse the request.

An application was made to

It says something about the culture of secrecy within some NSW public service agencies that an FOI request
appeared to be considered the bureaucratic equivalent of a declaration of war, judging by the reaction of
Departmental staff communicated directly to the author. Some of these communications amounted to attempts at
intimidation by suggesting that persistence with the request for information would somehow ‘damage’ relations
between the agency and the University. The decision to continue with the FOI requests effectively involved a
demand for access (albeit statutorily enabled, in the public interest) to information rather than a request. From the
author’s personal experience of working within Commonwealth agencies, the receipt of an FOI request is informally
considered an inconvenient and troublesome distraction from the ‘real business’ of an agency.
88 Freedom of Information Act 1989, s.16(a)(iv).
89 Letters to DLWC, 2.1.98, 27.1.98.
90 On 21 November 1997, the author made an FOI request to DLWC. On 2 December 1997, DLWC replied saying
that the request was refused on a number of grounds including s.25(1)(a1) of the Act ‘substantial and unreasonable
diversion of agency resources’. On 2 January 1998, the author applied for internal review of that decision. On 3
April 1998, DLWC replied saying that the result of the internal review was that the original determination had been
upheld. On 15 April, the author lodged a written complaint with the NSW Ombudsman.
91 Commenced 6.10.98, Parliamentary Counsel’s Office (2003) NSW Legislation in Force, internet version at
<www.legislation.nsw.gov.au>
92 Discussions regarding the particular requests were conducted with Mr Peter Bayne, Reader in Law, ANU Law
Faculty during 1998.
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overturn this decision at internal review. This was unsuccessful.93 The next course was to
initiate an application in the newly-constituted Administrative Decisions Tribunal.
Following an initial directions hearing, the author had sufficient leverage as a result of the
proceedings to negotiate far greater access than before. Documents were eventually
supplied that answered the questions posed in the FOI request.94 Without the lodgement
of such an appeal it is highly unlikely that any documents would have been supplied by
NPWS.
The difficulties and delays experienced in seeking information through with FOI must be
weighed against the need to obtain detailed, ‘hard’ information in terms of numbers and
dates, as opposed to the general impressions and generalisations that were offered
frequently by government officers during interviews.
Some of the DLWC data regarding administration of the Native Vegetation Conservation Act
1997 that was sought regarding regulation of PNF was subsequently released, apparently
following a campaign by conservationists for greater transparency. It became available on
DLWC’s internet site.95
Part of the difficulty in accessing data from DLWC and NPWS arose from the fact that
these agencies appeared not keep detailed and centralised sets of data on patterns of
decision-making in relation to PNF during the study period. In other words, even if
DLWC wanted to release the information, it could not, as the data may not have been
compiled. This observation was made frequently in interviews. It became apparent
during the course of the FOI exchange that DLWC and NPWS had failed to keep
adequate centralised records and statistical information in relation to their regulation of
PNF. There appeared to be difficulties with records management and file-keeping as the
central offices appeared to be either unaware of the files kept at regional offices or
unwilling to find out which files were kept in those offices. In terms of the FOI request
this approach involved a refusal by both agencies to respond to requests to provide a
listing of the names of files kept regarding PNF.

Appendix 5.5 contains the documents relating to the FOI request made of NPWS.
The requests filed with DLWC is reproduced at Appendix 5.4 and the NPWS request is reproduced at Appendix 5.5.
95 The information made available is a listing of the area of land approved for clearing under the NVCA, in each
DLWC region, broken down into the proposed land use category. For example, the documentation shows that PNF
was the most prominent form of land clearing approved in the Hunter and North Coast regions during 2002, on a
per hectare basis. DLWC website at <www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au/care/veg/pdfs/clearing_landuse_nov02.pdf>.
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The other primary method of data collection employed in order to determine how the
law was being applied in practice during the study period was interviewing key
informants. Over one hundred interviews were conducted with staff of government
agencies, industry representatives, and non-government conservation organisations,
either face-to-face or by telephone.96 Comprehensive notes of interview were taken and
filed. The majority of face-to-face interviews were tape-recorded where consent was
forthcoming. Interviews were frequently followed up with e-mail, fax or telephone
contact. Field trips were conducted to Hobart, Deloraine, Sydney, Grafton, Queanbeyan
and Canberra in order to interview relevant staff and to examine libraries, files and public
registers held by DLWC, NPWS, DUAP, EPA, other departments, industry and NGOs.
Face-to-face contact was preferred because telephone interviews involving ‘cold calling’
are less likely to succeed due to difficulty in establishing rapport with the interview
subject.97
The interview research involved a combination of qualitative and quantitative research
methods,98 employing a triangulation strategy in which the results from each method can
be used to check or corroborate the results from the other method.99 The main
qualitative research technique was semi-structured interviewing conducted with key
players drawn from the main interest groups (industry, government, environmental
groups).100 Unstructured or ethnographic open-ended interviewing, such as would occur
within a scenario in which the researcher had pre-arranged access to observe over a
period of weeks within the office of a particular regulatory authority, was rejected as both
unsuited to producing the data sought and as also too time-consuming.101 On the other
hand, fully-structured quantitative interviewing was rejected as being likely to stifle or
reduce the flow of information and candid admissions to the researcher, because in this
area building rapport, trust, and credibility with interview subjects was extremely
important. Further the subtle nuances of particular answers were important, providing
detailed anecdotes and indications as to the day-to-day approach of the particular

Appendix 5.6 provides a listing of persons with whom interviews were conducted.
Fontana, A.; Trey, J. (1998) “Interviewing: The Art of Science”, ch.2 in Denzin, N.; Lincoln, Y. (eds.) Collecting and
Interpreting Qualitative Materials, Sage Publications, London, at 47-78.
98 Punch, K. (1998) Introduction to social research: quantitative and qualitative approaches, Sage Publications, London.
99 Denzin, N. (1989) The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ,
3rd edition, at p.73.
100 Fielding, N. (1993) “Qualitative interviewing”, Ch.8 in Gilbert, N. (2001) Researching Social Life, 2nd edition, Sage,
London at 123-144.
101 In addition, given the sensitivity of the subject matter it is unlikely that full access to Departmental officers could
have been obtained freely without resort to some form of subterfuge.
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regulatory agency to the regulated community of landholders and private forestry
contractors and sawmillers.
As the focus of the thesis is on questions concerning implementation of legislation in
practice, the bulk of interview research involved government agency staff. In some
instances a ‘snowball’ sampling technique (a form of convenience sampling) was used in
order to select interview subjects most likely to be in a position to provide key
information sought.102 The technique involves seeking referrals from interview subjects
to other persons working in the field who may have greater knowledge of particular
issues than the subject concerned. There are dangers of bias in this method of selecting
interview subjects. They arise because the interview subject may be effectively stating “I’ll
refer you to someone who will support my viewpoint”. However, snowball sampling is
particularly useful in cases such as the present where the research involves an attempt to
locate informants who are somewhat difficult to find - i.e., informants within agencies
who were willing to talk candidly about the implementation of legislation, in a situation
where agency staff were sometimes unwilling to talk in any detail and were reluctant to
answer questions frankly or honestly. Due to the political sensitivity of some of the
questions being asked there was a tendency for some interview subjects with whom good
rapport had not been established effectively to offer ‘closed’ or yes/no answers, without
explaining the reasons that lay behind the situation.
In addition, having found a sympathetic interview subject, this is likely to provide more
valuable referrals to others who may also be willing to provide time to be interviewed
and be forthcoming with confidential information. If a research strategy had been
adopted of merely directing questions to the head of the agency concerned, the volume
and incisiveness of information that would have been forthcoming would have been
minimal, as there would have been a danger that the answers would have been tempered
with ‘political spin’ or public relations waffle.
The focus of the interview research involved the North-Eastern coastal region of NSW,
as that region has the most concentrated level of PNF activity in NSW.103 A significant
number of interviews were also conducted with agency staff in the Hunter and SydneySouth Coast regions of DLWC.
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This methodology is discussed in Gunningham and Grabosky (1998) above n 80 at 35.
Appendix 5.1 (Overview of PNF and Private Forestry in NSW).

CONCLUSION
The picture of NSW private forests as ‘the forgotten forests’104 is slowly changing as their
considerable commercial importance is underlined by restrictions on public forest timber
supply, and as their conservation significance is explored and spoken for by
environmentalists. The preliminary data available at the start of the research enterprise
raised questions about the silvicultural standards of forestry practices in this sector of the
industry, and about compliance with environmental laws.
This Chapter has argued the importance of examining the effectiveness of regulatory
approaches to environmental protection, and biodiversity conservation in particular. It is
important to determine whether laws are making an adequate contribution to the
achievement of conservation objectives.

The implications of failure to adequately

regulate PNF will most likely involve loss of biodiversity, degradation of other
environmental values, and mismanagement of an important timber resource.
In terms of the broader context, it is critical that we explore debates into which questions
of PNF regulation fit – arguments about the future of environmental regulation. The
next chapter, Environmental Protection and Regulatory Theory, reviews discussions within
environmental law, the sociology of law and regulatory theory over regulation and selfregulation and the ‘reinvention of regulation’.
Chapter Three considers questions of industry self-regulation in environmental law.
Those questions are relevant because in reviewing the regulatory framework for PNF in
NSW some may suggest that PNF in that state should be subject to a system where
substantial elements of industry self-regulation are relied upon.
Research into PNF regulation may have implications for broader research in regulatory
theory, particularly into regulatory systems incorporating self-regulation and selfassessment by landholders. It is also relevant to other attempts to apply environmental
104

Note that this title was applied by Calder, M., Calder, J. (1994) The Forgotten Forests: A Field Guide to Victoria's Box and
Ironbark Country, Victorian National Parks Association, 120pp. (This book is now in its 2nd edition as Victoria's BoxIronbark Country: A Field Guide) on the basis that they are no longer the forgotten forests following the creation of a
number of national parks and reserves. See also Anon. (2001) “The forgotten forests’ last stand”, Editorial, The Age,
30/08/2001, where the leader writer suggested “The woodlands are archetypal Australian bush, part of a cultural
and literary heritage….”.

regulation to small and medium sized enterprises – entities often neglected in studies of
environmental compliance.

Chapter Two

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AND REGULATORY THEORY
INTRODUCTION
Although the law is only one instrument of policy to address environmental damage, it is
a central aspect of contemporary responses. As such it requires study and investigation.1
This is not to suggest that environmental law-making is a new phenomenon in Australia
or that problems of implementation are entirely novel. Much of the customary law of the
nation’s first peoples embodies rules and principles of environmental stewardship. For
example, these principles are found in the tjurkurpa (or traditional law) of Pitjantjatjara
people of North-Western South Australia.2 Further, a number of environmental
protection laws (albeit narrowly focussed) were promulgated almost immediately upon
British colonisation of NSW.3 The colonists’ early environmental laws were directed at
ensuring orderly and managed resource exploitation.4 An intense wave of environmental
law-making activity in Australia took place in the 1960s and early 1970s with a rise in
popular and official awareness of ecological damage, and increased influence of the
environmental movement.5 The growth in environmental enactments has been steady,
with the result that legislative responses to most aspects of the environmental crisis have
been in place for a number of years now.6 The extent of legislative activity has been such

Other mechanisms include economic instruments such as taxes, and bounties, grants and incentives, policy
statements and guidelines, and education campaigns, as well as institutional reforms and ‘capacity building’.
2 Toyne, P., Vachon, D. (1984) Growing Up the Country, Penguin, Ringwood, Vic., at 15. In relation to other peoples see
Rose, D. B. (1992) Dingo Makes Us Human: Land and Life in an Aboriginal Australian Culture, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge at 106-107; Baker, R., Davies, J., Young, E. (2001) Working on Country: Contemporary Indigenous
Management of Australia's Lands and Coastal Regions, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Ch.4; Baker, R.(1999) Land is
Life: From Bush to Town - The Story of the Yanyuwa People, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, at 45.
3 For example, laws were made to prevent pollution of water supplies - in NSW, to protect the Tank Stream in 1795,
for similar purposes in Hobart in 1804, and in Victoria to protect the Yarra River with the Yarra Pollution Act 1855.
Bonyhady, T. (2000) The Colonial Earth, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, at pp. 5-10, 336.
4 Farrier, D., Lyster, R., Pearson, L. (1999) Environmental Law Handbook: Planning and Land Use in NSW, 3rd edition,
Redfern Legal Centre Publishing, Sydney, at 4.
5 Prevention of Oil Pollution in Navigable Waters Act 1960 (NSW), Clean Air Act 1961 (NSW), Aerial Spraying Control Act
1969 (NSW), Clean Waters Act 1970 (NSW), State Pollution Control Commission Act 1970 (NSW), Environment Protection
Act 1970 (Vic), Waste Disposal Act 1970 (NSW), National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW), Environment Protection
(Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 (Cth), Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975 (Cth), Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act
1975 (Cth), National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1975 (Cth), Noise Control Act 1975 (NSW), Heritage Act 1977
(NSW), Pesticides and Allied Chemicals Act 1978 (NSW), Coastal Protection Act 1979 (NSW), Environmental Planning and
Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW).
6 There are some notable gaps, for example, the lack of regulation restricting emissions of greenhouse gases (apart
from ozone depleting greenhouse gases).
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that observers such as Fisher have noted it would be difficult to remain fully abreast of
all the details.7
With such legislative action there are now relatively comprehensive frameworks of
environmental laws in place in most jurisdictions. Are these new enactments serving
adequately to address problems of environmental damage? Unfortunately, much
Australian literature on environmental law provides few answers about what is happening
in terms of on-the-ground impact. This is because it typically fails to go beyond a merely
descriptive, ‘black-letter’ depiction of the relevant statutory framework applicable to a
given environmental issue, for example offering descriptions of recent legislative
changes.8
A related criticism of environmental law is that it is merely structural - caught up with
administrative, procedural and institutional details.9 Much analysis of environmental law
remains within the discipline, or if it considers questions of implementation, only looks at
issues such as statutory provisions for enforcement or appropriate institutions from a
relatively narrow perspective.10

That much environmental law scholarship is

“preoccupied with mundane technical management issues”11 was demonstrated by
Tranter in an analysis of the content of the Environmental and Planning Law Journal between
1984-1997. Tranter found the majority of 271 surveyed articles to be largely descriptive.
30 percent were purely descriptive and another 48.9 per cent were grounded in generic,
standard legal analysis from within the discipline itself. Only 5.9 per cent of articles
actually grounded their analysis in some discussion of the role of the law in addressing
the broader ecological crisis.12

This point is noted by Fisher, D (2003) Australian Environmental Law, Law Book Company, Pyrmont, NSW at vii.
In this respect, it reflects a characteristic of some overseas environmental law literature. For example, in the UK see
Fry, M. (1995) A Manual of Nature Conservation Law, Clarendon, Oxford; and in the US see Campbell-Mohn, C.;
Breen, B. (1993) Sustainable Environmental Law, West Law & Environmental Law Institute, St Paul, Minn.
9 Fisher, D. (2003) above n 7, at vii.
10 Of course there are numerous exceptions to this generalisation; these are discussed further below. For example,
Ramsay, R.; Rowe, G. (1995) Environmental Law and Policy in Australia: Text and Materials, Butterworths, North Ryde,
wherein the authors introduce environmental law with chapters on the application of perspectives from economics,
science, philosophy and politics to environmental law. See also Prest, J. (1995) Licensed to Kill: Endangered Fauna
Licensing Under the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW) Between 1991-1995, Occasional Paper, ACEL, ANU,
Canberra.
11 Tranter, K. (1999) “Return to Green Foundations: Liberation and Survival” 8(2) Griffith Law Review 280-299 at p.294.
12 Ibid at 289-291.
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A narrow approach to legal scholarship arises from a barely acknowledged adherence to
legal formalism on the part of many lawyers.13 This perspective sees law as an
autonomous discipline, as “a discrete set of principles in a vacuum”, as a series of
statutory mechanisms to be explained.14 The ‘black-letter’ approach can be explained
either by a lack of a conscious theoretical perspective on the part of many authors, or by
a desire to simplify matters considered irrelevant by conveniently presenting only the law,
in a spirit of value-free ‘professionalism’.15
The emphasis on technical details in much environmental law writing has obscured a
necessary broader focus on “the ecological crisis” and its various causes.16 The
technocratic ‘management approach’ sees environmental problems as merely the result of
failures in the management of environmental threats, not of underlying defects in social,
economic and bureaucratic organisation.17 Within the technocratic perspective, there is
less emphasis on asking the more fundamental contextual and normative questions such
as ‘why’ and ‘should’.18 Yet according to White (1999), a perspective that looks at
political, economic and power relations suggests “regulation…can never be simply a
matter of finding technical solutions to what are, essentially, political problems.”19 Leane

Bottomley, S., Gunningham, N., Parker, S. (1991) Law in Context, Federation Press, Sydney at 4.
Mason CJ, Speech at the Inauguration of the Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong, 19.2.91. Therefore broadly
similar to the broader enterprise of law as “a deductive system with unquestionable premises leading to ineluctable
conclusions” : Leff, A. (1974) “Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Nominalism” 50 Virginia Law
Review 453 cited in Bottomley, S., et.al. (1991) above n 13, at 2.
15 This arises from a barely acknowledged, almost sub-conscious, internalised professional identity, an unwitting rather
than a deliberate failure to place environmental laws into their broader political and economic and sociological
context. In this way the privileged status of law and the legal discipline can be maintained as value free, above
politics and therefore of greater value. Many lawyers appear to be unwitting positivists, as opposed to the deliberate
and conscious positivism of many neo-classical economists. Eichner, A.(ed.)(1983) Why Economics is Not Yet a Science,
M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, N.Y. For another perspective see Simpson, G.; Charlesworth, H. (1995) “Objecting to
Objectivity: the Radical Challenge to Legal Liberalism”, in R. Hunter, R. Ingleby and R. Johnstone (eds.), Thinking
About Law: Perspectives on the History, Philosophy and Sociology of Law, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, at 86-132. Similar
arguments are used elsewhere to explain the failure of British lawyers - and the same could be said for Australian
lawyers on the whole - to fail to venture into economic analysis of the law. Ogus and Richardson have explained the
reluctance of British lawyers to engage with the promise of economic analysis of law on the basis of their
internalised belief that justice is the primary objective, rather than goals of overall social efficiency. They suggest
that tort law operates on the basis of questions of justice regarding individual, private claims rather than general
policy. U.S. lawyers are much more willing to ask whether legal solutions are economically efficient in the sense of
maximising overall social welfare. Ogus, Richardson, G. (1977) “Economics and the Environment: a Study of
Private Nuisance”, 36 (2) Cambridge Law Journal 284-325.
16 Plumwood, V. (2002) Environmental Culture: the Ecological Crisis of Reason, Routledge, London.
17 The sociology of law attempts to examine the way in which the law reflects social, economic and political forces as
well as shaping them: Bottomley, S., et.al.(1991) above n 13, at 58. Sociological analysis of the law was first
undertaken by Weber, Marx, and Durkheim who each addressed the function and implications of the law in their
studies of society: Laurence Ross, H. (1989) “Sociology and Legal Sanctions”, ch.2 in Friedland, M. (ed.) Sanctions
and Rewards in the Legal System: A Multidisciplinary Approach, Univ of Toronto Press, Toronto at 36-37 cites Weber
(1956) On Law in Economy and Society, Harvard Univ. Press, (ed. Rheinstein, M.); Cain, M., Hunt, A. (1979) Marx and
Engels on Law, Academic Press, London & New York ; Durkheim, E. (1964) The Division of Labour in Society, Free
Press, New York.
18 Tranter (1999) above n 11 at 292.
19 White, R.(1999) “Criminality, Risk and Environmental Harm” 8(2) Griffith Law Review 235-257 at 252.
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makes similar points about environmental law, arguing that it is “a shadow of
development law”.20
Apart from the technical and descriptive environmental legal literature there is some
writing offering a somewhat broader analysis, for example, literature considering
allocation of decision-making responsibility, literature considering the divide between
international and domestic law, and literature comparing the law across different
jurisdictions. One approach within the framework of conventional legal analysis involves
examining the allocation of responsibility for environmental management within federal
and multi-jurisdictional systems. Domestically there is a considerable literature examining
issues of federalism and allocation of decision-making responsibility between the States
and the Commonwealth.21 At an international level, this literature examines the role of
multilateral and bilateral agreements, particularly trade agreements on environmental law.
A recent collection by Reversz, Stewart and Sands discusses themes including
appropriate institutions, and the apportionment of responsibility for decision-making.22
Beyond these approaches, however, we are now beginning to see changes in the
preoccupations of environmental law academics towards research into the
implementation of environmental laws and the principles they embody.23 It is well known
that environmental law has begun to develop and incorporate its own substantial policy
and legal principles, based on the concept of ecologically sustainable development
(‘ESD’).24 Since the 1992 Earth Summit, these evolving principles and norms have been
incorporated, with ecologically sustainable development and ‘sustainability’ at the centre

Leane criticises environmental law, arguing that it ‘fails’ because it “conforms to the underlying deep structure of
liberal political ideology” which, it is argued is fundamentally in conflict with ecological protection. He argues that
environmental law is part of and reproduces the political paradigm of liberalism. Leane, G. (1998) “Environmental
Law’s Liberal Roots: (Not) a Green Paradigm” in Rogers, N. (ed) Green Paradigms and the Law, Southern Cross
University Press, Lismore, N.S.W at 1.
21 Lindell, G. (1997) “Scope of the Commonwealth's Environmental Powers and Responsibilities”, in Leadbeter, P.,
Gunningham, N., Boer, B. (1997) Environmental Outlook No.3, Federation Press, Sydney, 1997; Prest, J., Downing, S.
(1998) Shades of Green? Proposals to Change Commonwealth Environmental Laws, Research Paper No.16, 1997-98,
Commonwealth Parliamentary Library, Law and Bills Digest Group, Canberra.
22 Revesz, R.; Stewart, R.; Sands, P. (eds.) (2000) Environmental Law, the Economy, and Sustainable Development: The United
States, the European Union, and the International Community, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
23 For example, Farrier, D., and Tucker, L. (1998) “Beyond a Walk in the Park: The Impact of International Nature
Conservation Law on Private Land in Australia”, 22(3) Melbourne University Law Review 564; Gunningham, N.,
Sinclair, D. (2002) Leaders and Laggards: Next-Generation Environmental Regulation, Greenleaf Publishing, Sheffield, UK;
Rose, G. (2001) “A Compliance System for Kyoto Protocol”, 7(2) University of NSW Law Journal, 37-40; Rose, G.
(2000) “Mechanisms to Address Non-Compliance under Multilateral Environment Agreements" in Visits Under
Public International Law — Theory And Practice, Proceedings of an APT Workshop Geneva, 23-24 September 1999,
(APT Geneva 2000), at 137-142.; Mitchell, R. (1996) “Compliance Theory: An Overview” ch.1 in Cameron, J.;
Werksman, J. and Roderick, P. (eds.) Improving Compliance with International Environmental Law, Earthscan, 3-28.
24 Fisher, D. (2003) above n 7, at vii.
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as touchstone principles.25 Among them are the ‘precautionary’ principle, the ‘polluter
pays’ principle, and the ‘right to a healthy environment’. But the important shift of recent
years has been described by De Sadeleer as “the evolution of environmental principles
from their origins as vague political slogans to their embodiment in enforceable laws”.26
The ‘precautionary’ and ‘polluter pays’ principles have begun to be implemented in many
jurisdictions at regional, national, and international levels.27 The extent to which these
principles are actually binding is by no means resolved in all jurisdictions.28 Some of the
more insightful Australian writing examines the degree of congruence of the law with
ideals of ecological policy, and the extent to which the incorporation of the principles is
binding or merely symbolic.29
Even though recent enactments embody ecological principles, new tools, and stricter
standards by which decisions are to be made, the broad question still remains, “are they
actually working?”

Although the approach of examining the extent to which laws

embody the principles and approach of ESD represents a substantial advance, it is not
clear that such actions are sufficient to thoroughly address ecological problems.

INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES
Aside from examining implementation it is increasingly seen that there is a need for an
interdisciplinary analysis of law, perhaps in recognition of suggestions that “the
significant problems we face can not be solved at the same level of thinking we were at
when we created them”, as Einstein is said to have once observed.30 If narrow
approaches to environmental law are retained, mainly informed from within the legal
Sunkin, M., Ong, D., Wright, R. (2002) Sourcebook on Environmental Law, Cavendish, London, p. 46.
De Sadeleer, N. (2002) Environmental Principles-from Political Slogans to Legal Rules, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK.
27 Boer, B. Ramsay, R., Rothwell, D. (1998) International Environmental Law in the Asia Pacific, Kluwer Law, the Hague, at
96; Trouwborst, A. (2002) Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law, Kluwer Law
International; at a national level in the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, s.361; at a regional
level in the Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991 (NSW), s.6(2).
28 For example, the question of whether the precautionary principle was applicable to U.S. mining companies operating
in Indonesian West Papua was considered in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999) involving
an attempted application of the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. §1350. The Fifth Circuit held that the particular
violations alleged did not give rise to environmental torts under the “law of nations” prerequisite. The principles
relied on included the Polluter Pays Principle, and the Precautionary Principle. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the principles cited “merely refer to a general sense of environmental responsibility and state abstract
rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discernable standards and regulations to identify practices that constitute
international environmental abuses or torts.”
29 Farrier, D. (1999) “Factoring Biodiversity Conservation into Decision-Making Processes: The Role of the
Precautionary Principle” in Harding R and Fisher E, Perspectives on the Precautionary Principle, Federation Press, pp 99121; Stein, P. (2000) “Are Decision Makers too Cautious with the Precautionary Principle ?” 17(1) Environmental and
Planning Law Journal 3-23; Bradsen, J. (1994) “Alternatives for Achieving Sustainable Land Use”, ch.15 in Cosgrove,
L., Evans, D., Yencken, D. (eds.), Restoring the Land: Environmental Values, Knowledge and Action, Melbourne University
Press, Melbourne, 172-192.
30 Calaprice, A. (ed.) (2000) The Expanded Quotable Einstein, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.
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discipline, we are unlikely to produce laws or analysis of them that will substantially
contribute to solving environmental problems. In short, an inter-disciplinary approach is
required that considers the implications of the broader context of economic and political
forces and indeed the ecological crisis for law reform.31
Within the legal field as a whole there is now a widespread acceptance that “the study of
law is far richer when it is not carried out in isolation from other fields of scholarship.”32
Some authors are applying inter-disciplinary perspectives to the study of the law33 by
drawing lessons from such fields as history,34 sociology,35 economics,36 criminology,37
psychology,38 science,39 the study of social movements,40 and even art.41
One particularly influential interdisciplinary perspective has involved the application of
techniques of economic analysis to review the efficiency and effectiveness of various
aspects of the legal system. This literature typically presents a critique of legal (or
‘regulatory’) solutions to policy problems as being either ineffective or economically
inefficient or both. This is the intellectual heritage of the most prominent debate within
That there is an ecological crisis in progress is evident upon examination of Williams, J., Read, C., Norton, A.,
Dovers, S., Burgman, M., Proctor, W. and Anderson, H. (2001) Biodiversity: Australia State of the Environment Report
2001 (Theme Report), CSIRO Publishing on behalf of the Department of the Environment and Heritage, Canberra;
Houghton, J.T.; Ding, Y. (eds.) Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis: Contribution of Working Group I to the Third
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK;
Worldwatch Institute and United Nations Environment Programme (2003), State of the World: 2003, W. W Norton &
Co., New York; Worldwatch Institute, Renner, M., Sampat, P. (2002) Vital Signs 2002: The Environmental Trends That
Are Shaping Our Future, W. W Norton & Co., New York. Nevertheless there are those who disagree: see Lomborg,
B. (2001) The Skeptical Environmentalist, Cambridge University Press, and reviews of that book in the Scientific
American, “Misleading Math About the Earth”, 1.2.02; “Skepticism towards the Skeptical Environmentalist”, 15.4.02.
32 Bottomley, S., et.al. (1991) above n 13, at 4.
33 Macey, J. (1997) “Law and the Social Sciences”, 21(1) Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 171.
34 Bonyhady, T. (2000) above n 3; A US perspective on forestry laws is provided by Hurst, James W. (1964) Law and
Economic Growth: the Legal History of the Lumber Industry in Wisconsin 1836-1915, Univ. Wisconsin Press.
35 Laurence Ross, H. (1989) “Sociology and Legal Sanctions”, ch.2 in Friedland, M. (ed.) Sanctions and Rewards in the
Legal System: A Multidisciplinary Approach, Univ of Toronto Press, Toronto; Watson, I. (1990) Fighting over the Forests,
Allen & Unwin, Sydney; Ingleby, R.; Johnstone, R. (1995) “Invocation and enforcement of legal rules”, in R.
Hunter, R. Ingleby and R. Johnstone (eds.), Thinking About Law: Perspectives on the History, Philosophy and Sociology of
Law, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, at 157-173.
36 Bosselmann, K., Richardson, B. (eds.) (1999) Environmental Justice and Market Mechanisms, Kluwer Law, Utrecht,
Netherlands; Glaeser, E.; Shleifer, A. (2001) “A Reason for Quantity Regulation”, 91(2) American Economic Review
431-435.
37 Hopkins, A.
(1994) “Compliance with What? The Fundamental Regulatory Question”, 34 British Journal of
Criminology, 431-443; Pendleton, M. (1997) “Beyond the Threshold: The Criminalization of Logging”, 10 Society and
Natural Resources 181-193; Halsey, M. (1997) “Environmental Crime: Towards an Eco-Human Rights Approach”
8(2) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 211; Lipman, Z. (1993) “Old Wine in New Bottles: Difficulties in the Application
of General Principles of Criminal Law to Environmental Law”, in Gunningham, N.; Norberry, J.; McKillop (eds.)
Environmental Crime: Proceedings of a Conference held 1-3 September 1993, Hobart; Australian Institute of Criminology,
Canberra.
38 Psychology & Law International Interdisciplinary Conference 2003, Edinburgh, 7-12 July 2003.
39 D. Lunney (ed.) (1992) Zoology in Court, Royal Zoological Society of New South Wales, Mosman, N.S.W; Warren,
L.M. (1998) “Using Law to Define Uncertain Science in Environmental Policy”, ch.9 in Freeman, M.; Reece, H.
(eds.) (1998) Science in Court, Ashgate/Dartmouth, Aldershot ; Brookfield, Vt.
40 Bonyhady, T. (1993) Places Worth Keeping: Conservationists, Politics and Law, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, NSW.
41 Bonyhady, T. (2000) above n 3.
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the field of environmental law and policy - the debate over the effectiveness of the
regulatory approach and the potential of alternative instruments such as voluntarism,
economic mechanisms, incentives, self-regulation, and information-based mechanisms.42
A key task of this thesis is to examine implications of this push to ‘re-invent’
environmental regulation for one particular aspect of environmental policy - the
management of land for private native forestry and its implications for biodiversity
conservation. It is almost axiomatic in the literature that conventional legislative
approaches that seek to control and prohibit environmentally damaging activities are
subject to a number of limitations. These arguments coalesce in a generalised allegation
that conventional regulation is prone to ‘regulatory failure’.
‘Regulatory failure’ can be defined as “regulation which leads to outputs and outcomes
which are perceived not to be in the ‘public interest’”.43 A simpler definition is: an
instance where legislation fails to achieve its stated objects. Empirical research provides
an opportunity to test some of the claims made in wider debates within the theoretical
literature about regulation and self-regulation.
It is necessary to examine in detail the evidence of, and reasons for regulatory failures,
rather than merely accepting assertions that regulation is ineffective and an inappropriate
policy choice for resolving environmental problems on private land. Thus it is crucial to
embark upon a deeper level of investigation in relation to the implementation and
enforcement of environmental laws. This approach is informed by a tradition of sociolegal research that compares ‘law in the books’ with the ‘law in action’ - the law as it is
interpreted, communicated, applied, implemented and enforced in practice.44 Socio-legal
perspectives are relevant because questions of implementation cannot be answered
without reference to the political, social, economic and micro-sociological factors which

Gunningham, N., Grabosky, P. (1998) Smart Regulation, Oxford University Press; Ayres, I.; Braithwaite, J., (1992)
Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, Oxford University Press, New York. Some of these
arguments are presented in Gunningham, N.; Sinclair, D. (1999) “Integrative Regulation: A Principle-Based
Approach to Environmental Policy”, 24(4) Law & Social Inquiry 853-896 at 861; Young, M., Gunningham, N., Elix,
J., Lambert, J., Howard, B., Grabosky, P., McCrone, E. (1996) Reimbursing the Future : An Evaluation Of Motivational,
Voluntary, Price-Based, Property-Right, And Regulatory Incentives For The Conservation Of Biodiversity, Commonwealth
Department of the Environment Sport and Territories, Canberra, Parts 1&2, Biodiversity Series, Paper No.9.
43 Lodge, M. (2001) Competition, Innovation and Regulation: The Regulatory State and Policy Failure: Regulatory Regimes in Britain
and Germany, Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation London School of Economics, Paper for the 51st Political
Studies Association Conference, 10-12 April 2001, Manchester, United Kingdom.
44 Pound, R. (1910) “Law in Books and Law in Action”, 44 American Law Review 12.
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influence enforcement and implementation.45 The interdisciplinary approach of sociolegal studies enables a variety of methodologies to be applied, depending on the research
subject.46
According to Hutter, “socio-legal studies are motivated by the belief that it is necessary
to consider the law in its social context rather than for its own intrinsic value as a legal
text.”47 Thus socio-legal research typically involves studies of compliance with particular
regulations, and examines interactions within the regulatory process. A key concern is to
explore the manner in which broader social forces are reflected in the minutiae of
interactions between regulators and regulated community. This perspective is applied in
order to enable more incisive consideration of the nature of regulatory offences against
social and environmental laws, and the role of discretion and negotiation in the
regulatory process.48 This approach can assist us to become better informed about the
circumstances in which the law is most likely to be effective.49
Much of the work that approaches environmental law from an explicit framework of
socio-legal studies is international.50 There is a small but active community of socio-legal
researchers in Australia, of whom only a few are examining environmental law.51
Nevertheless a recent edition of the Griffith Law Review was devoted to interdisciplinary
perspectives on environmental law, and several authors have carried out studies from a
socio-legal perspective.52
Another aspect of socio-legal research is to undertake analysis of institutions established
to implement laws. A standard law reform approach is to examine institutional structures
The term ‘microsociological’ refers to the factors that influence individual interactions between individual regulatory
officers and the regulated community, such as how cultural conditions, social exchange and interaction including the
context within which one is seeking to implement legislation affect outcomes. In particular it refers to a research
approach in which researchers examine a relatively small group of subjects in a particular locale and studies the faceto-face interactions of those subjects rather than studying large groups in society.
46 Hutter, B., and Lloyd-Bostock, S. (1997) “Law’s relationship with social science: the interdependence of theory,
empirical work, and social relevance in socio-legal studies”, ch.1 in Hawkins, K. (ed.), The Human Face of Law: Essays
in Honour of Donald Harris, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p.19.
47 Hutter, B. (1999) “Socio-Legal Perspectives on Environmental Law: An Overview”, 3-47 in Hutter, B. (ed.) (1999)
A Reader in Environmental Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, at p.4.
48 Hutter, B. (1997) Compliance: Regulation and Environment, Clarendon Press, (Oxford Socio-Legal Studies).
49 Hutter, B. (1999) above n 47 at 37.
50 Hutter, B .(ed.) (1999) A Reader in Environmental Law, Oxford Readings in Socio-Legal Studies, Oxford University
Press, Oxford; DiMento, J. (1989) “Can Social Science Explain Organizational Non-compliance with
Environmental Law?”, 45(1) Journal of Social Issues, 109-132; Hutter, B. (1988) The Reasonable Arm of the Law ? The Law
Enforcement Procedures of Environmental Health Officers, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
51 For example, environmental law was the focus of only 6 of 80 papers at “Opening Law: Making Links - Crossing
Borders”, 20th Annual Law and Society Conference, University of Wollongong, 9-11 December 2002.
52 Griffith Law Review (1999 )Vol 8 (2) Special Issue: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Environmental Law.
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and arrangements and then suggest alterations. While such approaches are worth
pursuing, and indeed are pursued in this thesis, a deeper analysis involves consideration
of political and economic factors affecting public administration, involving observations
about the nature of the regulatory process. An important component is to acknowledge
the role of regulated parties in influencing the content and implementation of
regulations.53 The approach that the law should not be studied in the abstract is well
summarised in Bernstein's (1955) observation that: “Above all, regulation is a process
which is neither isolated in relation to the general political and economic environment
nor self-contained in its evolution.”54
Given socio-legal studies’ perspective of looking at the law in action there is necessarily a
strong tradition within socio-legal studies of conducting empirical research into the
implementation of various laws.

This typically involves examining issues of the

enforcement of environmental laws. Empirical research into the enforcement of social
regulation in Australia has focussed on fields other than environmental law - on
occupational health and safety55 and criminal law - with some exceptions.56 A number of
authors have carried out studies from a socio-legal perspective, looking at social relations
as well as implementation and enforcement difficulties.57 Overseas there is a stronger

Bernstein, M. (1955) Regulating Business by Independent Commission, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, at p.280
observes, “the regulation of business is an intensely political process which arouses pervasive antagonisms and bitter
disputes…Regulation…cannot be isolated from the web of economic and political relationships.” This work is a
study of the effectiveness of seven independent regulatory commissions in the US.
54 Ibid at 281.
55 Johnstone, R. (2002) The Nature of Regulatory Compliance: An Analysis of the Responses of Business Organisations to Constitutive
Regulation of Working Relationships, Occupational Health and Safety Research Unit, Socio-Legal Research Centre,
Griffith University.
56 Gunningham et. al.(1999-2001) Evaluating Environment Regulation: An Empirical Analysis of Reform in Australia,
Australian Research Council, Victorian Environment Protection Authority and Western Australian Department of
Environmental Protection(SPIRT). This research project is the first comprehensive review of the major legislative
and policy changes that have been introduced by State government environmental protection authorities during the
first half of this decade, with results published in Gunningham, N., Sinclair, D. (2002) above n 23; see also Comino,
M.; Leadbeter, P. (1998) “Enforcement of Pollution Laws in Australia - Past Experience and Current Trends”, 5th
International Conference of the International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (INECE), Monterey,
California, November, Vol. 1, pp. 57 – 82; Parker, A.J.; Davies, N.J.; Rychner, H. (1998) Liquid Waste Management
in Western Australia: A Case Study in Enforcement and Compliance”, 5th International Conference of the INECE,
Monterey, California, November, Vol. 1, pp. 221 – 246; Johnson, J. (1998) “Civil Enforcement of Environmental
Laws in Australia”, 5th International Conference of INECE, Monterey, California, November, Vol. 1, pp. 435 - 444. Full
text at <www.inece.org>.
57 Grabosky, P., Braithwaite, J. (1986) Of Manners Gentle: Enforcement Strategies of Australian Business Regulatory Agencies,
Oxford University Press, Melbourne; Briody, M.; Prenzler, T. (1998) “The Enforcement of Environmental
Protection Laws in Queensland: A Case of Regulatory Capture?” 15(1) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 54;
Marsden, S. Gibson, K. Hollingsworth, C.(2000) “Tasmania's Environmental Improvement Programs and the
'Brown Issues' - Environmental Accountability or Regulatory Capture?” 17(1) Environmental and Planning Law Journal
24; Smith, S. (1995) “Doing Time for Environmental Crimes: The United States Approach to Criminal
Enforcement of Environmental Laws” 12 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 168.
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tradition of empirical investigation in environmental law such as the work of Yeager58
and Hawkins.59
Yet just because socio-legal research involves an empirical emphasis does not mean that
it is atheoretical.60 Our choice of research questions arises inevitably from our theoretical
assumptions, our worldview and values.61 The approach taken in this thesis tends more
towards a socio-legal research perspective than one from the sociology of law.62 This is
due to a desire to constrain the scope of the project to facilitate a meaningful research
result, rather than to speculate more broadly about the manner in which the laws and
agencies investigated reflect broader social, economic and political forces.63
This is not to suggest that the approach taken is merely a positivist empirical
investigation. A broader interdisciplinary perspective is adopted for the reasons set out
above. In any case, the lines between socio-legal studies and the preoccupations of the
sociology of law with grander theory are blurred. Hutter has argued: “Socio-legal scholars
are as concerned to understand the social, economic, and political processes that bring
law about and shape its form and content as they are to examine its enforcement and
impact at the micro everyday level.”64
Nevertheless, the perspective of the sociology of law is informative because it permits
contemplation of the suggestion that environmental legislation has important symbolic
political purposes, as a display of environmental concern by legislators.65 A host of
exemptions as well as special projects legislation has been enacted, relieving industry in
selected circumstances of obligations under particular environmental laws, particularly to
prevent contemplated third party appeals or to override judicial decisions that were the

Yeager, P. (1987) “Structural Bias in Regulatory Law Enforcement: the Case of the US Environmental Protection
Agency”, in Hutter, B. (ed.) (1999) A Reader in Environmental Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, at 97-118
(reprinted from 34(4) Social Problems 330-344).
59 Hawkins, K. (1984) Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
60 Hutter and Lloyd-Bostock (1997) above n 46 at 25-26.
61 Hutter and Lloyd-Bostock (1997) above n 46 at 25: “It is impossible to conduct empirical work in a theoretical
vacuum. Research questions do not arise out of thin air.”
62 The distinction is explored in Campbell and Wiles (1976) “The Study of Law in Society in Britain” 10 Law and Society
Review 13.
63 Rather than becoming embroiled in a more ambitious attempt to understand the social order through a study of law:
Freeman, M. (1995) Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, Stevens & Sons, London at 541; cited in Hutter and LloydBostock, above n 46, at 22.
64 Hutter (1999) above n 47 at 4.
65 Dwyer, J. (1990) “The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation” 17 Ecology Law Quarterly 233-316.
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fruit of successful third party litigation.66 This is not to suggest that all environmental
laws are a symbolic façade subject to many loopholes. Reality is much more complex.
Nevertheless such questions are important and often neglected aspects of environmental
law.
The sociological and political critiques of environmental law briefly outlined above are
useful, but there remain many areas of environmental law in Australia in which
substantial basic research has not yet been conducted. It remains necessary to discover
what is (i.e., positive questions), before we can discuss why it is and how it ‘ought to be’ (i.e.,
normative questions).
A prime area for investigation of the efficacy of environmental laws in practice concerns
the law relating to nature conservation. Research is necessary in this area as the operation
of legislation is not as well studied as it is in relation to pollution laws, although the
environmental issues are at least as serious.67 Thus the core of this thesis presents the
findings of empirical research into the implementation of particular environmental laws
in NSW applying to the conservation of nature, particularly biological diversity
(‘biodiversity’) outside protected areas (i.e. outside national parks and nature reserves). As
a subset of that broad topic, in particular, the focus of research conducted concerned the
effectiveness of legal methods for mitigating the impacts of forestry activity on privately
owned land (i.e., private native forestry (PNF)) in New South Wales (NSW) and
Tasmania.

CALLS FOR THE RE-INVENTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Set against specific questions of the application of environmental laws in the off-reserve
context, we must still examine the broader context of papers that question the future role

In the ACT, special projects legislation was enacted to prevent scrutiny of the validity of approvals for a freeway
under the Gunghalin Drive Extension Authorisat ion Act 2004(ACT). In NSW, special legislation was passed to defeat
litigation in relation to the following projects: Bengalla Coal Mine (State Environmental Planning Policy No. 45 (‘Permissible
Mining’), Kooragang Island coal terminal (Kooragang Coal Terminal (Special Provisions) Act 1997), the Port Kembla copper
smelter (Port Kembla Development (Special Provisions) Act 1997), the Walsh Bay pier (Walsh Bay (Special Provisions) Act 1999 )
and the Sydney mega-tip waste transfer station (Clyde Waste Transfer Terminal (Special Provisions) Act 2003).
67 National Land and Water Resources Audit (2002) Australian Terrestrial Biodiversity Assessment 2002, Environment
Australia, Canberra, 195pp; Australian State of the Environment Committee (2001) Australia: State of the Environment:
Independent Report to the Commonwealth Minister for the Environment and Heritage, CSIRO Publishing, Collingwood, Vic.
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of conventional legal responses in this context. These have been described as proposals
for regulatory re-invention68 or for the reconfiguration of regulation.69
There is an increasing tendency within discussions of environmental law in Australia for
direct regulation to be avoided and for alternative instruments such as self-regulation and
market mechanisms to be advocated. Proposals for, and manifestations of, ‘light
regulation’70 are spreading across all fields of regulatory endeavour, from mine safety to
broadcasting and pollution control. The natural resources management field, too, is
becoming increasingly subject to such proposals.71 Discussions about the effectiveness of
methods for conservation on private land reflect broader debates within environmental
law literature regarding the future of conventional direct regulation. It is argued that
direct regulation is “an outdated approach”.72 The prevailing climate is one of preference
for

self-regulation,

indirect

governance,

government-community

partnerships,

exemptions and de-regulation ahead of direct regulatory controls.73
We must step back to consider the broader theoretical debates that have principally
arisen regarding the effectiveness of direct regulation in the pollution control context.
Some of the relevant questions include, ‘what are the options for supplementing
conventional regulatory approaches?’ and ‘what are the necessary preconditions for
alternative approaches to work effectively?’ The main topics explored are the
modification of regulation to accommodate new mechanisms and the potential and limits
of self-regulation.

Steinzor, R. (1998a) “Reinventing Environmental Regulation: Back to The Past By Way of the Future” 28 (7)
Environmental Law Reporter 10361.
69 Gunningham and Sinclair (2002) Leaders and Laggards above n 23.
70 Papadakis, E. (2001) “The Politics of Light Handed Regulation: New Environmental Policy Instruments in
Australia”, Paper for the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Joint Session of Workshops, Joint Session,
Grenoble Panel #1: New Environmental Policy Instruments, 6-11 April, Grenoble, France.
71 NSW Vegetation Forum (1996) Report on Native Vegetation Management in NSW, DLWC, June, at 8: “The Forum
favours a legislative scheme which allows self-regulation within a legislative regime, based on Regional Plans that
cover local and property plans. Self regulation refers to clearing undertaken in a manner consistent with relevant
approved plans of management.”
72 Dr G. G. Brown, Australian Academy of Technical Sciences and Engineering, Submission to the Senate ECITA
Legislation Committee on the EPBC Bill, 18.3.99, criticised the EPBC Bill on the basis that its “excessive reliance” on
criminal enforcement provisions “promotes an adversarial climate”, and claimed “the excessive reliance which the
Bill seems to place on such measures is an outdated approach.” <www.atse.org.au/publications/government/envbio-act.htm>, accessed 5.9.03. Note that the largest maximum penalties under the EPBC Act are civil penalties
rather than the results of criminal prosecution. For example civil penalties include fines of $5.5million for a
corporation, and $550,000 for an individual, eg. S.18 failure to obtain an approval prior to taking an action with a
significant impact on listed threatened species. By comparison, criminal prosecution can levy a maximum penalty of
$46,200 and/or seven year term of imprisonment (EPBC Act, s.18A(3)). Other, lesser penalties ($1.1 million for a
corporation and $110,000 for an individual apply through civil enforcement in relation to failure to comply with
conditions of an approval: s.142, EPBC Act).
73 Lyster, R. (2002) “Deregulating the Rural Environment”, 19(1) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 34-57.
68

THE REGULATORY APPROACH
At this point it is convenient to define key terms. This section defines ‘regulation’,
describes its basic elements, and sets out the scope of debates surrounding its
application.
The meaning of the terms ‘regulation’ and ‘regulatory’ is difficult to circumscribe.74 At its
broadest, ‘regulation’ suggests behavioural control. To ‘regulate’ is to control
systematically, i.e. to “direct by rule, principle, method, etc.”,75 to cause a person to obey
a rule or standard. In this sense, ‘regulation’ can mean any form of behavioural control,
whatever its origin.76
To many, the term ‘regulation’ implies regulation by the State, a persistent effort by a
public agency to exercise oversight or control over matters of public interest or
concern.77 Typically, ‘regulation’ is public in nature, and is centralised (‘public
regulation’).78
Yet one can validly point to various modes of private regulation.79 These are increasingly
assuming important roles in environmental law and policy. ‘Regulation’ goes further than
the exercise of control (conventional direct regulation) by the State through legislation.
There exists a continuum commencing with laissez-faire policies of reliance upon the free
market and extending to full State regulation of all activities within industries. Between
these two extremes lies ‘direct regulation’ and various models of self-regulation.
Examples at either end of the continuum are not as common as might be imagined, with
the majority of regulatory arrangements involving some mix of public and private
controls.80

The difficulty in defining the terms “regulatory” and “regulation” is explored by Black, J. (2002) “Critical Reflections
on Regulation” 27 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1-35; Braithwaite, J. (2002) “Rules and Principles: A Theory of
Regulatory Certainty” 27 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 47-82; Ogus, A. (1994) Regulation: Legal Form and
Economic Theory, Clarendon Press, Oxford, at 1-5.
75 Macquarie Dictionary (2001), Federation Edition, p1594.
76 Ogus, A. (1994) above n 74 at 1.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid, at 2-3.
79 Walker, L., Cocklin, C., LeHeron, R. (2000) “Regulating for environmental improvement in the New Zealand
forestry sector” 31 Geoforum 281-297 at 282.
80 Gunningham, N, and Rees, J. (1997) “Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective”, 19(4) Law and Policy
363-413 at 366.
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DIRECT REGULATION
To be in a position to discuss recent trends in regulatory policy, it is necessary to define
the benchmark of ‘direct regulation’. This is often referred to as the ‘command and
control’ approach (or ‘command regulation’), which has long been the dominant
technique of public environmental law. (In this thesis, ‘direct regulation’ is employed, as
it is a neutral term.)
Public environmental regulation acquired significant momentum in Australia and the
United Kingdom in the nineteenth century in response to growing official concern over
the health effects of industrial pollution and the implications of mismanagement of
natural resources such as forests and water supplies.81 Legislators recognised the limits of
private law approaches (eg. tort law) in providing effective, coherent and expeditious
responses to environmental damage, particularly from industrial pollution.82 It was on
this basis that a grand edifice of statutory public environmental law was incrementally
constructed.
‘Direct regulation’ is described by some as ‘command and control’ regulation, as it relies
upon legislative commands from the State to the regulatee (the command), reinforced by
the threat of criminal sanctions (the control). The State sets a requirement that a
particular standard or environmental goal is to be achieved, (i.e. that pollution by agent x
is permitted to a maximum level of y parts per million). It sometimes commands the
technologies, methods or processes that are to be used. For this reason it is also
described as ‘prescriptive regulation’.
In practice, in the environmental context, ‘direct regulation’ usually involves licensing.
Licensing as applied in the pollution control context provides an excellent illustration of
the main concepts. A given statute prohibits persons from polluting the environment.
Yet licensed persons are permitted to pollute, subject to conditions. Licensing allows

In Australia, laws were made to prevent pollution of water supplies, such as that made in NSW to protect the Tank
Stream in 1795, and for the protection of water supplies in Hobart in 1804, as well as the Yarra Pollution Act 1855 to
control pollution of the Yarra, as discussed in Bonyhady, T. (2000) The Colonial Earth, Melbourne University Press,
Melbourne, at pp. 5-10, 336, In the UK the Alkali Act 1863 (UK) established the Alkali Inspectorate, the first
specific-purpose environmental regulatory agency in that country, Second Alkali Act 1874, River Pollution Prevention Act
of 1876 (UK), Alkali etc Works Regulation Act 1906, Public Health (Smoke Abatement) Act 1926. These Acts were
preceded by the Public Health Act of 1848, and various mediaeval statutes which regulated local pollution of water
sources.
82 Bates, G. (1992) Environmental Law in Australia, 3rd edition, at pp. 49-51; Cane P. (2001) “Are Environmental Harms
Special?” 13(1) Journal of Environmental Law 3-20.
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individualised rules to be developed to address highly specific situations. The licence
provides a means for legalising what is deemed to be acceptable pollution,83 and for the
regulator to reduce or restrict the total amount of pollution from each enterprise. The
regulated entity remains within the law if it obtains a licence to pollute and keeps within
the limits of ‘acceptable’ pollution set out in the conditions. A criminal offence provision
of general application is coupled with case-specific exemptions available through the
licensing procedure. For example, in NSW, under the Protection of the Environment
Operations Act 1997 (‘POEO Act’), any act causing water pollution is considered a crime,84
but possession of a licence and compliance with its conditions provides a statutory
defence.85
The essence of regulatory laws is that they aim to control and regulate particular
activities, rather than to prohibit them absolutely. Obedience is sought through indirect
coercion, the implied threats of prosecution and ultimately the cancellation or suspension
of licences to pollute (and therefore to operate).86 The offence provisions operate in the
background, ensuring the proper operation of the licensing scheme, provided that the
threat of criminal sanctions generates sufficient deterrence to encourage compliance. For
these reasons it is referred to by some as ‘coercive’ regulation.87
Licensing is perhaps the most pervasive tool in public regulatory law. It is used to control
industries ranging from alcohol sales, building and construction, to professional
standards.88 In the environmental protection arena extending beyond pollution control,
licensing and its variants (permits, consents, approvals, licences, permissions, and

“Licensing always presupposes the existence of an underlying prohibition, irrespective of the statutory form or
language”: Ramsay, R., Rowe, G. (1995) Environmental Law and Policy in Australia: Text and Materials, Butterworths,
Sydney, at p159.
84 POEO Act 1997 (NSW), s.120, whereas there is no blanket prohibition on air and noise pollution: see Farrier et al.
(1999) above n 4 at 250.
85 POEO Act 1997, s.122.
86 Tuohy, C. (1989) “Achieving Compliance with Collective Objectives: A political science perspective”, ch.9 in
Friedland, M. (ed.), Sanctions and Rewards in the Legal System: A Multidisciplinary Approach, Univ. of Toronto Press,
Toronto, 179-202.
87 Grabosky, P., and Gant, F.(2000) Improving Environmental Performance, Preventing Environmental Crime, Australian
Institute of Criminology, Canberra, Research and Public Policy Series, Report No.27., at p. 95: “Incentives, which
involve the carrot rather than the stick, often allow flexibility of response and are thus more likely to be regarded as
legitimate by regulated interests than are more coercive regulatory instruments.” However, the choice of the
terminology ‘coercive’ carries with it the suggestion that this form of persuasion is somehow illegitimate and
inappropriate. Further, it implies that other policy instruments such as market mechanisms and information based
mechanisms (eg. National Pollutant Inventory) do not involve any element of compulsion, which is misleading.
Grabosky and Gant do concede that that “markets themselves may operate coercively”. (p.95).
88 Ogus, A. (1994) above n 74. Specifically, see: Prenzler, T., Sarre, R. (1998) “Regulating Private Security in Australia”,
Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No.98, Australian Institute of Criminology, November.
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exemptions) apply to the use and subdivision of land,89 the use of water, and the harming
or killing of threatened species. Other examples in the natural resources context include
controls over the clearing of native vegetation,90 and bans, bag limits and quotas on
hunting, fishing and collecting.91
Planning and natural resources management law applies a regulatory approach similar to
that of pollution licensing. Prior authorisation, if successfully obtained, permits what
would otherwise be an unlawful activity.92 Planning law is permissive in the sense that
landowners and developers may carry out otherwise restricted forms of development
provided they obtain approval in advance and then comply with any conditions placed
on consent.
In both the pollution control and planning control contexts, the emphasis of the law is
overwhelmingly on appropriate control of activities, rather than on outright prohibition.
As Hawkins put it: “the issue is not whether to allow pollution, but how much pollution
to allow.”93 As a result, a problem of moral ambiguity is inevitably associated with
environmental law. Breaches of environmental law are often perceived as minor,
technical, and not criminal or morally reprehensible. They are seen as merely an
unintended by-product of economically beneficial activities.94
This raises the issue of discretion and the extent to which it is possible or realistic to
attempt to constrain agency discretion to permit polluting or environmentally damaging
activities to continue. Studies of direct regulation have shown that agency discretion and
negotiation by field officers with the regulated community play a crucial role in day-today regulatory implementation.95 Offence provisions provide a point of leverage for
regulators to bargain for greater environmental performance from regulated parties. The
fact that this form of regulation involves countless administrative decisions regarding
Other direct regulatory techniques in the natural resources management arena include bans or restrictions coupled
with licences, quotas and other approval systems such as timber harvesting plans. Approvals are typically granted
subject to conditions or prescribed standards, and may be subject to specialised processes such as Species Impact
Statements or inter-agency concurrence processes, where the agreement of a specialised regulatory agency on
particular questions is required before the primary or ‘lead’ agency can approve the development in question. See
Part Two in relation to the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 and its concurrence mechanisms.
90 Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW) to be repealed by the Native Vegetation Act 2003 (NSW), Vegetation
Management Act 1999 (Qld), Native Vegetation Act 1991 (SA).
91 Resource Assessment Commission (1992) Forest and Timber Inquiry: Final Report, AGPS, Canberra, Vol 1, p.424.
92 Farrier et al. (1999) above n 4 at 45.
93 Hawkins, K.(1984) Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
UK, p.10.
94 Ibid at 206-207.
95 Ibid at 10.
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details of the implementation of regulation in specific cases raises a host of potential
difficulties and problems, which are addressed by doctrines of administrative law in order
to ensure proper and lawful decision making. Administrative law has a crucial role to play
in environmental law by controlling the scope of discretion exercised by regulatory
bodies and their officers.96 This is the case because decision-making about the scope and
content of the law is, in practice, effectively delegated to the decision-maker in this area
of the law.97

THE CRITIQUE OF DIRECT REGULATION
Since the 1970s there has been a concerted critique of direct regulation, especially in the
pollution control context.98 Calls for reform of environmental legislation continue to be
made by regulators, industry, academics and commentators. These observers have a
perception that “we are reaching the point of diminishing or even negative returns” with
direct regulation.99 It is said that with the conventional approach “the low hanging fruit
has all been picked”, with direct regulation reaching the limits of its technical capacity.100
Direct regulation is said to be less efficient, more costly, and less effective than other ‘less
interventionist’ measures.101 The critics argue that instruments using less ‘intervention’
provide greater flexibility to regulated parties as to how to comply, enabling them to
devise the most efficient and cost-effective means of compliance, thus generating less
political resistance.
It is suggested that substantial efficiency gains are also available to regulators if they
adopt a policy of only applying direct regulation to the ‘recalcitrant few’ who routinely,
deliberately, or incompetently fail to comply with environmental laws.102 Such statements
assume that only a minority are non-compliant. That assumption must be tested in each
arena in which environmental laws are applied.

Ibid at 10.
Ramsay, R., Rowe, G., Jones, J.(1995) Environmental Law and Policy in Australia: Text and Materials, Butterworths,
Sydney, p159; Farrier et al. (1999) above n 4 at 45.
98 According to LaPlante of the World Bank, “Numerous studies have indeed shown that economic incentives can
achieve a desired level of environmental quality at a far lower cost than command and control regulation”. LaPlante,
B. ( 1995) “Comment on It’s Not Easy Being Green: the Politics of Canada’s Green Plan”, 21(4) Canadian Public
Policy 461-467 at 461; cites Tietenberg, T. (1990) “Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation” 6(1) Oxford
Review of Economic Policy 17-33.
99 Gunningham, N. (1996b) “From Adversarialism to Partnership: ISO 14001 and Regulation”, Australian Centre for
Environmental Law, Australian National University at 17; Fiorino, D. (1999) “Rethinking Environmental
Regulation: Perspectives on Law and Governance”, 23 Harvard Environmental Law Review 441-469 at 448.
100 Gunningham, N.; Sinclair, D. (1999) above n 42 at 854.
101 Gunningham and Sinclair (1999) above n 42 at 855, 861.
102 Gunningham and Sinclair (1999) above n 42 at 862.
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The cost- and efficiency-focussed critique of direct regulation is the offspring of law and
economics scholarship,103 which in turn draws heavily on the analysis of regulation by
economists in microeconomic case studies.104 The literature of neo-classical economics
explains legislation in market terms, as an ‘intervention’ in the ‘free market’. Regulation in
the public interest is a device to correct ‘market failures’ or externalities (i.e., ‘spill-over’
costs).105 Such market failures are said to occur where the market for a given product (eg.
private car transport) malfunctions, causing an externality or public ‘bad’ such as
pollution or traffic congestion, imposing an unwanted cost on third parties.106 Thus
environmental and social regulation involves action taken by government to correct
market failures and address externalities; this is one technique for addressing market
failure.
Neo-classical economists often demand that existing regulation be reviewed and that
proposed regulations be subjected to tests of cost-benefit, effectiveness and efficiency107
instead of general principles such as environmental protection.108 The Industry
Commission supervised the National Competition Policy review of all Commonwealth
regulation in the mid 1990s along these lines.109 Some academics have taken this
approach further and studied regulation as part of an analysis and critique of the
economic costs of regulation - imposed on producers and consumers of goods. On the
basis of such ‘cost of regulation’ studies and other ‘public choice’ analyses of interestgroup participation in the legislative process,110 as well as the influence of broader
The combination of legal and economic forms of analysis is only one of the interdisciplinary approaches to legal
scholarship, but it is probably the most influential. Macey, J. (1997) “Law and the Social Sciences”, 21(1) Harvard
Journal of Law and Public Policy 171 at 172. One of the reasons for its appeal is because it applies the tools of analysis
of economics, with a series of explicit assumptions and, it is argued, a more rigorous methodology than were
conventionally applied by lawyers when thinking about the law. Bottomley, S., Gunningham, N., Parker, S. (1991)
Law in Context, Federation Press, Sydney cites Easterbrook, F. (1989) “The Inevitability of Law and Economics” 1
Legal Education Review 3-5. There is much to be said for interdisciplinary approaches to the study of law - also
including law and sociology, law and statistics, law and psychology. These have flourished because of the desire to
analyse and explain legal decisions and regulatory phenomena rather than simply describe them - an objective for
which the legal discipline struggles to provide sufficient tools and perspectives. Macey, J (1997) above at 171.
104 Weidenbaum, M. (1979) “The High Cost of Government Regulation”, Challenge, Nov-Dec., 32-39.
105 Pigou, A. (1932) The Economics of Welfare, London, McMillan, cited in Richardson and Bosselmann (eds.),
Environmental Justice and Market Mechanisms, Kluwer Law, at 7.
106 The market is said to have failed because a market transaction has an impact on other citizens who were not
voluntary parties to the original private transaction. Call, S.; Hollahan, W. (1983) Microeconomics, Wadsworth,
Belmont, CA., at 451, 463-465.
107 Braithwaite, J. (1993) “Responsive Regulation for Australia”, ch.6 in Grabosky, P. and Braithwaite, J. (eds.) Business
Regulation and Australia’s Future, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 81-96 at 84-86.
108 Weidenbaum, M. (1979) above n 104 at 39.
109 National Competition Council (1998) Compendium of National Competition Policy Agreements, 2nd edition, electronically
published at <www.ncc.gov.au>.
110 A sub-group of economists and lawyer economists, the ‘public choice’ theorists, undertook economic analysis of
the law one step further - by modelling both the functioning of the law and political decision making, as well as the
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theories of macro-economic management critiquing deficit-financed government
spending, a persistent case for deregulation and smaller government has been
presented.111
One of the pervasive objections of conservative economists to social and environmental
regulation is that it involves excessive compliance costs for business. However the very
objective of this form of regulation is to ‘internalise the externalities’ by including hidden
social costs such as pollution into prices. The economist Lester Thurow suggests that the
underlying reason for objections to the cost of regulation is self-interest, as “[t]he
resisters do not want regulations and they do not want to pay for something that they
have always had free (the right to pollute).”112 His suspicions are confirmed by action
taken in Australia113 and Canada114 to prevent introduction of a carbon tax on greenhouse
gas emissions. It is now known that the results of some ‘cost of regulation’ studies were
exaggerated, or based on misleading assumptions.115 On the other side of the ledger must
be placed the benefits of regulation - such as reductions in health expenditure following
reductions in atmospheric pollution - as well as the fact that direct regulation has to some
extent succeeded in improving environmental quality, at least in terms of reducing levels
of specified pollutants.116 Apart from those laws that exist in order to provide the
framework for the operation of markets, other regulations have substantial economic
benefits that are often greater than the costs they impose.117

role of interest groups in the passage of legislation. The public choice theorists argue that ‘market failure’ is often
replaced by ‘government failure’, and argue that many laws were not enacted in the broader public interest, but due
to the hijacking of the legislative process by particular ‘rent-seeking’ interest groups. Bottomley, S., Gunningham,
N., Parker, S. (1991) Law in Context, Federation Press, Sydney, at 208.
111 Friedman, M. (1980) Free to Choose: A Personal Statement, McMillan, Melbourne, 338pp.
112 Thurow, L. (1980) The Zero-Sum Society: Distribution and the Possibilities for Economic Change, Penguin, NY, NY, at 152.
Another possible objection is that the economistic approach represents an emphasis on saving industry’s costs in
compliance at the expense of an emphasis on the costs of remedying environmental damage.
113 Hamilton, C. (2001) Running from the Storm: the Development of Climate Change Policy in Australia, UNSW Press, Sydney.
114 Hoberg, G. and Harrison, K. (1995) “It’s Not Easy Being Green: the Politics of Canada’s Green Plan”, 20(2)
Canadian Public Policy 119-137 at 125.
115 Hamilton, C., Quiggin, J. (2002) “The Economics of Reducing Greenhouse Gases”, The Australia Institute, 26 July,
9pp which discusses economic modelling of climate change abatement strategies by the Australian Bureau of
Agricultural Resource Economics (ABARE) and other consultants; Tabb, W. (1980) “Government Regulations:
Two Sides to the Story”, Challenge, November-December 1980, 40-48 at 48. Alternative studies found that often
those studies which emphasised the cost of regulation - eg. the Clean Air Act (US) - did not set out net costs of
regulation, but instead emphasised costs of regulation without comparing benefits (such as reduced mortality and
morbidity). In one study, when costs were compared with (monetised) benefits, social regulation (including air and
water pollution controls) were found to provide benefits exceeding costs by a factor of 5:1. See Sunstein, C. (1990)
After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State, at 77-79.
116 Sunstein, C. (1990) above n 115 at 76-77.
117 Some environmental laws have indirect benefits of stimulating industry to innovate and thereby become more
internationally competitive. Braithwaite, J. (1993) “Responsive Regulation for Australia” at 84-85; cites Porter, M.
(1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Macmillan, London.

Present controversies over the direction of environmental regulation are best understood
against this backdrop of a broader ideological clash occurring over the role of the public
sector and the gradual ‘marketisation’ of society, (i.e., subjecting public administration to
market principles): the debate between Keynesians and neo-liberal, monetarist, economic
rationalists.118 With this relatively recent intellectual interest in a return to ‘unfettered’
market mechanisms grounded in the critique of Keynesian interventionism by Hayekian
and Freedmanite adherents of small government119 there has been an associated political
shift in many Western nations towards policies of de-regulation, and privatisation of
State assets, as well as contracting out of public sector activities.120
Academic interest in the economic impacts of regulation diffused across to the political
sphere to influence the direction of environmental policy and law making during the
1980s and 1990s. In the United States of America, small-government politics has
profoundly influenced the literature if not the broad practice of environmental law. In
that country, free market proponents have made extensive and detailed proposals for
‘free market environmentalism’ to reform environmental laws.121 For example, in 1998
alone, at least three detailed, high-profile reports were released arguing for the rejection
of ‘command and control’ approaches to environmental regulation and the introduction
of ‘performance-based’ and ‘outcomes-based’ regulation.122
The critique of direct regulation in Australia has mirrored the international critique.123 It
is frequently argued that direct regulation as applied to environmental problems
(‘command and control’) is ineffective, costly, economically inefficient, impractical or
even politically unacceptable (eg. for being ‘coercive’).124
Dovers, S. and Gullett, W. (1999) “Policy Choice For Sustainability: Marketization, Law And Institutions”, in
Bosselmann, K. and Richardson, B.J. (eds.) Environmental Justice And Market Mechanisms: Key Challenges For
Environmental Law And Policy, Kluwer Law International, London, pp. 110-128. at 115.
119 Hayek, F. (1976) Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 2 (The Mirage of Social Justice), London, Routledge and Keegan Paul;
Friedman, M. (1962) Capitalism and Freedom, Univ. Chicago Press, Chicago; Braithwaite, J. (2000) “The New
Regulatory State and the Transformation of Criminology”, 40(2) British Journal of Criminology 222-238 at 224-225.
120 Redgwell, C. (1999) “Privatisation and Environmental Regulation: a UK Perspective”, in Richardson and
Bosselmann (eds.), Environmental Justice and Market Mechanisms, Kluwer Law, at 261.
121 Anderson, T.; Leal, D. (1991) Free Market Environmentalism, Westview Press, Boulder, Co; Hill, P.; Meiners, R. (eds.)
(1998) Who Owns the Environment?, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Md.
122 Steinzor, R. (1998a) “Reinventing Environmental Regulation: Back to the Past by Way of the Future” 28 (7)
Environmental Law Reporter 10361 at 10362. The three studies mentioned were published by Yale University, the
National Academy of Public Administration, and a business group known as Enterprise for the Environment.
123 Grabosky, P. and Braithwaite, J. (eds.) (1993) above n 107; Curran, D. (2000) “The Conservation of Biological
Diversity on Private Property in NSW”, 17(1) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 34-59; Gunningham, N.,
Grabosky, P. (1998) above n 42.
124 Some of these arguments are presented in Gunningham and Sinclair (1999) above n 42 at 861. The Commonwealth
EPBC Bill was criticised as “command and control” regulation, by several industry organisations and associations in
submissions to the Senate Environment Communications Information Technology and the Arts Committee Inquiry
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Dovers and Gullett have pointed out that the term ‘command and control’ is equally
applicable to economic instruments, as taxes also require taxpayers to take unpalatable
actions. Thus on this basis, they suggest that it is “a derogatory and intentionally
misleading description” since it implies that regulation alone amongst government
interventions is coercive.125
The term ‘command and control’ is pejorative and value laden.126 It is a label with some
ideological force - the word ‘command’ makes subtle reference to the former Soviet
Union as a ‘command’ economy. It contains an implication that regulation, or ‘coercive
regulation’, was imposed on business by force and without consultation or input. This is
despite the reality that it was enacted by democratically elected legislatures. Richard
Stewart alleged in the Columbia Journal of Environmental Law that:
Our current environmental regulatory system…has grown to the point where it amounts to
nothing less than a massive effort at Soviet-style central planning of the economy to achieve
environmental goals.127

The focus on the phrase ‘command regulation’, with its negative connotations - revealed
more explicitly in the allied term, ‘coercive regulation” - performs a disservice by blinding
us to the positive benefits of regulation.128 Several surveys have found that the most
important motivator of improved environmental performance is regulation.129
Many so-called non-regulatory approaches such as rewards and incentives, pricing or
market mechanisms actually rely upon a regulatory structure for their operation.130 As the
economist Ronald Coase observed, “the delineation of rights is an essential prelude to

into the EPBC Bill, Chapter 5, paragraph 5.2; see Woodside Energy, Proof Committee Hansard, Perth, 26.2.99, p66; D.
Buckingham, Business Council of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18.3.99, p.309.
125 Dovers and Gullett (1999) above n 118 at 124; Dryzek, J. (1996) “The Informal Logic of Institutional Design”, in
Goodin (ed.) The Theory of Institutional Design, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
126 Cole, D. Grossman, P. (1999) “When is Command and Control Efficient?” Wisconsin Law Review 887-938 at 888.
127 Stewart, R. (1998) “Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives” 13 Columbia Journal of
Environmental Law 153 at 154.
128 Neiman, M. (1980) “The Benefits of Heavy-Handedness in Government”, ch.1 in Brigham, J.; Brown, D. (eds.),
Policy Implementation: Penalties or Incentives?, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, at p.30.
129 Gunningham and Sinclair (2002) above n 23, at 203, cites Henriques, I., Sadorsky, P. (1996) “The Determinants of
an Environmentally Responsive Firm: An Empirical Approach” 30(3) Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management” 381-395 (York University, Ontario).
130 Sunstein says: “The notion of laissez faire is a grotesque misdescription of what free markets actually require and
entail. Free markets depend for their existence on law…Moreover, the law that underlies free markets is coercive in
the sense that in addition to facilitating individual transactions, it stops people from doing many things that they
would like to do.” Sunstein, C. (1997) Free Markets and Social Justice, Oxford University Press, New York, at 5.

market transactions.”131 Planning laws, for example, facilitate the operation of the
property development and real estate industries. The function of regulation in such a
market is to reduce risks to capital investment, as well as to protect public ‘goods’.132
The introduction of an environmental incentive or tax requires the introduction of a
regulatory framework to support and implement it.133 There is in reality no such thing as
an unregulated modern economy, because “without government regulation there are no
property rights, and without property rights there is no free market.”134 Richardson
(1998), drawing upon New Zealand’s experience with the introduction of market
approaches, argues that substantial use of market mechanisms will entail “substantial
environmental re-regulation” rather than wholesale deregulation.135

The re-invention of regulation
Contemporary academic environmental law literature displays a virtual consensus in its
calls for the ‘re-invention’ of traditional approaches to environmental regulation.136 The
underlying premise is that conventional direct regulation has ‘failed’, or has at least
enjoyed only mixed success. With this starting assumption it is a given that there is an

Coase, R. (1959) “The Federal Communications Commission”, 2 Journal of Law and Economics 1-40, cited by
Dawkins, J. (1996) “In Praise of Regulation”, 33(1) Australian Planner 10. Note in other work by Coase, particularly
the article “The Problem of Social Cost”, Coase proposed that externality problems (eg. pollution) could be resolved
most efficiently if property rights between conflicting parties involved in an externality problem were well-defined.
If that were the case and there were no significant transaction costs impeding bargaining between the parties then
the mere definition of property rights rather than the imposition of a pollution tax or a regulatory solution would
lead to the most economically efficient outcome. However Coase also stated that if the parties were not in a position
to reach or enforce an agreement, or the transaction costs involved in carrying out such a negotiation were
excessive, government intervention would be required in order to resolve the externality problem. Coase, R. (1960)
“The Problem of Social Cost” 3(1) Journal of Law and Economics 1-44.
132 Dawkins argues “The State regulates developers because urban development is not possible in an unregulated
environment, any more than trade is possible under uninhibited piracy, or capital formation is possible when theft is
unpunished.”, above n 131 at 11, 15.
133 On a broader scale, the numerous privatisations of State-owned assets, corporations and infrastructure which
occurred as a result of the push for smaller government in the 1980s and 1990s, did not in fact lead to a reduction in
the number of statutes and regulations, merely to an evolution - and new forms of regulation to govern the
privatised provision of services to the public - in short the re-invention of the regulatory state. Braithwaite, J. (2000)
“The New Regulatory State and the Transformation of Criminology”, 40(2) British Journal of Criminology 222-238 at
224-225.
134 Thurow, L. (1980) The Zero-Sum Society: Distribution and the Possibilities for Economic Change, Penguin, NY, NY, ch.6,
Spreading Rules and Regulations, pp.128-129.
135 Richardson, B. (1998) “Economic Instruments and Sustainable Management in New Zealand” 10(1) Journal of
Environmental Law 21 at 21.
136 Fiorino, D. (1999) above n 99 at 464; see also Gaines, S.; Kimber, C. (2001) “Redirecting Self-Regulation” 13(2)
Journal of Environmental Law (UK) 157-184 at 157) who cite Prof. J. Freeman’s review of US articles, concluding “the
language of regulatory reinvention is ubiquitous.” Freeman, J. (1997) “Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State” 45 UCLA Law Review 1 at 3.
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urgent need to explore other policy instruments.137 Yet this premise, the alleged ‘failure’
of direct regulation, is ill-explored and poorly tested, at least in the Australian literature.
Claims in the Australian literature that direct regulation is less efficient and more costly
appear to be based on received wisdom, resting on either bare perceptions or
theoretically-based claims from the international law and economics literature, rather
than on the results of domestic empirical research.138 This is one of the larger gaps in
Australian environmental law literature. The critique of regulation must be set against the
considerable evidence of its contribution, particularly in relation to pollution control.139
Most of the debate over the role of direct regulation has been within the pollution
control arena. Arguments against direct regulation may be either untested or inapplicable
in the field of natural resources management. In the forestry context, there is evidence
from the United States of America that regulation can achieve environmental goals. One
survey revealed considerable increases in the annual extent of re-afforestation since the
inception of laws governing State forest practices in Oregon, California and
Washington.140
The micro-economic critique of regulation has influenced many legal commentators to
suggest that agencies should pursue voluntary agreements, self-regulation, informationbased tools, price-based economic mechanisms or property rights-based instruments in
preference to direct regulation.141 Another aspect of the regulatory literature is debate
Importantly such statements are made without testing the counterfactual scenario – i.e. the extent of environmental
damage that would have occurred had the environmental laws in question not been enacted. LaPlante, B. (1995)
“Comment on It’s Not Easy Being Green: the Politics of Canada’s Green Plan”, 21(4) Canadian Public Policy 461-467
at 465.
138 An exception to the lack of empirical research is the three case studies presented in Gunningham and Sinclair
(2002) Leaders and Laggards, above n 23, of regulation of the vegetable growing, refrigeration manufacture and smash
repair industries in selected Australian jurisdictions.
139 Cole, D. Grossman, P. (1999) above n 126 at 889.
140 Best, C. (2001) America’s Private Forests: Status and Stewardship, Island Press, Washington, at 132.
141 Grabosky, P. (1994b) Counter-productive Regulation, Administration, Compliance & Governability Program, Research
School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Working Paper: No.23; Self, Peter (1994) The Missing
conditions of effective regulation – an alternative perspective, ANU RSSS Working Paper No.23 at pp.43-55; Frieberg, Arie
(1986) “Reward, Law and Power: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Carrot”, 19 Australian and NZ Journal of Criminology
91-113; Smith, J.; Gray, C.; Lazarus, R.; Huber, P.; Sunstein, C. (1994) “Public versus private environmental
regulation”, 21 Ecology Law Quarterly 431-474; Industry Commission (1998) A Full Repairing Lease: Report of Inquiry into
Ecologically Sustainable Land Management, Industry Commission, Belconnen, ACT., 524pp.; Young, M., Gunningham,
N., Elix, J., Lambert, J., Howard, B., Grabosky, P., McCrone, E. (1996) Reimbursing the Future : An evaluation of
motivational, voluntary, price-based, property-right, and regulatory incentives for the conservation of biodiversity, Commonwealth
Department of the Environment Sport and Territories, Canberra, Parts 1&2, Biodiversity Series, Paper No.9;
Honadle, G. (1993) “Institutional constraints on sustainable resource use: resource overexploitation is not just an
attitude problem and conservation education is not enough”, in Aplet, J., Olson, A. (eds.) Defining Sustainable Forestry,
Washington, Island Press, at pp.90-119; Gunningham, N. (1994) Environment, Self-Regulation and the Chemical Industry:
Assessing Responsible Care, Occasional Paper, ACEL, Faculty of Law, ANU; See further: Campbell, S. (1999)
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over the respective merits and demerits of sanctions and rewards, the choice of carrot or
stick.142 With some commentators ranking instruments according to the degree of
coerciveness,143 the choices have been cast as between the tools of persuasion (e.g.
education and advertising campaigns) and command or exchange (i.e., the offer of
incentives). Gunningham and Grabosky at one point suggest that policy makers apply a
‘regulatory design principle’ labelled as “Prefer Less Interventionist Measures”, that is to
say, measures embodying both a low degree of prescriptiveness, and a low degree of
coercion.144
The law is but one means of many for altering, influencing and controlling the behaviour
of citizens and corporations. The more sophisticated literature clearly states that policy
instrument choices are not mutually exclusive but complementary. The challenge is to
discern the combinations that work most effectively and to broaden the range of tools in
the regulatory toolkit, rather than to debate the abandonment of direct regulation.145 With
the widely varying characteristics of particular environmental problems, and different
factual, legal, cultural, and historical contexts, policy responses to environmental
problems must be context-specific.146 There is little point in attempting to articulate one
single ideal solution to environmental and regulatory problems, based on grand theory.147
Instead, some analysts have devoted considerable time to questions of viable
combinations of various instruments.148 The challenge is to study environmental
problems and solutions at a lower level of generality, by consciously considering issues
within their specific political, economic, and institutional contexts.149 We need to
determine which scenarios are appropriate for the application of self-regulation and
which other situations represent too great a risk for its application. Chapter Four
explores issues of conservation on private land in this light.
“Governance, Responsibility, and the Market: Neo-Liberalism and Aspects of the Environment Protection and
Biodiversity Protection Act 1999 (Cth)”, 16(4) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 290.
142 Frieberg, A. (1986) “Reward, Law and Power: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Carrot”, 19 Australian and NZ Journal
of Criminology 91-113; Hopkins, A. (1994) “Compliance with What? The Fundamental Regulatory Question", British
Journal of Criminology, 34 (1994):431-443.
143 Hoberg and Harrison (1995) above n 114 at 120 cites Doern and Phidd (1983) Canadian Public Policy, Methuen,
Toronto.
144 Gunningham, N. and Grabosky, P. (1998) above n 42, at p.391-394. However this principle is subject to an almost
impossible-sounding caveat that such low interventionism should only be applied if it is likely to be effective and
mechanisms such as the use of tradeable permits can be readily verified.
145 Gunningham, N., Young, M. (1997) “Toward Optimal Environmental Policy: The Case of Biodiversity
Conservation” 24(2) Ecology Law Quarterly 243-298 at 298; Gunningham and Sinclair (1999) above n 42 at 857;
Gunningham, N.; Sinclair, D. (1998) “New Generation Environmental Policy: Environmental Management Systems
and Regulatory Reform” 22(3) Melbourne University Law Review 592-616 at 593.
146 Opschoor and Turner 1994 cited in Gunningham and Sinclair (1999) above n 42 at 855.
147 Ayres, I., Braithwaite, J.(1992) above n 42 at 101.
148 Gunningham and Grabosky (1998) above n 42; Ayres, I., Braithwaite, J. (1992) above n 42.
149 Gunningham and Young (1997) above n 145 at 297.

Modified models of regulation
By the 1990s, the message of advocates of regulatory reform began to influence the dayto-day practice and direction of environmental law as implemented by Australian
regulatory agencies.150 With the preference for solutions tending to focus on the market
and private actors, legislators and policy-makers to a limited extent are now
experimenting with a “re-privatisation” of selected aspects of environmental law.151
Yet the Australian experience so far has not involved abandoning the statutory approach
altogether in favour of complete reliance on tort law and market mechanisms, and is
better described as a “regulatory reconfiguration” than a retreat of the State.152 There has
been little slowing of the pace of environmental law-making.153 If anything, there has
been frenetic legislative activity since 1995, if NSW is an example.154 However, the range
of mechanisms and approaches included both within legislation and outside it has
broadened beyond permits and sanctions to give greater prominence to the ‘carrot’ of tax
relief, subsidies, voluntary agreements and other incentives.155 Tools such as selfmonitoring of pollution data, accredited licensing of industry leaders, bubble licensing,
tradeable pollution credits and audited self-regulation have been considered and
selectively applied in preventing pollution.156 Further, a range of voluntary agreement
approaches has been implemented in the pollution control context such as ‘cleaner
Christoff, P. (1998) “Degreening Government in the Garden State: Environment Policy under the Kennett
Government” 15(1) Environmental and Planning and Law Journal, 10-32; Dovers, S. and Lindenmayer, D. (1997)
“Managing the Environment: Rhetoric, Policy and Reality” 56(2) Australian Journal of Public Administration 65-80.
151 Gaines & Kimber (2001) above n 136 at 158; The drive of agencies to select and identify supplements to regulation
is probably not so much ideologically driven as driven by more immediate and practical needs - of finding more
effective methods of environmental regulation which might bring results with the expenditure of fewer regulatory
resources. Whilst the Howard government’s Natural Heritage Trust has dispensed large amounts for on-the-ground
environmental repair projects - funded by the proceeds of the part-privatisation of Telstra – there is less information
available regarding willingness to spend on regulatory approaches to environmental problems.
152 Gunningham and Sinclair (2002) above n 23 at 190.
153 Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth); Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld), Environment
Protection Act 1993 (SA), Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994 (Tas), Protection of the Environment
Operations Act 1997 (NSW), Environment Protection Act 1997 (ACT), Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1996 (NT),
Waste Management and Pollution Control Act 1998 (NT), Environment Protection (Amendment) Act 1996 (Vic).
154 Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (NSW), Threatened Species Conservation Amendment Act 2002 (NSW),
Environmental Planning and Assessment Amendment Act 1998 (NSW) Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997
(NSW), Pesticides Act 1999, Waste Management Act 1995, Water Management Act 2000, Native Vegetation Conservation Act
1997 (NSW), National Parks and Wildlife Amendment Act 2001, Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999; Contaminated Land
Management Act 1997; Sustainable Energy Development Act 1995; Waste Avoidance and Resource Recovery Act 2001, Native
Vegetation Act 2003, Natural Resources Commission Act 2003, Nature Conservation Trust Act 2001, Threatened Species
Legislation Amendment Act 2004 .
155 Bosselmann and Richardson (1999) “Introduction: New Challenges for Environmental Law and Policy”, at p.4 in
Richardson and Bosselmann (eds.), Environmental Justice and Market Mechanisms, Kluwer Law.
156 Examples of tradeable pollution credits – NSW EPA Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme under proposed
Protection of the Environment Operations (Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme) Regulation 2001 (NSW); Accredited licensing
– Victoria; Bubble licensing: NSW EPA South Creek Bubble Licensing Scheme for sewage treatment schemes on
the Hawkesbury–Nepean River, <http://www.epa.nsw.gov.au/licensing/bubble.htm>, accessed 27.10.02.
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production partnerships’ with industry, specifically involving grants to develop
environmental management systems (EMS),157 and the encouragement of voluntary
agreements with government described as ‘sustainability covenants’.158
Regulatory structures have also been expanded in order to create the preconditions or
necessary frameworks for the operation of market-based environmental protection
mechanisms, such as pollution trading, carbon trading and offset schemes.159 In a recent
discussion of “Light handed regulation in Australia”, Papadakis suggests that novel
environmental instruments such as tradeable pollution permits or voluntary approaches
should not be viewed so much as a return to the market, rather as extensions of
regulatory regimes. He argues that “the notion of ‘State-assisted marketisation’ assigns
government a central role, and ‘voluntary’ approaches entail programs designed by the
state or bargains struck between industry and government.”160 Nevertheless they indicate
that government has stepped back and expects the market to play an increasing role in
addressing environmental problems.
Thus in practice, the influence of pro-market literature has been more limited than it
might have been, in terms of reduction in the number of environmental statutes. A broad
program of repeal of all environmental laws – although occasionally recommended, as
for example by the Industry Commission in its Inquiry into Sustainable Land Management161 has not occurred. Rather, there have been additions to the regulatory toolbox, in some
instances nevertheless entailing a streamlining and repeal of particular fields or sectors of
existing legislation.162 The fact that wholesale deregulation has not eventuated is partly
due to the strong and consistent public support for legislative action to control
environmental damage.
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<http://www.epa.vic.gov.au/Business_Sustainability/projects.asp> accessed 23.7.03.
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(2003)
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The
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Forward,
<http://www.epa.vic.gov.au/Sustainability_Covenants/default.asp> accessed 23.7.03.
159 In NSW, Parliament has moved to facilitate carbon trading by enacting the Carbon Rights Legislation Amendment Act
1998 (NSW).
160 Papadakis, E. (2001) “The Politics of Light Handed Regulation: New Environmental Policy Instruments in
Australia”, Paper for the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Joint Session of Workshops, Grenoble
Panel #1: New Environmental Policy Instruments, 6-11 April, Grenoble, France, at p.14.
161 Industry Commission (1997) A Full Repairing Lease: Draft Report of Inquiry into Ecologically Sustainable Land Management,
at 65.
162 Examples of streamlining legislation include the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth),
Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW), Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW).
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Still, the lasting influence of the free-market environmentalists has been scepticism about
direct regulation and advocacy of alternative policy instruments. Governments have been
influenced to introduce or experiment with modified models of regulation.
Politically conservative governments (particularly the Commonwealth rather than the
States) have chosen to avoid regulation in favour of intergovernmental agreements,
broad policies, standards, goals, and outcomes, and voluntary corporate reporting and
agreements. In recent years the Commonwealth government has been reluctant to
regulate expansively for environmental protection.163 It has developed a framework to
enable the future transfer of regulatory obligations to the States, primarily through the
‘approvals bilateral’ agreement mechanisms of the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity
Conservation Act 1999.164
Examples of the Commonwealth’s light-handed approach are the National
Environmental Protection Measures (NEPM) made under the National Environmental
Protection Council Act 1994 (Cth) (‘NEPC Act’),165 the information-based approach of the
National Pollutant Inventory (NPI), and the Commonwealth’s program for voluntary
corporate greenhouse emissions reduction, the Greenhouse Challenge.
Another influence on the approach of the Commonwealth government to environmental
regulation has been the National Competition Policy. It has influenced Commonwealth
policy, firstly, through the completion of a review of all Commonwealth laws with a view
to determining whether those laws “restrict competition”,166 secondly, through the
introduction of discourses of ‘markets in ecosystem services’,167 and thirdly, through
pressure on the States to enact framework legislation to enable the implementation of
market-based solutions to water quantity problems, i.e., tradeable property rights in
water, to implement the COAG Water Reform Framework Agreement 1994.168 The National
Salinity Action Plan has continued this dialogue. Although emphasising the role of
For example, in relation to control of land clearing, and emissions of greenhouse gases.
Similarly the States have sought to transfer certain obligations to local government, particularly in NSW under the
Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997.
165 National Environment Protection Council Act 1994 (Cth), National Environment Protection Measures (Implementation) Act 1999
(Cth).
166 Lyster, R. (2002) above n 73 at 37.
167 DLWC (2002) Environmental Services Scheme: At A Glance, 14pp., DLWC, Sydney.
168 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s.36; Rights in Water and Irrigation Act 1914 (WA) Sch 1, Div. 7 (as amended) by
the Rights in Water and Irrigation Amendment Act 2000 (WA); see also: Gardner, A. (2002) “Water Resources Law
Reform in Western Australia - Implementing the CoAG Water Reforms”, 19(1) EPLJ 6-33 at 26.; Lyster, R. (2002)
above n 73.
163
164

effective land clearing control regulation in solving salinity problems, it has proposed
establishment of markets in environmental services, and the use of governmentcommunity partnerships.169 The latter theme, of partnerships, had already been cemented
as a central tenet of Commonwealth environment policy, in the methods selected for the
implementation of the National Heritage Trust (NHT).170

REFLEXIVE LAW
Many commentators depict the adaptation and modification of direct regulation as an
evolution of environmental law to a more advanced state. In this vein, Fiorino suggests
that “the heavy hand of regulation, which aims to control behaviour directly, is replaced
by ‘indirect and abstract’ forms of legal control.”171 The recent and ongoing reinvention
of regulation in many jurisdictions has involved a broader conception of the regulatory
process. Structures and tools for greater participation in the regulatory process by private
actors are the focus. Provisions are aimed at encouraging greater participation in the
regulatory process by both regulated parties and by third parties (‘regulatory surrogates’)
such as NGOs, financial institutions and industry associations.172 This section examines
the theoretical influences lying behind proposals for industry self-regulation, a policy
instrument that applies this philosophy and approach.
One school of recent theoretical writing on environmental law draws upon broader
notions of regulation from the German post-modernist legal sociologist Teubner, who
has presented and refined a notion of ‘reflexive law’ that draws on the work of political
theorist Jurgen Habermas.173 This model suggests a reduced role for the law and the State
in terms of direct social control. It proposes the development of indirect means and
mechanisms which encourage regulated entities to “devise processes of internal selfExamples of such partnerships include Bushcare, Streamcare and other NHT programs. COAG (2001) Our Vital
Resources: A National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality in Australia, Environment Australia and Department of
Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry, Canberra, 12pp. According to the promotional material: “A National Action Plan
for Salinity and Water Quality (the National Action Plan) was endorsed by the Prime Minister, Premiers and Chief
Ministers at the Council of Australian Governments on 3 November 2000. It involves a funding package of $1.4
billion from the Commonwealth, States and Territories. The significant funding allocation is over a seven year
period and complements the existing Commonwealth's $1.5 billion Natural Heritage Trust.” Apart from endorsing
and encouraging the investigation of market-based instruments, the plan also states that legislation is essential: “any
Commonwealth investment in catchment/region plans will be contingent upon land clearing being prohibited in
areas where it would lead to unacceptable land or water degradation.” at p.9.
170 The NHT has relied on community organisations rather than professional organisations and experts in order to
deliver on-the-ground conservation works, often at the expense of accountability, continuity and effectiveness.
171 Fiorino (1999) above n 99 at 448.
172 Gunningham and Sinclair (2002) Leaders and Laggards, above n 23 at 51.
173 Teubner, G. (1983) “Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law”, 17 Law and Society Review 239.
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regulation” to correct their own behaviour.174 The term ‘reflexive’ refers to organisational
and corporate capacities of the private sector for self-reflection, self-learning and selfcorrection of behaviour.175 Strict reflexive law approaches emphasise “autonomous goal
setting” and favour the exclusion of direct State involvement and public participation in
making corporate decisions.176 Reflexive regulation principles are applied in practice in
internal corporate EMS177 Similarly, reflexive law theories provide a theoretical
background and explanation to policy proposals for self-regulation.
Another stream of this literature is more accommodating of a role for government.
Farmer defines reflexive environmental law as “a law of ecological self-organisation using
strong external pressures for internal self-regulation.”178 This involves the State setting
environmental protection goals, leaving the mechanism for achievement of those goals to
the discretion of the regulatee, yet ensuring punishment if these goals are not achieved.179

CONCLUSION
It is important to note the prevailing scepticism about the future role of regulation in
environmental protection. There is a discernible tendency within some writing in the
field to reject the regulatory approach as being ineffective and inefficient. Despite this
scepticism there remains scope for considering how to improve regulation by
encouraging firms to improve their performance beyond mere compliance. Debates over
the re-invention of regulation and reflexive law are relevant to an inquiry into the
application of environmental laws to private forestry in NSW because they are likely to
inform and guide law reform proposals for that sector. Features of the debate of
particular relevance include proposals for more devolved, and less ‘interventionist’ policy
methods such as systems of self-regulation and market mechanisms. The next Chapter

Teubner, G.; Farmer, L.; Murphy, D. (1994) Environmental Law and Ecological Responsibility: The Concept and Practice of
Ecological Self-Organisation, Wiley and Sons, Chichester, UK.
175 Plumwood challenges the notion that capitalism is a sufficiently self-corrective system to avoid long term serious
environmental damage, instead arguing that the system lacks self-correctiveness due to the fundamental assumptions
lying at the core of economics and rationality: Plumwood, V. (2002) Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of
Reason, Routledge, London.
176 Gaines & Kimber (2001) above n 136 at 160-161, 168-9; cites Orts, E. (1995) “Reflexive Environmental Law” 89
Northwestern University Law Review 1227; Bergamn, E.; Jacobson, A. (1994) “Environmental Performance Review:
Self-Regulation in Environmental Law” 16 Cardozo Law Review 465.
177 Gunningham and Sinclair (2002) above n 23 at 192.
178 Teubner, G.; Farmer, L.; Murphy, D. (1994) above n 174.
179 Fiorino (1999) above n 99 at 464.
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examines the implications of various possible forms of self-regulation in the context of
environmental regulatory policy.

Chapter Three

SELF-REGULATION AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION

SELF-REGULATION
This Chapter discusses self-regulation as a particularly important example of regulatory
reform or regulatory re-invention. A simple definition of self-regulation is of a process
whereby an organised group, such as an industry association, regulates the behaviour of
its members.1 A broader definition involves industries or individual firms regulating their
own behaviour according to an organised voluntary or mandatory code of practice.
The objective of this Chapter is to review the literature which discusses the various
permutations of self-regulation and indirect governance.

In doing so, the broader

context surrounding discussion of law and policy for PNF is presented.
Self-regulation schemes in many different forms are applied in Australia in industries
including advertising, the media, direct marketing, financial services, mining,2
pharmaceuticals, the professions, retail trade, telecommunications - either alone or in
combination with conventional regulatory requirements.3
In Tasmania, substantial elements of industry self-regulation are relied upon in regulating
the PNF industry. The Tasmanian forest industry regulator, the Chief Forest Practices
Officer described it as “a co-regulatory approach comprising responsible selfmanagement by the forest industry with independent monitoring and enforcement by the
Forest Practices Board.”4 It is for that reason that questions about self-regulation become
highly relevant to our inquiry into PNF regulation in NSW. In reviewing the framework
Gunningham, N, and Rees, J. (1997) “Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective”, 19(4) Law and Policy 364.
Brereton, D. (2002) “The Role of Self-Regulation in Improving Corporate Social Performance: The Case of the Mining
Industry”, Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, University of Queensland, revised version of paper presented to
Australian Institute of Criminology Conference, Current Issues in Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance, Melbourne,
September, 23pp. published at <http://www.csrm.uq.edu.au/docs/brereton_2002_1.pdf>; Russell, G. (2001) “Regulation
and Self-regulation, Why codes of conduct?” AIDWATCH papers 2001, describes mining industry advocacy of selfregulation. Edited extract from Evans, G.; Russell, G. and Sullivan, R. (2001) “Reconciling Power and Responsibility: An
International Regulatory Framework For Mining”, Evans, G., Goodman, J. and Lansbury, N. (eds.) Moving Mountains:
Communities Confront Mining And Globalisation, Mineral Policy Institute, Otford Press and Zed Press.
3 Commonwealth Treasury (2000) Industry Self-Regulation in Consumer Markets, A Report prepared by the Taskforce on Industry Selfregulation, August, Treasury, Canberra, also at <www.selfregulation.gov.au/publications>, Terms of Reference.
4 Wilkinson, G. (2005) “Major Changes to the Forest Practices System”, 6(2) Forest Practices News at pp.1-2 , Forest
Practices Board, Hobart, Tasmania.
1
2

for PNF in NSW some participants will suggest that PNF should be subject to a
Tasmanian style system.
Self-regulation is commonly proposed as an efficient solution to problems of ‘regulatory
overload’ faced by the State in times of ongoing fiscal and budgetary constraints.
Proposals for self-regulation have been presented in Australian environmental law and
policy debates, particularly by industry bodies,5 but also endorsed by some government
bodies,6 mainly on the basis of the broader critique of regulatory effectiveness. It is
argued that regulators must innovate by devising non-traditional forms of regulation,7
and exploring ‘co-regulation’ and other variants of self-regulation both as an alternative
to, or as a complement to, direct regulation.
The basis of advocacy of self-regulation is threefold. The first is the broad literature
claiming the ineffectiveness of direct regulation, and exploring the notions of indirect
governance (discussed in Ch.1). Secondly, with the prospect of lower compliance costs,
less ‘red tape’ and ‘green tape’, self-regulation is attractive to industry. Self-regulation
schemes are often devised by industry (or negotiated with government) as a response to
an imminent ‘threat’ of government regulation in reaction to revelations of sub-standard
industry practices.8 Finally, self-regulation is attractive to governments, because by

Australian Industry Group (2003) Environment Policy, 2pp., <http://www.aigroup.asn.au/aigroup>, specifies a core principle
that "Ecologically sustainable development must be based primarily on a culture of industry self-regulation. Industry’s
approach must be dynamic and encourage change which reflects business requirements and society’s expectations." See
also: WA Chamber of Minerals and Energy (1995) Environmental Management in the WA Mining Industry: Policy & Practice 1995,
<http://www.mineralswa.asn.au/~cmeenpu/page2.html#self>; Prince, I. & Kinhill Engineers Pty Ltd (1995) “Selfregulation” in Gunningham, N.; Norberry, J.; and McKillop, S. (eds.) Environmental Crime, 1-3 September 1993, Hobart,
AIC Conference Proceedings Series, No. 26: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.
6 Commonwealth Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry -Australia (2000) Submission No. 28 to the Treasury Taskforce
on Industry Self-Regulation, January, AFFA, Barton, ACT; (“AFFA will continue to encourage greater industry involvement in
self-regulation or co-regulation as appropriate.”); Agriculture and Resource Management Council of Australia and New
Zealand (2000) Meeting Number 17, 3 March 2000, Resolution No: 5B, Endorsed the National Beef Cattle Feedlot
Environmental Code of Practice developed by the Australian Lot Feeders' Association (“The purpose of the Code is to enhance
self-regulation by the industry…”); see further discussion of self-regulation and quasi regulation, although not advocacy, by
Holmes, S. (1997) Some Lessons from the Use of Environmental Quasi-Regulation in North America, Office of Regulation Review
Staff Working Paper, Office of Regulation Review, Industry Commission, Canberra.
7 Koppen, I. (1994) “Ecological Covenants: Regulatory Informality in Dutch Waste Reduction Policy”, ch.9 in Teubner, G.;
Farmer, L.; Murphy, D. (1994) Environmental Law and Ecological Responsibility: The Concept and Practice of Ecological SelfOrganisation, Wiley and Sons, Chichester, UK; cites Rehbinder, E. (1992) “Reflexive Law and Practice” in Teubner, Gunther
& Febbrajo (eds.) State, Law and Economy as Autopoietic Systems: Regulation and Autonomy in a New Perspective, Milano, Guiffre,
595-624 at 595-8.
8 Commonwealth Treasury (2000) Industry Self-Regulation, Chapter 3; Gunningham, N.; Grabosky, P. (1998) Smart Regulation:
Designing Environmental Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Series editor: Hawkins, K, Series: Oxford Socio-Legal
Studies, p.55, that there is “considerable evidence” that such scenarios are the origin of many self-regulation schemes; see
also: Swenarchuk, M., Muldoon, P. (1996) De-regulation and Self-regulation: A Public Interest Perspective, A paper
prepared for a workshop: De-regulation, Self-regulation and Compliance in Administrative Law, Canadian Environmental Law
Association, Toronto, 17pp.
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encouraging industry to develop systems of self-regulation, they can transfer some of the
cost of regulating.9
There is no single form of self-regulation. Rather, a continuum of approaches exists. At
one end there is pure industry self-regulation or voluntary self-regulation, which involves
non-binding codes of conduct, established at the private initiative of firms or industry
associations. At the other end of the spectrum is direct regulation by government of
virtually all levels of activity within a given industry. Between these two extremes lie
various forms of partial self-regulation or ‘co-regulation’. A useful means of classifying
approaches is according to the proportion of components of the regulatory task
“contracted out” or “privatised”, i.e., delivered by the private sector and/or third parties.

Pure self-regulation and private forestry
A purely free market approach (i.e., pure self-regulation) to private native forestry (PNF)
management would involve allocating access to timber and forested land to the highest
bidder.10 For example, a block of land containing turpentine-ironbark forest, Sydney’s
rarest forest type, listed as an endangered ecological community (now reduced to 0.27%
of its original area), was offered by a State government department to the highest bidder
in March 2000.11 To leave decisions regarding the management of forests to be allocated
purely according to the market and the wishes of private owners runs the risk of ignoring
environmental considerations. In the USA, for example, almost all the remaining forest
habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl in the Pacific Northwest is on federally owned
public lands. By contrast, “virtually all the old growth on private lands has been logged
because the market attributed no value to preservation of old growth ecosystems.”12

As Steinzor put it: “self-regulation is politically expedient in an era of severe fiscal constraints.” Steinzor, R. (1998b)
“Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control” 22 Harvard
Environmental Law Review 103-202 at 104. Similarly, Robert Gibson wrote “The governments most willing to embrace
corporate voluntarism in place of regulation have also been those most energetic in gutting environmental and other social
programs in the name of fiscal responsibility”. Gibson, R. (ed.) (1999) Voluntary Initiatives: The New Politics Of Corporate
Greening, Broadview Press, Toronto, Canada, 268pp.
10 Blumm, M. (1992) “The fallacies of free market environmentalism” 15(2) Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 371-389 at
378.
11 Woodford, J. (2000) “Rare Forest May be Sold to the Highest Bidder”, Sydney Morning Herald, 3/3/00, p.2.
12 Blumm, M. (1992) above n 10 at 382.
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Codes of practice
Codes of practice are the tool at the centre of most self-regulation systems. Although the
term ‘Code of Practice’ usually implies a voluntary code of conduct or a voluntary nonbinding statement of best practice, there are in reality many types of Code spanning a
continuum from voluntary non-binding guidelines (i.e., pure self-regulation) to regulatory
Codes involving criminal penalties for non-compliance. In the latter case, the Code may
be a form of delegated legislation, breach of which constitutes a regulatory offence. The
Victorian13 and Tasmanian Forest Practices Codes14 and the British Columbia (Canada)
Forest Practices Code15 are examples. Similarly the Plantations Code made under the
Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999 (NSW) is a Regulation,16 breach of which
constitutes an offence.17
More commonly, however, the term ‘Code of Practice’ connotes a different form of
regulation, involving a partial privatisation of government decision making, particularly
of environmental impact assessment or development approval. Under the Tasmanian
Forest Practices Code, licensed Forest Practices Officers (FPOs) can devise and approve
their own Forest Practices Plan for logging. As the larger firms employ their own FPOs,
they are effectively self-regulating.

Partial self-regulation
The term is intended to refer to self-regulation by way of adherence to industry- or
company-devised codes of practice. This may be subject to varying levels of control by
the regulatory State either at the margins or in relation to particular issues, such as the
setting of rules or the enforcement of rules.
Different forms of partial self-regulation involve varying degrees of privatisation of the
regulatory functions of the State. This may involve privatisation of the making of rules,
the communication of rules, monitoring compliance with rules, enforcement, and

Conservation Forests and Lands Act 1987 (Vic), Part 5, ss.31-55.
Forest Practices Act 1985 (Tas), Part IV. The Forest Practices Code gains force through the requirement that forest practices
must be carried out in accordance with a Forest Practices Plan in which meets the specifications of the Code: Forest Practices
Act 1985, s. 18 (3).
15 Rolfe, C. (1997) Comments on Proposed Changes to Administrative Remedies in the Forest Practices Code of British Columbia, West Coast
Environmental Law Association, 24 July, <www.wcel.org>.
16 Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999 (NSW), s.29(1).
17 Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999 (NSW), s.31(3).
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adjudication on compliance, sanctions, and evaluation.18 Some forms of self-regulation
involve only the privatisation of monitoring and information- gathering functions (i.e.,
self-monitoring).
A useful distinction can be drawn between those schemes that involve privatisation of
rule-making functions, those that imply privatisation only of decision-making relating to
licences and approvals and those that also imply privatisation of implementation,
monitoring and enforcement functions.
‘Mandated full self-regulation’ involves government requiring industry to put in place a
formalised system of self-regulation (addressing both standards and enforcement),19 that
is, an internal environmental management system (EMS) or Code of Practice that is
subject to the approval of government.20 It is mandated in the sense that government,
(sometimes through the tool of legislation, hence ‘statutory self-regulation’) requires
industry to undertake these steps,21 to a certain standard, rather than allowing industry to
choose whether or not to set up an industry Code of Practice.22 This form of selfregulation involves business carrying out rule-making and enforcement functions, usually
through an industry representative body that sets codes of practice governing the
behaviour of firms. The industry body then regulates the conduct of its members under
that Code.23
‘Enforced self-regulation’ (ESR) is different to full self-regulation to the extent that it
involves broad objectives being mandated by government, with individual firms
responsible for determining the details of how compliance is to be achieved.24 However,
Priest, M. (1997) “The Privatisation of Regulation - Five Models of Self-Regulation”, 29 Ottawa Law Review 233 at 238.
Gunningham, N, and Rees, J. (1997) above n 1 at 365.
20 For example, the approval of a Code of Practice for the insurance industry by ASIC, the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission, under Insurance Act 1973 (Cth), s.113.
21 Despite the term ‘mandated self-regulation’, compliance with this form of self-regulation may either be mandatory
(involving a regulatory offence in the event of non-compliance, or may be voluntary; the term ‘mandatory’ refers to the
requirement to establish and participate in the scheme. For example, under the advertising industry’s self-regulation
scheme, participating firms are not bound to comply with determinations of the Advertising Board: See Commonwealth
Treasury (2000) Industry Self-Regulation, Chapter 3.
22 For example, see: Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), Part 6; Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth), s.123.
23 Bregman, E.; Jacobson, A. (1994) “Environmental Performance Review: Self-regulation in Environmental Law”, ch.10, in
Teubner, G.; Farmer, L.; Murphy, D. (1994) Environmental Law and Ecological Responsibility: The Concept and Practice of Ecological
Self-Organisation, Wiley and Sons, Chichester, UK, 411pp. Selznick, P. (1994) “Self Regulation and the Theory of
Institutions”, ch.17 (pp.395-402) in Teubner, G.; Farmer, L.; Murphy, D. (1994) Environmental Law and Ecological
Responsibility: The Concept and Practice of Ecological Self-Organisation, Wiley and Sons, Chichester, UK. Gunningham, N.;
Grabosky, P. (1998) above n 8 at 50; Gunningham, N. (1994) Environment, Self-Regulation and the Chemical Industry: Assessing
Responsible Care, Occasional Paper, ACEL, Faculty of Law, ANU at 6.
24 Ayres, I. and Braithwaite, J. (1992) Responsive Regulation: Transcending the De-regulation Debate, Oxford University Press, New
York, at 126.
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in the event of serious breaches of Codes of Practice, government retains the option to
step in to take punitive action.25
Ayres and Braithwaite see ESR as a type of self-regulation at the company level, without
the involvement of industry associations.26 This model is said to be enforced because
private rules are publicly enforceable, and firms are required to undertake the exercise.27
The particular variant of ESR envisaged by Ayres and Braithwaite involves “negotiation
occurring between the State and individual firms to establish regulations that are
particularised to each firm.” Individual firms are required to present self-regulation
proposals in order to avoid stricter government regulation.28 These proposals are
submitted for approval and may be rejected if insufficiently stringent.29
However, for the sake of simplicity, in this thesis the term ‘enforced self-regulation’ is
applied more broadly, to situations where government regulation is applied to improve
the effectiveness of a self-regulatory scheme, by setting targets and strategies and
providing external verification.30 Self-regulation takes place at the level of individual firms
within a framework operated by government where industry associations do not play a
significant role in the operation of the scheme. Here, government creates a legislative
framework and remains ready to take action against deviant firms.31 The most relevant
example of enforced self-regulation of direct relevance to the present thesis is the
Tasmanian Forest Practices Code (see Chapter 11).

Co-regulation
Co-regulation is a form of self-regulation that also entails combining the operation of
self-regulation schemes with direct government regulation in the background or at the
margins. A loose definition is applied by Emmett, and by Hopkins, as involving a

Hopkins, A. (1995) Making safety work: getting management commitment to occupational health and safety, Allen & Unwin, North
Sydney, at 76 cites Rees, J. (1988) Reforming the Workplace: A study of self-regulation in occupational safety, Univ. Pennsylvania Press,
Philadelphia.
26 Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) above n 24 at 101.
27 Ibid at 101.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid at 106.
30 Gunningham and Grabosky (1998) above n 8 at 55.
31 Hopkins, A. (2000) Lessons from Longford, CCH, Sydney.
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combination of self-regulation and government regulation, where the regulatory task is
shared between industry and government.32
Co-regulation can be usefully distinguished from enforced self-regulation, if we follow
the suggestion of Ayres and Braithwaite.33 Co-regulation is said to involve “industryassociation self-regulation with some oversight and/or ratification by government” [emphasis
added]. Co-regulation is described as such because industry associations co-operate with
government to develop industry-wide voluntary standards. In NSW, an example is the
co-regulatory disciplinary system handling complaints against the conduct of lawyers,
which is self-regulation overseen by the Office of the Legal Services Commissioner
(OLSC) and the Administrative Decisions Tribunal. Investigations into complaints are
conducted by the Law Society and the Bar Association, but may be reviewed by the
OLSC.34 Complaints are tested against a statutory definition of professional
misconduct.35
In this thesis, the distinction drawn by Ayres and Braithwaite between the terms
‘enforced self-regulation’ and ‘co-regulation’ is used, subject to the modifications noted
above. The latter refers to schemes where industry associations are involved in the dayto-day operation of the self-regulation scheme. ESR entails some form self-regulation at
the individual company level with government oversight.

Responsive regulation
The notion of self-regulation (and developing indirect and hybrid methods of
governance) is explored in great detail by Ayres and Braithwaite, who present a proposal
for ‘responsive regulation’. This was a rejoinder to the “either/or debate” regarding
regulation, designed to transcend “the sterile debate between regulation and deregulation”.36

Ibid at 92-93, cites Emmett, E. (1992) “New directions for occupational health and safety in Australia” 8(4) Journal of
Occupational Health & Safety - Australia & New Zealand, 293-308. Similarly co-regulation is described by Gunningham and
Sinclair (2002) as “a hybrid policy instrument involving a combination of government set-targets and industry-based
implementation.”
33 Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) above n 24 at 102.
34 Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW), Part 10, also Legal Profession Amendment (Complaints & Discipline) Act 2000. See Law Society of
NSW Professional Standards Department (2001) Professional Standards Annual Report 2000-2001: Complaints and Discipline in the
Legal Profession: Developments, Trends and Statistics, Law Society NSW, Sydney, 47pp.
35 Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW), s.155.
36 Braithwaite, J. (1993) “Responsive Regulation for Australia”, ch.6 in Grabosky, P. and Braithwaite, J. (eds.) Business
Regulation and Australia’s Future, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 81-96 at 95.
32

The concept of

‘responsiveness’, rather than involving a series of detailed policy

prescriptions or an ideal regulatory method, introduces a posture or attitude that can be
adopted by regulators to increase regulatory effectiveness, and necessarily involves a wide
variety of regulatory and self-regulatory approaches.37 At its core is the concept of
regulators putting in place a regulatory strategy that is appropriate to the character of
individual firms or entire industries. It involves tailoring the level of government
‘intervention’ (and, conversely, the extent of delegation of the regulatory task to private
actors) to the record of conduct of the companies in question. Under this model the
delegation of regulatory functions is limited, conditional and designed to be ‘enlightened’
or innovative. Other actors such as unregulated competitors or NGOs are thus
incorporated into the operation of the regulatory scheme. Responsive regulation “is
distinguished…both in what triggers a regulatory response and [in] what the regulatory
response will be.”38
This perspective involves a decision to identify a diverse range of explanations for noncompliance. Rather than assuming wilfulness it also explains non-compliance as
stemming from ignorance of regulatory requirements, record-keeping failures or lack of
capacity to comply.39
The authors argue that the most appropriate regulatory model is usually a form of
enforced self-regulation.40 Their approach places self-regulation in a context of reliance
upon an explicit pyramid model of potentially escalating levels of government
intervention, escalating according to the level of deviance and recalcitrance. The pyramid
relies upon an initial stance of trust, but conveys an explicit message to industry of the
regulator’s willingness and intention “to escalate regulatory intervention whenever lower
levels of intervention fail”.41 Conversely the strategy implies scaling back the level of
regulation to a lower point on the pyramid where industry demonstrates a record of
compliance with regulatory objectives.42

Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) above n 24 at 5.
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) above n 24 at 4-5.
39 Shover, N. Job, J., Carroll, A. (2001) Organisational Capacity for Responsive Regulation, Centre for Tax System Integrity Working
Paper No.15, ANU/ATO Centre for Tax System Integrity, Canberra, at p.4.
40 Braithwaite, J. (1982) “Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control”, Michigan Law Review, vol.
80, pp. 1466-507; Selznick, P. (1994) “Self Regulation and the Theory of Institutions”, ch.17 (pp.395-402) in Teubner, G.;
Farmer, L.; Murphy, D. (1994) Environmental Law and Ecological Responsibility: The Concept and Practice of Ecological SelfOrganisation, Wiley and Sons, Chichester, UK, p.396 at 401.
41 Braithwaite, J. (1993) above n 36 at 93.
42 Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) above n 24 at 6.
37
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The model was further developed by Braithwaite (1992), proposing the establishment of
“a dialogic regulatory culture” between the State, industry and environmentalists, who are
each encouraged to participate in a continual dialogue with each other regarding the
effective operation of regulatory institutions. According to Braithwaite, it will operate
most effectively where each player knows that the other will react with “responsiveness
to how responsibly others are playing the game”.43 The role of third parties is crucial to
this version of self-regulation. Braithwaite warns: “[i]ncentives for effective selfregulation come from other players (the state, NGOs, the environmental movement)
signalling to the industry that they will press for an escalation of regulatory intervention
up the pyramid if self-regulation is not implemented with energy and with results.”44

The pyramid of regulatory strategies
The use of self-regulation is advocated by a number of authors on the basis of regulatory
efficiency - the need for government to allocate its ‘scarce regulatory resources’ to their
most effective use. This involves supplementing direct government regulation with
varying forms of self-regulation wherever possible. Ayres and Braithwaite suggest that:
“[a] fundamental principle for the allocation of scarce regulatory resources ought to be
that they are directed away from companies with demonstrably effective self-regulatory
systems and concentrated on companies that play fast and loose.”45
A sophisticated strategy for achieving this was proposed by Ayres and Braithwaite, in the
form of a ‘pyramid of regulatory strategies’.46 It involves tailoring the regulatory method
to the industry being targeted in order to more efficiently apply scarce regulatory
resources.47 For those that will voluntarily comply, there may be no need for anything
more than persuasion and education. Others less willing to comply must receive a more
direct regulatory intervention, involving responses escalating from enforced selfregulation, to direct regulation with discretionary punishment, to a peak of direct
regulation with non-discretionary punishment. (Figure 1)

Braithwaite (1993) above n 36 at 95.
Braithwaite (1993) above n 36 at 93.
45 Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) above n 24 at 126.
46 Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) above n 24 at 39.
47 Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) above n 24 at 38.
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In summary this proposal involves the State applying ESR, and making explicit its
willingness to apply more rigorous regulatory approaches if firms abuse that privilege.48
In order for this approach to work, a regulator must create the perception that the
toughest response is not remote, but that it is something to fear. If this perception is
created there will be less need in practice to resort to tough enforcement. As Braithwaite
suggests: “Regulators will be able to speak more softly when they are perceived as
carrying big sticks.”49
This is the essence of the conceptual pyramid of graduated enforcement strategies first
presented by Braithwaite (1985), in To Punish or Persuade. Compliance is most likely to
occur where the regulator communicates clearly the existence of “an explicit enforcement
pyramid”.50 The tougher the possible enforcement action on view, the less likely the
agency will need to in fact resort to tough enforcement.51
Ayres and Braithwaite observed that a regulated party is more likely to comply when
faced with a regulator who is clearly in possession of a number of possible regulatory
responses, rather than just one possible response, even if that response is extremely
serious. The seriousness of a response such as licence revocation is such that it is unlikely
to be used, and the regulated party can foresee this, and adjust their strategy
accordingly.52

Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) above n 24 at 38-39.
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) above n 24 at 6.
50 At the base of regulatory responses lies persuasion, and responses from there increase in severity, through the stages of
warning letters or administrative notices which can be imposed if persuasion fails, to civil penalties, to the imposition of
criminal penalties, to temporary licence suspension, to a peak response of permanent barring from the industry by means
of revocation of the firm’s licence to operate. Ayres and Braithwaite,(1992) above n 24 at 35; cites Braithwaite (1985) To
Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety, State University of New York Press, Albany, NY.
51 Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) above n 24 at 6.
52Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) above n 24 at 36.
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Trust as a Regulatory Strategy
The literature advocating enforced self-regulation contains arguments suggesting that
‘trust’ and ‘nurturing corporate virtue’ should be the cornerstones of modern regulatory
strategies.54 Conventional reliance upon legal coercion is rejected with an argument that
assumptions of the likelihood of deviance paradoxically produce more deviance, when
compared to a starting position of trusting the regulatee. According to Cherney,
“[a]uthoritarianism is unable to motivate investment in trust due to it placing distrust in
the foreground.”55 Instead, a scenario is envisaged where self-regulation is applied “with
trust in the foreground”, but with coercive regulation lying in the background, as a failsafe or back-stop.56
This literature attempts to describe forms of regulation that will produce the maximum
results in terms of compliance, without causing widespread antagonism between
regulator and regulatee. It is suggested that the “coercive regulatory strategy”57 can be
counter-productive, creating a culture of defiance and resistance.58 Many arguments
relating to ‘regulatory backlash’ have their origins in the literature on occupational health
and safety and regulation of the environmental impacts of the chemical industry. In 1982,
Bardach and Kagan published a study of occupational health and safety enforcement in
the USA entitled Going By the Book: the Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness.59 That work
argued that the over-zealous enforcement culture of the Federal Occupational Health
and Safety Agency (OHSA) was having a negative effect on the extent of compliance,
and instead proposed the application of techniques of “responsive regulation”. It was
suggested that regulators could make laws more effective by cooperating with industry.60
It has been argued that direct regulation inhibits the development of corporate virtue,
which should be nurtured and encouraged.61

Cherney, A. (1997) “Trust as a Regulatory Strategy: a Theoretical Review” 9 (1) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 71-84.
Cherney (1997) above n 54 at 76.
56 This approach essentially resembles co-regulation, which is discussed below. However, in political terms, self-regulation is
often proposed by industry in order to head off demands for direct government regulation. It is frequently an “either or”
situation.
57 Cherney (1997) above n 54 at 76.
58 Grabosky, (1994b) Counter-productive Regulation, Administration, Compliance & Governability Program, Research School of
Social Sciences, Australian National University, Working Paper: No.23.
59 Bardach, E, Kagan, R. (1982) Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness, Temple Univ. Press, Philadelphia,
PA.
60 Ibid.
61 Braithwaite (1993) “Responsive Business Regulatory Institutions”, in Coady, C, and Sampford, C. (eds.) Business Ethics and
the Law, Federation Press, Sydney, cites Bardach and Kagan (1982) above n 59.
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Other studies have noted that successful regulatory schemes had significant levels of
industry ‘ownership’ of standards. Where industry has been involved from the beginning
in devising and monitoring the standards, they have a psychological attachment to the
regulatory scheme and are more willing to abide by it. For example, some managers were
able to recognise the need to create a level playing field by means of strong enforcement
that prevented sub-standard firms from competing unfairly by avoiding environmental
compliance costs.
However, the regulatory resistance argument may be inapplicable in the Australian
environmental law context, because excessive and overzealous enforcement is extremely
rare, with the majority of agencies adopting a strategy of trust and negotiation as a
starting point in any case.62 This tendency was observed by Grabosky and Braithwaite
(1986) in Of Manners Gentle, which although now out of date, made useful observations
about organisational culture, behaviour and psychology, particularly tendencies towards
‘capture’ and the ‘revolving door syndrome’ in inspectorates. Importantly, this study
found that the ‘softly softly’, ‘educate and conciliate’ approach involved regulatory
agencies adopting a mindset of trust and reluctance to proceed to prosecution and
licence suspensions in the event of corporate malfeasance. The authors found that
prosecution is “commonly undertaken only as a last resort”.63 The majority (81.3%) of 96
regulatory agencies surveyed stated that education and persuasion were more important
functions for them than law enforcement.64 If strong enforcement efforts are avoided in
the face of multiple breaches of the legislation, then a strategy of relying upon selfregulation whilst coercive regulation awaits in the background as a back-stop will be
ineffective.

HYBRID OR INDIRECT GOVERNANCE
With the emphasis on the cost of enforcement and administration, critics of direct
regulation present an argument about the ‘regulatory overload’ or ‘regulatory burden’ of
the State. They observe that with the growth of forms of social and economic regulation,
with expansion of the scope of responsibilities assumed by the modern State, and with a
tax base that is often shrinking, the State is typically overloaded and under-resourced.
On the other hand, in the rural context it has some application almost regardless of the true extent of regulation, and this
issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.
63 Grabosky, P., Braithwaite, J. (1986) Of Manners Gentle: Enforcement Strategies of Australian Business Regulatory Agencies, Oxford
University Press, Melbourne, at 1.
64 Ibid at 190.
62

Therefore it is suggested that continued reliance on direct regulation alone is likely to be
insufficient or ineffective.65 Broadening the range of players involved in the regulatory
task is considered an important objective given limited regulatory budgets.66
The literature on ‘governance’ explores alternative approaches for achieving compliance
with agreed societal objectives and presents a broader conception of the task of
governing. It is argued that the State need not have a monopoly on regulation.67
Grabosky discusses concepts of indirect regulation whereby government’s role is to
‘steer’ social enterprises from a distance,68 using ‘hybrid governance’ or ‘indirect
governance’ by enlisting either regulated parties or third parties in the regulatory effort.69
There are numerous historical examples of the State encouraging private acts of
enforcement. Examples include: rewards for information leading to the capture of
criminals; the reporting of street crime; arrangements for private tax farming (i.e. tax
assessment and collection) in ancient Rome and Greece; rewards for detection of afterhours trading in 14th Century England; and rewards for reporting tax evaders in the US
since 1791.70
Accordingly this literature explores options for the recruitment and involvement of the
public and third party interest groups in governance - for example, by NGOs,
community groups or the banking and insurance industry71. Hence the literature
discusses mechanisms including “information-based strategies” such as the Toxics
Release Inventory (US), or National Pollutant Inventory (Australia) – the ‘community
right to know’ schemes - which encourage public participation in the regulatory process.

Gunningham, N, and Rees, J. (1997) above n 1 at 363; Grabosky, P. (1994c) Organisational leverage and the technologies of
compliance, Administration, Compliance & Governability Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National
University, Working Paper No.24. at 2. However, A pernicious aspect of the ‘regulatory burden’ argument is that may
obscure implicit social and political value choices about the forms of public spending which are a priority for the State.
66 Grabosky, P. (1994c) above n 65 at 3-6.
67 Grabosky, P, Braithwaite, J. (eds.) (1993) Business Regulation and Australia’s Future, Australian Institute of Criminology,
Canberra, at 6.
68 Grabosky, P. (1995) “Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory Compliance”, 8(4) Governance 527.
69 Grabosky, P, Braithwaite, J. (eds.) (1993) above n 67; Grabosky (1994) produced a comprehensive survey of methods for
recruitment of third parties into the task of achieving regulatory compliance, describing it as “co-production of
compliance” using “indirect governance. Grabosky, P. (1994) Organisational Leverage and the Technologies of Regulatory Compliance,
Administration, Compliance and Governability Program Working Paper No. 24, Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University, Canberra.
70 Grabosky, P. (1993) Rewards and Incentives as Regulatory Instruments, Administration, Compliance and Governability Program
Working Paper No.13, August, RSSS ANU, Canberra.
71 Ayres, I. and Braithwaite, J. (1992) above n 24; Richardson, B, (2002) “Environmental Regulation Through Financial
Institutions: New Pathways for Disseminating Environmental Policy, 19(1) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 58-77.
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Self-regulation in the forestry industry
There is significant evidence of some movement towards self-regulation in the forestry
industry in Australia.72 It is already in place at the Commonwealth level, in Tasmania, and
there are strong demands for it to be introduced in private forests in NSW. The
Commonwealth Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (AFFA) recently
argued that: “After nearly a century of operating in a highly regulated environment,
Australia's agricultural and fisheries industries, together with the food and forestry
industries, are moving inexorably along the path to self-regulation.” Two key aspects
were identified by AFFA - product certification, linked to the application of
Environmental Management Systems (EMS), and the progressive reduction in layers of
Commonwealth regulation.73
At the Commonwealth level, the forestry industry in Australia has recently achieved
virtual self-regulation, after two decades of regulation. The woodchip export control
regime applying to public and private forests has been removed. The controls applying to
private forestry were gradually relaxed during the 1990s, partly with the creation of a
category of “degraded forest licence” in 1996, which enabled the export of additional
woodchips from private lands above the volume permitted under the normal quota.74
With the Regional Forest Agreements process and with the passage of the Environmental
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 and Regional Forest Agreements Act 2002, the
Commonwealth has almost completely divorced itself from regulation of forestry, leaving
forestry matters to companies, State agencies and State-level regulation.75 (See further,
below, p.Error! Bookmark not defined.)
Indeed there is some evidence of this being a trend in other jurisdictions also: Stefano Pagiola, Joshua Bishop and Natasha
Landell-Mills (2002) Selling Forest Environmental Services: Market-based Mechanisms for Conservation and Development, Earthscan,
London.
Jones, T. and Wibe, S. (1992) Forests: Market and Intervention Failures, Earthscan, London.
73 Commonwealth Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Australia (2000) Submission to the Taskforce on Industry Selfregulation, Submission No.28, AFFA, January, at p.14.
74 Export Control (Hardwood Wood Chips) Regulation 1996 (Cth), r.13-19. Note that this category appears to have been made in
response to lobbying by North Forest Products to enable it to clear wet sclerophyll forest and rainforest on its Surrey Hills,
Tasmania block for woodchipping and plantation establishment. Although the Regulation required the Minister to consider
“whether the floristic composition of the forest has been altered significantly”, the report of the Forest Practices Board on
the block stated “ in the remaining native forests at Surrey Hills there is no detectable change in the floristic composition,
measured by species richness with regard to their varied selective logging histories.”(p.21). The CSIRO’s Division of
Wildlife and Ecology review (February 1997) of this report stated “We consider it is not justified to be drawing any
confident conclusions about floristic changes. “ (p.9) Yet an internal Minute of DPIE (Cth Dept of Primary Industries and
Energy) to the Minister for Resources regarding the licence application dated 28 February 1997 states “For Urgent
Decision – as North is due to enter into sales and price negotiation with Japanese customers”. The licence itself, No.
MEPWOOD 1509 was granted on the same day, 28 February 1997.
75 The exception is forestry operations in a property included within the World Heritage list or the Ramsar wetlands list will
still require approval under the Act, according to the tests and definitions applied by Environmental Protection and Biodiversity
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth), s.42.
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In NSW, the PNF industry has in recent years actively sought self-regulation in
preference to direct regulation. In a policy document entitled ‘Promotion of Private
Forestry in NSW’ the PNF industry body, Australian Forest Growers (AFG), argues that:
“Presently, private forestry is over-burdened with unnecessary regulation and overzealous environmental limitation…” Instead AFG has called for the “practical
application of self-regulation through codes based on best practice”.76

SELF-MONITORING AND AUDITED SELF-REGULATION
The most common form of self-regulation in practice in Australian environmental law is
a very limited form of self-regulation that involves ‘self-monitoring’. This arrangement
involves the recruitment of the regulated party into the compliance process. It does not
involve industry determining the standards that are to be complied with. It simply
involves privatising the collection of compliance data, by employing self-reporting
strategies, whilst retaining the remainder of the regulatory and licensing apparatus. Under
the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW), licensed premises can be
required to conduct self-monitoring, and to report the results of their own collection of
pollution data to EPA.77 Licensees may be required to self-certify the extent of their
compliance with licence conditions and particulars of failures to comply with
conditions.78 Self-monitoring typically relies for its effectiveness on a form of random
auditing. The classic model of audited self-monitoring is in income tax assessment, where
individual taxpayers complete a reporting form subject to random auditing.

However

there is little or no literature that poses the question of how such methods could be
effectively applied in the forestry context.
The underlying objective is to provide regulators with more efficient means of
administering the regulatory scheme. They reduce data collection costs, but do not
abandon the existence of criminal penalties for deviance. The threat of a random audit
Australian Forest Growers NSW Chapter (1999) Promotion of private forestry in NSW, internet publication
<http://www.afg.asn.au/Site%20files/policy.html>, 18 February 1999, Authors: Francis Clarke, Brian Furrer, Accessed
20.3.02.
77 Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW), s.66(1), with offence of providing false and misleading information in
self-monitoring data at s.66(2).
78 The privilege against self-incrimination is removed by the statute in relation to this clause. Protection of the Environment
Operations Act 1997 (NSW), s.66(5). The significance of this approach is that a fraud offence is attached to the making of a
false of misleading certificate of compliance - which may be judicially regarded with potentially greater seriousness than a
pollution offence. Similar strategies are applied in Victorian pollution control law. Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic),
s.21(1)(e).
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must be sufficiently real so as to guarantee accuracy in the reporting data supplied. This
approach is at best described as a modified form of direct regulation. It does not
dispense with the use of strong regulation.
Monitoring must be distinguished from auditing. Monitoring is the process of gathering
information about environmental conditions and about environmental pollution and
damage.79 Auditing is primarily an effort to check compliance with legal requirements.80
External verification or auditing involves checking by a certified, guaranteed independent
third party.81

LIMITS TO SELF-REGULATION
Although it appears that the new orthodoxy is to view self-regulation as a preferred
policy response given limited regulatory resources, there are grounds for scepticism
about its capacity to deliver substantial environmental protection. In popular terms, this
scepticism finds expression in the retort that self-regulation amounts to “asking the fox
to guard the chicken coop”. Behind this expression lies a reference to the inherent
difficulty in requesting companies to forgo profits in deferring to public environmental
protection goals.82 Any system of self-regulation must present or contain sufficiently
strong disincentives to counteract the tendency for the profit motive to drive corporate
behaviour to the detriment of environmental concerns. Yet the literature on reflexive law
and trust-based strategies appears to take little account of the obligations of corporate
management to shareholders to maximise returns.83
Self-regulation approaches are likely to be subject to several other limitations. Selfregulation systems are often deployed as a public relations device, suggesting that
problems are being appropriately managed by industry. In this way, industry can give the
Defined in the Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), “monitoring program” means all actions taken and equipment used for
the purpose of detecting or measuring quantitatively or qualitatively the presence amount or level of any substance,
characteristic, or effect.
80 Under the POEO Act 1997 (NSW), s.172, an environmental audit is “a periodic documented evaluation of an activity
(including an evaluation of management practices, systems and plant) for either or both of the following purposes: (a) to
provide information to the persons managing the activity on compliance with legal requirements, codes of practice and
relevant policies relating to the protection of the environment, (b) to enable those persons to determine whether the way
the activity is carried on can be improved in order to protect the environment and to minimise waste.”
81 Gunningham, N. (1993) “Environmental Auditing: Who Audits the Auditors?” 10 Environmental and Planning Law Journal
229-238.
82 This assumes that there is a conflict between environmental protection and profitability, which may not be the case in some
industrial contexts involving waste reduction and energy efficiency measures.
83 Call, S., Holahan, W. (1983) Microeconomics, 2nd edition, Wadsworth, Belmont, CA at 116.
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appearance of regulation, without necessarily delivering the substance. Braithwaite
described the potential for self-regulation schemes to be misused - as he put it rather
bluntly, “[s]elf-regulation is frequently an attempt to deceive the public into believing in
the responsibility of an irresponsible industry.”84 There is a related point that selfregulation schemes are often proposed by industry as a political strategy to forestall the
imposition of legislation, or to shape the characteristics of legislation introduced.85 For
example, the system of enforced self-regulation applying to Tasmanian PNF is said to
have been introduced in recognition of the problems identified by a government inquiry,
but was also introduced to avoid direct regulation of this sector by the Commonwealth.86
Governments facing fiscal imbalances may find a coincidence of interest with industry at
this point, being granted a seemingly legitimate excuse for inaction.87 The desire to avoid
mandatory regulation was a factor in the introduction of the Commonwealth
Government’s Greenhouse Challenge Program.88 This program to encourage voluntary
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions was introduced following industry lobbying
aimed at forestalling an emissions tax.89
Models of self-regulation have a recent intellectual heritage in theories of reflexive law
(above, p.55.). That perspective can be criticised as
Braithwaite, J. (1993) above n 36 at 91. Baggot (1989) had similar thoughts about much self-regulation schemes, saying
they are “no more than a form of placebo policy…designed mainly for their cosmetic effects…a useful way of organising
issues out of politics…a wicked weapon of agenda management.” Baggot (1989) “Regulatory Reform in Britain: The
Changing Face of Self-Regulation” 67 Public Administration 45 at p.45 cited in Gunningham (1994) describing many schemes
as “largely a sham (symbolic self-regulation).” Gunningham, N. (1994) Environment, Self-Regulation and the Chemical Industry:
Assessing Responsible Care, Occasional Paper, Australian Centre for Environmental Law, Faculty of Law, Australian National
University, at p.63-64.
85 Robert. E. Gibson, ed. (1999) Voluntary Initiatives: The New Politics Of Corporate Greening, Broadview Press, Toronto, at 126-7
in relation to introduction of Ontario Blue Box recycling scheme which it is suggested was devised by industry in order to
forestall the introduction of beverage container deposit legislation; see also Fowler, E. (2000) “Book Review” of Gibson,
op.cit., in July-August Policy Options (Canada)72-75.
86 Bonyhady, T. (1992) “Property Rights”, ch.3 in Bonyhady, T. (ed.) Environmental Protection and Legal Change, Federation Press,
explains the introduction of enforced self-regulation in Tasmania in the private forestry context of the basis of a desire to
avoid direct Commonwealth regulation, at p.54. In Austria, “the business/industry sector clearly is the driving force behind
the use of voluntary agreements. This instrument is primarily seen as a means to prevent threatening additional
environmental regulation, as well as eco-taxes, in a country, which isperceived by all environmental policy actors to be
strongly regulated or even over-regulated.” Brückner, L. (2001) “New Environmental Policy Instruments in Austria”, Paper
for the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Joint Session of Workshops, Workshop # 1, The Politics of New
Environmental Policy Instruments, Grenoble, France, April 6-11, 2001, 33pp. at p.11.
87 “Sometimes it is a strategy to give the government an excuse for not doing its job”: Braithwaite (1993) above n 36 at 91.
88 The empirical record regarding the effectiveness of the Greenhouse Challenge shows that emission reduction targets set
voluntarily by industry under this program were only actually attained in 8.4% of cases. Only 9 of 76 participants met the
targets that they set for themselves under the program. See: Commonwealth Parliament, Senate Environment
Communication Information Technology and the Arts Committee, Supplementary Estimates hearing, 3 May 2000, Hansard
at 2. Of the 240 companies involved, only 76 (or 31.6%) actually lodged a report on their progress (at p.3). This example
also raises questions of whether audited self-regulation models are actually more cost effective than direct regulation, given
the amount spent on auditing and verification consultants for that program. It may be that these methods of ensuring
corporate accountability were selected more for their ideological acceptability than their relative efficiency. During
February-June 2000, the Australian Greenhouse Office paid “$201,042.43 in order to assemble a panel of 15 private sector
consultants to perform independent verification under the Greenhouse Challenge”. Australian Greenhouse Office (2000)
AGO Consultancies 1999-2000, 17pp., unpublished, AGO, Canberra.
89 Hamilton, C. (2001) Running From the Storm, UNSW Press, Chapter Three.
84

politically naïve for its belief in, and reliance upon, ‘corporate virtue’ as an environmental
protection strategy.90 Some theorists of reflexive law may have become lost in a fog of
post-modernist relativism by believing excessively in the power of “autonomous goal
setting” by corporations.91 The danger of allowing industry excessive scope in developing
and setting regulatory standards is that it will tend to set standards to suit its immediate
short- and medium-term economic objectives at the expense of the broader public and
social interest. If the setting of environmental protection standards is left to individual
firms or peak industry bodies, a relaxation of environmental protection standards is very
likely. Such bodies are not normally driven by altruism, but by a commitment to the
bottom line.92 Proposals for ‘autonomous goal setting’ are also probably unworkable,
because, once we move beyond broadly shared goals of ‘environmental protection’ or
‘sustainable development’, there are numerous difficult - and inherently political decisions to be made regarding the identification of ‘socially acceptable’ levels of
pollution or destruction of biodiversity. The encouragement of public participation in the
regulatory enterprise by the creation of information disclosure mechanisms, and statutory
provision for citizen suits (third party litigation) may serve to mitigate the risk that selfregulation may degenerate into de-regulation in practice.93
However, regulatory theorists such as Gunningham and Grabosky recognise this and
argue there is “a substantial gap” between industry self-interest and the public interest.94
The greater the costs associated with environmental protection measures, the larger the
gap that may develop between the public interest and the self-interest of firms and
industry. As Gunningham and Grabosky put it: “the greater the incentive to renege on
self-regulatory objectives.”95 Voluntary self-regulation is likely to be particularly
ineffective in this context. One reason for this is because voluntary self-regulation
schemes depend for their success on a high rate of participation by firms in the industry.
The importance of profits rather than altruism in motivating the decision-making of
firms to join such schemes has been recognised by various authors who have commented

Gaines, S.; Kimber, C. (2001) “Redirecting Self-Regulation” 13(2) Journal of Environmental Law (UK) 157-184 at 161. (A
discussion of reflexive law theories and their practical implementation in self-regulation systems, and the limitations of selfregulation in the corporate context.) Lubbe-Wolff, G. (2001) “Efficient Environmental Legislation - On Different
Philosophies of Pollution Control in Europe”, 13(1) Journal of Environmental Law (UK) 79-87.
91 Gaines & Kimber (2001) above n 90 at 173.
92 Gaines & Kimber (2001) above n 90 at 174.
93 Hopkins, A. (2000) Lessons from Longford: the Esso gas plant explosion, CCH, Sydney, at 94.
94 Gunningham and Rees (1997) above n 1 at 390.
95 Gunningham and Grabosky, (1998) above n 8 at 55.
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that high rates of consumer recognition of a self-regulation scheme (such as a labelling or
certification scheme) will create incentives for non-member firms to join the scheme.
A more substantial problem is that self-regulatory schemes will tend to set standards too
low, requiring too little of industry participants, as higher standards will conflict with
needs for profit maximisation. It is on this basis that Braithwaite argues that “selfregulation schemes often fail...” 96 For this reason, voluntary self-regulation is likely to be
ineffective. Thus Gunningham argued: “only rarely can self-regulation alone be relied
upon to achieve environmental goals.”97 Gunningham and Sinclair (2002) found: “Many
less interventionist strategies are unlikely to succeed if they are not underpinned by direct
regulation. For example, under reflexive regulation, some enterprises may be tempted to
develop ‘paper systems’ and tokenistic responses which ‘independent’ third party
auditors may fail to detect.”98
Even where industry does not set the standards, but merely applies and enforces those
set by government, there remains the problem that self-regulation tends to be poorly
enforced. Especially where enforcement is left to industry bodies, “enforcement is
ineffective, and punishment is secret and mild.”99
These points suggest a hypothesis that externally-enforced self-regulation will be the only
potentially viable species of self-regulation where there is any substantial gap between
private self-interest and the public interest.100 Both regulatory theorists and regulators are
sceptical about the scope for introducing schemes for voluntary self-regulation. Research
in the US into the views of senior forestry administrators in the private forestry sector
revealed that purely voluntary codes of practice or guidelines were considered by only a
minority (20%) to be a “very effective” means for ensuring private forest landholders
apply prescriptions for water quality protection. The majority indicated that voluntary
approaches were in their opinion ineffective (41%) or of only moderate effectiveness
(39%).101 It tends only to be industry that freely advocates self-regulation without
Braithwaite (1993) above n 36 at 91.
Gunningham and Grabosky (1998) above n 8 at 55.
98 Gunningham and Sinclair (2002) Leaders and Laggards, at 203.
99 Gunningham and Grabosky (1998) above n 8 at 53.
100 Gunningham and Rees (1997) above n 1 at 390.
101 Ellefson, P.; Cheng, A.; Moulton, R. (1997) “Regulatory Programs and Private Forestry: State Government Actions to
Direct the Use and Management of Forest Ecosystems”, 10 Society and Natural Resources 195-209 at 201 cites Cheng, A.,
Ellefson, P. (1993) State programs directed at the forestry practices of private forest landowners: Program administrator’s assessment of
effectiveness, Staff Paper Series No.87, University of Minnesota, Department of Forest Resources, St Paul, MN.
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stressing the need for additional external enforcement – for example the Australian
Forest Growers in relation to private forestry in NSW, and the Australian Industry
Group in relation to the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth)
(‘EPBC Act’).102
Awareness of the limits of self-regulation is ubiquitous in the regulatory literature. Even
the Industry Task Force on Self-Regulation report (2000) states: “Where there are strong
public interest concerns, such as major health and safety issues, and the specific
problems are of high risk and/or high frequency, then other forms of regulation may be
more appropriate.” Self-regulation should only be introduced where the consequences of
a failure of self-regulation are minor. These statements appear to indicate a lack of faith
in self-regulation. In other words, it should only be attempted in contexts where it does
not really matter whether it succeeds or fails.
Academic advocates of self-regulation such as Ayres and Braithwaite suggest selfregulation can only be effective if species of enforced self-regulation or co-regulation are
introduced. Pure self-regulation is dismissed as ineffective.103 Braithwaite suggests the
introduction of responsive regulation strategies that rely upon “genuine empowerment of
all the stakeholders in a regulatory dialogue…”104
Although these models of indirect governance state, correctly, that third parties can be
recruited into the enforcement process, they fail to emphasise that there are limits to
what can be achieved by third parties. One of these barriers is secrecy. There is a natural
tendency of firms to limit the flow of information to the public about their
environmental impact. Full and frank disclosure to the public has the potential to reduce
profit levels, and therefore the transmission of such information cannot be assumed. In
the private property context, it is unlikely that significant volumes of information will be
shared with government, let alone with third parties, especially with environmental
groups that are traditionally regarded in the rural community as the enemy, not as
partners in a regulatory dialogue. Braithwaite’s model may assume rather optimistically
However, Ian Whyte, former director of the Forest Industries Association of Tasmania, when interviewed stated that pure
or voluntary self-regulation was note appropriate in the Tasmanian context, and the industry did not seek its introduction.
Interview, Chief Executive, Forest Industries Association Tasmania, 12.11.98, Hobart, in person.
103 Gunningham, N. (1984) Safeguarding the Worker: Job Hazards and the Role of the Law, Law Book Company, Sydney at 63, 67;
Braithwaite (1993) “Responsive Regulation for Australia” above n 36, at 91; Gunningham and Sinclair (2002) Leaders and
Laggards, p.204.
104 Braithwaite (1993) “Responsive Regulation for Australia”, above n 36 at 95.
102

that in real life, stakeholders such as environmentalists are adequately resourced, and
empowered, and provided with access to data - a situation that only occasionally pertains.
Further, insufficient attention has been paid to the incompatibility between the secrecy
associated with privatisation, private agreements, and self-regulation, with measures for
public participation such as FOI and third-party review, essential for viable enforced selfregulation. Thus Self concludes that even if theoretically attractive, indirect or ‘light’
regulation will not be effective in practice, as it produces results “under favourable or
special conditions which often do not apply”.105 Similarly, Cole and Grossman have
argued that: “Standard economic critiques of command environmental regulation are
insensitive to the historical, technological and institutional contexts that can determine
the comparative efficiency of alternative regulatory regimes.”106
A crucial issue raised in discussions of self-regulation is the role of trust.107 The
effectiveness of trust-based strategies will depend on the social, economic and political
context present. If new policy approaches are to be focussed on trust and nurturing
corporate virtue, they must provide a plausible reply to the question of whether that trust
will be abused in pursuit of short-term profit. Sutton and Haines suggest that advocacy
of the ‘nurturing virtue’ theory should be subject to a number of qualifications. They
argue that globalisation of economic activity, subcontracting, and competition within
industries all place practical limitations on ‘responsive regulation’ strategies.108
Whether one believes ‘trust’-based regulatory strategies can work depends on an
assessment as to whether trust strategies are “impractical utopian dreams”109, or are a
common-sense addition to the regulatory toolbox based on observations about the
psychology of regulatory compliance. There is substantial agreement in the literature that
pure self-regulation alone is unlikely to be effective and that additional external pressure

Self, Peter (1994) The Missing conditions of effective Regulation – an alternative perspective, ANU RSSS Working Paper;
Administration, Compliance & Governability Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University,
Working Paper No.24 at 43, 48.
106 Cole, D. Grossman, P. (1999) “When is Command and Control Efficient?” Wisconsin Law Review 887-938 at 888.
107 Fiorino, D. (1999) “Rethinking Environmental Regulation: Perspectives on Law and Governance”, 23 Harvard
Environmental Law Review at 468.
108 Haines, F.; Sutton, A. (1997) “Crime Prevention and White Collar Crime: Some Lessons for Regulatory Theory”, ch. 6 in
O’Malley, P.; Sutton, A., Crime Prevention in Australia: Issues in Policy and Research, Federation Press, Sydney 138-163 at
139, 154, 157-9; citing Bendix, R. (1977) Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, University of California Press.
109 Pettit, P. (1990) Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics, Polity Press, Cambridge cited in Cherney, A. (1997) “Trust as a
Regulatory Strategy: A Theoretical Review” 9(1) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 71-84.
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is required to ensure that self-regulation does not amount in practice to a glorified
exemption from substantive legal requirements.
The most significant gap in this area of the regulatory literature in Australia concerns
information about the existence or otherwise of various preconditions for viable selfregulation in various industry sectors.110 It remains to be asked whether such
preconditions actually exist (or can be viably created) in natural resource management
contexts involving issues of off-reserve conservation, such as forestry or agriculture.

Small enterprises and self-regulation
An important but little-investigated area in the regulatory literature concerns the
environmental performance of small and medium-sized enterprises (‘SMEs’).111 This is a
particular issue in the area of rural environmental regulation. These parties pose a unique
challenge for environmental regulators as they commonly have limited resources to
devote to environmental compliance. They may lack environmental expertise and
awareness, and are often isolated from or invisible to the public and regulators. Further,
many small and medium-sized enterprises and individual landholders may not be
sensitive to adverse publicity, and may not be receptive to environmental issues.112
Certain conditions that are required for successful application of a self-regulation
approach relate to the structure of the regulated industry. Priest identified a number of
key factors: “there are relatively few players; the costs of exiting from the industry are
high; there is a history of effective cooperation [within the industry]; expertise and
resources for regulation are within the industry; non-compliant behaviour can be
punished; consumers value compliant behaviour...and some role is available for public
participation or oversight.”113
The Industry Task Force on Self-Regulation stated that self-regulation tends to be less
effective where there is a broad spread of smaller businesses that communicate

For example, Gunningham and Rees state that industry interests “may be entirely inconsistent with the public interest” but fail to point to detailed examples in relation to environmental issues: above n 1 at 390.
111 An exception is Gunningham, N.; Sinclair, D.
(1998) “New Generation Environmental Policy: Environmental
Management Systems and Regulatory Reform” 22(3) Melbourne University Law Review 592-616 at 610-612.
112 Gunningham and Sinclair (2002) Leaders and Laggards, at 14.
113 Priest, M. (1997) above n 18 at 239.
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infrequently.114 Sutton and Haines argued, on the basis of extensive research into
compliance with occupational health and safety (OH&S) legislation in Australia, that
smaller contractors in intensively competitive industries will be in no position to be
motivated by virtue. Regardless of the existence or otherwise of any good intentions to
comply, they will often be forced by competitive pressures and the need for profit to cut
corners on environmental protection and occupational health and safety.115
The sheer number of SMEs makes it difficult for regulators to conduct frequent
inspections or even to make contact with enterprises for extension and education
purposes. The literature based on empirical research suggests that micro-businesses
involving one to five participants have the least environmental awareness. They are said
to be “unwilling to take action unless threatened by strong external forces such as
prosecution or customer demands.”116 Obviously there will be exceptions, as SMEs are a
diverse and numerous group of organisations. The point remains that there is some
evidence that this group is often unwilling to voluntarily take substantial actions for
environmental protection.
Further research is required into the question of the compatibility of self-regulation with
industries that are dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises. Given the
domination of the private forestry sector in Australia by SMEs, this question will be
explored in depth later in the thesis.
A viable strategy is to offer a ‘two-track regulatory system’ which offers co-regulation
and EMS to larger firms who have proven that they can go, and have gone, ‘beyond
compliance’, and a second tier of direct regulation for smaller and less adventurous firms,
and the ‘laggards’ of a particular industry.117

Commonwealth Treasury (2000) Industry Self-Regulation in Consumer Markets, A Report prepared by the Taskforce on Industry Selfregulation, August, Treasury, Canberra, also at <www.selfregulation.gov.au/publications> Chapter 5 at 41-58.
115 Haines, F.; Sutton, A. (1997) above n 108 at 138-163.
116 Groundwork Foundation (1998) Small Firms and the Environment: A Groundwork Status Report, Birmingham, UK,
Groundwork Foundation, cited in Gunningham and Sinclair (2002) Leaders and Laggards at 14.
117 Gunningham, N. (2001) Options for Regulations to Interface with Environmental Management procedures: Integration of
EMS into legislation in the oil and gas industry, paper for UNEP Mineral Resources Forum,
<www.mineralresourcesforum.org/docs/pdfs>, accessed 27.5.02.
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This thesis focuses on proposals for self-regulation as one aspect of the reconfiguration
of regulation. Other tools for supplementing regulation such as forestry certification,118
corporate environmental reporting,119 and environmental management systems120 are
relevant but cannot be considered in detail in this study as they are beyond its scope and
focus. Each of these techniques would normally apply to larger companies and larger
forestry operations and therefore are not centrally relevant in the PNF context.

CHAPTER SUMMARY
This Chapter has reviewed recent debates over the reform and ‘reinvention’ of
environmental regulation. The objective of this Chapter has been to review particular
aspects of the broader theoretical literature that consider the various possible
permutations of self-regulation and indirect forms of governance. By doing so the
broader context surrounding discussion of law and policy for PNF has been presented.
The natural resources management field is becoming increasingly subject to proposals for
self-regulation and ‘light regulation’, as is the case in other areas of environmental law
and policy. The broader political context for environmental law reform in Australia is
one of preference for indirect governance, government-community partnerships,
exemptions and de-regulation, at the expense of direct regulatory controls.121
A position taken in this thesis is that one cannot endorse self-regulation as inherently
better than direct regulation, any more than direct regulation can be credibly criticised as
inherently inefficient and ineffective. It is vital that such issues must be examined in the
specific factual, sociological, and political contexts in which they arise. Although there are
often numerous practical difficulties with the application of direct regulatory techniques,
Bruce, R. (1996) Comparison of the FSC Forest Certification and ISO Environmental Management Schemes and Their Impact on a Small
Retail Business, MBA Dissertation, University of Edinburgh Management School, unpublished.
119 Richardson, B. (2002) above n 71.
120 The use of EMS and certification is seen by industry and government in Australia as a vital aspect of a move towards selfregulation by the forestry industry: Commonwealth Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Australia (2000)
Submission to the Taskforce on Industry Self-regulation, Submission No.28, AFFA, January, at p.18. A draft Australian Forestry
Standard was released in August 2002: Standards Australia, Australian Forestry Standard Steering Committee and Technical
Reference Committee (2002) Forest Management-Economic, Social, Environmental and Cultural Criteria and Requirements for Wood
Production (the Australian Forestry Standard), Pre-Publication Final Committee Draft, 2 August 2002, 207pp.,
<http://www.forestrystandard.org.au/documents.html>. See also: Gunningham, N.; Sinclair, D. (1999) “Environmental
Management Systems, Regulation and the Pulp and Paper Industry - ISO14001 in Practice” 16(1) Environmental and Planning
Law Journal 5-24. See more generally: Brooks, A. (2001) “Systems Standard and Performance Standard Regulation of
Occupational Health and Safety: A Comparison of the European Union and Australian Approaches”, 43(4) Journal of
Industrial Relations 361-386 at 361; Nash, J.; Ehrenfeld, J. (1999) Environmental Management Systems and Their Roles in
Environmental Policy, Technology, Business and Environment Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, prepared for
Summit Conference on EMS, Brookings Institute, Washington DC, 2-3 November 1999, 20pp., at 3.
121 Lyster, R. (2002) “Deregulating the Rural Environment”, 19(1) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 34-57.
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it has been argued that there is a need to avoid over-enthusiastic endorsement of selfregulation approaches.
The following Chapter continues to examine the consequences of the pervasive
theoretical rejection of ‘prescriptive’ regulation. It addresses the specific contexts and
challenges presented by the task of conserving biological diversity and other
environmental values on privately-held property. Such issues (including questions of how
to achieve and encourage ecologically sustainable forest management (ESFM) surround
the question of how best to regulate forestry operations on privately-owned land.

Chapter Four

PRIVATE LAND CONSERVATION AND THE LAW

“It’s our land. If the National Parks Service want us to farm some endangered beetle, they had
better pay us to do it.”
- Grazier’s comment from the floor, during NPWS Community Consultation
Seminar regarding proposed regulation to prescribe ‘routine agricultural activities’
under the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (NSW), Platypus Lodge, Cooma,
August 1997.
“I think that the liberal Lockean conception of private property is pretty iniquitous. It always
struck me when I first came here, that the kind of power I was given over this place was just
inexcusable. I could raze the whole thing. But you can’t pick up an inch of soil here that isn’t
occupied. You can see things squirming and jumping everywhere. The whole place is just packed and
crammed with living things, and an incredible history of the earth. To think that I had the power
to destroy it remains deeply shocking to me.”
- Dr Val Plumwood, philosopher, referring to her ownership of forested land
adjacent to the Budawang National Park, near Braidwood, NSW.1

INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes some of the specific legal, political, sociological and physical
characteristics of the private land context that constrain policy choices for private native
forestry regulation. The task of devising law and policy for the private land context
requires legislators and regulators to address specific issues regarding private property
ownership. This chapter reviews the rights of private property owners to deal with land
at common law, as well as statutory and common law limitations on those rights. It also
discusses cultural resistance to regulation.
Other policy constraints are raised by the inherent nature of the task of biodiversity
conservation. The particular characteristics of this task, such as the problem of decisionmaking in a context of limited ecological information and the existence of thresholds of
irreversible biodiversity loss, must also be addressed in setting policy in this situation.

1

As interviewed in Prest J. (1997) “Protecting Plumwood Mountain”, 41(6) National Parks Journal 17.

In this context, as always, broader debates over the appropriate level of direct regulation
of economic activity by the state are of central relevance. The consequences of the
pervasive theoretical and political rejection of ‘command’ or ‘prescriptive’ regulation
within the particular context of off-reserve production environments needs to be
examined. There is a strong theme running through much Australian literature relating to
nature conservation on privately owned land, of seeking to avoid or minimise the use of
direct regulation, which is frequently perceived as ‘coercive’.2 This chapter asks “What
are the opportunities and the dangers presented by the push to ‘reinvent’ environmental
regulation in terms of the specialised context of biodiversity conservation on private
land?”

LAWS FOR NATURE CONSERVATION
Increasingly it has been recognised that actions for conservation within the off-reserve
context are an important aspect of policies for biodiversity conservation. Such policies
entail reviewing measures for sustainability outside of national parks and nature reserves,
within primary production contexts such as agriculture and forestry. To an ever-greater
degree, attention is being paid to the impacts of particular land-use practices on
biodiversity and ecological sustainability.
As stated above, there are serious problems world-wide involving the loss of
biodiversity.3 The severity of these problems is reflected in Australia, where biodiversity
decline is recognised by scientists as one of the most pressing environmental issues.4 The
large number of species, ecological communities and ecosystems listed within Australian
legislation as vulnerable, threatened or endangered gives an idea of the magnitude of the

Curran, D. (2000) “The Conservation of Biological Diversity on Private Property in NSW”, 17(1) Environmental and
Planning Law Journal 34-59; Gunningham, N. (1996a) “Biodiversity: Economic Incentives and Legal Instruments”,
ch.15 in Boer, Fowler, Gunningham (eds.) Environmental Outlook No.2: Law and Policy, Federation Press, Sydney at
232-233; Gunningham, N., Young, M. (1997) “Toward Optimal Environmental Policy: The Case of Biodiversity
Conservation” 24(2) Ecology Law Quarterly 243-298; Young, M., Gunningham, N., Elix, J., Lambert, J., Howard, B.,
Grabosky, P., McCrone, E. (1996) Reimbursing the Future : An evaluation of motivational, voluntary, price-based, property-right,
and regulatory incentives for the conservation of biodiversity, Commonwealth Department Environment Sport and Territories,
Canberra, Parts 1&2, Biodiversity Series, Paper No.9.
3 World Conservation Union, United Nations Environment Program, and World Wide Fund for Nature (1990) Caring
for the World: A Strategy for Sustainability, IUCN, UNEP and WWF, Gland, Switzerland, p.58; Myers, N.; Knoll, A.
(2001) “The Biotic Crisis and the Future of Evolution”, Colloquium Paper, 98(10) Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences 5389-5392; Wilson, E. (1992) The Diversity of Life, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
4 Burgman, M. (1998) Conservation Biology for the Australian Environment, Surrey Beatty, Sydney. A Commonwealth
government publication stated that 20 mammal species, 20 bird species and 76 plant species are known to have
become extinct since European settlement. : Department of Environment (1998) Reform of Commonwealth
Environmental Legislation: Consultation Paper, Environment Australia, Canberra at p.19.
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crisis; in NSW there are 321 endangered species and 367 vulnerable species listed.5
Australia has a particular international responsibility for biodiversity conservation, being
one of 17 nations which are custodians of a ‘megadiverse’ biota– and only one of two
with ‘developed nation’ status.6 80 per cent of its terrestrial and aquatic flora and fauna is
endemic.
The reservation of natural areas within national parks and other protected areas has long
been a strategy for nature conservation in Australia, starting with the gazettal of Royal
National Park in 1879.7 Australian approaches have evolved from earlier preoccupations
with the creation of public protected areas based on anthropocentric considerations
(including the preservation of scenic, recreational, and hunting values8), to a
contemporary awareness of the need for comprehensive reservation of ecosystem types.9
Governments and commentators, prompted by the National Strategy for the Conservation of
Australia’s Biological Diversity (1996), are now asking whether the reserve system adequately
conserves

samples

of

each

ecosystem,

meeting

nationally

agreed

tests

of

comprehensiveness, adequacy, and representativeness.10
Although publicly-owned reserves provide the greatest protection to natural habitats,
they only cover a small proportion of the total land area,11 e.g. in NSW in 1999, protected
areas under the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 covered only 6.2 per cent (estimated)
of the State.12 A biodiversity conservation strategy relying upon protected-areas
legislation has significant limitations, as many ecosystems are not adequately ‘represented’
EPA NSW (2000) NSW State of the Environment 2000, EPA Chatswood, Table 6.15, at
<http://www.epa.nsw.gov.au/soe/soe2000/cb>. There are also 17 endangered populations, and 28 endangered
ecological communities listed in the Schedules of the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995.
6 As recognised in 2000 by the World Conservation Monitoring Centre. Discussed in Williams, J., Read, C., Norton, A.,
Dovers, S., Burgman, M., Proctor, W. and Anderson, H., (2001) Biodiversity: Australia State of the Environment Report
2001 (Theme Report), CSIRO Publishing on behalf of the Department of the Environment and Heritage, Canberra at
p.13.
7 Royal National Park is the second oldest national park in the world after Yellowstone (USA).
8 Cresswell, I., Thomas, G. (eds.) (1997) Terrestrial and Marine Protected Areas in Australia, Environment Australia,
Biodiversity Group, Canberra, at p.3.
9 Sivertsen, D. (1995) “Habitat Loss – Its Nature and Effects – including case studies from NSW”, in Bradstock, R.
et.al., Conserving Biodiversity: Threats and Solutions, Surrey Beatty and Sons, Sydney, 29-42.
10 Commonwealth of Australia (1995) National Forest Conservation Reserves: Commonwealth Proposed Criteria: A Position Paper,
July, AGPS, Canberra at v-vi; Joint ANZECC/MCFFA National Forest Policy Statement Implementation SubCommittee (JANIS) (1996) Ministerial Nationally Agreed Criteria for the Establishment of a Comprehensive, Adequate and
Representative Reserve System for Forests in Australia, Canberra.
11 Across Australia, whilst 40 million hectares of land lies within the formal terrestrial nature reserve system, 500
million hectares or more than two thirds of Australia’s land mass is managed by private landholders.
Commonwealth of Australia (1996) National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity, DEST,
Canberra, p.11.
12 Benson, J. (1999) Setting the Scene: The Native Vegetation of New South Wales, Background Paper No.1, Native Vegetation
Advisory Council, Sydney at 34. However note that a large number of national parks have been proclaimed since
that time.
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within the publicly-owned nature reserve system.13 The reserve system has emerged
largely as a result of a series of ad hoc and often politically opportunistic decisions.14
It is apparent that off-reserve conservation entails a far broader range of options than
simply “locking up” areas of privately-held land as though they were another form of
nature reserve. It also involves incorporating sustainability approaches into production
environments, within forestry and agricultural industries. One particular subset of offreserve policies entails minimising the environmental impacts of forestry within native
forests on privately-held land. As indicated earlier, nearly 70 per cent of Australian native
forests15 are under private sector management, on freehold or leasehold land.16

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION
Australia’s moral obligations and responsibilities as a custodian of certain unique
components of global biodiversity now generate particular legal obligations which were
accepted upon the signature (1992) and ratification (1993) of the United Nations Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD).17 The ongoing development of international instruments for
nature conservation, such as the CBD, represents a source of pressure for domestic law
reform. It encourages parties to confront problems at their source by emphasising in situ
conservation rather than ex-situ actions. To this end, one of the CBD’s requirements is

Cresswell, I., Thomas, G. (eds.) (1997) above n 8 at pp. 9-12. In New South Wales, of the 124 environmental
domains mapped, 27% of these are not represented at all in the reserve system, whilst those represented at a level of
0-2.5% of their extent covered 54% of the total area of NSW : Howard, B & Young, M. (1995) Selecting and Costing a
Representative Expansion of the NSW Protected Areas Network, a report prepared by CSIRO Futures Program for DEST,
Canberra; cited in EPA NSW (1997) State of the Environment Report at 322. Apart from various forest ecosystem types,
other even more threatened ecosystems include lowland grasslands and certain woodland vegetation types in South
Eastern Australia: Benson, J., Wyse Jackson, M. (1994) “The Monaro Region”, in McDougall, K., Kirkpatrick, J.
(eds.), Conservation of Lowland Grasslands in South Eastern Australia, World Wide Fund for Nature Australia, Sydney;
Benson, J. (1994) “The Native Grasslands of the Monaro Region: Southern Tablelands of NSW”, 3 Cunninghamia
609-643.
14 Pressey, R. (1992) “Opportunism in Acquiring Land Reserves – Why it’s a bad idea”, National Parks Journal, August,
at 19-22; Weatherley, M. (1993) “Save what you can when you can: a reply to Bob Pressey”, National Parks Journal,
February, 10-11; State of the Environment Advisory Council (eds.), Australia: State of the Environment Report, 1996, an
independent report to the Commonwealth Minister for the Environment, CSIRO Publishing, Melbourne, at 4-52,
10-15. The deficiencies in the representativeness of the system have been confirmed by research into an Interim
Biogeographic Regionalisation of Australia (IBRA): Cresswell, I., Thomas, G. (eds.) (1997) above n 8 at pp. 9-12.
15 The National Forest Inventory (NFI) defined ‘forest’ as “an area that is dominated by trees having usually a single stem and a
13

mature or potentially mature stand height exceeding 2 metres and with existing or potential crown cover of overstorey strata about
equal to or greater than 20 per cent.” National Forest Inventory (1998) Australia’s State of the Forests Report 1998, Bureau
of Rural Sciences, Canberra, p.30.
16
17

Ibid at 35.
UN Convention on Biological Diversity, Done at Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, ATS 1993 No.32; 31 ILM 818 (1992), in
force 29.12.93, (signed for Australia 5.6.92, ratified by Australia 18.6.93); see also Farrier, D. (1997) “The Concept of
Biological Diversity”, paper presented to the Seminar ‘Biodiversity Conservation and the Law’, Centre for Natural
Resources Law and Policy, University of Wollongong, and NSW Local Government and Shires Association, Sydney.

for parties to develop a system of protected areas and guidelines for the selection,
establishment and management of those areas.18
International environmental law, as exemplified in the CBD, has developed further
towards accommodating the issue of off-reserve conservation (on private land), and away
from its previous tendency of imposing other international environment-protection
treaties and instruments to focus on public land reservation strategies for “special places”
and “special areas”.19
Domestic awareness of the importance of off-reserve conservation is reinforced by the
requirements of the CBD for biodiversity conservation across the landscape,20 and
conservation of habitats on all land tenures.21 The CBD requires biodiversity conservation
across the landscape, including on private land. Article 8(c) of the CBD creates an
obligation on State parties to “regulate or manage biological resources important for the
conservation of biological diversity whether inside or outside protected areas with a view to
ensuring their conservation and sustainable use”22 [emphasis added]. The provisions of
the Convention are supplemented by international policy strategy documents that have
called for legislative responses to biodiversity loss. For example, the Global Biodiversity
Strategy (1992) calls upon nations to “improve and expand legal mechanisms to protect
species.”23 Relevant international policy documents include the World Conservation
Strategy24 and the Global Biodiversity Strategy. These include many relevant points such as
Action 49, calling upon national governments to “Incorporate biodiversity conservation
practices into the management of all forests.25

UN Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), above n 17, Article 8(a).
Farrier, D., and Tucker, L. (1998) “Beyond a Walk in the Park: The Impact of International Nature Conservation
Law on Private Land in Australia”, 22(3) Melbourne University Law Review 564.
20 UN Biodiversity Convention, Article 8(c); Farrier, D., and Tucker, L. (1998) above n 19.
21 Benson, J. (1999) above n 12 at 35; Farrier, D. (1997) The Concept of Biological Diversity, a paper prepared for the
'Biodiversity Conservation and the Law' Seminar conducted jointly by the NSW Local Government and Shires
Associations and the Centre for Natural Resources Law and Policy, Sydney, 19 September 1997; Young et al (1996)
above n 2.
22 Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 8(c). The adoption of measures is not optional, however a specifically
regulatory approach to biodiversity conservation appears optional given the choice of the phrase “regulate or
manage” within the Article.
23 Action #64 specified in World Resources Institute, World Conservation Union, United Nations Environment
Program (1992) Global Biodiversity Strategy: Guidelines for Action to Save, Study, and Use the Earth’s Biotic Wealth Sustainably
and Equitably, WRI, IUCN, UNEP, p.136.
24 IUCN, UNEP, WWF (1980) World Conservation Strategy, IUCN, Gland, Switzerland.
25 World Resources Institute, World Conservation Union, United Nations Environment Program (1992) above n 23 at
108.
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With the emphasis in national and international policy documents on improving
legislation for biodiversity conservation, we must ask: is existing domestic legislation
adequate for the task of off-reserve conservation? That broad question is addressed later
in this thesis in relation to the specific issue of the regulation of private native forestry in
NSW.

IMPLEMENTING OFF-RESERVE CONSERVATION
As argued above, the broad context of international agreements and soft international
law are creating pressure in the domestic context for adequate conservation measures
outside reserves and across the landscape. The relatively simple steps associated with
setting up conservation reserves on public land have in most cases already been taken. By
now the more difficult challenges are to be found on private land and in the ‘off-reserve’
context.26 The National Strategy for Biodiversity Conservation27 suggested that off-reserve
conservation must involve “integrated and consistent approaches across freehold and
leasehold and other Crown lands.”28 But the apparent difficulty of such actions in
Australia was recognised by the OECD in an external review of Australia’s performance
in 1996, stating that “progress with programmes for biodiversity conservation outside
protected areas has been extremely limited.”29
Conserving biodiversity on privately-owned land presents the sharpest point of
confrontation between the special legal status afforded private property ownership and
the particular policy difficulties associated with the task of biodiversity protection.30
Although land acquisition and reservation (the declaration of nature reserves) are
recognised to be highly effective strategies for conservation, because of the security of
tenure involved and (to a lesser extent) the likelihood of appropriate management,
acquisition has a limited role in relation to conservation on private land. First, as there
are thousands of patches of remnant vegetation on privately-held land, their very number

Except see Benson, J. (2000) “Building a geography of hope through land acquisition”44(1) National Parks Journal
(NSW).
27 Commonwealth of Australia (1996) National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity, DEST,
Canberra, p.11.
28 Ibid at 11. Other features required are linkages across the landscape, such as habitat corridors, linking private land
remnant vegetation with larger areas of habitat in national parks or other public land reserves. Benson, J. (1999)
above n 12.
29 OECD, (1996) Environmental Performance Reviews: Australia, p. 72.
30 Glanznig, A. (1995) Native Vegetation Clearance, Habitat Loss and Biodiversity decline: an overview of recent native vegetation
clearance in Australia and its implications for biodiversity, Department of Environment, Sport and Territories, Canberra;
Young et.al. (1996),above n 2.
26

makes it impractical to place them all in reserves, even if this were politically feasible.31
Second, the use of acquisition powers by the State, whether by negotiation or
compulsion, inevitably involves considerable expense, delay and other transaction costs.
32

Third, some of these costs will be political. Cultural respect for private property

suggests that there is usually a reluctance to interfere with it in such a drastic way, unless
there is an extreme and urgent need.33
Instead, the use of legislation to regulate and control the impact of primary industries on
private land has become a much more common option.34 Official government policy
documents at National and State level (eg NSW Biodiversity Strategy (1999)) have endorsed
legislative responses to prevent further biodiversity loss.35 The National Strategy calls for
the review of existing legislation “…that results directly or indirectly in loss of biological
diversity.”36 Similarly, international strategy documents such as the Global Biodiversity
Strategy (1992) have called for nations to “improve and expand legal mechanisms to
protect species.”37
When seen in historical perspective, attitudes have changed markedly since 19th- and early
20th-century policies in regard to nature conservation on privately-held lands. Early
policies, if they can be described as such, were characterised by laissez-faire, voluntarism
and self-regulation. In addition, pro-development policies encouraged removal of native
vegetation, with tax concessions. On leased land tree felling was frequently directed, with
lease conditions requiring vegetation clearance, usually by ringbarking.38 The 1970s
marked the beginning of a move away from statutes aimed at the ‘wise use’ and
conservation of individual species - in game- and wildlife-protection acts - towards
Benson, J. (1999) above n 12, at 35.
Australia. Parliament. House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and the Arts
(1993) Biodiversity: the Role of Protected Areas, AGPS, Canberra.
33 A perception of urgency in relation to biodiversity conservation on private land is a perception which is unlikely to
ever be adopted given the prevailing political context.
34 Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (NSW), Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth), Flora
and Fauna Guarantee Act 1988 (Vic), Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld).
35 Commonwealth of Australia (1996) National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity, DEST,
Canberra p.43, Para 7.3. See also World Wide Fund for Nature Australia (WWF) (1998) From Words to Action: A
Preliminary Review of Progress to Implement the National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity, Humane
Society International and WWF Australia, Sydney; NPWS (NSW) (1999) NSW Biodiversity Strategy, NPWS, Sydney, as
required by the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (NSW).
36 Commonwealth of Australia (1996) National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity, DEST,
Canberra, p.43.
37 Action #64 specified in World Resources Institute, World Conservation Union, United Nations Environment
Programme (1992) Global Biodiversity Strategy: Guidelines for Action to Save, Study, and Use the Earth’s Biotic Wealth
Sustainably and Equitably, WRI, IUCN, UNEP, p.136.
38 Author’s recollection of review of lease documents from the 1870s covering the Gudgenby Valley in what is now
Namadgi National Park, ACT conducted in a historical tenure search in relation to a Determination Application
under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).
31
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biodiversity protection acts. In more recent versions, these represent statutory
recognition of the importance of habitat conservation on private lands, particularly by
restricting broad-acre vegetation clearing.39 More recent legislation has acknowledged
critiques of the ‘species specific’ approach - exemplified by the US Endangered Species Act
1973, but also evident in the Victorian Flora and Fauna Guarantee Act 1988 - for their
emphasis on particular species in isolation40 rather than ecosystem conservation as a
whole.41
The main cause of biodiversity decline in Australia is the clearance, removal and
modification of habitats - most significantly from broad-scale vegetation clearing for
agriculture.42 Thus recent law reforms have acknowledged this point by preventing
habitat loss rather than emphasising the conservation of particular species.43 Other
elements of the proactive approach involve addressing the causes of biodiversity loss by
implementing development controls and ‘threat abatement plans’.44 Many of these threats
are recognised in biodiversity protection legislation as “key threatening processes” to be
addressed via statutory threat abatement plans.45 An ecosystem-based approach is partly
achieved by means of protection measures such as listing of endangered ecological
communities.46

THE POLICY CHALLENGES OF BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION
There are special difficulties raised by the characteristics of the biodiversity conservation
task that must be taken into account by policy-makers in the private land and private

Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Queensland), Soil Conservation and Land Care Act 1989 (SA), s8, Native Vegetation Act
1991(SA), Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW); State Section of Victorian Planning Scheme under Planning
and Environment Act 1987, cl.3-8, cl.7-4 of Development Controls.
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native forestry contexts. The unique aspects of the biodiversity conservation context are
as follows. Firstly, the loss of biological diversity, after a particular point is reached, is
ultimately irreversible and permanent – i.e. species extinction. This reduces the scope for
‘trial and error’ policy-making, which is often associated with the use of market
mechanisms. Similarly, in relation to ecosystems as opposed to specific species, there
exists a possibility of ecosystem collapse at a certain point, following continual damage
and alteration.
Secondly, there is considerable scientific uncertainty surrounding many components of
biodiversity. Many species, particularly invertebrates, are as yet undiscovered and there is
a risk they may be destroyed before their ecological characteristics and habitat needs are
well known, or even before they have been formally discovered.47 Limited scientific
knowledge about known species means that it is often not possible to set out exactly
where the 'thresholds of reversibility', up to which a species or ecosystem can withstand
disturbance, actually lie. Thus in order to avoid actions that may cause the extinction of
species, it is necessary to adopt a precautionary approach to the approval of actions
which may contribute to the decline or extinction of species.
Given the inadequacy of information relating to biodiversity, there is frequently a need to
apply the ‘precautionary principle’. A definition of the precautionary principle is
contained in the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Act 1999 (Cth)48 and numerous NSW
laws.49 It is that “lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing measures to prevent degradation of the environment where there are threats
of serious or irreversible damage.”50
Whilst the precautionary principle is a very useful decision-making concept, it has a
tendency to focus on micro level issues. It is possible to expand the precautionary
principle to create a concept of ‘precautionary standards’. 51 Regulators can set a target or
World Resources Institute, World Conservation Union, United Nations Environment Programme (1992) Global
Biodiversity Strategy: Guidelines for Action to Save, Study, and Use the Earth’s Biotic Wealth Sustainably and Equitably, WRI,
IUCN, UNEP, at 9.
48 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth), s. 391(2).
49 By reference to the Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991, s.6(2)
50 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth), s.3A(b), 391(2). See also: Gullet, W. (1997)
“Environmental Protection and the Precautionary Principle: A Response to Scientific Uncertainty in Environmental
Management”, 14 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 52; Barton, C. (1998) “The Status of the Precautionary
Principle in Australia: its emergence in Legislation and as a common law doctrine”, 22 Harvard Environmental Law
Review 509.
51 Young et al. (1996) above n 2 at 177.
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minimum standard of vegetation which must be preserved within a particular region, as a
tool with which to measure the extent of compliance with the precautionary principle on
a macro, or regional basis.52
In order to implement precautionary standards, it may be necessary to ensure that
legislation places an onus on landowners to justify proposed activities that exceed an agreed
threshold of risk in terms of likely biodiversity loss.53 This approach has the benefit of
shifting the burden of proof and the economic and logistical burden of informationgathering onto the developer, who is the party to gain economically from the proposed
activity. This represents an adaptation of the ‘polluter pays’ principle to the biodiversity
context.
A need has also been increasingly recognised for a natural resources management (NRM)
framework which incorporates so-called ‘adaptive management’ strategies. This is an
approach developed by ecologists, “who, bringing the scientific method to the messier
world of policy and management, construed management interventions as testable
hypotheses

designed

to

advance

ecosystem

management

through

explicit

experimentation and learning.”54 Dovers argues that environmental lawyers should
ensure legal frameworks for NRM enable the operation of the adaptive management
principle.55 However, this objective is directly contradicted by other trends in forest
policy aimed at providing ‘resource security’ such as compensation commitments granted
by the Commonwealth in RFAs, long term timber supply agreements in NSW and
Private Timber Reserves in Tasmania.56 In the USA, adaptive management is threatened
by ‘no surprises’ clauses being written into Habitat Conservation Plans under the
Endangered Species Act 1973 (ESA).57
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A third problem is that much biodiversity appears to have no immediate economic value,
and therefore a classic externality problem or 'market failure' arises.58 Market signals
cannot be relied upon to protect biodiversity. There is likely to be a large gap between
the private interest of developers and the wider public and ecological interest. In most
cases there is no immediate economic incentive for a private land-holder to preserve
biodiversity. Thus serious policy-making difficulties can arise because of the conflict
between pursuit of the profit motive and the objective of biodiversity conservation.59
There may be fundamental difficulties in applying self-regulatory approaches in this
context.
Associated with this is the need for direct regulation to correct what is commonly
described as the ‘free rider’ problem. Direct regulations are necessary, because without
them, only certain market players will take action to ensure ESFM techniques are used in
PNF. Other participants, variously described as ‘cowboys’ or ‘recalcitrants’, will be able
to gain a competitive marketplace advantage by not expending scarce resources on
environmental protection measures, and will be able to sell their product at a lower price,
having a lower production cost structure. Thus, Reimbursing the Future recommended “that
all incentive mixes be underpinned by ‘safety net’ regulations to catch the recalcitrant few
not persuaded by positive instruments.”60
Fourthly, there may be adverse and site-specific impacts on biodiversity caused by
particular development activities, as different regions have different ecosystems and
bioregions. This presents some challenges for the adoption of a market-based trading
approach, for example, under a tradeable permits scheme, as biodiversity is not a
uniform commodity, by comparison with sulphur dioxide or other airborne pollutants
controlled under some US schemes.
Fifthly, the causes of biodiversity loss are numerous, complex and operate
contemporaneously.61

Therefore,

it

is
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that

a

single

policy

Biodiversity and ecosystems provide ecosystem services which ultimately support industrial production. New
industrial chemicals, products and pharmaceuticals can all be derived from biodiversity.
59 Similar debates have been canvassed frequently in relation to occupational health and safety - eg. Gunningham, N.
(1984) Safeguarding the Worker: Job Hazards and the Role of the Law, Law Book Company, Sydney, at 270. “The plain fact
is that employers do not have an interest in minimising work hazards.”
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or regulatory instrument can address all of these causes. Sixthly, there is a need for
ongoing management actions (such as control of weeds and feral animals) in order to
protect biodiversity. Preventing biodiversity loss requires more than a once-and-for-all
policy response. It requires ongoing action.62
Finally, there is often a low level of awareness of the need for biodiversity protection and
therefore the level of intrinsic moral support for conservation is low. Biodiversity
conservation is a relatively new concept, and is not universally accepted in the rural
community, especially where it comes into conflict with production objectives.
The characteristics of the biodiversity context also imply important differences from the
pollution control context. Policy instruments and prescriptions appropriate that context
may not be applicable here. For example, the need for biodiversity protection actions,
and the consequences of not taking them may not be apparent to the landholder,
whereas the need for ameliorative actions will often be obvious in the pollution control
context.63

LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRIVATE LAND CONTEXT
The special status of private real property within the Anglo-Australian legal system raises
a number of difficulties for governments seeking to conserve biodiversity on private
land.64 These difficulties exist on two levels – first, impediments to environmental lawmaking affecting private property rights, and secondly political impediments to restricting
the use of private land.
Environmental law in Australia has in recent years been evolving to extend its application
to address industries and activities not previously subject to regulation. In an increasing
number of jurisdictions it now seeks to more comprehensively regulate environmental
impacts of activities on private land and not just immediate, drastic impacts on
neighbours as have been long regulated by various common law doctrines such as
nuisance and the law in Rylands v Fletcher (as now modified by the Australian High
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Court).65 The growth of reach of environmental laws will continue to raise questions of
the scope of private property rights and notions of regulatory ‘acquisition’ of property.
In the context of discussing PNF, reference is frequently made by forestry advocates to
the rights of private property owners, in an attempt to exclude the operation of
environmental laws.66 For example, the Forest Products Association proclaimed in 2002:
“Private forestry is just that, Private, and ultimately under the control of the landowners
who have practiced [sic] conservation for many years…They have done so without any
need for overzealous regulation…”67
Yet notions of unassailable private property rights are more ideology than law; even the
common law has long placed limitations on private property owners, albeit in order to
protect the private rights of others. At this point it is necessary to briefly review the law
relating to real property and the rights of beneficial owners of real property.
Does freehold title permit the landowner in New South Wales to fell trees and destroy
vegetation at will? To answer this question we must briefly explore the definition of the
terms ‘ownership’ and ‘property’ and determine the applicable law,68 consisting of the
common law as modified by relevant statutes. British land law was imported into
Australia upon the assertion or acquisition of sovereignty by the British, applying to all
grants and interests in land - other than native title rights.69
The principles of negligence relating to an occupiers liability for damage caused by the escape of fire or dangerous
substances introduced to his/her premises as set out in Rylands v Fletcher (1866) LR 1 Ex 265; afd (1868) LR 3 HL
330 were subsumed into the general law of negligence in Australia by the High Court in its decision in Burnie Port
Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 ALR 42.
66 Personal observation of the author from attending meetings of the PNF Reference Group, DLWC, Bridge St,
Sydney, April-June 2002.
67 Forest Products Association NSW (2002) Exemption Process for Sustainable Forestry: FPA Framework, FPA, Sydney,
20.5.02, 8pp at p.1.
68 Bonyhady, T. (1992) “Property Law” in Bonyhady, T. (ed.), Environmental Protection and Legal Change, Federation Press,
Sydney, at 44-45.
69 Mabo v Queensland [No.2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 at 48,49 per Brennan J. According to MacDonald et al at 29: “Prior to
Mabo No.2 it had been held in a number of cases that the effect of the introduction of the doctrine of tenure into
Australian law was that, on acquisition of sovereignty, the Crown became the absolute and beneficial owner of all
land in Australia.” But the radical title acquired with the acquisition of sovereignty did not confer an absolute
beneficial title upon the Crown to the occupied land - as the rights and interests in land of the indigenous
inhabitants were recognised in the form of native title. MacDonald, C., McCrimmon, L., Wallace, A. (1998) Real
Property Law in Queensland, LBC Information Services, North Ryde, NSW, at p.29. Native title rights are defined in
the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), s.223 as the rights or interests of indigenous Australians in land or waters, and the
content of native title rights will vary from place to place: Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1 at 169 per
Gummow J. The native title of Australia’s indigenous inhabitants has been held to have been extinguished upon
Crown grant of freehold (Mabo v Queensland [No.2] (1992) 175 CLR 1; Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 156 ALR 721)
and certain forms of leasehold: Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1; Wilson v Anderson (2002) 190 ALR 313 re
effect of leases under Western Lands Act (NSW). The issue of modification of native title rights by environmental
laws is another question, and for reasons of limited space and time is not explored here. TSCA, s.145 provides that
the TSCA is not intended to affect native title rights and interests.
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The term ‘land owner’ can be more precisely defined as a person beneficially entitled to a
fee simple estate in freehold tenure.70 An estate in fee simple comprises a bundle of rights
relating to a particular parcel of land including the right to exclude others from the use or
benefit of the land, the right to use and deal with land - to sell, mortgage, subdivide, as
well as to possess, quietly enjoy, lease, and dispose of the property.71
At common law, title to land entails title to the timber and vegetation growing on it.
Thus ‘land’ is defined to include the soil and surface layer of the Earth and all physical
things attached to it (such as trees and timber) or things which are in the ground (e.g.
minerals). This position is reflected in statute law in NSW, except in relation to
minerals.72 These aspects of land are referred to as corporeal hereditaments (loosely,
tangible things as opposed to intangible rights such as easements).73 This definition is
based on the Latin maxim quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit, meaning “whatever is attached
to the ground [i.e. fixtures] becomes a part of it”.74
At common law, a landowner is generally free to carry out any lawful activity on her or
his land and use the land for whatever purpose she or he desires.75 These rights are
modified by the common-law doctrine of private nuisance76 and the so-called ‘natural
rights’ of land ownership77 - the right to support for land (i.e. a right of action in the
event of subsidence)78 and the right to the flow of water (i.e., riparian rights).79 The
primary objective of such doctrines is to protect the proprietary rights of other land
In NSW a land owner is defined as “any person entitled to an estate of freehold in possession in the land… whether
in fee simple or for life or otherwise…” Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), s.135A.
71 The rights of property owners were summarised by Blackburn J in Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd: “property, in its many
forms, generally implies the right to use or enjoy, the right to exclude others, and the right to alienate.” Milirrpum v
Nabalco Pty. Ltd. (1971) 17 FLR 141, MacDonald, C., McCrimmon, L., Wallace, A. (1998) Real Property Law in
Queensland, LBC Information Services, North Ryde, NSW, at p.11. Geyer, Leon (1995) “Property Rights – A
Fundamental Right Requiring Constitutional Protection or a Political Right Manufactured Without A Duty ?”,
unpublished paper presented to Law School University of Melbourne, 29pp., at 4; see also discussion at Wilcox, M.
(1992) “Retrospect and Prospect”, ch.8 in Bonyhady, T. (ed.), Environmental Protection and Legal Change, Federation
Press, Sydney, 206-230 at 207.
72 s.3, Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) largely adopts the common law definition of land. It defines land as: “Land,
messuages, tenements, and hereditaments corporeal and incorporeal of every kind …, together with all …
plantations, gardens, … and all trees and timber thereon….” ‘Land’ is similarly defined in Interpretation Act 1987,
s.21(1) ; Conveyancing Act 1919 s.7.
73 Butt, P. (1996) Land Law, 3rd edition, LBC Information Services, North Ryde, NSW, at 400.
74 Ibid at 22.
75 MacDonald, C., McCrimmon, L., Wallace, A. (1998) Real Property Law in Queensland, LBC Information Services,
North Ryde, NSW, at p.120.
76 Malliate v Sharpe [2001] NSWSC 1057 (13 December 2001); Bonnici & Anor v Ku-ring-gai Municipal Council [2001]
NSWSC 1124 (12 December 2001); Dynamic Flooring Pty Limited v Carter & Anor [2001] NSWCA 396 (8 November
2001); Stockwell v State of Victoria [2001] VSC 497 (17 December 2001).
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owners. It would not be accurate to say that the common law and the law of equity have
completely failed to provide tools to restrict indiscriminate tree-felling or environmental
damage. The question is more one of the common law’s failure to provide adequate
levels of environmental protection. The NSW Supreme Court confirmed in Van Son v
Forestry Commission that non-point-source water pollution arising from timber-felling
amounted to a private nuisance.80 The common law also places restrictions on the felling
of timber on private property by life tenants, placing limits on cutting under the doctrine
of ‘waste’ - in particular equitable waste (which is committed by acts of excessive tree
felling).81 The law of equity has also made provision for land owners to impose negative
or restrictive covenants upon the future use of property by subsequent owners. Such
equitable covenants can require the owner of burdened land to refrain from particular
activities such as cutting timber, but cannot oblige the assignee to expend monies.82
Sax, Raff, Plumwood, and others have argued that the limited ecological perspective
associated with the traditional common-law rights of private property are inimical to the
creation of an ecologically sustainable society.83 According to Sax:
Traditional legal concepts lead to the conclusion…that the owner of a forest may destroy it as a
living and sustaining entity if to do so is advantageous. Except for nuisance type limitations - you
may not burn if the smoke affects your neighbour, or perhaps you must not cut in ways that will
cause massive erosive mud slides across your boundary line - your forest is yours to deal with as
you wish….84

Sax argues that individualistic ideologies of private property ownership “have had their
day” as they rest on a factually incorrect assumption that the use of one’s land is a private
matter “because it affects me and only me”, whereas the science of ecology has identified
the interconnectedness and inter-relatedness of parts of the ecosystem.85 Similarly,
Metzger bemoaned the “environmental insensitivity of the land use law produced by our
view of property.”86 He suggested that the origin of the problem is “the fundamental
denial in modern Western civilisation of the interdependence of people with their fellows
80 Van
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and their environment.”87 In the time of Locke, it may have been true that, as Locke put
it, “nor was the appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice to any
other man.”88 However there is now abundant scientific evidence that this is often no
longer the case.
It is not intended to debate the institution of private property here, but to discuss the
development of a more ecologically-aware law as applies to the rights of private property
owners. Literature from conservation biology ponders the tendency of individuals and
social institutions such as the media, the law, and our economic system, to persist in
denying ecological damage.89 Thus, a number of suggestions have been made about the
extent of law reforms that might be required. Sax proposed an affirmative duty of
proprietorship for land owners to use their property “in the service of a habitable planet”.
(The notion of a landholder’s duty of care is discussed in Part IV). Secondly, he drew
attention to the need for the law to distinguish between the environmental importance of
particular parcels of land, rather than to treat all parcels of land alike.
There are essentially two competing conceptions of the western liberal concept of
property, with one emphasising ‘freedom of property’ and the rights associated with
property ownership, and the other suggesting that property ownership entails social
obligations as well as rights.90 The latter view was elaborated in Backhouse v Judd, albeit an
animal welfare case. Napier J of the SA Supreme Court stated that “There is nothing
novel in the idea that property is a responsibility as well as a privilege.”91
In any case, due to its limited effectiveness in providing environmental protection, the
common law has now been extensively modified by modern environmental and land-use
planning legislation which restricts the uses to which privately-owned land may be put,
Ibid at 793. He argues “The forces arrayed against the recognition of ecological reality in the area of land use
planning are formidable. In addition to the entrenched ignorance, emotionalism, social inertia, and powerful vested
interests…those who seek reform in land use planning…must do battle with the cherished notion of private
ownership of real property.” (at 801).
88 John Locke, Treatise II at 33, cited in Ashcraft, R. (1986) Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises of Government,
Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.
89 Orr, D.; Ehrenfeld, D. (1995) “None So Blind: The Problem of Ecological Denial”, 9(5) Conservation Biology 985-987.
90 Raff, M. (1998) above n 83 at 661; Bonyhady (1992) above n 68, pp.44-45. McAuslan identifies two other notions of
the role of the law in relation to private property in the area of land use planning - that the law also has a crucial role
in advance the public interest in relation to the use of private land; and a radical or populist view that the law should
be used to enable rights of public participation in relation to the uses of private property. McAuslan, P. (1980) The
Ideologies of Planning Law, Pergamon Press, Oxford, at 2.
91 Backhouse v Judd [1925] SASR 16; Further, according to international experts at the UN Workshop on Land Tenure and
Cadastral Infrastructures for Sustainable Development: “property rights in land do not in principle carry with them a right
to neglect or destroy the land.” cited in Raff, M. (2000) Submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on
Environment and Heritage Inquiry into Public Good Conservation, 8 May 2000, p.3.
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and the activities that may be carried out on it.92 Rights to fell timber and clear vegetation
on private property in NSW have been restricted by statutes including the Native
Vegetation Conservation Act 1997, Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, and the
Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995.
It is an established principle of planning law that land uses permitted in one location may
be prohibited in another, given the public interest in orderly direction of the
development of land and the protection of public health, amenity, et cetera.93 The fact that
planning laws restrict private rights was accepted by the judiciary long ago. In 1969, Lord
Diplock said:
“[t]he whole purpose of planning control…is to take away private rights of property.
Any refusal of planning permission does just this…”94

Yet despite clear statutory statements of objects and parliamentary speeches about the
necessity for environmental protection, these statutes occasionally fall foul of a common
law presumption of statutory interpretation that Parliament does not intend to detract
from property rights unless the statute in question states this expressly or by necessary
intendment.95 In Protean (Holdings) Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (Vic) pollution
control legislation was interpreted in favour of a polluting landholder on the basis of the
landholder’s existing proprietary rights.96
The ultimate source of justification for restrictions on the use of private property lies in
the doctrine of tenures, which contains the proposition that private property ownership
exists ultimately as a result of a grant from the Crown.97 On this basis there is no
absolute ownership of land itself but ownership merely of an estate in land. The Crown’s
radical title lies between the land itself and a freehold estate in it.98 With the reception of
such doctrines of British law into Australian law, land owners ultimately hold their

Farrier, D., Lyster, R., Pearson, L. (1999) Environmental Law Handbook: Planning and Land Use in NSW, 3rd edition,
Redfern Legal Centre Publishing, Sydney. p.9.
93 Rio Pioneer Gravel Co Pty Ltd v Warringah Shire Council (1969) 17 LGRA 153 (Land & Valn Ct NSW), Else-Mitchell J at
162.
94 Westminster Bank Ltd v Beverley Borough Council [1969] 1 QB 499, at 526 per Diplock J.
95 Colonial Sugar Refining Co v Melbourne Harbour Trust Commissioners [1927] AC 343 at 359, per Lord Warrington of Clyffe;
Pearce, D., Geddes, R. (1996) Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 4th edition, Butterworths, Sydney at 137-140; Raff,
M. (1998) above n 83 at 662-3.
96 Protean (Holdings) Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (Vic) [1977] VR 51 at 55-56.
97 MacDonald, C., McCrimmon, L., Wallace, A. (1998) Real Property Law in Queensland, LBC Information Services,
North Ryde, NSW at 21.
98 Butt, P. (1996) Land Law, 3rd edition, LBC Information Services, North Ryde, NSW, at p.112.
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property at the pleasure of the Crown.99 It is from this point that the Crown ultimately
derives its powers for compulsory acquisition of private property.100

Acquisition, regulatory takings, and compensation
One of the questions that arise when regulating PNF is: how far can the Parliament go in
making forestry and environmental laws? In what circumstances does a regulatory
‘interference’ with the rights of a private landholder amount to, or come to represent,
effectively, an ‘acquisition’ of that property giving right to an entitlement to
compensation?
Laws of the Commonwealth Parliament providing for the acquisition of property by the
Commonwealth and its agencies must be consistent with section 51(xxxi) of the
Commonwealth Constitution, that any acquisition of property by the Commonwealth
must be “on just terms”.101 The question of validity of environmental legislation under
s.51(xxxi) was considered in the Tasmanian Dams case. It was held by 3 of 7 justices that
although the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983 (Cth) had effectively ‘sterilised’
the use of Tasmanian Crown land by preventing dam-building on it,102 this exercise of
power did not amount to an acquisition. This was because the Commonwealth did not in
fact gain any property or proprietary interest, or have such an interest vested in it.103
Murphy J observed: “[T]he extinction or limitation of property rights does not amount to
acquisition…”.104
In the Dams case the High Court also considered arguments regarding regulatory
acquisition of property. The Australian law was described as “significantly different” to
US doctrines on ‘regulatory takings’. According to Mason J: “The emphasis in s.51(xxxi)

The incorporation of the doctrine of tenures in Australian law was confirmed in Mabo v Queensland (No.2) (1992) 175
CLR 1 at 45, Brennan J.
100 Along similar lines, Farrier et. al. (1999) above n 92 at 12 advance an argument, on the basis of the writings of JS
Mill, that the State has an interest in ensuring that the use of land is “of general expediency” i.e. of benefit to the
community at large, even if indirectly.
101 Commonwealth Constitution, s.51(xxxi).
102 Mason J at para 70.
103 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, per Mason J at 145, Brennan J at 247-8, with Deane J dissenting at 286.
See further, Bonyhady, T. (1992) above n 68 at 46.
104 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 at 181 per Murphy J. Similarly, Mason J held: “To bring the
Constitutional provision into play it is not enough that legislation adversely affects or terminates a pre-existing right
that an owner enjoys...”. Mason J at 145. Compare this situation with that considered in the Bank Nationalisation
Case: Bank of NSW v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1.
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is not on a ‘taking’ of private property but on the acquisition of property for purposes of
the Commonwealth.” The US law was described as having “no direct relevance”.105
The notion of a regulatory ‘acquisition’ of property has not been broadly accepted in
Australian law. The exception is the High Court’s acceptance of such arguments in 1997
in the context of interpretation of the constitutional validity of Commonwealth
proclamations under the former National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1975 in
Newcrest v Commonwealth.106 For the first time the High Court held that particular
environmentally-based land-use restrictions infringed the Commonwealth Constitutional
prohibition on uncompensated acquisitions of property.107 The expansion of a national
park in the Northern Territory which had effectively sterilised a mining company’s
property rights in the form of mining leases wash held to amount to a compensable
acquisition. However it is important to note that the decision applied in the Northern
Territory and is likely to be of limited application in the states (see further, below).
In the United States, the Constitutional jurisprudence on regulatory ‘takings’ represents
as a major impediment to environmentally-sensitive land-use regulation108, as well as
other forms of environmental regulation.109 Yet numerous restrictions on private land use
are still in place in that country. For example under the Endangered Species Act 1973, and
have survived challenge in the courts. In the Sweet Home case, a logging community was
unsuccessful before the Supreme Court in winding back the Fish and Wildlife Service’s
broad interpretation of ‘take’ (i.e. harming or killing) of endangered species in the Act to
include habitat modification.110
More importantly for our purposes, at the State level in Australia, Parliaments are free to
legislate to modify the rights of land owners in the interests of environmental protection
without fear of falling foul of constitutional limitations on the acquisition of property.
Mason J at 145, para 68 in original judgement.
Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 147 ALR 42, Kirby J, Toohey, Gaudron, Gummow JJ, with Kirby J
making interpretative reference to Article 17 of the UN’s Universal Declaration on Human Rights. In dissent were
McHugh J and Brennan CJ, making reference to Tasmania v Commonwealth, on the basis that the ban on mining had
not involved a transfer of Newcrest’s mining lease to the Commonwealth. See also Blackshield, Williams &
Fitzgerald (1998) Australian Constitutional Law and Theory : Commentary and Materials, 2nd edition, Federation Press, pp.
743-756.
107 Sperling, K. (1997) “Going Down the Takings Path: Private Property Rights and Public Interest in Land Use
Decision Making”, 16(6) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 427 at 431.
108 Eg. Lucas v South Carolina Council 505 US1003 (1992); Metzger (1976) above n 86.
109 Meadows, D. (1995) “Pay Me Not to Pollute”, The Global Citizen, 9.3.95.
110 Iovino, S. (1996) “Habitat Modification and ESA Takings Under Babbit v Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon” 7(2) Villanova Environmental Law Journal; Flick, W.; Tufts, R.; Zhang, D. (1996) “Sweet Home as Forest
Policy”, 94(4) Journal of Forestry (USA) 4-8.
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The States’ Constitutions do not contain an acquisition clause equivalent to s.51(xxxi) of
the Commonwealth Constitution. The State Parliaments enact most environmental
legislation affecting land use. The primary exception is the Commonwealth EPBC Act
1999 which has some application to land within the States, particularly where listed
threatened species or other matters of national environmental significance are
concerned.111
Even though State Constitutions enable State Parliaments to enact legislation which does
not require payment of compensation for the compulsory acquisition of property, they
have proceeded to create such rights. In NSW these rights are created by the Public Works
Act 1912112 and the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991.113
A vital distinction is drawn in Australian and English law between regulation that merely
restricts the rights of property owners (even if it involves prohibition) and that which
involves acquisition giving rise to a right of compensation.114 Bonyhady summarised the
way in which this distinction has tended to be drawn by legislators: “The norm is that
legislation provides for compensation for acquisitions of land, but not for restrictions on
land use.”115 Generally statutes that only restrict the use of private property contain
limited or no provisions for compensation. On this basis, planning statutes provide
narrowly-defined circumstances in which compensation may be payable, if at all. Usually
these situations are where private land is explicitly reserved for a public purpose.116
In relation to private forestry, NSW legislation merely restricts private land use but does
not amount to regulatory acquisition. Therefore Acts such as the Native Vegetation
Prest, J. (2001) “Farming and Commonwealth Environmental Law”, Research Note No.30, 2001-2002, Department
of the Parliamentary Library; Minister for the Environment & Heritage v Greentree [2003] FCA 857 (8 August 2003),
Sackville J, Federal Court of Australia; application to dissolve the interim injunction granted on 31 July 2003
dismissed. Injunction against land clearing, ploughing or cropping activities portion of the declared Ramsar wetlands
known as Gwydir Wetlands.
112 The rights to compensation under this legislation were extensively litigated in Haig v Minister Administering National
Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (1994) 85 LGERA 143.
113 The latter provides a process for compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes by State authorities (that have
powers to acquire land granted under other legislation :Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991, Part 2; see
also Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, s.21 enabling LEPs to contain provision for reservation of land
exclusively for a public purpose, but not authorising LEPs to “contain a provision empowering or purporting to
empower the compulsory acquisition of land”.
114 Bonyhady, (1992) above n 68 at p.49. Fogg (1974) cites France Fenwick and Co. Ltd [1927] 1 KB 458, where it was
stated that “mere negative prohibition, though it involves interference with an owner’s enjoyment of property, does
not…merely because it is obeyed, carry with it any right to compensation.”. Fogg, A.(1974) Australian Town Planning
Law: Uniformity and Change, 1st edition, Brisbane, UQP, at 427.
115 Bonyhady, T. (1992) above n 68 at 76.
116 Bonyhady, T. (1992) above n 68 at 49, cites Wilcox, M. (1967) The Law of Land Development in New South Wales, Law
Book Co., Sydney, at 277-97.
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Conservation Act do not offer compensation directly to landholders. Nevertheless in
recognition of cultural and political realities, financial recompense is offered through a
statutory Native Vegetation Fund, in the form of grants and incentives available upon
application to projects meeting specified criteria.117
The question remains whether, as a matter of policy, land owners should be paid
‘compensation’ in order to encourage their cooperation with the spirit of environmental
regulations. Raff argued: “It is by no means clear why the right of a property owner to
beneficial use of the property extends to environmental destruction and why the owner
should be compensated for desisting from it.”118
There is a tendency on the part of some members of the PNF industry to confuse land
use restrictions with land use prohibitions. For example, in a submission to a NSW
Government panel examining private forestry regulation, a submission by a branch of the
Institute of Foresters Australia suggested that the removal of exemptions for private
forestry and equated the imposition of consent requirements with “creating national
parks by stealth”.119
Environmental laws instead usually only amount to restrictions rather than prohibitions.
A distinction must be drawn between regulation which merely modifies the uses to
which land may be put, and regulation which so fundamentally alters the capacity of the
owner to deal with that property so as to ‘sterilise’ those rights of ownership involving
absolute extinguishment of all economic uses of the land. The latter category is in fact
rare in the field of environmental law. Similarly, road traffic rules do not typically prevent
licensed persons from driving their cars – they merely restrict their use of cars by asking
them to drive safely, obey speed limits and wear seat belts. There are many examples of
environmental restrictions on the use of private property which are intended to ensure
outcomes in the public good that do not amount to a prohibition of activity.120
Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW), Part 7, Division 3 (ss.56-57).
Raff, M. (1998) above n 83 at 659.
119 Institute of Foresters Australia, Northern NSW Branch (2002) Submission to Private Native Forestry Exemption Reference
Group, 24 May 2002, 6pp, at 3. A number of PNF industry representatives also verbally expressed the view that a
consent requirement effectively amounted to a prohibition in practice; observation of the author at meetings of the
PNF Reference Group, DLWC. Bridge St., Sydney, April-June 2002, particularly comments of Mr. Gaine Cartmill
(NSW FPA), and Mr. Ken O’Brien (Riverina Freehold Forestry Management Group).
120 Similarly broader regulatory restrictions on the capacity of persons to earn income from business assets are not new.
Legal limits on economic activity in the form of consumer protection and competition laws (Misrepresentation Acts
and the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), not to mention the prohibitions on economic exchange such as slavery, child
labour, and drug trafficking.
117
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In seeking to regulate forestry activity on private land, a problem for regulators arises in
relation to dealing with that category of persons who have purchased land with “logging
rights” (or a profit à prendre) attached and have an expectation of being able to log that
land in the longer term. Raff suggests that the onus is on purchasers of land to ensure
that land is fit for the purpose intended, that it be bought in a cleared state if the
purchaser seeks a cleared property.121 Thus there is a similar onus on a purchaser to
check the zoning restrictions on the land before purchase.122
Considerable difficulty also exists for regulators in imposing restrictions on forestry
under planning laws, on the basis of claims of ‘existing use’.123 Planning laws in all States
provide for the preservation of “existing uses”, so that if a planning scheme is
commenced having the effect that a previously-lawful use of land becomes prohibited or
subject to a requirement for development consent, that land use may be continued as an
existing use, despite those restrictions.124 The protection of existing uses is limited and
does not encompass alterations to uses that amount to a change of land use, nor does it
apply to land uses abandoned over time (see further, Chapter Nine).125 Yet the High
Court has construed existing use provisions liberally in favour of private rights of land
development so that activities such as land clearing have been considered consistent with
an existing use of agriculture and thus restrictions on vegetation clearing contained in
planning instruments were held ineffective.126 These problems are largely circumvented
by imposing restrictions through laws other than planning instruments.

THE PRIVATE LAND CONTEXT: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORY POLICY
A branch of the domestic and international literature raises specific practical - as opposed
to legal - difficulties that arise when attempting to apply direct regulation for biodiversity
conservation on private land. In addition to the difficulties generally attributed to direct,
Raff, M. (2000) Submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and Heritage Inquiry into Public
Good Conservation, 8 May 2000, p.3
122 However these arguments do not address the situation where land was purchased in the previous era of lower
ecological consciousness where there was an expectation of being able to clear land, or where property was
inherited.
123 These questions are further discussed in Chapter Nine regarding the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979
(NSW).
124 For example, Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), Part 4, Division 10; Land Use Planning and
Approvals Act 1993 (Tas), s.20(3); Development Act 1993 (SA), s.6(2). See: further, Chapter Eight.
125 Farrier et.al. (1999)above n 92 at 13-14.
126 Parramatta CC v Brickworks Ltd (1971) 128 CLR 1. Regarding land clearance see Dorrestijn v Planning Commission SA
(1985) 59 ALJR 105. However in Vanmeld Pty Ltd v Fairfield CC (1992) 128 CLR 1, existing use rights were described
as being more in the nature of a privilege than a right.
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or ‘command and control’ regulation (Chapter Two), in this context, traditional
regulation is said to be impracticable and ineffective for a variety of reasons. Instead, a
mixture of policy instruments is advocated that either avoids regulation altogether or
offers incentives such as stewardship payments alongside regulation.
In Australia, a sizeable recent literature presents and considers alternatives to regulation
within the biodiversity context.127 A key paper is Reimbursing the Future, a consultant’s
report to the Commonwealth which examined motivational, voluntary, price-based,
property-right, and incentives approaches to biodiversity conservation. The broader
political context of the commissioning of that report was a desire on the part of the
Commonwealth to address biodiversity decline whilst focussing on non-regulatory
approaches.
Several other reports produced at the Commonwealth level by the Productivity
Commission128 and ANZECC129 - dealing with land clearing and conservation on private
land - have sought to investigate alternatives to regulation. In 2002, the Department of
Land and Water Conservation (DLWC), indicating its desire to explore regulatory
alternatives, reviewed the literature regarding the application of economic mechanisms
on private land. It also embarked on a pilot ‘environmental services scheme’ to
investigate ways in which landholders could be paid for providing environmental services
such as vegetation conservation.130
One of the problems is that a degree of defiance and resistance to external regulation is
often observed by environmental agencies in the rural context in Australia.131 This
resistance is evident almost regardless of the extent of enforcement activity. It stems

Young et al. (1996) above n 2; Binning, C., Young, M. (1997) Motivating People: Using Management Agreements to Conserve
Remnant Vegetation, Environment Australia: Biodiversity Group, Canberra; Curran, D. (2000) above n 2.
128 Industry Commission (1998) A Full Repairing Lease: Report of Inquiry into Ecologically Sustainable Land Management,
Industry Commission, Belconnen, ACT.
129 National Resource Management Ministerial Council (NRMMC) (2001) National Framework for the Management and
Monitoring of Australia’s Native Vegetation, Commonwealth Department for Environment and Heritage December.
130 Bari, M. (2002) Literature Review on Market Based Instruments, DLWC, Sydney, July, 27pp.; DLWC (2002)
Environmental Services Scheme, 13 June, <http://www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au/care/es_scheme.html>.
131 Independent Expert Working Group (1998) Assessment of Management Systems and Processes for Achieving Ecologically
Sustainable Forest Management in NSW, A report undertaken for the NSW CRA/RFA Steering Committee, Project
No. NA 18/ESFM, Resource and Conservation Division, Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (NSW) and
Forests Taskforce, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (Cth), RACAC, Sydney at 98-101.
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from landholders’ reluctance to accept the notion that certain rural activities on freehold
land should be regulated.132
On private land, the imposition and enforcement of regulatory controls on activities (e.g.
forestry) that have been considered “normal” and conducted for many years is often
resented. Regulatory resistance is manifested in the formation of property rights
committees within farmer associations, advocacy by PNF associations,133 and pressure
for official investigation of the effects of environmental laws on private property holders.
In response to this pressure, two recent Commonwealth inquiries were initiated to focus
attention on the economic impacts of environmental laws on landholders.134
The private native forestry (PNF) industry has historically resisted the introduction or
‘imposition’ of external regulation. The Australian Forest Growers posed the rhetorical
question of whether private forest owners are likely to “comply with unpopular and
unsupported regulations imposed without their agreement”.135 They advocated
“avoidance of excessive and unwarranted bureaucratic intervention and regulation” of
PNF. 136
In a 2002 review of the regulation of PNF in NSW, industry representatives argued for a
“general exemption” for PNF, with consent requirements only applying to “special
areas”.137 A model put forward by Australian Forest Growers declared:
private native forestry is a basic right of landholders on their own properties without requiring
planning consent as long as this is carried out according to a set of principles enshrining
sustainable management.138

Observations of the author at community consultation exercises conducted by DLWC (2001) and NPWS (1997) in
Southern NSW. Notes on a Speech given by Mr. Robert Adam, DLWC, Sydney-South Coast region, DLWC re
proposed BOS Best Operating Standards for Private Native Forestry (PNF) under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act on 21
February 2001, at Candelo, Southern NSW at ANU Forestry workshop, “The Evolving Legislative and Regulatory
Environment for the Management of Private Native Forests in NSW”. Also observations of the author from
attendance at NPWS consultation meeting, August 1997, Platypus Lodge, Cooma, NSW. The consultations was
carried out by NPWS prior to introduction of a regulation to limit the routine agricultural activities exemption in the
Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995. Sixty meetings were held throughout NSW in 1997. The regulation was
never introduced due to the level of campaign generated against it.
133 In NSW, primarily the Australian Forest Growers and Forest Products Association NSW. Examples of their
advocacy can be seen at <www.afg.asn.au> and <www.nswfpa.asn.au>.
134 Australia. Parliament. House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and Heritage (2001) Public
Good Conservation- Our Challenge for the 21st Century, Inquiry into the Effects Upon Landholders and Farmers of Public Good
Conservation Measures Imposed by Australian Governments, September, 217pp; Productivity Commission (2003) Inquiry into
Impacts of Native Vegetation and Biodiversity Regulations (commenced April 2003), Productivity Commission, Canberra.
135 Garsden, R. (2002) Submission to the Private Native Forestry Reference Group : Draft Exemption G1 – The Cyclist Analogy
Model, Australian Forest Growers (NSW Branch).
136 Ibid.
137 Forest Products Association NSW (2002) Exemption Process for Sustainable Forestry: FPA Framework, FPA, Sydney,
20.5.02, 8pp at p.1; Bruskin, S. (2002) Submission to the Private Native Forestry Reference Group, Institute of Foresters
Australia, Northern NSW Branch, 24.5.02, 5pp at 1.
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Resistance to regulation is driven by ideologies of private property rights that reject the
notion of State control of activities on privately-held land. Resistance is also generated
particularly when the rationale for environmental laws is poorly understood and when
laws perceived as unnecessary, coercive or unfair, are enforced stringently.139
Critics of regulation sometimes cite research relating to the consequences of overzealous
enforcement by Bardach and Kagan in the occupational health and safety context.140 In
the rural context in Australia, even moderate levels of environmental protection
regulation are likely to be resented. Thus the problem is not so much about overzealous
enforcement, but often a fundamental objection to being regulated at all. For example, an
Australian Forest Growers submission to a recent review of PNF regulation in NSW
stated that “moving the private sector to a fully regulated system is a grossly unwarranted
imposition on both the industry and the public.”141
Some of the theoretical literature on regulation emphasises the need to develop trust with
the regulated community as an explicit regulatory strategy.142 Whilst this approach may
have its place, the language of trust becomes problematic when used to support
arguments such as, “if landholders don’t like this law, then we won’t force it upon them”,
for fear of jeopardising a ‘trust’ relationship. The question is whether government should
go out of its way to avoid generating resistance, regardless of how pressing the need may
be for state intervention for environmental protection.
This said, the law does not operate in a vacuum. Economic forces are still the major
motivator and determinant of landholder decision-making about land management. It is
not wise to simply advocate more stringent enforcement of environmental laws without
awareness that this may generate a backlash in which landholders will take actions in

Office of Private Forestry NSW (2002) Submission to the Private Native Forestry Reference Group: “As-of-right model for
private native forest regulation”, 9.5.02, 1pp.
139 Gunningham, N. (1996) above n 2 at 235; cites Sherman, L. (1993) “Defiance, Deterrence and Irrelevance: A
Theory of Criminal Sanction”, 30(4) Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 445-473.
140 Bardach and Kagan (1982) Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness, Temple Univ. Press,
Philadelphia, PA; Gunningham, N. (1994) Environment, Self-Regulation and the Chemical Industry : Assessing Responsible
Care, Occasional Paper, Australian Centre for Environmental Law, Faculty of Law, ANU.
141 Garsden, R. (2002) Submission to the Private Native Forestry Reference Group : Draft Exemption G1 – The Cyclist Analogy
Model, Australian Forest Growers (NSW Branch).
142 Cherney, A. (1997) “Trust as a Regulatory Strategy: A Theoretical Review” 9(1) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 71-84.
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spite of the law.143 If incentives or stewardship payments are offered, then regulatory
resistance can often be overcome and the regulatory framework can be retained unaltered
and applied effectively.
Conventional direct regulatory strategies on private land must address the so-called ‘first
mover problem’.144 This describes the common situation where a regulatory agency has
poor levels of information regarding threatened biodiversity, and is at a disadvantage
compared to the party it is regulating. In such a scenario, when a landholder discovers a
threatened species on his/her property, there is a strong financial incentive to conceal
that fact from regulators.145 Although many landholders may lack the knowledge to
identify threatened species, particularly flora, if they do manage to do so, they may take
actions to destroy them in order to remove the threatened species ‘problem’ from the
land. Collectively this has been described as the tendency to “shoot, shovel and shut
up”.146 It is also described as the first mover problem because if the regulatee moves first,
the regulator will fail to achieve conservation objectives. Knowledge of these difficulties
led the authors of a scientific manual on plant conservation to advise:
When a rare plant is located [in a botanical survey], notify the landowner as soon as possible, but
avoid giving the exact locality unless you are sure the site will not be destroyed.147

Unless countervailing economic incentives to preserve threatened species are offered to
landholders, biota may be destroyed.148 Incentives to conserve biodiversity are usually
offered in the form of management agreements and stewardship payments. The latter
involve a contract between landholder and government to provide environmental
Olson, T.(1996) “Biodiversity and Private Property : Conflict or Opportunity”, ch.5 in Snape (ed.) Biodiversity and the
Law, Defenders of Wildlife and Island Press, Washington DC, at p.69.
144 Gunningham, N., Young, M. (1997) above n 2 at 286-7.
145 Gunningham, N.; Grabosky, P. (1998) Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, at 363.
146 Curran, above n 2 at 44. Put another way, private landholders have strong financial incentives tend to “shoot,
shovel, and shut up’ about the presence of threatened species: Gunningham, N. (1996) “Biodiversity: Economic
Incentives and Legal Instruments”, ch.15 in Boer, B., Fowler, R., Gunningham, N. (eds.) Environmental Outlook No.2,
Law and Policy, Federation Press, Sydney.
147 Cropper, S. (1993) Management of Endangered Plants, CSIRO Publications, East Melbourne, at 18-19. Cropper cites the
following anecdote: “Even when legislation is used, populations can still be lost. A population of the endangered
Pterostylis gibbosa (Illawarra Greenhood) occurs on private land. Three ICOs [interim conservation orders] under the
Heritage Act were made by the relevant New South Wales minister to protect the orchid’s habitat. Despite the ICO,
the landowners destroyed part of the site.” Cropper at 19 cites Benson (1989) “Establishing priorities for the
conservation of rare or threatened plants and plant associations in New South Wales”, in Hicks, M., and Eiser, P.
(eds.), The Conservation of Threatened Species and Their Habitats, pp.17-82, Australian Committee for International Union
for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Canberra.
148 In an interview with Mr. Gary Davey, 30.4.98, Manager Threatened Species Unit, Northern Zone, NPWS NSW the
opinion was expressed that “too firm application of the Act [Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995] can backfire.”
The officer described an incident in which a landholder was asked to examine threatened species issues arising on
his property prior to development consent. A fauna consultant was bought in for a preliminary examination. Species
were identified including koala and phascogale. The landowner then burnt and slashed vegetation on the property. A
further fauna study was carried out which revealed that no threatened species were present.
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services over a given time period in return for a specified price.149 Given shortcomings of
these arrangements such as the limitations on their term (thus not guaranteeing longterm biodiversity conservation), and the risk of crucial sites not being included as
stewardship agreements are voluntary, it is wisest that such economic instruments are
applied in conjunction with regulation and other policy instruments.150
Chapter Two explored the broader context of recent writing on regulatory theory, which
displays a reticence about the application of direct regulation. Gunningham and Sinclair
suggest: “It is essential that government regulation serves as a backstop, only being
invoked where other instruments fail to achieve the desired effect.” This strategy is said
to enable government to ‘regulate at a distance’ and more efficiently allocate its limited
administrative capacity.151 Elsewhere Gunningham and Grabosky put forward axioms
such as “Prefer Less Interventionist Measures”, implying that regulation be avoided
where possible if a choice arises.152
It is often argued that direct regulation alone is doomed to failure because it does not
enlist the cooperation of landholders to either correct ecologically unsustainable forest
management practices or to actively conserve forest values.153 Conventional regulation
can prevent or restrict land uses but is not particularly effective at encouraging particular
forms of active land management such as control of weeds and feral animals.154 These
problems arise because conventional regulation does not address disincentives to
ESFM.155 There is a need to offer incentives to secure cooperation by means of the
carrot rather than by relying exclusively upon deterrence-based coercion. Yet this critique
can be addressed if regulation is applied in conjunction with stewardship payments to
those landholders who are required to perform a public-good conservation service at
These schemes are common in the United States and Europe, with 20% of European agricultural land under some
form of stewardship arrangement : Gibbons, P., Briggs, S., Shields, J. (2002) “Are Economic Instruments the
Saviour for Biodiversity on Private Land?” 7 Pacific Conservation Biology 223-228.
150 Gibbons, P., Briggs, S., Shields, J. (2002) “Are Economic Instruments the Saviour for Biodiversity on Private
Land?” 7 Pacific Conservation Biology 223-228 at 227.
151 Gunningham, N.; Sinclair, D. (1999) “Integrative Regulation: A Principle-Based Approach to Environmental
Policy”, 24(4) Law & Social Inquiry 853-896 at 892.
152 Grabosky, P., Gunningham, N. (1998) Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, Clarendon Press, Chapter One.
However, in other contexts Gunningham has more often indicated the need for a mix of regulatory and nonregulatory approaches. The proposition “Prefer Less Interventionist Measures” implies that a choice must be made,
a choice which is inconsistent with the proposal, on the subject of land clearance, for “a firm regulatory safety net
that prohibits irreversible actions.” (p.360-1), and similar views about the value of a precautionary regulation in
Gunningham, N., Young, M. (1997) “Toward Optimal Environmental Policy: The Case of Biodiversity
Conservation” 24(2) Ecology Law Quarterly 243-298.
153 Environment Australia (1998) Discussion Paper on the assessment of forests on private land in New South Wales for
Comprehensive Regional Assessments, 8pp, Canberra.
154 Curran, D. (2000) above n 2 at 44.
155 Independent Expert Working Group (1998) above n 131 at 98-101.
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private expense, in excess of landholder’s normal environmental protection obligations
to the community at large.
Another criticism of direct regulation is that its effectiveness is restricted by access
difficulties associated with private land ownership, and the difficulty in gathering data
and proving offences relating to vegetation clearance.156 Enforcement is said to be almost
too difficult as there are large areas of land over which it is very difficult to check
compliance with environmental laws. It is said to be impossible to ‘have a cop on the
corner of every forest’.
However, with aerial photography, aircraft fly-overs, satellite mapping, and computer
analysis of remote sensing data, regulators can obtain detailed information about changes
to vegetation cover on private land, which can greatly assist in the detection and
prosecution of offences of vegetation clearance.157 Vegetation disturbance detected can
be investigated by site visits.158
Regulating activities on private property involves other related difficulties, as a closed
domain posing access problems for regulators. Yet statutes address the issue of access,
with provisions in the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997, the National Parks and
Wildlife Act 1974 (NPWA ), and the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997. 159 For
example, the NPWA

enables staff to enter any property for the purpose of

“investigating the presence or condition of threatened species, populations or ecological
communities, and their habitats”.160 However these provisions on their own do not
address the source of regulatory resistance, and a backlash can arise when property
entrance powers are applied insensitively.161

Statements regarding the difficulty in proving pre-existing vegetation in the course of prosecutions for breach of the
Native Vegetation Act 1991 (SA): Telephone interview, Ms J. Justine, Solicitor, Crown Solicitors office SA, 15 March
2001 (solicitor with primary carriage of prosecutions under SA legislation).
157 Davies, C.; Hoban, S.; Penhoet, B. (1999) “Moving Pictures: How Satellites, the Internet, and International
Environmental Law Can Help Provide Sustainable Development”, 28(4) Stetson Law Review 1091; Markowitz, K.
(2002) “Legal Challenges and Market Rewards to the Use and Acceptance of Remote Sensing and Digital
Information as Evidence” 12 Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 219-264 at 228-9.
158 UN FAO (2001) State of the World’s Forests: 2001, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Rome,
181pp, at 99.
159 NVCA, s.61, POEO Act, s. 196.
160 NPWA , s.164.
161 Skinner, S. (2003) “Bulldozers, Trees and Making a Quid”, Background Briefing, ABC Radio National, 14.9.03,
9.10am.
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A useful summary of criticisms of direct regulation in the private land context was made
in the NSW ESFM Expert Report (1998):
It is cheap but inefficient to set up command and control regulatory regimes relating to private
land. In practice, these are largely symbolic because inadequate resources are devoted to providing
decision makers with background information through the strategic planning process, to auditing
compliance, to providing incentives for active management. There is some evidence that this has
happened in the past in NSW. 162

Ultimately these problems boil down to a question of providing the resources to make an
effective PNF regime a priority. Even if we are to rely on incentives, governments will
need to provide the necessary resources.
In spite of the criticisms of regulation, there is some consensus that a ‘bottom line’ of
regulation needs to apply on private lands: a regulatory safety net to prevent irreversible
environmental damage.163 Even in circumstances considered favourable to selfregulation, Gunningham and Young viewed a regulatory safety net as necessary “to deal
with the irrational or incompetent”.164 There has been little work to clarify whether
existing laws amount to an adequate safety net or what such a regulatory safety net would
entail.165

CONCLUSION
This chapter has argued that aspects of the task of biodiversity conservation limit the
policy options available to those seeking to regulate and guide activities on private land in
Australia. It was argued that the private property context presents special challenges in
making policy for sustainable land management, particularly in terms of issues of access
and resentment of conservation-based government restrictions on land use. Although the
law applying to private land often does not technically provide for the payment of
compensation in the event of land use restrictions (and only in the event of compulsory
acquisition of private land), deep-seated attitudes about property rights pervade the
practical day-to-day context of making policy in this sector.

Independent Expert Working Group (1998) above n 131 at 100.
Young et. al. (1996) above n 2 at 177. For reasons of space, debates over the future of regulation are reviewed
elsewhere: Bosselmann, K. and Richardson, B. (eds.) (1999) Environmental Justice and Market Mechanisms, Kluwer Law,
Utrecht, Netherlands; Gunningham, N.; Sinclair, D. (1999) above n 151 at 874.
164 Young et.al., (1996) above n 2, at 113.
165 Further, there is a danger that in practice advocacy of economic instruments may lead to an abandonment of
attempts to regulate industry.
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Despite the advocacy of self-regulation and tendencies to shun conventional direct
regulation, the inherent difficulties of the biodiversity conservation context, particularly
the problems of irreversibility, limited information, and multiple causes and effects all
play havoc with setting policy for biodiversity conservation.
These problems have encouraged a conclusion in the Australian literature that a ‘baseline’
of effective regulation is essential, whether alone or in combination with other
instruments.166 It is necessary to retain a regulatory structure to provide ‘precautionary
standards’.167 Incentives and motivational instruments are usually not considered
sufficient to protect biodiversity in all circumstances.168 The fact that it may be advisable
for regulatory agencies to attempt to integrate offers of incentives into their regulatory
approach does not detract from the necessity for a strong stance of enforcement in cases
of blatant environmental damage.
Although the need for regulation in the biodiversity protection context is recognised,169
less frequently is the next step taken to discuss what effective regulation would entail.
Once the need for a regulatory ‘safety net’ is accepted, it becomes necessary to examine
regulatory effectiveness in practice. This is the purpose of the review conducted in
subsequent chapters, of the law applicable to private native forestry in NSW and
Tasmania.

Young et. al. (1996) above n 2, Part 1, p.viii; Gunningham suggests that “regulation may be made more acceptable,
and effective, by combining it with other less coercive measures, such as tax concessions, compensating land owners
for loss of profits, and voluntary agreements” : Gunningham (1996 a) above n 2 at 234.
167 Tasmanian Public Land Use Commission (1996) Inquiry into areas to be reserved under the Tasmania-Commonwealth Regional
Forest Agreement: Background Report Part F: Mechanisms for achieving conservation management on private forested land: a discussion
paper, Tasmanian Public Land Use Commission, Hobart, p.8.
168 Young, et.al., (1996) above n 2.
169 Gunningham and Sinclair (1999 ) above n 151, at 873.
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Chapter Five

PRIVATE NATIVE FORESTS AND THE LAW
INTRODUCTION
To provide an informed background to later discussion, this Chapter briefly summarises
the available data regarding the tenure of forests in NSW, about the conservation
significance of private native forests and their economic importance. It then describes
and discusses the various factors that have shaped, and which are likely to shape the law
applying to PNF in NSW. To place later discussions of law reform in context the
Chapter briefly reviews the implications of government commitments to ecologically
sustainable forest management, the influence of international law relating to forests, as
well as the role of the Commonwealth Parliament in regulating PNF. Finally the existing
– and scarce - literature regarding the regulation of PNF in NSW is mapped out. That
material is considered along with available data about the standards of forestry practices
in the NSW PNF industry.

FACTS ABOUT PNF: TENURE OF FORESTS IN NSW
Almost 70 per cent of Australian native forests1 are managed by the private sector –
either on freehold or leasehold land.2 But such broadly aggregated statistics are only a
starting point, as much of these forests are not considered commercially viable for timber
production.3
In NSW, depending on the source consulted, between 35 and 38 per cent of the
remaining forests are privately owned.4 Another 29 per cent are leasehold.5 The

1

The National Forest Inventory defined ‘forest’ as “an area that is dominated by trees having usually a single stem and a mature or
potentially mature stand height exceeding 2 metres and with existing or potential crown cover of overstorey strata about equal to
or greater than 20 per cent.” National Forest Inventory (1998) Australia’s State of the Forests Report, Bureau of Rural
Sciences, Canberra, at 30.
2 NFI (1998) above n 1 at 35.

Livestock grazing is the predominant use of many privately-held forests: Northern NSW Forestry Services Pty Ltd
(2000) The Private Hardwood Forest Resource in Northern NSW, A report for the Northern Rivers Regional Development
Board (NR Regional Plantation Committee), <www.nrrdb.com.au/privateforestry/pri_hdw.htm>, accessed on 3.8.01.
4 Appendix 5.1 contains further detailed graphs and tables concerning private forests in NSW. According to the
National Forest Inventory (1998) 38.69% of NSW are privately owned. According to the EPA NSW (1997) New
South Wales State of the Environment 1997, (Chatswood, NSW, p.196) 35% of NSW forests are privately owned. The
RAC (1992) stated that 36% of NSW forests were privately owned: Resource Assessment Commission (1992) Forest
and Timber Inquiry: Final Report, AGPS, Canberra at 89; NFI (1998) above n 1, ch. 3 & p 167. The differences in
these figures derive largely from the varying definitions of ‘forest’.
3

remaining forests are designated as State forests managed for timber production (15%)
or as national parks and other reserves (15%).6

However such statistics do not

differentiate between closed, open and woodland forests (i.e., based on density of crown
cover). Therefore a useful analysis from the National Forest Inventory (NFI) is set out in
Table 1.
Table 1 Forest types in NSW by tenure
Forest Type

Closed Forest

Open Forest

Woodland

State Forest

32%

26%

7%

Conservation

49%

21%

10%

Private Forest

19%

46%

34.4%

Leasehold

-

3%

46.6%

Other

-

4%

2%

reserves

Source: National Forest Inventory: Australia’s State of the Forests Report 7
The NFI found that a significant proportion of open forest8 in NSW is privately owned
(46%), (compared to 26% in State Forests and 21% in conservation reserves).9 Similarly,
much of the woodland forest10 in NSW is privately owned (34.4%), with an even greater
proportion held on leasehold tenures (46.6%).11 Only 19% of the closed forest in NSW
is privately owned.12

5

The NFI and RFA processes have defined private forest to exclude leasehold tenures. According to C. McElhinny of ANU
Forestry: “This approach is at odds with the Montreal Process, which includes leasehold land under the category of private forests.
This broader definition reflects the fact that while management options available under leasehold title are more restricted than
options available under freehold title, in both tenures the landowner retains a major influence over the condition of the forest
resource.” (McElhinny, C. (2000) Private Native Forest Inventory Within the Context of a Continental Sampling Framework,

Discussion paper prepared for National Forest Inventory Steering Committee, Department of Forestry, ANU,
Canberra). On the other hand it is a mistake to equate leasehold with freehold as some forms of lease do not permit the lessee to
engage in tree felling other than for minor on-farm uses such as fencing and clearing for sheds.

NSW EPA (2000) State of the Environment NSW, Table 6.11, derived from NFI (1998).
7 NFI (1998) above n 1 at 36.
8 Open forest is defined as having 51–80 per cent crown cover of the land area when viewed from above: National
Forest Inventory (1998) above n 1 at 30-31.
9 National Forest Inventory (1998) above n Error! Bookmark not defined. at 36.
10 Woodland forest is defined by the NFI as having 20-50% Crown cover : National Forest Inventory (1998) above n 1
at 30-31.
11 National Forest Inventory (1998) above n 1 at.36.
12 Closed forest is defined by the NFI as having 81-100% Crown cover; National Forest Inventory (1998) above n 1 at
30-31.
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COMMERCIAL IMPORTANCE
PNF activity centres on North-East NSW, with private forests comprising 46% of the
area of commercial forest types in the Upper and Lower North-East (‘UNE’ and ‘LNE’
respectively).13 Other important sectors of PNF activity involve river red gum-logging in
the South-West, and cypress and ironbark logging in the Central West.14 (Other details of
production are listed in Appendix 5.1)
To review the ecological impacts of PNF it is important to focus on forests of
commercial significance subject to forestry activity. We must consider the extent of
commercial forest types that are privately held, rather than just the extent of broadly
defined “forest”. Such figures are difficult to obtain, but broadly speaking woodland
forest ecosystems are not targeted for timber production, apart from firewood logging
and charcoal production.34 Most PNF production activity in NSW centres on the northeast and coastal NSW. Private forests comprise 46% of the area of commercial forest
types in Upper and Lower north-eastern NSW.35 Also significant are river red gum (E.
camaldulensis) logging (e.g. sleeper cutting) in the south-west, and cypress (Callitris sp) and
Ironbark logging in the central west.36
A relatively small proportion of the moist coastal and tableland eucalypt forests and
rainforest are privately held. On the other hand, a greater proportion (approaching 40%)
of drier forest types are privately-owned (Table 2). While a higher percentage of the drier
forest types are on private land, the proportion of these forest types which are
commercial forest types or are commercially viable is lower than for the coastal forests.

This data was provided by State Forests of NSW to Bureau of Rural Sciences/AFFA (1999) A Report on Forest Wood
Resources for the Upper and Lower North East NSW CRA Regions: undertaken for the NSW CRA/RFA Steering
Committee, RACAC (DUAP), Sydney, cited by Northern NSW Forestry Services & Bureau of Rural Sciences (1999)
Private Forest Management Intent Survey: Northern NSW CRA Regions, a report undertaken for the NSW CRA/RFA
Steering Committee, Project # NA 47/ES, Resource and Conservation Assessment Commission (NSW), Sydney at
5.
14 Defined as the area of land North of Newcastle to Queensland border and West to the ridgeline of the Great
Dividing Range. See:; Northern NSW Forestry Services (2000) Identifying the Available Forest Resource in Northern New
South Wales and the Potential Investment Opportunities over the Next 5 Years, A project undertaken for the Northern Rivers
Regional Development Board Inc. & the New England - North West Regional Development Board Inc. May 2000
Northern NSW Forestry Services, Casino. Internet published at <www.nrrdb.co.au/privateforestry>.
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Table 2: Percentage of total
forested area on privately owned
land in NSW, June 1996 15

Forest Type

% on private land

Rainforest

12.41 %

Blackbutt
Moist coastal eucalypts

28.06%

Dry coastal eucalypts

36.5%

Moist tableland eucalypts

16.04 %

Dry tableland eucalypts

37.8%

Low dry eucalypts

34.3%

Western box–gum–ironbarks

40.3%

River red-gum

37.7%

White cypress pine

34.7%

28.4%

PNF production has traditionally been around 25-35% of total sawlog production in
NSW.16 Not only is PNF of considerable commercial significance but the contribution of
private forests increased in the late 1990s to the point that production in the UNE and
LNE was described by RFA consultants as reaching the limits of sustainable yield.17 In
relation to the LNE forests, it was stated: “further substitution is unlikely because the limit
of private wood supply has been reached.” In the UNE region, PNF was estimated in
November 2000 to have recently increased to around 50% of total sawlog production.18

EPA NSW (1997) New South Wales State of the Environment Report 1997 (Chatswood, NSW, p.196). Table 2.28. ‘Privately
owned’ does not include “Other Crown Timber Lands” some of which may be held leasehold.
16 Forestry Commission NSW and Margules Groome Poyry (1995) The Economic Impact of the New South Wales Timber
Industry, MGP, Sydney, pp A-6 & B-17.
17 Centre for Agricultural and Regional Economics Pty Ltd (‘CARE’), Gillespie Economics, Environment and
Behaviour Consultants (1999b) Regional Impact Assessment for the Lower North East CRA Region: A Project undertaken as
part of the NSW Comprehensive Regional Assessments, Project numbers NL 08/ES & NA39/ES, Published by Resource
and Conservation Division of Department of Urban Affairs and Planning and Forests Taskforce of Department of
Prime Minister and Cabinet, p.78. In the UNE, the production of timber from private native forests was estimated
to have been at 200,000m3/pa in 1997/98 which according to CARE and “industry analysts”, “would be close to
the sustainable yield of private sector forests”.
18 Interview, Mr B. Attwood, Vegetation Resource Manager, Northern Region, DLWC, in person, Grafton Office,
23.11.00. Notes on file; Centre for Agricultural and Regional Economics Pty Ltd (‘CARE’), Gillespie Economics,
Environment and Behaviour Consultants (1999a) Regional Impact Assessment for the Upper North East CRA Region: A
Project undertaken as part of the NSW Comprehensive Regional Assessments, Project numbers NU 12/ES & NA39/ES,
Published by Resource and Conservation Division of Department of Urban Affairs and Planning and Forests
Taskforce of Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, p.70; Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
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In the Lower NE region, more than half the mills (78 of 146) processed nothing but
private timber, according to a 1998 survey.19 Collectively this data suggests that PNF is of
considerable commercial significance.20 It also raises questions about the sustainability of
PNF activity in NSW during the study period. (Such questions are considered in greater
depth at p.32 in this Chapter.)
The importance of PNF has increased for several reasons. The primary reason why
private forests have become more important is because large areas of State forests and
other Crown land were added to the nature reserve system during the RFA process. A
substantial report by economic consultants to the Forestry Commission in 1995
predicted that, with further restrictions, sawmillers will “turn to the private property
resource for an increasing proportion of their supplies.”21 This is borne out by empirical
research showing that when access to public forests was restricted in 1995-6, sawmills in
NE augmented their wood supply with timber from private land.22 The secondary
reason relates to increased awareness of the ecological importance of some private
forests, awareness which has increased as a result of studies performed during the RFA
process (see below, p. 19).

PNF industry structure
There are two distinct types of private native forestry in NSW: small-scale, low-capital
forestry by individuals, families and small companies, and the less-common large-scale
and capital-intensive forestry ventures.23 However there is no available data on the
proportion of the PNF industry that each category represents.24

(Cth) (1999) A Report on Forest Wood Resources for the Upper and Lower North East NSW CRA Regions, A Report
Undertaken for the NSW CRA/RFA Steering Committee (project # NA/52/ES, Resource and Conservation
Assessment Commission, Sydney, p 42.
19 Centre for Agricultural Economics (1999b) above n 17 at 78.
20 Centre for Agricultural Economics (1999b) above n 17 at 71 states: “The limited amount of information available to
CARE for nine mills in the LNE region (representing around 15 per cent of the industry) showed that the amount
of wood taken from private property had increased by 23 per cent from 1994-95 to 1996-97. Private property wood
represented 52 per cent of their wood supply in 1996-97. This is a relatively small sample of mills and they do
indicate a higher reliance on private property wood than is used below for the base case (1997-98).” [emphasis
added.]
21 Forestry Commission NSW and Margules Groome Poyry (1995) The Economic Impact of the New South Wales Timber
Industry, December, Margules Groome Poyry, Sydney.
22 Centre for Agricultural and Regional Economics, et.al.(‘CARE’) (1999a) above n 18 at 78; Centre for Agricultural
and Regional Economics, et.al. (1999b) above n 17 at 69.
23 Interview, Dr. I. Hannam, DLWC Parramatta, 11 Jan 98, in person; interview, Mr. Cameron Slatyer, NSW Team,
Forests Task Force, Environment Australia, 10.3.99, Canberra, in person.
24 Interview, Mr. J. Clark, Office of Private Forestry NSW, 19.10.01 (by telephone).

The available evidence suggests that the PNF industry is dominated by small-to-mediumsized enterprises, by individuals, family farms and small companies. There are three
categories of participants in the PNF industry: landowners, forestry contractors, and
timber processors (primarily sawmillers). Anecdotal evidence collected from interviews
during the research process suggested that there is a low level of corporate ownership of
private native forests in NSW (less than is the case in Tasmania).25 There appears to be a
much higher level of large-company involvement in the plantations sector. In general
terms, the majority of NSW farms are family-owned rather than run by larger corporate
concerns (with the latter type occurring mainly in the intensive animal production
sector).26
There is evidence that the majority of PNF activity involves supplying the smaller-tomedium sawmills, in turn meaning that the processing sector of the PNF industry is
dominated by small-to-medium-sized enterprises.27 The larger sawmills obtain the
majority of their supply from public forests, often under long-term wood-supply
agreements with the NSW government, but supplement these supplies with timber from
private forests when necessary.28
It appears to be the smaller mills that are more reliant upon the private property
resource, with a significant proportion obtaining their supply exclusively from private
forestry.29 In documents produced for the Lower North-East region RFA, economic

consultants stated that:

In Tasmania, the Forest Practices Board’s Annual Reports make a specific distinction between the “independent”
private property sector and the company or corporate private property sector of the forestry industry. (See: Chapter
Eleven).
26 A NSW Farmers Association statement reads: “We represent over 15 000 farming enterprises, the majority of which
are family farms.” NSW Farmers Mission Statement for Community Solutions to Salinity Summit, organised by
Nature Conservation Council of NSW, see: <http://www.nccnsw.org.au/veg/context/cssmission.html>
27 Although no firm evidence exists on the question, it is most probably the case that these small mills are supplied by
small family run companies and logging contractors rather than by large vertically integrated publicly listed industrial
forestry companies such as Boral and North.
28 A survey conducted for ABARE in 1999 found that small and medium sized sawmills in the Southern RFA region
purchased most of their hardwood logs from private land forest operations (69% of the intake in medium sized
mills. ABARE (1999) Sawmill Survey: Southern Region, A project undertaken for the Joint Commonwealth NSW
Regional Forest Agreement Steering Committee as part of the NSW Comprehensive Regional Assessments, project
number NS 21/ES, RACAC (NSW) and PM&C (Commonwealth), at p.8.
29 Northern NSW Forestry Services (2000) Identifying the Available Forest Resource in Northern New South Wales and the
Potential Investment Opportunities over the Next 5 Years, A project undertaken for the Northern Rivers Regional
Development Board Inc. & the New England - North West Regional Development Board Inc., May 2000,
Northern NSW Forestry Services, Casino, NSW. This pattern that can be traced as far back as wood-allocation
practices in the post-war period because of industry rationalisation and changes to the allocation of timber rights in
State Forests, many of the smaller sawmillers were forced to obtain the majority of their log supplies from private
property, in order to survive at the margins of the industry. Watson argues that the smaller, family operated bush
sawmills cutting timber from private forests were more economically marginal and many were edged out of business
for various reasons including difficulties in obtaining credit and difficulties in securing wood supply. Small bush
25

Prior to the IAP, there were many mills, mostly small, who [sic] operated entirely by using wood
from private property. Many of the larger mills accessed some of their supply from private property or
had the potential to access wood from that source. In the two years following the IAP some of
the log shortfall was replaced with timber from private property. This was a logical response to a
reduction in supply from State Forests. [emphasis added]30

Similarly, another study, specifically of the timber industry in the Northern Tablelands of
NSW stated that whilst the largest mill in the region processed timber mainly derived
from State forests, “[t]he…smaller mills in the region source timber almost exclusively
from private property.”31
Given that there is a multitude of private-forest owners with a diversity of motivations,
objectives and resources,32 there is inevitably some difficulty in generalising about them.
Further, there are inherent logistical and communication difficulties in regulating private
forest owners, by comparison with the task of regulation of a single entity, State forests.33
An idea of the scale of this issue is evident from the fact that there are around 122,000
landholders with holdings over 10 hectares in New South Wales, although only some are
forest owners.34
This information about the structure of the industry has important implications for
questions of the choice of regulatory method. Some policy literature suggests that the
nature of the regulatory target should guide the choice of policy intervention.35
Sociologically, both the smaller contractors and landholders could be typified as having

30

31

32

33

34
35

mills also had the worst working conditions and the highest accident rate. Watson, I. (1990) Fighting over the Forests,
Allen & Unwin, Sydney, Caption, Photo 5, Adjacent p.74.
CARE (1999b) above n 17 at 71. The IAP referred to is the Interim Assessment Process or Interim Forest
Assessment by the NSW government prior to the RFA. Reductions in wood supply under the Interim Forestry
Agreement came into effect in July 1996. (CARE (1999b) above n 17 at 10).
Thompson, D. (1999) Agroforestry from Existing Timber Resources on the Northern Tablelands, A report for the Rural
Industries Research and Development Corporation /Land and Water Resources Research and Development
Corporation /Forest and Wood Products Research and Development Corporation Joint Venture Agroforestry
Program, RIRDC Publication No 99/15, Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation, Barton, ACT.
<http://www.rirdc.gov.au/reports/AFT/99-151.pdf>, at p.11.
Donaldson, J. (1998) “Private Forestry: Where have we been? Where are we going?” in Dyason, R., Dyason, L.,
Garsden, R. (eds.) Plantation and Regrowth Forestry: A Diversity of Opportunity, Australian Forest Growers Biennial Conference
Proceedings, 6-9th July 1998, Lismore, NSW, Australian Forest Growers, 271-282 at 272; cites Byron, N. and
Boutland, A. (1987) “Rethinking private forestry in Australia: strategies to promote private timber production”,
50(4) Australian Forestry 236-244.
Note however that there remain questions needing answers about the legality of the present approach for State
Forests which involves the Forestry Commission acting as regulatory buffer or regulatory agent for logging
contractors and companies, by completing their environmental compliance paperwork, now in the form of the
‘Integrated Forestry Operations Approvals’ under the Forestry and National Park Estate Act 1998 (NSW). In an earlier
paper, the author raised this question and gave it some more detailed consideration, see: Prest, J. (1995) Licensed to
Kill: Endangered Fauna Licensing Under the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW) Between 1991-1995, Occasional
Paper, Australian Centre for Environmental Law, Australian National University, Canberra, 108pp, (incl.
Appendices). To the author’s knowledge, there has been no judicial consideration of this question in NSW.
Rural Lands Protection Board (1998) Annual Report, cited by Benson, J. (2000) “Building a geography of
hope through land acquisition”44(1) National Parks Journal (NSW).
Stone, Christopher (1989) “Choice of Target and Other Law Enforcement Variables”, ch.10 in Friedland, M. (ed.),
Sanctions And Rewards In The Legal System: A Multidisciplinary Approach, Univ. of Toronto Press, Toronto.

lesser capacity to effectively interact with a government regulatory bureaucracy because
they operate on a small scale or, in the case of landholders, because they are not ‘repeat
players’ in the forestry game. This issue is further explored in the following chapter. One
source suggested that as the extent of government regulation of private forestry
increases, this will tend to favour the domination of this industry sector by larger
corporate forestry interests such as Boral, with a greater capacity to understand, and
comply with, complex regulatory requirements.36 Later chapters consider in more detail
the implications for regulatory policy of differences in the capacity to comply of small,
medium and large enterprises.

CONSERVATION VALUE
In 1992, the National Forest Policy Statement (NFPS) advanced a solid rationale for private
forest conservation:
As well as containing significant timber resources, native forests on private lands contain some
ecosystems and species that are not well represented in nature conservation reserves. They also
help to maintain environmental and aesthetic values and basic ecological processes, and under
conditions of climate change they may provide refuges or corridors for the movement of native
species.37

Yet there is a body of opinion, particularly within the timber industry, that most private
native forests in NSW are degraded regrowth and thus of minimal conservation value.38
Whilst such arguments may be valid in some areas they ignore the impact on other forest
areas of conservation significance. A forestry consultant, O'Neill, states that a substantial
area of old growth forest (OGF)39 exists on steep or remote sites on private land in
Northern NSW.40
There are significant areas of OGF and high conservation value (HCV) forests on private
land according to the NSW State of the Environment Report.41 A more detailed study
undertaken by Environment Australia (1999) found that 21% of total OGF in the UNE
Interview, Mr. Cameron Slatyer, ex-SF NSW Forester (Buladelah), Forests Task Force, Environment Australia,
10.3.99, Canberra.
37 Commonwealth of Australia (1992) National Forest Policy Statement: A New Focus for Australia’s Forests, AGPS,
Canberra, p.26.
38 O'Neill, M. (1998) “The Private Hardwood Forest Resources of Northern NSW”, in Dyason, R., Dyason, L.,
Garsden, R. (eds.), Plantation and Regrowth Forestry: A Diversity of Opportunity, Australian Forest Growers Biennial Conference
Proceedings, Lismore, NSW, 6-9 July 1998, 129-137; Mott, I. (2001) “What, Exactly, is a Lawful Forestry Purpose?” in
Country Conferences Pty Ltd, (ed.) 2nd Australasian Natural Resources Law & Policy Conference (Focus on Forestry), Perth,
W.A, Country Conferences Pty Ltd, 111-117.
39 Old-growth forest can be defined in several ways. The NFPS defined old-growth forest as ‘forest that is ecologically
mature and has been subjected to negligible unnatural disturbance such as logging, roading and clearing’. JANIS
(1996 ) stated, ‘old-growth forest is ecologically mature forest where the effects of disturbances are now negligible’.
40 O’Neill, M. (1998) above n 38 at 135.
41 EPA NSW (1997) above n 4 at 197.
36

region was on private land.42 This report showed that a significant area of private forest
was of environmental significance in several other respects.43
Some private forests have considerable importance for conservation - particularly in
Northern NSW.44 A sizeable number of forest ecosystem types exist on private land that
are not adequately represented within the nature reserve system on public lands (56
forest types in the Upper N-E, 85 in the Lower N-E and 30 in the Southern Region).45
The conservation significance of private forests is further explored in Appendix 5.1.

PRIVATE FORESTS AND THE LAW
We have seen that in NSW there is a substantial area of privately-held forests, and that
some of these forests have considerable conservation significance. Yet the volume of
timber cut from them has tended to increase in recent years, whilst preliminary evidence
- discussed further below in this Chapter at p. 31 - suggests that standards of
environmental management in the PNF industry are often relatively unsophisticated.
How effective was the response of the law to such a situation during the study period?
This section discusses the various factors and forces that have shaped, and are shaping
the law applying to PNF in NSW. In order to properly answer questions regarding the
effectiveness of the present law, it is useful to step back to briefly survey the broader

42

Note that the Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975 was repealed in 2003 by the Australian Heritage Council Act 2003 (Cth) which
inserted new Commonwealth heritage provisions into the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth). Data
from: Environment Australia (1999) Identification, Assessment and Protection of National Estate -Part A Natural Values: Upper North
Eastern NSW CRA Region, a Project Undertaken for the Joint Commonwealth NSW Regional Forest Agreements Steering
Committee As Part of the NSW Comprehensive Regional Assessments, project numbers NA 59/EH, NA 65/EH, February, joint
publication of RACAC & Forests Task Force, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Sydney and Canberra.

43

Statements made by Mott in delivering paper: Mott, I. (2001) above n 38 ; Similarly, Banks (2001) “Forest
Regulation - Acquisition of Property on Just Terms?” in Country Conferences Pty Ltd, (ed.). 2nd Australasian Natural
Resources Law & Policy Conference (Focus on Forestry), Country Conferences Pty Ltd, Perth, WA. Note that Banks (2001)
“Forest Regulation - Acquisition of Property on Just Terms ?” in Country Conferences Pty Ltd, (ed.). 2nd
Australasian Natural Resources Law & Policy Conference (Focus on Forestry), Country Conferences Pty Ltd, Perth, WA.at 96
argues that only 3% of the private forests in S-E Queensland are old growth.

44

Research conducted by Environment Australia in 1999 into the natural National Estate values in the forests of the Upper NorthEast showed that on a number of indicators, private land was important for nature conservation. Of the total areas identified as
having indicative national estate significance for vegetation community richness, 52.7% was on private land. Of those areas
identified as above threshold for rare fauna, 23% was on private land. Of areas identified as above threshold for rare flora, 26%
was on private property. Private land was also important for centres of species endemism (41.2% of total area), areas important for
species of fauna with disjunct populations (36% of total area), environments important as refugia for the conservation of
environmentally sensitive species (38.5% of total area). Private land provided the majority of area identified as having national
estate significance on the basis of habitat richness (38.8% of total area): see Environment Australia (1999) above n 42.

45

Commonwealth of Australia and State of NSW, Regional Forest Agreement for North East NSW (Upper NE and Lower
NE) (the Commonwealth, Canberra, (2000)(hereafter ‘NE RFA’), Table 1 “Percentage Reservation Status of Forest
and Non-Forest Ecosystems in the Upper NE Region based on Vegetation Modelling to Establish the pre-1750
extent of Forest Ecosystems in the Region”, contained in Attachment 1(a): Comprehensive, Adequate and
Representative Reserve System for Upper NE Region, pp.41-63.

picture of the development of forestry law in Australia in general terms, across all land
tenures.

Factors shaping forestry law in NSW
Scholars of law and policy have long recognised that the law is the outcome of the
interplay of economic, social and political interests.46 Dargavel has observed that forestry
laws are the outcome of interactions between government, industry and the public, and
that “these relationships – expressed in a mass of licences, leases, and regulations and
administrative customs – do not arise in a political vacuum; rather they are the
consequence of contests between various users and interests.”47 In a reflection of this
fact, the content of the law has featured as a core aspect of recent disputes over the
management of Australia’s native forests, particularly in NSW and Western Australia.48
Such insights suggest that it is useful to briefly examine the various phases of social and
political attitudes towards forest use and conservation which have shaped the law during
several historical periods in Australia. Four distinct phases of forest management in
Australia have been identified by forest historians. Each of these four phases has shaped
the law relating to forestry and forests.49 Following Aboriginal custodianship and
management of forests came a phase of colonial and pioneer use/exploitation of forests.
The common law occupied much of the original picture, with statutes controlling
forestry only introduced at a later date. The common law was directed overwhelmingly at
protecting rights of land owners, and clarifying the rights of licensees, lessees and those
holding profits à prendre to harvest timber.50 To the extent that it restricted tree-felling, the
common law was concerned with protecting other private property owners’ interests
Bottomley, S., Gunningham, N., Parker, S. (1991) Law in Context, Federation Press, Sydney; Hutter, B.(1999) “SocioLegal Perspectives on Environmental Law: An Overview”, 3-47 in Hutter, B. (ed.) A Reader in Environmental Law,
Oxford Readings in Socio-Legal Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
47 Dargavel, J. (1995) Fashioning Australia’s Forests, Oxford University Press, Melbourne at 10.
48 Corkill v Forestry Commission (1991) 73 LGRA 126; Forestry Commission v Corkill (1991) 73 LGRA 247, Jarasius v Forestry Commission
[No.1] (1989) 69 LGRA 156; Jarasius v Forestry Commission [No.2] (1990) 71 LGRA 116; Bridgetown/ Greenbushes Friends of the
Forest Inc v Executive Director of the Department of Conservation and Land Management (1997) 94 LGERA 380 (FC of SC
WA, special leave to appeal to AHC refused, see dissent by Kirby J).
49 Similar progressions are set out in U.S. histories, with phases of settlement, protective custody, and a transition to
management ideologies: Cubbage, F., O'Laughlin, J., Bullock, C.(1993) Forest Resource Policy, John Wiley & Sons, New
York, NY, at 23-27.
50 McCauley v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1944) 69 CLR 235; Australian Softwood Forests Pty Ltd v Attorney-General
(NSW) (Ex rel Corporate Affairs Commission) (1981) 148 CLR 121. See also Manwood, J. (1598) A treatise and discourse
of the lawes of the forrest: wherin is declared not onely those lawes, as they are now in force, but also the originall and beginning
of forrestes: and what a forrest is in his owne proper nature, and wherein the same doth differ from a chase, a park, or a warren,
... . Also a treatise of the purallee, declaring what purallee is, how the same first began, what a purallee man may doe, how he
may hunt and vse his owne purallee, ... . / Collected and gathered together, aswell out of the common lawes and statutes of this
land, as also out of sundry learned auncient aucthors, and out of the assisses and iters of Pickering and Lancaster, Thomas
Wight and Bonham Norton, London. (Held at the Bodleian Library, Oxford).
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rather than with protecting the environment.51 The rapacious destruction of forests
during this period,52 and a growing awareness of the value of native forests led to a phase
of ‘wise use’ and ‘national development’ of forests which began around the 1860s.
Concern about the rate of permanent clearing of forests had become strong by the midnineteenth century.53 State forests were established in Victoria in the mid 1860s54 and
NSW in 187155 in order to limit the deleterious impacts of uncontrolled timber-gathering
as well as forest-clearing for agriculture on both Crown and private lands.56 The emphasis
of the law during this period (1860-1970) was on ensuring ongoing production of timber
(i.e. regulation of yields), and on preventing the permanent conversion of forest to
agriculture. Other laws were aimed either at promoting industry development or
allocating public forest resources to private corporations - such as the Tasmanian
Concession Acts.57
In the late 1960s, a modern phase commenced in which environmentalist ideals of forest
and ecosystem conservation increasingly influenced policy and law.58 A key theme of this
phase was conflict between those placing priority on timber production objectives and
those emphasising environmental conservation.
Private forestry was largely forgotten in NSW in the course of epic struggles during the
1980s and 1990s over the future of publicly-owned forests (‘State forests’).59 Those
For example, the law of private nuisance, and the law regarding the “natural rights” of property owners - in the law
of support of land and the law of water rights.
52 Lines, W. (1991) Taming the Great South Land: A History of the Conquest of Nature in Australia, Allen & Unwin, Sydney,
NSW.
53 There has been commercial-scale logging in Glen Innes & Tenterfield since the 1860s, Coffs Harbour and Urunga
since the 1890s, Batemans Bay since the 1870s, logging of coastal lowland spotted gum and blackbutt forests around
Nowra since the 1820s, and forestry around Moss Vale and Tumut since the “early 1800s” : State Forests of NSW
(1999) Mapping of Forest Management History Report: UNE, LNE and Southern Regions, August, NSW CRA Project #
NA21/EH, RACAC & PM&C at pp.8-13; Bickford, A., Brayshaw , H., Proudfoot, H., (1998) Thematic Forest History
and Heritage Assessment (Non-Indigenous) UNE/LNE CRA Regions, Project Number NA 29/EH, 86pp.
54 Bonyhady, T. (2000) The Colonial Earth, Miegunyah Press, Melbourne, at 109-110. This action led to the
establishment of State forests) (i.e. dedicated public timber production reserves i.e., in order to ensure a permanent
forest estate. Dargavel (1995) above n 47 at 66. The management of state forests was formalised with the passage of
the Forestry Act 1916 which established the NSW Forestry Commission.
55 By 1882, there were 460 [public land] reserves encompassing more than one million hectares: Parliament of New
South Wales (1990) Public Accounts Committee of the Fourty-Ninth Parliament: Report on the Forestry Commission, Report
No.52, at 5.
56 According to SFNSW (1994) Proposed Forestry Operations, Eden Management Area, Environmental Impact Statement, pit saws
operated in the Eden area by the mid-1800s; sawmills operated in the south-east from 1869. Ten sawmills were
operating by 1900, with most timber coming from freehold land. Sleeper cutting employed hundreds of cutters at its
peak, the main species targeted being E. longifolia (woollybutt), E. bosistoana (coast grey box) and later, E. sieberi
(silver top ash). By about 1960, the industry was in decline.
57 Legislation including Florentine Valley Paper Industry Act 1935, Associated Pulp and Paper Mills Act 1936, Forestry
(Australian Paper Manufacturers Ltd) Act 1976, Pulpwood Products Industry (Eastern and Central Tasmania) Act 1968.
58 Dargavel, J. (1995) above n 47 at 12.
59 Dargavel has referred to private forests as “the wood of neglect”, in Dargavel, J. (1998) “The Wood of Neglect”,
History and Forests Resources Conference, Florence, Italy, 18-23 May.
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confrontations involved forest blockades, public inquiries, as well as litigation, and
numerous contentious changes to legislation.60 In Tasmania, conflict has also been a
constant feature of debates over the law applying to forestry, although the political might
of the timber industry has shaped most of the dominant characteristics of this law.61 The
heat of the social and political contest over forest management has been so intense that it
has shaped and forged the development of many aspects of Australian environmental law
beyond forestry, particularly environmental impact assessment law and threatened
species law.62
In NSW, with private forestry less in the spotlight, the development of the law applying
to private forests has been characterised by political and policy inertia. When not
forgotten, the private forests have typically been placed in the ‘too hard’ basket by policy
makers, legislators, conservationists and foresters.
There are several explanations - apart from what a sheer lack of information about what
is going on in private forests. The primary factor is a traditional political reluctance to
interfere with what are seen as the rights of private rural landholders to deal with their
land as they wish. Secondly, due to its very location, PNF is not highly visible and thus is
not readily scrutinised.63 Thirdly, as the actors and participants in PNF are numerous and
dispersed, they are not ready targets for lobbying and protest, unlike the large forestry

A series of citizen initiated civil actions resulted in findings against the Forestry Commission, for its non-compliance
with the law on environmental impact statements (EIS), wildlife protection, and pollution control. See: Kivi v Forestry
Commission (1982) 47 LGRA 38, Prineas v Forestry Commission (1984) 53 LGRA 160, Jarasius v Forestry Commission [No.1] (1989) 69
LGRA 156; Jarasius v Forestry Commission [No.2] (1990) 71 LGRA 116, Corkill v Forestry Commission (1991) 73 LGRA 126; Forestry
Commission v Corkill (1991) 73 LGRA 247, Corkill v Hope (1991) 74 LGRA 33, South East Forests Conservation Council Inc. v D-G NPWS
(1993) 81 LGERA 288, Nicholls v Director-General NPWS (1994) 84 LGERA 397. For various accounts of NSW disputes see: Boer,
B. and Preston, B., "Forestry - Reform and Regeneration", (1987) 4 EPLJ 80; Prineas, P. “The NSW Forestry Commission and its
Act”, in EDO (ed.) (1991) Towards a New Forestry Act, EDO(NSW), Sydney; Bonyhady, T. (1993) Places Worth Keeping:
Conservationists, Politics and Law, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, NSW; Dargavel, J. (1995) Fashioning Australia’s Forests, Oxford
University Press, Melbourne.
61 This has involved the passage of numerous exemptions from legislation comprising Tasmania’s resource management and planning
system, in an apparent attempt to exclude the demands for a different standard of environmental protection associated with other
laws, agencies and professions. Browne, R. (2002) “Forestry Exemptions”, A paper presented to the 2002 Conference of
60
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the Environmental Defender’s Office (Tas) Inc., 6pp. at <www.tased.edu.au/tasonline/edo/browne.pdf>; Gee, D.,
Stratford, E. (2001) “Public Participation and Integrated Planning in the Tasmanian Private Timber Reserve
Process”, 18(1) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 54-70. For an alternative perspective see Wilkinson, G. (2001)
“Building Partnerships - Tasmania’s approach to Sustainable Forest Management” In International Conference on the
Application of Reduced Impact Logging to Advance Sustainable Forest Management: Constraints, Challenges and Opportunities,
26.2.01-1.3.01, Kuching, Sarawak, Malaysia, Compendium of Conference Papers 219-226.
Such litigation has included Prineas v Forestry Commission (1984) 53 LGRA 160, Jarasius v Forestry Commission [No.1] (1989) 69
LGRA 156; Jarasius v Forestry Commission [No.2] (1990) 71 LGRA 116, Corkill v Forestry Commission (1991) 73 LGRA 126; Forestry
Commission v Corkill (1991) 73 LGRA 247, Corkill v Hope (1991) 74 LGRA 33. Dargavel, (1995) above n 47; Bonyhady, T.
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(1993) Places Worth Keeping: Conservationists, Politics and Law, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, NSW.
On the other hand, activities within public forests may not be entirely transparent for reasons such as forest closures
on the grounds of ‘public safety’, claims of commercial confidentiality, and in Tasmania, exemptions from FOI
legislation.

companies and government agencies operating on public land. Fourthly, private forests
have been seen in the past as less significant in both conservation and economic terms.
Nevertheless the law applying to private forests has been gradually influenced since the
mid 1990s by broader social concerns over environmental protection already so evident
in amendments to the law applying to public forests. In NSW, statutes applicable in a
broader context in response to concerns about vegetation clearing, threatened species
decline, and pollution have been variously enacted, and some of these apply to a range of
land-use activities on private land, including PNF.64 Thus there has not been so much a
considered strategy to holistically regulate PNF, but rather a gradual encroachment by
broader tides of legislative enactment.
The struggle over public forests in NSW has nevertheless had some unexpected spillover effects into the private land context. For a long time many private forest owners in
NSW operated under a working assumption that they were not subject to external
regulation and environmental controls apart from protected land controls that have
applied to steep slope and selected riparian logging since 1972.65 However in September
1991 the law applying to forestry on private land attained greater importance overnight
with the decision of the NSW Land and Environment Court concerning logging of the
Chaelundi State Forest near Dorrigo (Corkill v Forestry Commission).66 In a judgement later
upheld by the NSW Court of Appeal, Stein J decided that the incidental taking or killing
of endangered fauna by habitat modification and destruction, whether on public or private
land, was unlawful without a licence granted under the National Parks and Wildlife Act
1974. Although that decision was temporarily overridden by the making of a regulation,67
it was effectively reinstated by the passage of a private member’s bill, the Endangered
Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (NSW), Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW), Protection of the
Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW).
65 Forestry, Soil Conservation and Other Acts (Amendment) Act 1972 amending the Soil Conservation Act 1938.
64

66
67

Corkill v Forestry Commission of NSW [No.2] (1991) 73 LGRA 126 (Land and Environment Court, Stein J), Forestry Commission v
Corkill (1991) 73 LGRA 247 (Court of Appeal).

The Greiner Cabinet discussed an immediate response to the judgement in the form of a regulation under the
NPWA . On 2 October, an extraordinary edition of the Gazette was rushed through the government printers containing the ‘Chaelundi regulation’. Gazette, No.138 of 2.10.91, at pp.8499-8501. This was created under National
Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW) s.100(2). So effective was this haste that it defeated an attempt by Mr Corkill to
injunct the regulation's gazettal. (Hansard, 12.12.91, p.6628. Hansard, 5.12.91, p.5748; 12.12.91, p.6602). On the
same day, the Liberal Minister for Education, Dr Metherell resigned from the Government citing amongst his
reasons the attitude of the Government towards environmental laws, including their decision to create the
‘Chaelundi regulation’. Robertson, T., Anderson, M., (1992) The Chaelundi Aftermath: Regulation of Forestry Activities and
the Endangered Fauna (Interim Protection) Act 1991 (NSW), paper presented to 11th NELA Conference, Perth,
September 1992, p.54; Woolf, “Editorial : Corkill v. Forestry Commission of NSW” , (1992) 9 Environmental and
Planning Law Journal 1 at 3. By exempting all public authorities and persons from the endangered and protected
fauna provisions of the NPWA , the regulation effectively overturned the decision of Stein J.

Fauna (Interim Protection) Act 1991.68 That Act confirmed the requirement to obtain
licences to take or kill endangered fauna69 if undertaking habitat-damaging activities on
public or private land.70 Upon the expiry of this legislation, regulation of habitat
modification on private land was continued by the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995,
an act that remains in force on private land today.

Difficulties in regulating PNF
With the expansion of environmental laws applying to private land, regulatory agencies
are coming to realise that there are particular difficulties inevitably involved in this
context. Not least are the issues that arise from applying environmental laws in a domain
where they previously did not apply, or at least were perceived not to apply. Problems in
regulating activities on private property arise from the fact it has been perceived as a
closed domain. This introduces certain difficulties, albeit not insurmountable, of access
and monitoring for regulators.71
Another impediment to applying forestry laws on private land arises from the traditional
cultural resistance of much of the rural community to external regulation. In Australia
there is a collective social ambivalence regarding the application of environmental laws in
the rural context, particularly on freehold land. There are inevitably difficulties for
agencies in applying environmental statutes that impose new obligations overnight on
rural landholders.72
Historical sources suggest that previous governments have from time to time sought to
rise above a laissez-faire attitude to PNF, attempting to regulate it. However, they have
usually had mixed success. Two episodes in particular serve to illustrate this point.
Prest, J. (1995) Licensed to Kill: Endangered Fauna Licensing Under the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW) Between
1991-1995, Occasional Paper, Australian Centre for Environmental Law, Australian National University, Canberra.
69 Note that ‘endangered fauna’ was the umbrella or generic term under the former EFIP Act, divided into two
categories – ‘threatened’ and ‘vulnerable’, whereas under the TSC Act, the generic term became ‘threatened’, divided
into two categories ‘endangered’ and ‘vulnerable’.
70 Endangered Fauna (Interim Protection) Act 1991, s.4, Schedule 1, Item 2(f), amending National Parks Act s.5(1). Timber
Industry (Interim Protection) Act 1992. See also NPWS (1994) List of Licences Issued, database print out, dated 13.7.94,
68pp. See also Timber Industry (Interim Protection) Act 1992 - Report to Parliament, January 1994, p.5.
71 Virtually all such legislation provides at least rudimentary powers of entry and inspection for the staff of regulatory
agencies. Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW) s.61(1); Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld), s.145; Development
Act 1993 (SA) s.19(1)(a); Environment Protection Act 1993 (SA) s.87(1)(a).
72 Witness the blockade of DLWC staff attempting to conduct a lawful inspection of a farm near Nyngan for the
purposes of researching an alleged breach of the NVC Act during March 2003,: Lewis, D. (2003) “We’re hurting:
irate farmers block inspections in protest”, Sydney Morning Herald, 12.3.03. More generally, see Farrier, D. (1995)
“Policy Instruments for Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land”, in Bradstock et.al. (eds.) Conserving Biodiversity:
Threats and Solutions, Surrey Beatty & Sons, Sydney, 337-359.
68

In the early years of the colony in NSW, according to one account, there was no restraint
on logging private land - although on Crown lands early Governors issued edicts
requiring licences to fell timber.73 Bonyhady recounts that in 1803, Lieutenant Philip
King made an attempt to control tree felling on private land. He recounts:
King recognised…that clearing of river banks by landholders on the Hawkesbury River had
increased the damage caused by floods. As a result, he prohibited the clearing of cedars on private
land abutting the river, and ‘earnestly recommended’ that occupiers of this land replant these trees.
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A key aspect is Bonyhady’s observation that concern for private property rights kept the
lieutenant from requiring the replanting of trees that had been felled.
A second episode from NSW history, albeit from a much later period, serves to illustrate
difficulties in regulating private native forestry. In 1992, an effort was made by the
Legislative Council to introduce a framework for the environmental assessment of PNF
during the passage of the Timber Industry (Interim Protection) Act. That Act suspended the
environmental assessment provisions of the EP&A Act in relation to public forests.75
Opposition amendments inserted a framework for regulating private forestry, activated
upon the making of a regulation. This included a requirement that a regulation could not
be made unless the Minister certified that “proposed logging operations are to be
conducted in a manner which mitigates their environmental impacts to the greatest
practicable extent.”76 However, no regulation was ever made prior to the Act’s expiry in
December 1998. This was likely due to the political sensitivity of raising the question of
the adequacy of environmental standards in PNF. Robertson and Anderson speculated
that this regime was never activated “probably because of the serious environmental
problems which this additional albeit weak system of environmental accountability
[would have] disclosed.”77
Set against difficulties in regulating forestry on private land are contemporary concerns to
ensure that forestry meets environmental protection objectives. There are three particular
Parliament of New South Wales (1990) Public Accounts Committee of the Fourty-Ninth Parliament: Report on the Forestry
Commission, Report No.52, at p.5 . On the other hand, it was common for leases of Crown land to specify that a
certain number of trees were to be ringbarked annually by the lessee.
74 Bonyhady, (2000) above n 54 at 10; cites Historical Records of Australia, series 1, Vol 5, pp.67-68.
75 Robertson, T., Anderson, M., (1992) above n 67 ; Bonyhady (1993) above n 60.
76 Timber Industry (Interim Protection) Act 1992, s.12(3)(c). On the other hand, another section, inserted by the government
stated that where a regulation was made, the effect would be to suspend the operation of the environmental
assessment provisions of Part 5, EPAA, and the provisions of the Endangered Fauna (Interim Protection) Act 1991, see
TIIP Act, s.12(4).
77 Robertson, T. and Anderson, M. (1992) above n 67 at 60.
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factors which emphasise the need to ensure that State laws for PNF are adequate. These
factors are discussed in turn below. They are (a) the withdrawal of the Commonwealth
from regulation of PNF; (b) the policy stance of Regional Forest Agreements in NSW to
avoid placing restrictions on timber cutting on private lands and to apply only voluntary
measures for conservation; and (c) government commitments to ecologically sustainable
forest management.

Commonwealth regulation of PNF
Until the late 1990s, the Commonwealth played a significant part in the regulation of
forestry, including PNF. The export of woodchips from private land was subject to
Commonwealth environmental regulation, such as when the export control licence
regime triggered legislation including the Endangered Species Protection Act 1992 (Cth),78 and
the Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975 (Cth). By this means, environmental
protection conditions were attached to woodchip export licences applying to PNF.79
The Commonwealth’s regulation of forestry has long been a site of struggle over the
overall direction of forest policy in Australia. Federal controls over forestry were
introduced, frequently challenged in the courts and slowly consolidated in a gradual
process between the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s.80 Disputes over logging in Tasmania
and in North Queensland led to litigation which clarified the constitutional authority of
the Commonwealth to legislate to intervene (eg. through World Heritage nominations,
the application of export controls, and the establishment of inquiries) to protect forests
in spite of State legislation that allowed logging of sensitive forests.81

Broadly, the Endangered Species Protection Act 1992 (Cth) in Part 6, Division 4 and s.78 required that threatened species
be taken into account in the taking of Commonwealth actions and the making of Commonwealth decisions. The
Act applied to both Commonwealth land and, in certain circumstances, to activities on non-Commonwealth land
(i.e. on private land). The main vehicle for this application was the EPIP Act. This is because the ESP Act was linked
to the operation of the EPIP Act: (s.5A EPIP). Any action which could threaten with extinction or significantly
impede the recovery of a listed species or community was considered to be a matter of environmental significance in
terms of the EPIP Act and therefore may have required environmental assessment under that legislation.
79 Woodchip Export Monitoring Unit (1997) WEMU Annual Report 1996, Department of Primary Industry and Energy,
Canberra. For example, in 1996, conditions required parties to “ensure that operations...did not threaten with
extinction, or significantly impede the recovery of threatened species or ecological communities.” The export
conditions in turn affected the detail of harvesting prescriptions applied under state environmental laws - at p.36.
Whether these controls were particularly effective is another question which this thesis does not set out to answer.
80 Richardson v Forestry Commission (Tas) (1987) 73 ALR 589, Queensland v Commonwealth (1988) 77 ALR 291; Lemonthyme
and Southern Forests (Commission of Inquiry) Act 1987 (Cth). See further, Toyne, P. (1994) The Reluctant Nation, ABC
Books, Sydney, Chs. 5,6,7; ACF v Minister for Resources (1989) 76 LGRA 200 discussed in Bonyhady (1993) above n
60 at 92.
81 Other disputes such as the South East Forests clarified the scope of Commonwealth legislation such as s.30 of the
Heritage Commission Act 1975: ACF v Minister for Resources (1989) 76 LGRA 200.
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The Regional Forest Agreements process
The Regional Forest Agreements (RFA) process and changes to forestry legislation that
have been associated with it, are part of the essential background context to recent law
and policy making for PNF in NSW and Tasmania.
The notion, and later the reality, of Regional Forest Agreements has been at the centre
of official forest policy since 1992. At that time it was agreed by the Commonwealth and
States that the most appropriate means for implementation and achievement of the goals
of the NFPS was through a series of Regional Forest Agreements.82 These agreements
between the Commonwealth and States provided for common principles of forest
management, specifying the means by which the aims of the NFPS were to be met.83
Australia was divided into twelve RFA regions. Tasmania is covered by a single RFA,
which was concluded in November 1997, whilst NSW is covered by four RFA regions84
for which agreements have all have been made.85
A tangible but always unstated objective of the RFA process was to reduce the role of
the Commonwealth in forest management, thereby removing it from the political
complications of ongoing conflict over forestry. The NFPS of 1992 marked the
commencement of a process of diminishing the Commonwealth’s place in forestry
regulation. The RFA process embodied that policy position of devolution of power to
the States.86 Associated legislation was then altered to reflect that approach.
In the RFAs, the parties agreed that the Commonwealth would defer to state regimes for
the management of public forests, and that it would withdraw itself from regulation of
forestry. In particular, the Commonwealth asserted that it could rely upon accredited
State legislative regimes for EIA and threatened species consideration for the purposes
Commonwealth of Australia (1992) NFPS above n 37 at 24-25; see also Bartlett, T. (1999) “Regional Forest
Agreements – A Policy, Legislative and Planning Framework to Achieve Sustainable Forest Management in
Australia”, 16(4) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 328-338.
83 Commonwealth of Australia (1995) Regional Forest Agreements: The Commonwealth Position, February, AGPS, Canberra,
40pp, plus Appendices, 33pp.
84 The NSW RFA regions are Upper North East, Lower North East, Southern NSW, and Eden.
85 At November 2000, the Southern RFA had not yet been concluded due to disagreements between the
Commonwealth and the States, however it was signed in April 2001.
86 The Inter-governmental Agreement on the Environment (IGAE) was the first endorsement of this practice, via
Commonwealth accreditation of State environmental impact assessment regimes. IGAE, clause 1.5, 2.5.1.1;
Schedule 2, Items 6,8; Schedule 3, Item 1,4,5. See also Fowler, R. (1994) “New National Directions in
Environmental Protection and Conservation”, in Boer, Fowler, and Gunningham (eds.) Environmental Outlook: Law
and Policy, Federation Press, Sydney, pp. 113-148.
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of implementing its own environmental legislative obligations. In parallel, the strictness
of the woodchip export control licence regime was gradually relaxed (and then later
totally removed). For example, a category of “degraded forest licence” was created in
1996 to enable the export of additional woodchips from private lands above normal
quota levels.87
The Commonwealth took the next step of withdrawing itself from the regulation of
forestry during the course of a major revision of Commonwealth environmental law
involved with the enactment of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act
1999 (Cth). With that Act, the Commonwealth wrote itself out of obligations to impose
environmental impact assessment upon forestry within RFA regions, by means of a
broad-brush exemption clause.88
The text of the RFAs prior to the passage of the EPBC Act reflected the stance of
Commonwealth non-intervention with explicit policy commitments not to apply
Commonwealth environmental laws to restrict logging.89 These commitments were
backed up by promises in the RFAs to pay compensation in the event of ‘intervention’.
Those promises became legally binding upon enactment of compensation provisions
within the Regional Forests Agreements Act 2002 (Cth).90
Thus at the conclusion of the RFA process, and with the passage of the EPBC and RFA
Acts the Commonwealth had largely divested itself of forestry regulation, both public and
private.91 At the time of writing, regulation of the environmental impacts of forestry
(public and private) now falls almost exclusively to State and local governments. The key
implication of this gradual reduction in the Commonwealth’s role is that questions of the
effectiveness of State laws have renewed importance.

Export Control (Hardwood Wood Chips) Regulation 1996 (Cth), r.13-19.
EPBC Act 1999, Part 4, Division 4, s.38, 40, exemptions which are qualified in relation to World Heritage listed
forests in s.42.
89 The questionable legality of such attempts to not apply existing legislation and further, to bind future parliaments
were amongst the legal issues considered by the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee (1999)
Report on Provisions of the Regional Forest Agreements Bill 1998, 25 February 1999, the Senate, Parliament House,
Canberra.
90 Regional Forests Agreements Act 2002 (Cth), s.8.
91 Tribe, J. (1998) “The Law of the Jungles: Regional Forest Agreements”, 15(2) Environmental and Planning Law Journal
143; Prest, J., Downing, S. (1998) Shades of Green? Proposals to Change Commonwealth Environmental Laws, Research Paper
No.16, 1997-98, Commonwealth Parliamentary Library, Law and Bills Digest Group, Canberra; Senate Rural and
Regional Affairs and Transport Committee (1999) Report on Provisions of the Regional Forest Agreements Bill 1998, 25
February 1999, the Senate, Parliament House, Canberra.
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Environmental assessment in the RFA process
These aspects of the RFA process were counterbalanced by advances in knowledge
yielded through a comprehensive series of studies of all aspects of forests and forestry in
each of the RFA regions. The signing of each of the RFAs was preceded by a process of
study and assessment of forest values, forest inventory and review of ecological
sustainability of forest management.
This was the Comprehensive Regional Assessment (‘CRA’) Process which identified the
area and extent of each forest ecosystem type (current and pre-1750). For each RFA, a
wide range of research reports were commissioned addressing ecological matters such as
documentation of forest growth stages using aerial photographic interpretation, as well as
economic and social issues.
The CRA process adopted nationally agreed ‘JANIS’ criteria to identify areas of forest
requiring protection. It was recognised that it is necessary to retain a percentage or
minimum area (for smaller ecosystems) of each type of forest ecosystem, and for these to
be protected in perpetuity. One of the JANIS criteria was to include 15% of the pre-1750
distribution of each forest ecosystem type within reserves. Additional criteria were set for
the conservation of vulnerable, rare and endangered forest ecosystem types as well as
areas of old-growth and wilderness forests.
The RFA process in each region led to the protection of some of the under-target forest
ecosystems found in State Forests by protecting them from logging and placing them in
National Parks or informal flora reserves. However, as other under-target forest
ecosystems are largely found on private land, the public land reservation approach was
not sufficient to protect them. Protecting under-target forest ecosystems on private land
from damage was necessary if NSW and Tasmania in particular were to meet JANIS
targets and to create a CAR reserve system.

Private forest conservation in the RFA process
As the RFA process applied to both private and public forests, the agreements reveal
many aspects of the policy stance of governments towards PNF. The agreements, signed

by four of the five states with a significant native forest industry, set the context for
future legislation and policy making with regard to private native forests over a 20 year
period. While these political agreements are highly unlikely to be legally binding,92
diverging from their approach in the future will be politically difficult.
The RFAs dictate four main policy parameters for PNF management in NSW and
Tasmania. These are are set out here. Firstly, it was agreed that private native forests
would only be included within the CAR reserve system after options for filling
reservation targets from public forests had been exhausted. In 1992 in the NFPS, the
States and the Commonwealth had agreed that:
“....the representative areas for [nature] reservation will, in the first instance, be drawn
from Crown lands. Purchase of private land for reservation purposes is appropriate in
cases where high conservation values are inadequately represented on Crown land and
where complementary management practices on those private lands are unlikely to
adequately protect those conservation values...”93

The second feature of forest policy set out in the NSW RFAs is that the methods for
private forest conservation listed are overwhelmingly non-regulatory.94 The NSW RFAs
embodied this policy stance by containing an agreement that “All conservation
mechanisms for the establishment of the Private Land component of the CAR Reserve
System will be voluntary.”

95

Whilst following the course set by the NFPS, the RFAs

went a little further and played down the role of acquisition to a minimum. The NE
NSW agreement stated “Provision is also made in the JANIS Reserve Criteria for
inclusion of Private Land in the CAR Reserve System, with the agreement of
landholders, where the Criteria cannot be met from Public Land.” [emphasis added]96 It
may be difficult to achieve such objective, given that the author’s research revealed that
during the study period the NPWS was applying a protocol of not approaching private
landholders to purchase properties, but instead waiting for them to contact NPWS.97
The main tool envisaged for the completion of the private land component of the CAR
reserve system in the N-E RFA was to place it “under secure management arrangement
South Australia v Commonwealth (1986) 108 CLR 130 at 154; see Tribe, J. (1998) “The Law of the Jungles: Regional
Forest Agreements”, 15(2) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 143 at 144.
93 NFPS above n 37 at 9.
94 Ibid, Attachment 2, Clause 5, p.70.
95 Commonwealth of Australia and State of NSW (2000) Regional Forest Agreement for North East NSW (Upper NE and
Lower NE), March 2000, Clause 56.
96 Ibid, cl 2, Attachment 1(a), p. 41.
97 Interview, Paul Packard, Conservation Assessment and Data Unit, NPWS Southern Directorate, 23.01.01.
92

by agreement with private landholders”.98 Other mechanisms specified included “Voluntary Conservation Agreements; landholder initiated agreements; non-contractual
voluntary agreements; fee for service; voluntary acquisition; fixed term common law
contract; in perpetuity common law contract; community grants; property management
plans; voluntary land and water management plans..”99
The third feature of the RFAs in NSW was a policy position of explicitly avoiding
restrictions on timber cutting on private lands. In relation to production forests, it was
agreed:
“New South Wales confirms that the CAR Reserve System has been established through this
Agreement …and that conservation levels achieved in that reserve system will not subsequently
be used as a basis for preventing timber harvesting being carried out on Private Lands...”100

This amounts to a promise not to prevent timber harvesting in private native forests, on
the basis of an assertion that the CAR reserve system had already been created –
overlooking the reality that it was still in the process of being created.

Government commitments to ESFM
A fourth and in the light of the foregoing, perhaps contradictory feature of policies for
PNF set out in the RFAs was the adoption of a goal of ESFM. ESFM can be defined as
“managing forests so that they are sustained in perpetuity for the benefit of society by
ensuring that the values of forests101 are not lost or degraded for current and future
generations.”102 These sustainability goals were adopted first in the National Forest Policy
Statement (1992) and later were reiterated in the RFAs in relation to public and private
Ibid, clause 2, p.2.
Ibid, Attachment 2, clause 5 (pp.70-71).
100 Commonwealth of Australia and State of NSW (2000) Regional Forest Agreement for North East NSW (Upper NE and
Lower NE), March 2000, Clause 59.
101 NSW RFA documents discussing ESFM set out a goal to “maintain or increase the full suite of values (biodiversity,
forest ecosystem health, soil and water, heritage, carbon cycles, social and economic benefits) across the NSW native
forest estate for present and future generations.” Independent Expert Working Group (1998) Assessment of
Management Systems and Processes for Achieving Ecologically Sustainable Forest Management in NSW, A report undertaken for
the NSW CRA/RFA Steering Committee, Project No. NA 18/ESFM, Resource and Conservation Division,
Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (NSW) and Forests Taskforce, Department of Prime Minister and
Cabinet (Cth), RACAC, Sydney at 20-21.
102 Independent Expert Working Group (1998) above n 101 at 17.
These goals were adopted by Australian
governments in the National Forest Policy Statement (1992) and the Regional Forest Agreements process. Note that
the economically efficient level of biodiversity conservation is unlikely to be the ecologically sustainable level of
biodiversity conservation. An alternative view of ESFM (Recher, 1992) stresses that policies must ensure
“conservation of the integrity of the ecological processes and functions that characterise forest ecosystems.” Recher,
H. (1992) “Paradigm and Paradox: Sustainable Forest Management”, in Rowland, M. (1992) Sustainable Forest
Management, Proceedings of a Seminar, University of Newcastle, Sponsored by Institute of Foresters and Board of
Environmental Studies, at 14.
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forests.103 The goal was adopted in response to ongoing scientific concerns and public
disputation over the ecological impacts of public forest management.104
In addition to commitments to ESFM, there are national policy commitments to
biodiversity protection which specifically call for biodiversity conservation within the
commercial forestry context.105 The NSW Biodiversity Strategy recommended “ensuring
that legislation, policies, institutional frameworks, codes, standards and procedures
related to forest management require and provide incentives for ESFM.”106
Part of the sustainability agenda of the RFAs involved the creation of a CAR reserve
system. For forests designated by the RFAs to be production areas, the RFAs set an
objective of ESFM (ecologically sustainable forest management). The North East RFA,
concluded in March 2000 helps explain the constraints upon policy making for PNF
presented by the RFAs. The “basis of [that] agreement” was expressed to include
“promoting the conservation and management of the private forest estate.”107 In the
North East RFA, the NSW government made a commitment to achieving ESFM on
private native forest land. It was agreed that:
“New South Wales confirms its commitment to the achievement of ESFM on Public
and Private Land consistent with the principles of Ecologically Sustainable Forest
Management [at Attachment 14], and to the ongoing review and subsequent
implementation of its legislation, policy, plans, Codes and Regional Prescriptions to
ensure ESFM objectives can be achieved in a more efficient regulatory
environment.”108

The N-E agreement spoke in terms of encouraging private land holders to improve
practices, rather than regulating to ensure this. It was agreed that “The Parties agree to
encourage private forest owners to ensure that their management operations are consistent

North East NSW Regional Forest Agreement, cl. 46, p.17.
ESFM was first adopted as a goal by Australian governments in the NFPS, above n 37 at p.25. See also
Commonwealth of Australia (1997) First Approximation Report for the Montreal Process, DPIE, Canberra. See further
Australian reports to United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development’s Intergovernmental Forum and Panel on
Forests (IPF). Demands for ESFM have also been made by forest ecologists, conservationists and NGOs: Norton,
T.W.; Kirkpatrick, J.B. (1995) “Sustainable Forestry – the Urgency to Make the Myth a Reality”, in Bradstock et.al.
(eds.) Conserving Biodiversity: Threats and Solutions, Surrey Beatty & Sons Ltd, Sydney, at 240-248.
105 The National Biodiversity Strategy calls for “State and Territory forestry management legislation and administrative
arrangements [to] take into account the conservation of biological diversity.” Commonwealth of Australia (1996)
National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s Biological Diversity, DEST, Canberra, Paragraph 7.3.1., p.20-21.
106 National Parks and Wildlife Service (NSW) (1999) NSW Biodiversity Strategy, NPWS, Sydney, p.35-36.
107 NE RFA, cl.7(d).
108 NE RFA, cl.46, p.17.
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with ESFM practices.” {emphasis added}. In the Southern Forests RFA and Eden
RFAs, a similar approach was taken to PNF.109
Although considerable work has been done to investigate the sustainability of public
forestry. However there has been little investigation of the sustainability of PNF. In
particular there has been absent any consideration of whether laws for PNF actually
require ESFM. The only source to have done this for NSW were ESFM reports prepared
for Regional Forest Agreements during 1998, after this study commenced.110

Forest management – international treaties, conventions and policy initiatives
In addition to commitments to ESFM at the domestic level, International agreements
and strategy documents relating specifically to forests or applicable to forests are also
generating a degree of policy momentum for the conservation of important forest
habitats, and more sustainable management of forest resources.111 At present, there is no
binding international instrument specifically related to conservation of temperate
forests.112 Nevertheless, there are many international conventions of general application
with a bearing on forest management. Eleven international environment protection
treaties and agreements applicable to the question of forest management are listed by the
National State of the Forests Report (1998), such as the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change.113 Other potentially relevant conventions include the UNESCO World
Heritage Convention114, the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance115, the
CITES Convention116 and regional nature conservation conventions.117 Other

Southern RFA, cl.53-58, p.18; Attachment 2, p.57-58; Eden RFA, cl.53-56, p.18, Attachment 12, p.74.
Independent Expert Working Group (1998) above n 101. Tasmanian Public Land Use Commission (1997)
Tasmania-Commonwealth Regional Forest Agreement : Assessment of Ecologically Sustainable Forest Management Systems and
Processes Independent Expert Advisory Group (Final Report): Background Report Part G;
111 UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (1997) State of the World’s Forests, FAO, Rome.
112 Jackson, W.J (2000) “Forest conservation: increasing impact through partnership” 31(1) World Conservation 23
(formerly IUCN Bulletin).
113 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 31 ILM 849 (1992).
114 UN Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 23 November 1972, 11 ILM 1367 (Done at
Paris, entered into force 17.12.75).
115 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention), 11 ILM 969
(1972) Done at Ramsar, Iran, 2.2.71, entered into force 21.12.75).
116 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 3.3.1973, 27 UST 1087, 993 UNTS 243.
117 Convention Concerning the Protection of the Natural and Resources and the Environment of the South Pacific Region (SPREP
Convention), ATS 1990 NO.31, 26 ILM 38; Convention on Conservation of Nature in the South Pacific (‘Apia Convention’),
Done at Apia, W. Samoa, 12.6.76, ATS 1990 No.0041.
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international agreements and statements such as the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 are also
of relevance to the broader context of forest management.118
The importance of forests on all tenures has also incresed in recent years because of
recognition of their value as carbon sinks in the face of human induced climate change.
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in particular
is a source of indirect pressure to conserve forests. This is because under the Protocol all
forests are carbon sinks and changes in forest cover are now included in calculations of
total national greenhouse gas emissions.119 Vegetation clearance is a source of greenhouse
gas emissions, and over 17 per cent of Australia’s total emissions are considered to arise
from land clearing and vegetation modification. At the Fourth Conference of the Parties,
Australia negotiated special concessions in relation to the required extent of reduction in
direct conventional carbon emissions, because promises to the international community
to reduce broadacre vegetation clearance were accepted.120
This has led to the creation of a market mechanism for ‘carbon trading’ by domestic and
overseas jurisdictions enacting trading framework legislation. In 1998, NSW enacted the
Carbon Rights Legislation Amendment Act 1998, providing an explicit framework for the
recognition of carbon sequestration rights as a species of profits à prendre created by the
Conveyancing Act.121 The Act thus makes a legal framework for the trading of carbon
stored in trees and forests not confined to plantations. Specifically, it amends other
legislation to enable generators and distributors of electricity and the Forestry
Commission, as well as private individuals and corporations, to acquire and trade in such
forestry carbon rights.122 These developments mean that regulation of forestry and
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, (‘UNCED’) (1992) Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, 31 ILM 874, UNCED Doc A/Conf. 151/5/Rev.1; Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable
Development, UNCED Doc. A/Conf.151/26 (1992).
119 Article 3(3) of the Protocol provides: “The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by
sinks resulting from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation,
reforestation, and deforestation since 1990…shall be used to meet the commitments under this Article.”
120 Hamilton, C., Reynolds, A. (1998) Land Use Change in Australia and the Kyoto Protocol, paper presented by the Australia
Institute to the Fourth Conference of the Parties of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, Buenos Aires,
12th November 1998, Australia Institute, Canberra, 22pp.
121 The Act provides “carbon sequestration right, in relation to land, means a right conferred on a person by agreement
or otherwise to the legal, commercial or other benefit (whether present or future) of carbon sequestration by any
existing or future tree or forest on the land after 1990” (s.87A Conveyancing Act 1919 as amended by the Carbon Rights
Legislation Amendment Act 1998.)
122 The prospect of establishing forest plantations to serve as carbon sinks for the purpose of carbon trading, with a
market established in 1999 by the Sydney Futures Exchange, has led to an increase in the rate of plantation
establishment in Australia, with electricity suppliers entering into contracts with forestry agencies in NSW. Hordern,
N. (1999) “SFE punts on carbon trading”, Australian Financial Review, 31.8.99, p.5; Washington, S. (1998) “Deal
Opens Way for Carbon Credit Trade”, Australian Financial Review, 5.6.98, p.6; Hordern, N. (1999) “TEPCO warming
to the concept of planting trees”, Australian Financial Review, 9.7.99, p.24. On the other hand, there are concerns that
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vegetation clearance on private land has assumed new importance in terms of
compliance with international obligations.

An International law regime for forests? The Montreal Process
Apart from the indirect application of international agreements relating to other subject
matters, considerable pressure is building, principally through the ‘Montreal process’, for
the development of a specific-purpose international law regime governing the
management of forests.123
Australia is one of twelve countries, whom together represent 90 per cent of the world’s
temperate and boreal forests, which, in 1994, signed a non-legally-binding agreement
aimed at the development of criteria and indicators for the sustainable management of
temperate and boreal forests.124 Australia recently submitted its First Approximation Report
to the Process.125 This report suggests adequate Australian progress towards the targets
set under the Montreal Process. It is, however, short on detail.
The Working Group of the Montreal Process first met in Montreal, Canada in September
1993, charged with developing ways to implement the Global Statement of Principles on Forest
Conservation (signed the previous year at the United Nations Earth Summit at Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil).126 While non-binding, the Statement represented a first step towards the
creation of a binding instrument to address the global problems of deforestation. The
Statement called upon States to preserve representative samples of forest types, but as is
apparent from its preamble, maintained a non-binding stance, and an emphasis on
sovereign rights of resource exploitation. The Principles encouraged States to direct
conservation efforts as follows:
National policies and/or legislation aimed at management, conservation and sustainable
development of forests should include the protection of ecologically viable
representative or unique examples of forests, including primary/old growth forests,

plantations are being established at the expense of native forests, rather than on already cleared agricultural land,
particularly in Tasmania: see: <www.nfn.org.au>.
123 Boer, B. Ramsay, R., Rothwell, D. (1998) International Environmental Law in the Asia Pacific, Kluwer Law, the Hague, at
316.
124 National Forest Inventory (1998) above n 1 at p.109.
125 Commonwealth of Australia (1997) above n 104.
126 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (1992) Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on
the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of all types of Forests, A/CONF. 151/6, reprinted in 31 ILM 881
(1992).

cultural, spiritual, historical, religious, and other unique and valued forests of national
importance.127

In February 1995, the Working Group of the Montreal Process endorsed the Santiago
Declaration, which presents seven criteria and sixty-seven indicators which can be used to
arrive at a common understanding of the term “sustainable forest management”.128 The
seventh criterion relates to the development of legislation and other institutional
frameworks of each country that are necessary to achieve the form of sustainable
management set out in the first six criteria.129 Criterion 7, ‘Legal, institutional and
economic framework for forest conservation and sustainable management’, states that
the indicators concern:
the extent to which the legal framework (laws, regulations, guidelines) supports the
conservation and sustainable management of forests, including the extent to which it:
a) clarifies property rights…
b) provides for periodic forest-related planning, assessment and policy review…
c) provides opportunities for public participation in public policy and decisionmaking related to forests and public access to information;
d) encourages best-practice codes for forest management;
e) provides for the management of forests to conserve special environmental,
cultural, social and or scientific values.

Further, indicator 7.2(e) is concerned with:
the extent to which the institutional framework supports the conservation and sustainable
management of forests, including the capacity to …(e) enforce laws, regulations and guidelines.

Australia’s First Approximation Report merely provides a two-paragraph response to this
last indicator, reporting somewhat blandly that enforcement officers and tribunals are
used to enforce laws and guidelines. It admits, perhaps unsurprisingly, that “Compliance
monitoring of … timber harvesting on private lands is less extensive than the level of
monitoring of timber harvesting on public lands.”130
In addition to the Montreal process, parallel developments have been occurring through
efforts to develop an international instrument specifically related to forest conservation.
These efforts have been drawn out, and it may be several years before such an
Ibid, Article 8(f).
criterion is defined as “A category of conditions or processes by which sustainable forest management may be
assessed. A Criterion is characterised by a set of related indicators which are monitored periodically to assess
change.” An indicator is defined as “A measure (measurement) of an aspect of the criterion. A quantitative or
qualitative variable which can be measured or described and which, when observed periodically, demonstrates
trends.” See Montreal Process home page at <http://www.mpci.org/criteria_e.html>.
129 National Forest Inventory (1998) above n 1, at 109.
130 Commonwealth of Australia (1997) above above n 104 at 103.
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instrument is complete, if, indeed, it is ever complete.131 This process is being pursued
via the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development’s Intergovernmental
Forum on Forests (IFF) which was preceded by the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests
(IPF), established in April 1995132. The process builds upon the 1992 Rio UNCED
Statement of Forest Principles and upon the content of Chapter 11 of the UNCED Agenda 21
Program of Action133 for Sustainable Development.134
A further source of ongoing international policy and ‘soft law’ development of the
international soft law on forests has been pressure exerted by NGO groups for the
development of a Forest Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity135 or the Climate
Change Convention.136 Similar efforts are being pursued by NGOs to list certain species of
timber such as certain mahogany species into Appendix II of the CITES Convention on
Endangered Species of Wild Flora [and fauna].137 Such efforts to regulate the trade in forest
products may, however, run foul of the World Trade Organisation’s rulings on Technical
Barriers to Trade and its Code of Good Practice.138

The doubts over the future prospects for such a binding statement on forests arise principally from intense friction
between the main timber producing and exporting nations (such as Canada and Malaysia) and other States which are
seeking to impose greater controls on the environmental consequences of timber production and the rate of tropical
deforestation (such as European Community nations). The timber producing nations have adopted the objective of
establishing a forests agreement separate to the biodiversity convention in order to avoid the restrictions that would
flow from the alternative approach of a forests protocol to the CBD. A number of governments including Australia
and the United States have argued against the adoption of a separate forests agreement. See: Gillespie, A., (1996)
“The Malaysian Agenda and Influence on the International Tropical Deforestation Debate” 1(1) Asia Pacific Journal of
Environmental Law 25 at 37.
132 Internet URL <www.un.org/esa/sustdev/forests.htm>.
133UNCED: Rio Conference on Environment and Development (1992) 22 Environmental Policy and Law 204 at 208.
[Agenda 21: “an agreed programme of work by the international community addressing major environment and
development priorities for the initial period 1993-2000 and leading into the twenty first century”]
134 In the form of the Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management,
Conservation, and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests and reporting to the UN CSD (Commission on
Sustainable Development). The Third Session of the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests was held in Geneva, on
3-14 May 1999.
135 At the expiry of the IPF, no conclusion was reached on a forest convention, but the IPF provided governments
with a set of over 130 Proposals for Action on Forests . The Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) was
established as a successor body, for two years. “The IFF, whose main mandate was to monitor and enhance the
implementation of the PfAs, resulted in additional PfAs being developed and in the establishment of a new body
called the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) plus an enhanced interagency task force on forests called the
Collaborative Partnership on Forests.” According to FERN, the Forests and the European Union Resource
Network, at <www.fern.org>, accessed 10.8.03.
136 Vanderzwaag, D., MacKinlay, D. (1996) “Towards a Global Forests Convention: Getting Out of the Woods and
Barking Up the Right Tree”, ch.1 in Canadian Council of International Law (ed.), Global Forests and International
Environmental Law, Kluwer Law International, London, 1-39 at 21 cites Maini, J. (1991) “Towards an International
Instrument on Forests” Background Paper prepared for Informal Intergovernmental Consultation”, February 1991,
Geneva, Switzerland, in International Affairs Directorate, Forestry Canada (1992) Canadian Perspectives on UNCED
Issues: Forests, Hull, Quebec, Forestry Canada, at 16.
137 The Traffic Network - WWF and IUCN (1997) Recommendations on Proposals to Amend the CITES Appendices at the
Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Harare, Zimbabwe, June. at p.27-8; Pers. Comm., Mr Ian Fry, Greenpeace
Australia, Canberra, 20.5.99.
138 Tarasofsky, R. (2000) “Trade in forest products and the WTO: towards a sustainable regime”, 31(1) World
Conservation (formerly the IUCN Bulletin) 21-23 at 22.
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The development of an international legal instrument regarding forests has many
implications for domestic forests policy, particularly the question of the need for review
of legislation at the provincial (i.e. state) level relating to forestry. Such a review would
have the aim of achieving a certain amount of consistency in “philosophy and practice”,
according to a recent review by Professor Boer.139 However it seems many NGOs are
opposed to a specific forests convention on the basis that it may represent a ‘lowest
common denominator’ solution, and one that by-passes existing, binding conventions
such as the CBD.140

Relevance of international instruments to domestic forest policy
Apart from being a general and indirect influence on domestic forest policy and
biodiversity conservation policy development, these agreements may in certain specific
circumstances generate obligations on domestic decision-makers and policy-makers. It is
an accepted principle in Australian law that treaties are not directly or automatically
incorporated into Australian domestic law merely by the action of ratification or
accession to the treaty in question.141 That is, a doctrine of ‘automatic incorporation’ does
not apply. Without Parliamentary approval in the form of domestic legislation, treaties,
conventions and ‘soft’ international law cannot create legal rights or obligations in
Australian domestic law. For example, unless the CBD has been implemented directly
into domestic legislation, it is not immediately applicable in Australia. However, that
treaty has been domestically implemented to a limited extent by the recent enactment of
the Commonwealth EPBC Act and provisions of State legislation.

Boer, B. (1997) “Developments in International Environmental Law relating to Forests”, 14(5) Environmental and
Planning Law Journal 378-385 at 385; Tarasofsky, R. (1995) The International Forests regime: Legal and Policy Issues, IUCN
and WWF, Cambridge, UK; Brack, D. (2003) “Multilateral environmental agreements and the World Trade
Organisation: WTO Implications of an International Timber Licensing Scheme”, paper presented to ANU National
Europe Centre, International Conference on Environmental Policy Integration and Sustainable Development, 19-20 November
2003, ANU, Canberra, 20pp.
140 According to Boris Romaguer of the NGO Ambioterra, (2003) “The Third United Nations Forum On Forests As Seen By
An Environmental NGO Representative On The Canadian Delegation” internet published at <http://www.cenrce.org/eng/caucuses/forest/docs/3rd_un_forum_on_forests_ngo_perspective.pdf> : “Although many NGOs
were in favour of a forest convention at the time of the Earth Summit, their position has changed. At the moment,
most NGOs are no longer as enthusiastic about a forest convention as they believe that the present political
atmosphere is not favourable to an environmentally-based convention. They fear that if a forest convention is to be
agreed upon now, it would be done so at the lowest common denominator. Many believe that the forest convention
would principally promote the financial and commercial interests of its proponents.”.
141 NSW v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337 at 450-1; Simsek v McPhee (1982) 148 CLR 636 at 641. Generally, see
Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee (1995) Trick or Treaty? Commonwealth Power to Make and
Implement Treaties, at 86.
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The above proposition is qualified by the long-accepted practice of Australian courts
making reference to international treaties in order to interpret ambiguous statutes.142
Where there is ambiguity, the provision in question should be read in accordance with
relevant international laws rather than in breach of them.143 This principle was applied in
the Teoh, Leatch and Blue Sky decisions144 which each involved interpreting the
implications of provisions of international agreements not formally incorporated into
Australian domestic law by means of legislation.145

Australian forest policy responses to international developments
The present context of international agreements and domestic government policy
documents concerning sustainable forestry and biodiversity conservation is so
comprehensive - and only likely to develop further - that their combined effect is to
provide a strong mandate for effective regulatory oversight and guidance of PNF at both
Commonwealth and State levels. Nevertheless, as we have seen above, Commonwealth
legislation and policy has recently sought to reduce the Commonwealth’s role in forestry
regulation. Such developments have increased the importance of State laws. Thus the
effectiveness of State laws has become much more crucial. So, what is already known
about the regulation of PNF in one particular state, NSW?

142Pearce

and Geddes, (1996) Statutory Interpretation in Australia, Fourth edition, Butterworths, Sydney, at pp.45-47. The
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (s.15AB(2)(d)) provides that in order to resolve a question of ambiguity surrounding a
particular provision, reference can be made to “any treaty or other international agreement that is referred to in the
Act”.
143 Newcrest Mining v Commonwealth (1997) 147 ALR 42 at 147-8 per Kirby J; Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 152 ALR
540- at 571 per Gummow and Hayne JJ; Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 146 ALR 126 at 190 per Gaudron J). The
reasoning is that Parliament would have intended to legislate in conformity with international law, rather than in
conflict with it.
144 Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Ah Hin Teoh (1994-1995) 183 CLR 273; Project Blue Sky v Australian
Broadcasting Authority (1998) 153 ALR 490, Leatch v Director-General NPWS (1993) 81 LGERA 270. See further, Rothwell, D.
(1999) “Quasi-Incorporation of International Law in Australia”, 27(3) Federal Law Review.
145 In Teoh, the High Court decided that when the Executive ratifies an international agreement, given no statutory or
executive indications to the contrary, such action will generate a legitimate expectation that administrative decisions
will be made in accordance with the provisions of that international agreement that Australia has ratified (even
where no legislation has been enacted to incorporate those provisions into domestic law). Mason CJ and Deane J
explained: “ratification of a convention is a positive statement by the Executive government of this country to the
world and to the Australian people that the Executive government and its agencies will act in accordance with the
Convention. That positive statement is an adequate foundation for a legitimate expectation, absent statutory or
executive indications to the contrary, that administrative decision makers will act in conformity with the
Convention.” Note that although the so-called ‘anti-Teoh’ bill, the Administrative Decisions (Effect of International
Instruments) Bill 1997 was reintroduced to Parliament, it did not have bipartisan support, and was not enacted. If
enacted it would have attempted to overturn the Teoh decision by providing along the lines that “the act of entering
into a treaty does not give rise to legitimate expectations in administrative law which could form the basis for
challenging an administrative decision made from the date of enactment onwards.” Cf. Commonwealth
Parliamentary Library (1997) Bills Digest No.10 of 1997-8.

EXISTING LITERATURE ABOUT PNF REGULATION IN NSW
Questions of the effectiveness and adequacy of the law applying to PNF in NSW were
difficult to answer at the commencement of this research project. The application of the
law to PNF is one of the main data gaps within the literature on PNF in NSW. There are
few published papers that focus on regulation of PNF in NSW.146 Virtually the only
works that directly discuss this in any detail are Hannam (1994, 1995) and the NSW
ESFM Working Group (1998).147 Dr. Ian Hannam of the Department of Land and Water
Conservation148 - the de facto ‘lead agency’ on PNF during the study period, reviewed the
operation of the protected lands provisions of the Soil Conservation Act 1938 which at the
time regulated PNF logging on steep slopes and riparian zones and concluded that
although those provisions were making a substantial contribution to environmental
protection there was a need for a specific purpose Private Forests Act.149 Later, in 1998, the
Expert Working Group on ESFM in NSW examined PNF law and stated: “It would be a
significant understatement to conclude that the law and policy relating to private forestry
is complex, confused and inconsistent.”150 It later concluded that “current processes for
ensuring ecologically sustainable management of private forests are poorly developed.151
Yet apart from these reviews which have focussed on the inadequacies of the regulatory
framework itself, there is virtually no available data relating to the application of those
environmental laws to PNF in practice. In particular, there was no readily available data
confirming how many consents and licences were granted, and for what purposes, which
would enable a picture to be developed of the ‘under-regulation’ or conversely, the ‘overregulation’, of the industry. These data gaps regarding the implementation of
environmental laws reflect broader data gaps regarding PNF in NSW.152
An early exception was Resource Assessment Commission (1992) above n 4; Farrier, D., Byron, N., (1992) A Review
of the Legislative and Regulatory Framework Affecting Forest Management on Private and Leasehold Lands, Consultants’ Report
to the Resource Assessment Commission Forest and Timber Inquiry, No. FTC 92/20, RAC, Canberra.
147 Hannam, I. (1995b) “Environmental Law and Private Property Management in New South Wales”, paper presented
to 2nd Annual Defending the Environment Conference, Australian Centre for Environmental Law, University of Adelaide,
20-21 May 1995, Published Conference Proceedings, 223-250; Independent Expert Working Group (1998) above n
101.
148 DLWC is now part of the Department of Infrastructure Planning and Natural Resources.
149 Hannam, I. (1995b) above n 147 .
150 Independent Expert Working Group (1998) above n 101.
151 Independent Expert Working Group) (1998) above n 101 at 11.
152 Regarding the lack of data about PNF, see Hannam, I. (1995b) above n 147 at 225. There are a number of reasons
for this lack of data. One of the key factors in NSW is that there is no overarching agency with a responsibility to
collect information relating to private forests, in contrast to public forests (administered by NSW State Forests).
Although NSW law already contains a requirement that all timber coming from PNF operations be branded or
marked as coming from private property (Forestry Regulation 1999 (NSW), cl. 61) and previously sawmill returns
including private property data were compiled by the Forestry Commission, it is difficult to establish whether these
statistics are still being compiled or whether they are reliable. McElhinny, op.cit., casts doubt on the reliability of
sawmill return data. The second key fact is the sheer physical remoteness of many areas of private forest, creating
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In Tasmania, the data gap regarding PNF is narrower than in NSW. In the former State,
PNF is a larger component of the timber industry in terms of its share of total output.
There is a more established institutional structure and a more systematic approach to the
regulation of PNF in Tasmania under the Forest Practices Act153and the Private Forests Act
1994. Information-gathering tasks regarding PNF were carried out by the statutory
authority Private Forests Tasmania (PFT), as well as by the Forest Practices Board.154 For
these reasons, far more is known about PNF in Tasmania, than in NSW, which has no
equivalent bodies.155 Questions concerning the regulation of PNF in Tasmania are
considered in detail in Chapter Eleven.

Standards of forest management
Even though there was scant data available concerning the implementation of
environmental laws in practice to the PNF industry in NSW, some material about PNF
regulation became available during the course of the research process in addition to the
author’s own research results (1995).156 That data lends itself to the formation of
preliminary views regarding the application of environmental laws to the sector during
the study period.
There exists a body of opinion amongst regulatory agencies and consultants with
experience of the PNF industry that, on the whole, in NSW there are comparatively poor
levels of forest management and planning within the PNF industry when compared with
public forests.157 The NSW State of the Environment Report in 1997 found:

difficulties in access and monitoring. Thirdly, the very fact that these forests are on private property leads to
additional difficulties in gaining access to information.
153The main works which discuss PNF in Tasmania are Rolley, E. (1993) “Private Forestry in Tasmania”, 72
Commonwealth Forestry Review 86-91; Tasmania: Public Land Use Commission (1997) Tasmania-Commonwealth Regional
Forest Agreement : Assessment of Ecologically Sustainable Forest Management Systems and Processes Independent Expert Advisory
Group (Final Report): Background Report Part G; Wilkinson, G. (2001) “Building Partnerships - Tasmania’s approach to
Sustainable Forest Management” In International Conference on the Application of Reduced Impact Logging to Advance
Sustainable Forest Management: Constraints, Challenges and Opportunities, 26th February to 1 March 2001, Kuching,
Sarawak, Malaysia, Compendium of Conference Papers 219-226; Gee, D., Stratford, E. (2001) above n 61 ; Browne,
R. (2002) above 61.
154 Now the Forest Practices Authority,
155 In addition, a considerable amount of data was produced by the Tasmanian Public Land Use Commission and
numerous consultants during the RFA process: Tasmanian Public Land Use Commission (1996) Inquiry into areas to
be reserved under the Tasmania-Commonwealth Regional Forest Agreement: Background Report Part F, PLUC, Hobart.
156 Prest above n 33.
157 These findings are also consistent with those of a study of PNF in Queensland which concluded: “Long term
sustainable timber production is rarely practised in private native forests in Queensland.” Queensland Department
of Primary Industry (1995) “From the Forest”, Between the Leaves magazine, Summer 1995, pp.16-19.

private forests [in NSW] are not generally managed for long term sustainability [of timber
production].158

A forestry consultant from Northern NSW, O’Neill (1998), helped to explain that
proposition by observing:
Generally the history and pattern of logging and management has been demand driven and
sometimes exploitive, resulting in a significant proportion of the private hardwood forests being
generally of a young age.159

Later, a forestry consultant, Dr Andrew Smith, engaged by the DLWC to work on ESFM
standards for PNF,160 noted that such high-intensity exploitative harvesting of private
forests was often “a precursor to land clearing or land sale.”161
A DLWC regional officer from the Sydney-South Coast region with experience in
regulating PNF operations commented on the “generally low level of forest management
skills and opportunistic approach to timber harvesting common in the [private] industry”
in an internal document dated 2000.162 In a report for the Rural Industries Research and
Development Corporation, based on interviews with participants in the PNF industry in
the Northern Tablelands, Thomson (1999) stated:
There was … concern (from both saw-millers and land owners) that some saw
millers/contractors operated in a less than professional manner. This included incidences [sic] of
taking more timber than they paid for, not paying at all, not following the landowner’s instructions
about where to log or leaving the logged area in a considerable mess...163

Such statements are indeed generalisations, and probably cannot be relied upon as
reliably descriptive of the entire sector. Nevertheless there is evidence that standards of
environmental management in PNF operations in much of NSW are often low.
These preliminary sources, when taken together, clearly indicate that there are problems
with the level of environmental standards met by the PNF industry in NSW. These
EPA NSW (1997) above n 4 at at 199.
O'Neill, M. (1998) above n 38 at 132.
160 DLWC was amalgamated with the former Department of Urban Affairs and Planning in 2003 to form DIPNR the
Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources. This thesis refers however to DLWC, as that was
the agency at the time of writing, and during the study period January 1998- December 2002.
161 Smith, A. (1999) Guidelines for Application of Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 Exemption to Sustainable Forestry on
Private Lands in NSW, Setscan Pty Ltd, Armidale.
162 DLWC (2000) Summary of Comments on Desktop Audit of Exemptions (Stage 1 Review of Exemptions), Comments by
DLWC and RVC only, internal unpublished document, at 63, Comments by DLWC Officer No.12 (Compliance
Officer), Sydney-South Coast Region.
163 Thompson, D. (1999) above n 31 at 19-20.
158
159

sources raise questions about the contribution of NSW law to the attainment of
sustainability objectives. However, there are limits to the scope of this thesis. It does not
attempt to answer the question of whether private native forestry practices during the
study period in NSW were - as a matter of fact - ecologically unsustainable. This thesis is
primarily concerned with the extent to which the legal framework is likely to contribute
to the attainment of sustainability. It is not concerned to come to speculative conclusions
outside the boundaries of the legal discipline. The author’s research suggests that the data
gaps regarding PNF are so broad that there is insufficient data for appropriately qualified
ecologists to come to generalised or even regional conclusions in relation to the
ecological sustainability of private forestry in NSW.

CONCLUSION
The picture of NSW private forests as ‘the forgotten forests’164 is slowly changing as their
considerable commercial importance is underlined by restrictions on public forest timber
supply, and as their conservation significance is explored and spoken for by
environmentalists. The existing data about PNF in NSW also raises questions about the
silvicultural standards of forestry practices in this sector of the industry, and about its
compliance with environmental laws.
This chapter has argued that there are difficulties in regulating PNF because of access
and cultural issues, particularly regarding claims of private property rights. Historically
this has led to reluctance on the part of regulators to concern themselves greatly with
questions of sustainability of PNF activity and with strongly implementing existing
legislation. Yet against this background of past difficulties with such questions, there
exist more recent Commonwealth and State government commitments to ESFM in the
Regional Forest Agreements and the international arena.
The background material describing the nature of the PNF industry in NSW and
attempts to regulate it to date enable us to pose several working hypotheses. Among

164

Note that this title was applied by Calder, M., Calder, J. (1994) The Forgotten Forests: A Field Guide to Victoria's Box and
Ironbark Country, Victorian National Parks Association, 120pp. (This book is now in its 2nd edition as Victoria's BoxIronbark Country: A Field Guide) on the basis that they are no longer the forgotten forests following the creation of a
number of national parks and reserves. See also Anon. (2001) “The forgotten forests’ last stand”, Editorial, The Age,
30/08/2001, where the leader writer suggested “The woodlands are archetypal Australian bush, part of a cultural
and literary heritage….”.

these are that the legislation applicable to the PNF industry is inadequate for the industry
to achieve ESFM. Further, there is a preliminary picture that the legislation that applies is
inadequately implemented, leaving the industry in practice either largely unregulated or
under-regulated, despite the formal application of various laws.
These are the hypotheses which informed the research process set out in Part Two and
subsequent Parts. Part Two presents the results of research into the law applicable to
PNF in New South Wales and its record of implementation during the study period. It
asks “Precisely which regulatory controls apply to PNF in NSW, and in what
circumstances do various different forms of regulation apply?” This survey is conducted
with a view to being able to comment on the extent to which the legal framework in
place during the study period was likely to contribute to the attainment of ecological
sustainability. Chapters Six to Ten examine the administration of environmental
protection laws as they applied to PNF in NSW. Later, in order to provide a point of
comparison, Part Three (Chapter Eleven) examines laws applying to PNF in Tasmania.
In concluding, Part Four poses questions for law reform which include: Is the existing
law sufficient to encourage, enable and require ESFM and biodiversity protection? How
can the legal and institutional framework for regulation of PNF in NSW be improved?

Chapter Six

NSW PRIVATE NATIVE FORESTRY REGULATION
WITH A FOCUS ON THE NATIVE VEGETATION

CONSERVATION ACT 1997

This Chapter provides an overview of the regulatory framework in NSW for PNF during
the study period. Detailed discussion of the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW)
ensues.1 The application of the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (NSW) and the
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EPAA) to private forestry to PNF are
considered in subsequent Chapters.

OVERVIEW OF NSW LAWS APPLYING TO PNF
The law in NSW regulating private forestry is not part of a unified system of forestry
regulation applying across all land tenures. Rather, NSW has three legal regimes applicable
to forestry depending on the type of forestry and where it takes place. In State Forests, it is
regulated under the Forestry Act 1916, Forestry and National Park Estate Act 1998, in
plantations under the Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999,2 and on privately held forest
under a variety of laws.

There is no single law setting out the main framework for regulating PNF, by contrast to
Tasmania or Victoria with their Forest Practices Codes which apply across all tenures.3
Rather, PNF operations in NSW are subject to a complex, multi-layered and often
This discussion of the NVCA is prefaced by the observation of the passage of the Native Vegetation Act 2003 in
December 2003 which is to gradually replace the operation of the NVCA. Many of the practical issues in regulating
PNF and native vegetation clearance – such as the definition and application of regulatory exemptions - will remain the
same and will continue to bedevil the implementation of the legislation.
2 The Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999 (PRA) (NSW) applies to most land tenures (i.e. privately owned land, State
forest or other Crown-timber lands, “or any other land”). PRA, s.5(4). However it does not apply to land within 13
nominated categories, including land protected by SEPP 14 (wetlands), or SEPP 26 (littoral rainforests). PRA, s.7,
Schedule 1.
3
Forest Practices Act 1985 (Tas), Forest Practices Code (Tas) (under revision 2000); Victoria, Department of Natural Resources
and Environment (1996) Code of Practice: Code of Forest Practices for Timber Production – Revision No.2, November, 68pp,
DNRE, East Melbourne. (Note that in the other jurisdictions there are relevant laws applicable in addition to Forest
Practices Codes). In relation to NSW, it was agreed in the North-East NSW RFA that a Forest Practices Code for
private land would be introduced before 2005: NE RFA (2000), Cl. 57.
1
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overlapping regulatory framework that has developed incrementally over time. The laws
that apply to PNF are not industry specific, but rather are environmental laws of general
application directed at broad environmental objectives such as land use planning
(Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, and associated Planning Instruments), and
statutes directed at broad environmental problems such as native vegetation clearing and
soil loss/degradation (Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (during the study period),4 loss
of threatened species (Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995, National Parks and Wildlife Act
1974), water pollution (Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997), and as well as the
common law.5
Table 1: Approval requirements potentially
applicable to PNF in NSW during the study
period
Approval
requirements Relevant instrument during
which may be applicable to the study period
PNF operations
Consent to clear native Native Vegetation Conservation Act
vegetation
1997 in conjunction with
Environmental
and
Planning
Assessment Act 1979, Part 4
Development
consent
requirements according to
content
of
Local
Environment Plan (LEP)
Development
consent
requirements or prohibitions
to protect littoral rainforest
Development
consent
requirements or prohibitions
to protect koala habitat
Development
consent
requirements

Administering
Agency
during
the study period
Dept of Land and
Water
Conservation
(DLWC)6

Environmental
and
Planning Local government
Assessment Act 1979, Part 4.
SEPP 26 consent

Local government

SEPP 44 consent

Local government

Regional Environmental Plans
under EPAA (various) (not
applicable in all regions)
Pollution Control licences
Protection of the Environment
Operations Act 1997
Licence to harm or pick Threatened Species Conservation Act
threatened species*
1995, s.91

Local government
EPA7/
Local
government
National Parks and
Wildlife
Service

To be repealed and replaced by the Native Vegetation Act 2003 which had not yet commenced at April 2005. See further
below, this Chapter.
5 See Van Son v Forestry Commission (1995) 86 LGERA 108, a private nuisance action concerning riparian rights and nonpoint source water pollution from forestry operations; see also Lawrence v Kempsey Shire Council (1995) 87 LGERA 49.
6 Now part of DIPNR Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources. See further below.
7 The EPA is now part of the DEC Department of Environment and Conservation. See further below.
4

CHAPTER SIX ▫

THE NATIVE VEGETATION CONSERVATION ACT & PNF

▫

3

(NPWS)8
Licence to harm threatened Fisheries Management Act 1994, Fisheries NSW
species of freshwater fish*
Part 7A, s.220ZW9
Consent to interfere with National Parks and Wildlife Act NPWS
Aboriginal heritage
1974, s.90
Commonwealth approvals for Environment
Protection
and Commonwealth
actions with significant impact Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 Department
of
on listed threatened species
(Cth) - only applicable to Environment and
forestry in World Heritage listed Heritage
forests or Ramsar sites.
* TSCA and FMA licensing only required if neither Part 4, 5 EPAA apply.

THE NATIVE VEGETATION CONSERVATION ACT
The most important legislation applying to PNF in NSW during the study period was the
Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NVCA), administered by the Minister for Land and
Water Conservation with the assistance of the Department of Land and Water
Conservation (DLWC).10 Discussion of the NVCA is prefaced by noting the passage of
the Native Vegetation Act 2003 in December 2003 which is to gradually replace the operation
of the NVCA, but which had still not commenced operation at April 2005.11 Although
there is to be a major legislative change,12 many of the practical issues in regulating PNF
and native vegetation clearance – such as the definition and application of regulatory
exemptions13 - will remain the same - and will probably continue to bedevil the
implementation of the legislation.

The NPWS was merged with the EPA in September 2003 to form the Department of Environment and Conservation.
Threatened fish are listed in Schedule 4 (endangered) and Schedule 5 (vulnerable) of the Fisheries Management Act 1994.
10 On 29 May 2003, following the re-election of the Carr Government, the Department of Land and Water Conservation
(DLWC) was merged with Planning NSW (formerly DUAP) to form the Department of Infrastructure, Planning and
Natural Resources (DIPNR) with the Hon Craig Knowles MP Minister for Infrastructure and Planning, and Minister
for Natural Resources. The former Minister was the Hon Richard Amery MP.
11 The NVCA remained in operation at the time of final revisions of this thesis in March 2005, but is to be repealed,
along with its associated Regulation and Regional Vegetation Management Plans upon commencement of the Native
Vegetation Act 2003, s.52, to commence operation upon proclamation. The new Act had not commenced operation at
11.4.05 according to the NSW Parliamentary Counsel’s Office. Note also associated amendments introduced by the
Natural Resources Commission Act 2003 (which commenced 23.1.04).
12 The new legislation offers landholders the option of either submitting a development application to DIPNR, or to
submit a Property Vegetation Plan to the new Catchment Management Authority in their region. That plan may last up
to 15 years (s.30(1)). The new Act purports to exclude the operation of local government plans (LEPs) and other
environmental planning instruments prohibiting or restricting clearing that are made after the approval of a PVP
(s.17(b)).
13 A specific purpose exemption from development consent requirements existed under the NVC Act for PNF during the
study period, and will exist on a transitional basis until the new regime commences at some time in 2005. Native
Vegetation Act 2003 ss.2, 12, 14,15 and Natural Resources Commission Act 2003. Departmental fact sheets at
www.dipnr.nsw.gov.au viewed on 29.1.05 stated that the Act would not commence operation until the associated
Regulation was prepared and approved by the Minister and then came into force. That Regulation was put on public
exhibition on 9 November 2004 and was open for comment until 31 January 2005.
8
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The broader purpose of this Chapter is to commence an evaluation of the NVCA. It asks
“Is this legislation sufficient to provide for ecologically sustainable forest management
(ESFM)?” Chapter Seven analyses data on the implementation of the NVCA in relation to
PNF.

THE NVCA – BACKGROUND
The NVCA was enacted in December 1997 with the object of preventing “the
inappropriate clearing of native vegetation”.14 The Act affected forestry as well as
agriculture, as it controls native vegetation clearing regardless of the cause (subject to
exemptions and exclusions).15 Nevertheless, the primary intention was to manage broadacre
vegetation clearing in the agricultural context.
The NVCA commenced operation on 1 January 1998, replacing State Environmental Planning
Policy No. 46: Protection and Management of Native Vegetation (SEPP 46), made under the
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (‘EPAA’) in August 1995.
SEPP 46 was introduced following political, scientific16 and popular recognition of and
concern over the deleterious effects of excessive clearing of native vegetation.17 NSW was
amongst the last of the States (but not the very last) to introduce legislative controls with
statewide application addressing broad-scale clearance of native vegetation.18
NVCA, s.3(f).
Clearing is defined in s.5 to include ”cutting down, felling, thinning, logging or removing native vegetation” as well as
other actions which substantially damage or injure ‘native vegetation’, which is defined in NVCA, s.6.
16 Commonwealth of Australia (1995), Native Vegetation Clearance, Habitat Loss and Biodiversity Decline, Biodiversity Series,
Paper No.6, Department of Environment, Sport and Territories.
17 Prior to the introduction of SEPP 46, clearing in NSW was estimated to be occurring at 150,000 hectares per annum, at
“unsustainable levels”, according to Departmental documents. DLWC (1998) Native Vegetation Conservation Act Fact Sheet
No.2: Why Was the Act Introduced?, DLWC, Sydney, p. 2. Over 50% of the woodlands and forests of NSW had been
cleared since colonisation, including most of the original grassy woodlands. Benson, J. (1998) “The Structure And
Composition of Pre- European Native Vegetation In South Eastern Australia: How Was It Burnt And How Should
What Remains Be Managed Today?” in Environmental Defender's Office (NSW) Conference Papers: Caring for the Land, EDO, Sydney, at p.2;
Benson, (1999) Setting the Scene: the Native Vegetation of New South Wales, NVAC, Sydney, at 5 ; cites Graetz, D., Wilson,
M., Campbell, S. (1995) Landcover Disturbance over the Australian Continent: a Contemporary Assessment, Biodiversity Series,
Paper 7, Environment Australia, Canberra.
18 See Native Vegetation Management Act 1985 (SA), Native Vegetation Act 1991 (SA). An amendment to the State section of
all planning schemes in Victoria was made in 1989 to address broad scale vegetation clearance. See: ANZECC Working
Group on Nature Conservation on Private Land (1996) Nature Conservation on Private Land: Commonwealth, State and
Territory Legislation and Programmes: a Report of the Working Group on Nature Conservation on Private Land Prepared for the
Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council, Standing Committee on Conservation, Australian Nature
Conservation Agency, Canberra, 41pp. at 35. In WA, regulations under the Soil and Land Conservation Act 1945 were
introduced in 1991. In Qld: Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld). Other states recognised this as a environmental
protection and land degradation issue of crucial importance much earlier, including South Australia (in 1985), Victoria
(in 1989), and Western Australia (in 1991). Only Queensland (1999) and Tasmania (with no legislation as yet) lagged
behind NSW. Regarding the question of Commonwealth government action on vegetation clearing, a regulatory
approach to control of vegetation clearing under the EPBC Act was avoided, instead selecting a cooperative political
and policy process. The goal of uniform national standards for the control of vegetation clearance has been pursued
through the National Framework for the Management and Monitoring of Native Vegetation Australian and New
Zealand Environment and Conservation Council (ANZECC) (2000) National Framework for the Management and
Monitoring of Australia's Native Vegetation, Commonwealth Department of Environment and Heritage, Canberra,
14
15
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SEPP 46 had commenced overnight on 10 August 1995 by gazettal,19 without substantial
advance warning or publicity.20 In this way it forestalled the ‘panic clearing’ associated with
a drawn-out debate over a legislative mechanism for vegetation protection, as has recently
been the case in Queensland.21 It was an interim measure designed to reduce vegetation
clearance during negotiations and public consultation over the shape of longer-term
vegetation-clearing legislation.22
Prior to the introduction of SEPP 46, the protection of native vegetation in the rural
context on private land was largely a matter of the haphazard application of planning
requirements in Local Environmental Plans (LEPs) and Regional Environmental Plans
(REPs) made under the EPAA,23 and the application of the protected-lands provisions of
the Soil Conservation Act 1938, where steep slopes and specified riparian vegetation were
involved. A Tree Policy was released in 1984, and a Tree Plan followed in 1993.24
On Crown timber lands, the clearing of trees was regulated by the Forestry Act 1916, in
recognition of the value of timber on public land as a Crown asset.25 In the Western
Division, (see map, Appendix 5.2.) clearing was regulated by the Western Lands Act 1901.
However, it was generally the case in practice that neither the Soil Conservation Act, nor the
Forestry Act, nor the Western Lands Act prevented the broad-scale clearance of vegetation,
but rather resulted in the imposition of conditions upon clearing.26

December 1999, 66pp. and projects funded from the Natural Heritage Trust: Natural Heritage Trust of Australia Act 1997
(Cth).
19 Under authority of s.34(5) Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979.
20 Lee, Baird et al describe it as a “surprise gazettal”, see Lee, E., Baird, M., Lloyd, I. (1998) “State Environmental
Planning Policy No.46 – Protection and Management of Native Vegetation”, 15(2) Environmental and Planning Law
Journal 127 at 128. Although note that the gazettal of the policy was referred to in the Sydney Morning Herald on 8 August
1995: Woodford, J., Beale, B. (1995) “Crack-down on land clearing”, Sydney Morning Herald, 8/8/95, p.1.
21 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) (assent 21 December 1999, commencement by proclamation 15 September 2000);
Vegetation Management Amendment Act 2000 (Qld) (assent 13.9.00), Vegetation Management Regulations 2000 (Qld).
22 Pittock, J. (1997) “Native Vegetation Protection on Hold”, 45 Impact 12 at 12.
23 Murray REP No.2 - Riverine Land, cl.13, part 9. The policy covers “the clearing, logging, removal or damaging of any
species of trees and shrubs that are indigenous to the River Murray floodplain. Some examples of LEP controls forestry is prohibited in Hastings LEP 2001, Zone 7 (h) Environment Protection - Habitat, but permitted with consent
in Zone 7 (d) Environmental Protection - Scenic. In the Kiama LEP 1996 forestry is prohibited in Zone No 7 (e) Rural
Environmental Protection (Hinterland) and Zone No 7 (l) Rural Environmental Protection (General), however in the
former zone “tree plantations and harvesting” are permitted with consent. In the Tweed LEP 2000, forestry is
permitted with consent in Zone 7(1) Environmental Protection - Habitat zone, but faces a special onus of proof of
necessity and consistency with plan and zone objectives against clause 8.
24 Native Vegetation Advisory Council (NSW) (2000) Draft Native Vegetation Conservation Strategy for NSW, Sydney, NVAC and DLWC at 6.
25 Robson, D.(1998) “Exemptions and Codes of Practice under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997”, Environmental Defender's Office (NSW) Conference

Papers: Caring

for the Land, Sydney, EDO, 5pp .at 1.
26

Smith, S. (1995) “Native Vegetation Protection in New South Wales”, NSW Parliamentary Library Research Paper, 15pp.,
Briefing Paper No.028/95. The picture was also complicated by the operation of Tree Preservation Orders (‘TPOs’)
made by some councils under the authority of the EPAA. However the effect of TPOs is patchy as many (rural)
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One reason for replacing SEPP 46 with an Act was to create a more permanent regime for
native vegetation protection.27 It would be more difficult for an unsympathetic future
government to attempt to repeal an Act than a SEPP, which could be removed by a simple
action of the Executive.28 Similarly, it would be more difficult to weaken an Act by
amendment than would be the case with a SEPP.
A second reason for the replacement of SEPP 46 was the desire to create a simpler,
streamlined and less fragmented regime for native vegetation management across NSW, by
consolidating the various requirements relating to vegetation clearance throughout NSW.29
This involved repealing SEPP 4630 and the ‘protected land’ provisions contained in the Soil
Conservation Act 1938 (‘SCA’), incorporating the clearing controls from the Western Lands
Act 1901 (‘WLA’) and the Crown Lands (Continued Tenures) Act 1989, and drastically
restricting the scope for granting clearing licences ‘on Crown timber lands’31 under the
Forestry Act.32 Before the passage of the NVCA, PNF in the Eastern and Central Divisions
(see: map, Appendix 5.2) was subject to two separate clearance controls, namely the
protected lands provisions of the Soil Conservation Act (SCA), and the provisions of SEPP
46 on areas not mapped as protected land. With the enactment of the NVCA, the
protected lands provisions of the SCA were repealed and most aspects of that protected
land regime were transferred to the NVCA.33 The NVCA brought most of the Western

councils have not made TPOs, and those that have made them usually have drafted them so that TPOs only protect
established trees rather than all native vegetation (eg. understorey species).
27 In part, this decision may have been related to the unpopularity of SEPP 46 within many rural communities.
28 Note that the NSW Liberal-National Party opposition promised the repeal of the NVCA during the March 2003
election campaign and Mr D. Page (MP, National Party) stated on 04/09/2002, NSW Legislative Assembly Hansard, at p.
4598 et. seq. that “the Government has chosen an unnecessarily complex, intrusive, costly and highly regulated
implementation model” and that “Under a Coalition government, the Native Vegetation Conservation Act will be one
of a number of pieces of legislation that will be replaced by a more integrated, clearer and more practical Resource
Management and Conservation Act...”
29 An additional objective has been to bring the Western Division within the scope of the Act. NVCA, Schedule 5.4.
30 NVCA, s.70.
31 ‘Crown timber lands’ refers to vacant Crown land, and parcels of Crown land larger than 2ha that are leased or under
licence under Crown lands legislation.
32 Forestry Act 1916, s.4. These areas were not regulated by SEPP 46: Clause 3(c),(d), SEPP 46. Following amendments by
the NVCA, the Forestry Act now states that the Forestry Commission cannot issue a clearing licence for Crown-timber
land that is subject to a Crown lease under that Act for the purpose of clearing native vegetation. Farrier, D., Lyster, R.,
Pearson, L. (1999) Environmental Law Handbook: Planning and Land Use in NSW, 3rd edition, Redfern Legal Centre
Publishing, Sydney at 394. However, the regime of clearing licences granted has not been completely repealed by the
NVCA and still applies to types of Crown timber land, primarily State Forests, which are not subject to the provisions
of the NVCA, and for which a forest lease has been granted. Forestry Act 1916, s.27G. Under s.27(3)(a)(ia) clearing is
not an offence if done in accordance with the NVCA. Further clearing licences cannot be granted under s.27H over
protected land (s.27H(d), or to clear native vegetation within the meaning of the NVCA: (s.27H(d1)).
33 Division 2 of Part 4 of the Soil Conservation Act 1938 (ss. 21A-21E) was repealed. Protected land is provided for in the
NVCA, s.4(1) (definitions), s.7,22 (State protected land), s.19 (regional protected land).
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Division within the clearing-control regime.34 It also extended coverage of clearing controls
to include land affected by Murray REP No. 2 (Riverine Land), which were not previously
regulated by SEPP 46.35

Mechanisms of the NVCA
The NVCA differed from SEPP 46 in that it introduced a broader range of tools for the
protection of native vegetation than its predecessor. The NVCA combined both
conventional regulation (through the development control process), and alternative policy
instruments, best described as flexibility mechanisms. These instruments complement the
development consent mechanism. They include the making of Regional Vegetation
Management Plans (RVMPs),36 and Codes of Practice for particular industries.37 The
NVCA also provided for the payment of incentives for vegetation protection to
landholders, particularly those who sign a statutory property agreement.38 Financial
assistance can be paid from a statutory Native Vegetation Management Fund.39

THE DEVELOPMENT CONSENT MECHANISM OF THE NVCA
The central mechanism of the NVCA for the management of clearing and preservation of
native vegetation was development consent under Part 4 of the Environmental Planning and
Assessment Act 1979 (‘EPAA’). The precise approval requirements applicable to a clearing
or logging proposal in a particular area depend upon whether there is an RVMP in force
for that region. The Act continued the approach of SEPP 46, by providing a general rule
that in order “to clear native vegetation”, in those regions where there is no RVMP in
Western Lands Act 1901, s.18DB, Western Lands Regulation 1992; note major amendments by Western Lands Amendment Act
2002. SEPP 46 did not apply to leasehold lands in the Western Division administered under the Western Lands Act
(94% of the land in that Division). SEPP 46, Clause 3(f). However, it did apply in those parts of the Western Division
which are freehold land. This is 2.5% of the Western Division; Adrian, P. (1998) “Where Else has a Vegetation
Program in the State Worked ?” in Environment Defender’s Office (NSW) (ed.), Caring For the Land : Conference
Proceedings, EDO, Sydney at 2.
35 SEPP 46, Clause 3(g). The Murray REP applies to “the riverine land of the River Murray within the City of Albury and
the [local government] areas of Balranald, Berrigan, Conargo, Corowa, Deniliquin, Hume, Murray, Wakool, Wentworth
and Windouran” (Murray REP No. 2, clause 4).
36 NVCA, Part 3.
37 NVCA, Part 4. Although it is the case that COPs and RVMPs were first introduced in amendments to SEPP 46, these
mechanisms were expanded upon in the NVCA and given much broader application.
38 NVCA, Part 5. Property agreements are a written agreement between a private landholder and the Director General of
L&WC, providing for the future conservation and management of native vegetation on a particular parcel of land:
ss40-41. Property agreements are not an exemption from the NVCA. The signing of a property agreement will not
remove the need for development consent in order to clear: NVCA, s.41(3); Salvin, S. (1998) “Clearing Act
explained”, The Land, 2.4.98, p.14.
39 NVCA, ss.56,57. The retention of the consent requirement operates as the stick accompanying the carrot of funds
from the NVM Fund. Departmental publications suggest there may be room for ‘trade-offs’ - “appropriate clearing
may be offset by the establishment, enhancement and/or retention of other native vegetation which has positive
environmental impacts.” See: DLWC (1998) NVCA Fact Sheet No.4, “Property Agreements”, p.2.
34
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place, development consent under Part 4 EPAA40 must be sought and obtained from the
Minister41 prior to clearing.42 If permission to clear is refused the applicant may appeal to
the Land and Environment Court.43 The clearing of vegetation without consent in breach
of Part 2 of the Act is an offence.44

Matters for consideration
The NVCA does not set out particular statutory guidelines that direct the attention of the
consent authority to questions of conservation of significant native vegetation
communities.45 The closest it comes to this are its objects, which include “to protect native
vegetation of high conservation value” and “to prevent the inappropriate clearing of
vegetation”.46 The Act does not absolutely prohibit the clearing of particular classes of
vegetation (eg. endangered ecological communities). Nor does it specify particular land
categories of high biodiversity value (eg. rainforest or under-represented ecosystem types)
that will automatically be protected.47
Despite this relative vacuum of specific statutory guidance, certain matters must still be
considered in the consent decision-making process under the NVCA. When assessing an
application, the Minister (DLWC in practice) is required to “take into consideration” the
factors that any other consent authority must address, specified in s.79C EPAA,48 those
listed in the EPAA Regulation49 as well as the scope, purpose and objects of the NVCA.
That section requires consideration of “the likely impacts of that development, including
environmental impacts on both the natural and built environments, and social and
economic impacts in the locality”.50 These include the provisions of any applicable EPI,
the likely impacts of the development (environmental, economic or social), the suitability of

NVCA, s.15(1).
NVCA, s.14. On a day-to-day basis, it is DLWC which has a significant role in applying threatened species protection
law under the NVCA.
42 NVCA, s.21(2)(a).
43 EPAA, s.97(1). Under SA legislation appeals against refusal to grant consent or conditions attached to a consent are
not possible: Native Vegetation Act 1991 (SA), s.29(12). Native Vegetation Act 1991 (SA), except for claims of denial of
natural justice, s.29(15).
44 NVCA, s.17(1). The penalty provisions of s.126 EPAA are applied by s.17(2) NVCA.
45 By contrast, under SEPP 46, the consent authority was originally required to take into account 13 different
environmental considerations.
46 NVCA, s.3(c),(f).
47 The Queensland Vegetation Management Act 1999, has an object of preserving “remnant endangered regional ecosystems”
s.3(1)(a)(i). It originally specified “of concern” vegetation.
48 EPAA, s.79C (previously, s.90), see also NVCA, s.15(2).
49 The EPAA Regulation 2000, cl.92 which replaced EPAA Regulation 1994, cl.65 now no longer requires consent
authorities to take into account “the effect of the development on… the habitat of any…protected fauna, and the
means to be employed to protect them from harm, or to mitigate the harm.” as was previously the case.
50 EPAA, s.79C(1)(b).
40
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the site for development, and the public interest.51 The consent process also involves
consideration of the likely impact of logging and clearing on threatened species, against an
8-part test of significance set out in s.5A EPAA. Additional matters for consideration
include the Department’s Staff Guidelines for the Assessment of Clearing Applications,52 the
Department of Urban Affairs and Planning’s Guide to s.79C and the EPAA Regulation.53

Discussion of whether the NVCA embodies a precautionary approach
The issue facing those drafting legislation for the protection of native vegetation and its
provisions for the guidance of the decision-maker is the tension between objectives of
conserving nature by taking ‘a precautionary approach’ to permitting clearing, and that of
allowing clearing to proceed in the economic interests of the State.
The NVCA is ambiguous about the approach required of the decision-maker in addressing
such questions raised by clearing applications. Although the NVCA states that its object is
to prevent “inappropriate clearing”, it fails to specify the components of “inappropriate
clearing”. Indeed, this particular choice of words for the objects clause implies that a
certain amount of vegetation clearance is considered both appropriate and acceptable.
Further, the NVCA does not set out specific statutory obligations on the Minister to
protect and conserve native vegetation.54
The fact that the Act contains an exhortation that its objects (eg. “to encourage and
promote native vegetation management in the social, economic and environmental
interests of the State”) are expected to be achieved “in accordance with the principles of
ecologically sustainable development” (ESD) (thus including the ‘precautionary principle’),
suggests that the consent-decision process should require the refusal of clearing in some
instances, e.g. where native vegetation is potentially of high significance for nature
conservation.55 On the other hand, the fact that the NVCA and EPAA together require
the examination of economic considerations may lead to a risk of allowing such matters to
EPAA, s.79C(1).
DLWC (1999) Staff Guidelines for the Assessment of Clearing Applications under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997,
DLWC, Sydney, 88pp.
53 EPAA Regulation 2000, cl.92, will be of limited relevance in practice. SEPP 46 required consideration also of the factors
listed in s.90 EPAA and in cl.65 of the EPA Regulation 1994. Since then the EPAA and EPAA Regulation have been
amended extensively, with the effect that the EPAA Regulation is irrelevant to PNF: EPAA Regulation 2000, cl.92.
54 The closest the Act comes is its objective: “to encourage and promote native vegetation management in the social,
economic and environmental interests of the State…in accordance with the principles of ESD.”NVCA, s.3(b). This is
an ambiguous and internally contradictory objective.
55 NVCA, s.3(b),(c).
51
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overwhelm environmental considerations. This is particularly the case as the EPAA, in
s.79C, requires the application of a series of potentially conflicting heads of consideration,
with no clear ranking assigned to them. More broadly, there is a tension within the objects
of the NVCA, making the Act subject to the principles of ESD and the objective of
encouraging and promoting “native vegetation management in the social, economic, and
environmental interests of the State.”56 The objects clause is ambiguous in the sense that
native vegetation management ‘in the economic interests of the State’ could be interpreted
as an encouragement for the consent authority to err on the side of approving clearing
proposals, given the short-term economic benefits which are likely to accrue to applicants.
The ambiguity of the Act in relation to conservation objectives is further exhibited in the
fact that it merely requires the decision-maker to weigh up relevant social, economic and
environmental considerations, as is required by any Part 4 consent authority under s.79C
EPAA. The approach of the judiciary to the question of the conflicting objectives in the
Part 4 consent process is discussed in Chapter Eight. The Land and Environment Court
has held that there is no rule indicating the weight that must be applied to each of the
relevant s.79C considerations, as long as each is considered. There is no requirement that
environmental factors be accorded weight equal to economic factors in the decisionmaking process.57 There is also no requirement that that consent must be refused upon a
finding that the proposal meets a negative reaction against any single head of
consideration.58
The lack of specific statutory guidance relating to native vegetation for the decision-maker
within the NVCA is a step backwards from the previous approach of SEPP 46 and the
approach still contained within South Australian legislation.59 SEPP 46, in its earliest
incarnation, required the consent authority to consider the likely impact of clearing against
twelve specific matters regarding native vegetation conservation.60 It allowed the consent
authority to grant consent to the clearing of native vegetation only “if satisfied” that none
of twelve issues of environmental sensitivity listed (regarding native vegetation) were raised
by the clearing proposal in question. For example, the decision-maker could only consent if
NVCA, s.4(1). The principles of ESD are as defined in Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991, s.6(2)
Parramatta City Council v Hale (1982) 47 LGRA 319.
58 Bauer Holdings Pty Ltd v Sydney City Council (1981) 48 LGRA 356.
59 South Australian legislation also contains a statutory presumption against the grant of development consent for clearing
affecting particular specified forms of native vegetation, i.e., clearing which offends statutory Principles of Native
Vegetation Conservation). SA Native Vegetation Act 1991, s.29(1)(b) & Schedule 1.
60 SEPP 46 (Amendment No.1), Clause 7. (Gazette No. 158 of 22.12.1995, p. 8835)
56
57

CHAPTER SIX ▫

THE NATIVE VEGETATION CONSERVATION ACT & PNF

▫

11

satisfied that “the area does not have a high biological diversity”.61 If any one of these
twelve mandatory criteria could not be met, consent could not be lawfully granted. Thus
SEPP 46 effectively prohibited clearing in these 12 categories, when clearing exemptions
were not available or applicable.62 Amendments saw these requirements reduced to an
obligation to consider only six matters, “where relevant”.63 The decision to relax these
provisions of SEPP 46 was almost certainly influenced by lobbying by rural interests.64
In summary, the Part 4 EPAA consent process applied under the NVCA, as interpreted
by the courts to date, does not inspire confidence that ESFM objectives will take
precedence over short-term economic objectives such as timber production. By contrast, a
precautionary approach to the question of whether or not to approve applications to clear
vegetation would involve delaying approval of clearing until it could be demonstrated that
the native vegetation to be cleared was not of conservation or biodiversity significance or
that measures to address these issues were to be put in place.

EXEMPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS
The requirement of the NVCA for landholders to seek development consent prior to
logging or clearing is subject to a large number of exemptions. Study of these exemptions is
essential to a full understanding of the operation of the NVCA in practice. The exemption
provisions have crucial implications for the capacity of the NVCA to deliver ESFM.
Under the NVCA, exemption clauses relieve certain categories of clearing in specified
circumstances on particular land tenures from the general obligation created by the Act to
seek Part 4 EPAA consent.65
There are 34 exemptions under the NVCA that were carried over from existing legislation
– the former SEPP 46, the Soil Conservation Act 1938 (protected lands),66 and the Western

SEPP 46, clause 7. (as at 10 August 1995).
A further requirement was for the consent authority to “take into consideration” four additional matters relating to the
significance of the vegetation in question, which brought the list to a total of 16 matters for consideration. SEPP 46,
cl.8.
63 SEPP 46 (Amendment No.2), Clause 7(1) (Gazette No. 81 of 18.7.97, p.5595).
64 Brunton, N. (1996) “The Nature of Recent Environmental Law Reforms in NSW: SEPP 46 - Protection and
Management of Native Vegetation” 13(2) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 71-74 at 72.
65 DLWC (2000) Review of the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 Exemptions, Soil and Vegetation Access Branch,
Internal unpublished document, at p.2.
66 Eight exemptions from the Soil Conservation Act 1938 s.21C(2)(b) (now repealed).
61
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Lands Regulation 1997.67 When combined with exclusions of the NVCA from particular land
tenures such as state forests and national parks, and clearing authorised under other
legislation (eg. Mining Act 1992), the total number of exempt situations climbs to sixtyfour.68 Most exemptions will not be either (i) simultaneously available to a given set of
circumstances, or (ii) applicable to a given situation. Nevertheless, some exemptions (eg.
the SEPP 46 exemptions) can be claimed in combination.69
Where there is a plan in force, it will be necessary to consult the plan to see if it has
adopted or modified these exemptions or whether other new exemptions have been
incorporated.
There are six categories of exemptions and exclusions set out in the NVCA. The first
category of exemptions was those types of clearing activity permitted under former
legislation and instruments, including SEPP 46.70 This includes exemptions transferred into
the NVCA from the Western Lands Act71 and from the Soil Conservation Act. The second
category covered various exempt land tenures, managed under particular statutes, such as
national parks and state forests.72 The third applied to lands within local government areas
exempted by Gazettal or Regulation.73 Under the fourth category, particular types of
clearing activity authorised under certain other legislation, e.g. regarding rural fires and
roads, were excluded.74 The fifth category was for plantations under plantations legislation.
The sixth category of exemptions involved Native Vegetation Codes of Practice (COPs).
These groups of exemptions and exclusions are discussed below.

Exemption category one: exempt types of clearing
The NVCA retained and continued the list of exempt forms of clearing available under the
former SEPP 46,75 as well as under the Soil Conservation Act and the Western Lands Act.76 The
Twelve exemptions from former SEPP 46, and 14 exemptions carried over from the Western Lands Regulation 1997.
See also Western Lands Act, s.18DB plus Regulations Schedule 4. The exemptions under the other legislation were
repealed but were carried forward under the savings and transitional provisions of the NVCA.
68 There are 34 exemptions under Schedule 4 (SEPP 46, Protected lands, Western Lands Act), 12 exemptions under NVCA
section 9 (exempt land classifications), 1 exemption for LGAs, 16 for other legislation, 1 for Codes of Practice.
69 DLWC (2000) above n 65 at 11.
70 SEPP 46, r.11, and Schedule 3, clause (i).
71 The exemptions from Western Lands Act 1901 are now contained in NVCA, Schedule 4 (with 14 sub-sections), and
s.18DB of the WLA refers to the obligations of the lessee to comply with the provisions of the NVCA regarding
clearing.
72 NVCA, s.9, referring to areas listed in Schedule 1 or 2.
73 NVCA, ss.10,11, and s. 67(3).
74 Those listed in NVCA, s.12.
75 NVCA, s.68, giving effect to Schedule 4, Clause 3(2).
76 SEPP 46, Clause 11 referring to exemptions listed in Schedule 3.
67
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SEPP 46 exemptions are most relevant to private forestry. The exemptions most relevant
to PNF77 include:
(a)
Minimal Clearing. The clearing of up to 2 hectares per annum for any contiguous land
holding in the same ownership.
(b)
Minimal Tree Cutting. The cutting of no more than 7 trees per hectare in any period of one
year for on-farm uses, including fence posts and firewood.
(f) Burning. The clearing of native vegetation if it is authorised under the Bush Fires Act 1949.
(h)
Planted Native Vegetation. The clearing of native vegetation planted for forestry,
agriculture, agroforestry, woodlots, gardens and horticultural purposes.
(i)
Private Native Forestry. The clearing of native vegetation in a native forest in the course of
its being selectively logged on a sustainable basis or managed for forestry purposes (timber
production).
(j)
Regrowth. The removal of native vegetation, whether seedlings or regrowth, of less than 10
years of age if the land has been previously cleared for cultivation, pastures or forestry plantation
purposes.

Exemptions within this category are not available on State protected land. This is because
SEPP 46 did not apply to protected land.

The private native forestry (PNF) exemption
The most important exemption in relation to PNF is that entitled ‘private native forestry’.
It was originally an exemption from SEPP 46, and was carried over by Schedule 4 of the
NVCA.78 In regions not yet covered by an RVMP (i.e. most of NSW at the time of
writing),79 it removes the usual development-consent requirement.80 However, the
exemption is not available where the land is State protected land as SEPP 46 never applied
to that land; and where an RVMP is in force – although a similar exemption may apply
under the terms of a future RVMP.81
The text of the exemption states that it may be claimed in the following circumstances:
“Private Native Forestry. The clearance of native vegetation in a native forest in the course of its being
selectively logged on a sustainable basis or managed for forestry purposes (timber production).”82

This text contains two distinct parts open to diverse interpretations – e.g. “selectively
logged on a sustainable basis”, or “managed for forestry purposes”. For example, it is
unclear if the phrase ‘sustainable basis’ refers to sustained timber yield or to a broader
According to DLWC in DLWC (1997) SEPP 46 - Protection and Management of Native Vegetation: Amendment No.2:
Definitions and Exemptions, 2nd edition, DLWC, Sydney at p.18.
78 This exemption (and others) from SEPP 46 were carried over and saved by Schedule 4 of the NVCA. Although the
PNF exemption is not explicitly set out within the NVCA, it applies because of the operation of savings provisions:
NVCA, s.68, giving effect to Schedule 4, Clause 3(2).
79 Two plans have been made - Riverina Highlands RVMP, Mid Lachlan RVMP, and ten other plans are at draft stage.
Source: <http://www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au/care/veg/vegact/vegact3.htm>, accessed 2.10.03.
80 This exemption (and others) from SEPP 46 were carried over and saved by Schedule 4 of the NVCA. Although the
PNF exemption is not explicitly set out within the NVCA, it applies because of the operation of savings provisions:
NVCA, s.68, giving effect to Schedule 4, Clause 3(2).
81 NVCA, Schedule 4, clause 3(3).
82 SEPP 46, Schedule 3, Clause (i).
77
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notion of ecological sustainability. The term ‘sustainable’ is a matter of dispute amongst
ecologists, foresters and others. In its ambiguity, the PNF exemption is similar to many of
the other SEPP 46 exemptions. Research findings about the interpretation and
implementation of this exemption in practice are presented in the next Chapter.

Exemption category two: exempt lands
Twelve specified land tenures including national parks, state forests and areas with natural
values protected by other legislation, are excluded from the operation of the Act.83 Any
proposed clearing or logging on land within these classifications is not subject to consent
requirements under the NVCA, because of the operation of other legislation for their
protection and management.

Exemption category three: exempt local government areas
The NVCA made provision for the partial or total exemption of particular local
government areas (‘LGAs’) from the provisions of the Act.84 The rationale for this category
of exemption was presumably so that the vegetation clearance controls contained in LEPs
of the more conservation-minded LGAs could be preserved.85 The Act also excluded
councils in the Greater Sydney metropolitan area from requirements for development
consent.86

Exemption category four: clearing under other legislation
Where permission to clear native vegetation granted under various other statutes, such as
the Rural Fires Act 1997, the Roads Act, and the Mining Act has been granted, consent was
not required under the NVCA.87
NVCA, s.9. In summary, they include the following : land dedicated or reserved under the National Parks and Wildlife
Act 1974 (NPWA );land affected by SEPP 14 (coastal wetlands); land affected by SEPP 26 (littoral rainforests);land
managed under the Forestry Act 1916; land acquired for the purposes of a State Forest; land dedicated or reserved under
the NPWA ; land acquired for dedication or reservation under the NPWA or for the preservation of Aboriginal
heritage under the NPWA ; land subject to conservation agreement under the NPWA ; land subject to an IPO Interim
Protection Order under the NPWA ; land known as critical habitat under the TSCA and NPWA .
84 NVCA, ss. 10,11. Partially exempt LGAs are listed in Schedule 1 and are only LGAs within the Greater Sydney region.
Totally exempt LGAs can be listed in Schedule 2. At the time of writing none are listed in this category. November
2000. However, in future the Coffs Harbour LEP and Tweed LEP may be exempted, if material on the websites of
these LGAs is to be taken seriously.
83

85 This interpretation was confirmed by the Second Reading speech which explained that: Certain LGAs are to be excluded where their LEPs provide adequate native vegetation
conservation protection. Hansard, 5.12.97, p.89.

NVCA, s. 10 (1) ; 11 (1) (a).
87 NVCA, s.12(b) permits clearing in accordance with a bush fire management plan under the Rural Fires Act 1997.
Section 12 excludes sixteen different types of clearing authorised under other legislation from the requirements of the
86

CHAPTER SIX ▫

THE NATIVE VEGETATION CONSERVATION ACT & PNF

▫

15

Exemption category five: Clearing under the Plantations and Reafforestation Act
The Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999 (‘PRA’) - which replaced the Timber Plantations
Harvest Guarantee Act 1995 88 - provides a separate regime for the control of the clearing of
native vegetation in the course of plantation establishment. The Plantations and Reafforestation
Code provides the detail of regulatory requirements under the PRA.89 The NVCA does not
apply to vegetation clearance for authorised plantation establishment, as the PRA created
an additional category of exempt vegetation clearance within the NVCA.90 Excluded from
the requirement to seek consent is clearing consisting of “plantation operations” taking
place on an ‘authorised plantation’, in accordance with the conditions of the authorisation
and the Code. “Plantation operations” includes “establishment operations” being:
“activities carried out for the purpose of establishing a plantation, for example, the clearing
of land, the use of pesticides, herbicides and fertilisers…and the planting of trees or
shrubs.”91 Thus land-clearing is contemplated by the Act as falling squarely within the
scope of the term ‘plantation operations’.
Under the framework created by the PRA it is not possible for landholders to elect to wait
to obtain authorisation until just after clearance operations have been completed.92 The
conduct of such clearing operations on an unauthorised plantation constitutes an offence.93
The Act also states “to avoid doubt, a natural forest is not a plantation for the purposes of

NVCA. The most relevant include: s.12(e) clearing under a licence granted under Part 6 TSCA (i.e. s.91 licences);
s.12(i) clearing in accordance with a licence issued under s.133 NPWA ; s.12(l) clearing involved in the harvesting
operations on timber plantations accredited under the Plantations and Reafforestation Act. Additional exemptions are
brought into the NVCA, transferred from the Western Lands Act (s.18DB). The Western Lands exemptions are
contained in NVCA, Schedule 4 (with 14 sub-sections). In addition, various ‘protected lands’ exemptions are
transferred across from the Soil Conservation Act 1938.
88 NSW Office of Parliamentary Counsel (2002) NSW Legislation in Force, June, at p.47, 225.
89 Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999, Part 3.
90 NVCA, s.12(l); PRA, Schedule 2, Clause 2.7, part [1]; amending NVCA, s.12.
91 PRA, s.4(1).
92 This is because the PRA, in section 9(1), requires all plantations (except ‘exempt farm forestry’) to be authorised. As
plantation establishment falls within the definition of plantation operations this requirement for authorisation includes
a requirement that clearing for plantation establishment be authorised under the PRA, s.9(1), see also Plantations and
Reafforestation Bill 1999, Explanatory Note, p.4. .
93 PRA, s.9(3). The Act further closes this potential loophole by giving the Minister the capacity to elect to refuse the
authorisation of plantations on land which was illegally cleared. It provides in s.17 that the Minister may refuse an
application for authorisation of a plantation that is already fully or partially established “if the Minister determines that
the establishment operations were not carried out in accordance with any applicable requirements of this Act, the
EPAA 1979, any law dealing with native vegetation conservation and any other relevant law.” Will the PRA encourage
the PNF for conversion to plantation on smaller blocks fitting the definition of ‘exempt farm forestry’ (‘EFF’) ? EFF
covers plantations operations on a single farm that do not exceed 30 hectares, so long as clearing involved is exempt
under the NVCA. If the clearing is associated with an EFF proposal, it may exploit the exemptions of the NVCA.
The significance of this depends (a) on the proportion of PNF operations which are captured within the 30 hectare
boundary of the ‘exempt farm forestry’ definition; and (b) the breadth of the PNF exemption as interpreted by
landholders, DLWC, and the Courts.
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this Act.”94 As the PRA defines ‘plantation’ as “an area of land on which the predominant
number of trees …are trees or shrubs that have been planted…”, private native forestry
will not be able to take direct advantage of the approvals regime provided by the PRA. 95
However the PRA may indirectly encourage the logging of native forests on smaller parcels
of private land, prior to conversion to plantations, if the operation falls under the category
of ‘exempt farm forestry’ – where it involves an area of less than 30ha, is exempt from the
development consent requirements of the NVCA.96 The extent to which this is the case
depends on the proportion of PNF operations on blocks smaller than 30 hectares; and the
breadth of the PNF exemption as interpreted by landholders, DLWC, and the Courts.

Exemption category six: Codes of Practice
The NVCA also provides for the making97 of Codes of Practice (‘COP’) to regulate the
clearance of native vegetation by particular industries or land uses.98 Where there is no
RVMP in place, clearing undertaken in accordance with a COP is exempt from the general
requirement to seek development consent.99 If a COP for PNF was made, it would amount
to a more detailed PNF exemption.100 Where clearing has been carried out in purported
compliance with a COP, but in reality was not “in accordance with” its terms, development
consent would be required.101
If logging or clearing is undertaken in accordance with a COP, can additional consent
requirements be imposed by the operation of LEPs or other legislation? This depends on
whether or not an RVMP is in place in the relevant region. In a non-RVMP area, COPs
cannot prevail over the operation of applicable LEP requirements. PNF logging under a
PRA, s.5(2).
PRA, s.5(1).
96 PRA, s.6(1); Plantations Code r.5. NVCA s.12(l) provides that exempt clearing includes “any clearing that consists of
plantation operations within the meaning of the Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999 on an authorised plantation in
accordance with any conditions of the authorisation and with the Plantations and Reafforestation Code under that
Act.”
97 The COPs, although devised by the Department, must be signed off by the Minister, who is obliged to consult with the
Native Vegetation Advisory Council, and take the Council’s views into account prior to approving any COP. See
NVCA, s.37(1)(b), s.37(2).
98 NVCA, Part 4 (ss.37-39). According to a departmental publication use of the COP mechanism is to limited to
situations “where an industry specific approach to clearing is needed.” DLWC (1997) A Proposed Model for Native
Vegetation Conservation in New South Wales: A White Paper, DLWC, July, 26pp, at p.19. It is debatable whether this
represents an environmental safeguard, or whether it in fact represents an unjustifiable “open slather” approach for a
particular industry. One commentator argued that the COP provisions of the Act were problematic in that particular
powerful industry lobby groups may “use these provisions to circumvent other checks and balances in the Act and
entrench dubious environmental practices.”
99 NVCA, s.21(2). COPs come into force when adopted by Regulation: NVCA, s.39. They can be amended by
subsequent regulations. NVCA, s.39(3).
100 NVCA, s.21(2)(b).
101 NVCA s.21(2)(b). It is unlikely in such a situation that consent would have been obtained, and as a result a criminal
offence (of clearing without consent) would have been committed. NVCA, s.64.
94
95
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COP would remain subject to any applicable consent requirements or prohibitions under
an LEP, REPP or SEPP.102 In those regions where an RVMP is in place, RVMPs may
adopt or incorporate provisions of a COP as part of the Plan.103 However, an RVMP
cannot amend the provisions of a Code, either adding environmental protection
requirements or removing them.104 A Code may impose additional requirements to those
contained in an RVMP. The inconsistency provisions that prevent imposition of additional
restrictions on vegetation clearing in situations where vegetation is to be cleared in
accordance with an RVMP do not apply to the operation of COPs (because COPs do not
fit the definition of an EPI).105
The operation of COPs is subject to several safeguards including that they cannot be
inconsistent with the objects of the NVCA,106 and are not applicable to either ‘State’ or
‘regional’ protected land.107
To date, no COPs have been made, although two possible COPs have been considered.
First, in order to clarify the ambiguity of the PNF exemption, a COP was proposed for
PNF. It was to be developed on the basis of a consultancy report into sustainable private
forestry. However that report was shelved, due to its political and economic implications.108
Second, there was preparation (to an advanced stage) of a COP for clearing for plantation
establishment, but that was abandoned upon the enactment of the Plantations and
Reafforestation Act 1999.109

The effect of the Plantations and Reafforestation Act has some similarity to impact of the PNF exemption, in areas where
there is no RVMP in force, which does not oust requirements for development consent which may be contained in an
LEP. This interpretation of the Act is confirmed by a Note attached to s.23(3) which states: For example, in any case
where clearing is carried out in accordance with a native vegetation code of practice, the clearing may still require
development consent because of an environmental planning instrument.
103 NVCA, s. 25(2)(c).
104 NVCA, s.38(4).
105 NVCA, s.20(1).
106 NVCA, s. 38(2)(a).
107 NVCA, s. 38(2)(b).
108 Setscan Pty Ltd (1999) Guidelines for Application of Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 Exemption to Sustainable Forestry
on Private Lands in NSW, a report to the DLWC by Dr. Andrew Smith, Armidale, 128pp.
109 The PRA provides in Part 3 for the making of a Plantations and Reafforestation Code of Practice. In terms of
background, regarding a COP under the NVCA, the White Paper for the NVCA suggested that a COP for “clearing
associated with the establishment of plantations” would be prepared. DLWC (NSW) (1997) above n 98 at 19. By
November 1999, another Code had been prepared: DLWC (1999) Draft Code of Practice for the Prevention and Control of
Scrub Dominated Landscapes in the Western Division of NSW, DLWC, 11pp. Another Departmental document, dated
February 1998, states that a draft COP for timber plantations will be exhibited for public comment prior to July 1998:
DLWC (1998) NVCA Fact Sheet No.1, p.2. Work on a COP for plantations was partly in response to the setting of
plantation establishment targets by government; see: Smith, B. (1998) “The Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997:
How will it be implemented”, in Environment Defender’s Office (NSW) (ed.), Caring For the Land : Conference Proceedings,
EDO, Sydney at 5. By September 1999 this COP was still awaiting Ministerial approval: Telephone Interview, Officer,
Vegetation Assessment Unit, DLWC Parramatta, 21.9.99.
102
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INTERACTION OF EPIS WITH THE NVCA
This section discusses the interaction between requirements of the NVCA and those of
Environmental Planning Instruments (such as LEPs and TPOs, REPs, and SEPPs), and
the implications of their interaction for the PNF industry. 110
The precise impact of EPIs on a given PNF proposal in NSW depends upon at least six
factors, including:
•
•
•
•
•
•

whether an RVMP is in force in that region;
the terms of the LEP in question, depending on the zoning of the area;
the effect of paramountcy or inconsistency clauses in the NVC Act;
whether exemptions (carried over from SEPP 46 or other NVCA exemptions) are
applied;
whether SEPP 26 (littoral rainforests) or 44 (koala habitat) are applicable; and
whether there is any relevant restriction in an REP.111

Since the passage of the NVCA, there is still a role for Local Environmental Plans (LEPs),
despite claims made in Parliament that the Act would represent a comprehensive ‘one-stop
shop’ for all requirements relating to clearing activities on private land.112 LEPs may require
a private-forest owner to seek consent for PNF, where consent is not required under the
NVCA because of the operation of exemptions. However, where NVCA exemptions are
not claimed, additional consent requirements cannot be imposed by an LEP or by the
provisions of any Act (other than the NVCA or the EPAA).113 The underlying policy
principle is to avoid duplication of consent requirements.
We have seen above (p.11) that the NVCA has retained ‘activity based’ exemptions from
SEPP 46, e.g., PNF exemption. Where this exemption is available and is relied upon, then
the provisions of the relevant LEP, REP, SEPPs and TPO should be examined as they may
require consent to be sought.114 (See Error! Reference source not found.) Whether
consent is required depends on the content of the LEP, and the zoning of the land in
question. Some LEPs require consent for forestry in the General Rural 1(a) zone, and more
still require it in environmental protection (‘7’) zones. If the LEP contains a requirement to
Environmental Planning Instrument as defined in the EPAA., s.4(1) “means a State environmental planning policy, a
regional environmental plan, or a local environmental plan, and except where otherwise expressly provided by this Act,
includes a deemed environmental planning instrument.”
111 For example, certain vegetation clearance is not permitted without consent in the Kosciusko REP, cl.9(3).
112 The Hon J. Shaw, NVC Bill: Second Reading, NSWPD (Hansard), 5.12.97, p.90.
113 The Parliamentary Counsel’s Explanatory Note which accompanied the NVC Bill 1997 stated in this context: “there
will generally be no need to obtain any other form of approval or authorisation to clear.” Native Vegetation
Conservation Bill 1997, Explanatory Note, p.5.
114 NVCA, s.23(3).
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seek consent for PNF in that particular zone, then this requirement will be unaffected by
operation of the NVCA and the inconsistency provision contained in sub-section s.23(1).
Under s.23(3) NVCA, where NVCA exemptions are claimed, then development consent
may still be required, because of the requirements of an LEP or TPO.115

115

NVCA, Division 3 of Part 2. The Note attached to s.23(3) NVCA makes it clear that situations exist in which there
remains a role for EPIs. It states: “For example, in any case where clearing is carried out in accordance with a native
vegetation code of practice, the clearing may still require development consent because of an environmental planning
instrument.” Another way of stating this proposition is presented by Farrier et.al. (1999) above n 32 at 369: “Where
development consent is required by an LEP the PNF exemption under the NVCA will have no effect.” (at 369).
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Figure 1 Abbreviated Overview of regulation
of non-plantation private forestry
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EFFECT OF NVCA ON PART 5 EPAA
The NVCA makes special provision such that the clearing it regulates will not be affected
by Part 5 EPAA. That is, it will not become a Part 5 ‘activity’ where Part 4 consent is not
required, e.g. due to the operation of exemptions contained in the NVCA. The Act
provides:
Part 5 of the EPA Act does not apply to any clearing carried out in accordance with this Part [i.e. Part
2 which provides the consent rules for clearing] and any such clearing is not an activity for the
purposes of Part 5 of the EPA Act.116

Therefore Part 5 cannot be applied as an alternative to Part 4 EPAA, despite the existence
of approval requirements which may have ordinarily triggered environmental assessment
requirements under that Part. This is no different to the situation that applied previously
under SEPP 46.117 Nevertheless, other requirements may apply where neither Part 4 nor
Part 5 apply, such as licensing requirements of the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995.

REGIONAL VEGETATION MANAGEMENT PLANS (RVMPS)
The other key mechanism of the NVCA of relevance to PNF is provision for the making
of Regional Vegetation Management Plans (‘RVMPs’).118 These provisions are an attempt
to transcend the impact of thousands of micro-level decisions under planning law that have
been taken without consideration of cumulative regional environmental impacts.
In the Second Reading Speech,119 it was stated that RVMPs “will be the single source of
information required by anyone within that region who is responsible for managing native
vegetation”. Once an RVMP is in place, local government would no longer be involved in
vegetation-clearing control (below, p.Error! Bookmark not defined.). RVMPs will specify
NVCA, s.16.
SEPP 46, where it required landowners to seek development consent under Part 4 EPAA, obviously did not trigger
Part 5 of the EPAA. SEPP 46 originally contained a broad requirement to seek consent (Clause 6(1)), but this was
modified by Amendment No.2 of 18.7.97, so that consent was not required where a vegetation management plan or
code of practice applied.
118 NVCA, Part 3. Generally, see: Houghton, P., Roberts, K. (1998) “Towards Sustainable Native Vegetation
Management in NSW - the New Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997”, in NELA National Environmental Law
Association (ed.), Proceedings of 17th Annual National Environmental Law Association Conference, Canberra, 25-27 March. at 5.
The concept of such plans was first introduced in the second round of amendments to SEPP 46 which provided for
the making of “interim regional vegetation management plans”. SEPP 46, s.5, Schedule 2. See Garrard, I. (1996)
Grassland Management in NSW: The Evolution of an Approach, DLWC, Sydney, unpublished, 7pp. at 1. SEPP 46 also
introduced regional planning in the first round of amendments in order to manage clearing of specified native
grasslands.
119 The Hon J. Shaw, NVC Bill: Second Reading, NSWPD (Hansard), 5.12.97, p.90.
116
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in which areas development consent is required to clear vegetation, and where it is not
required.
RVMPs are drafted by Regional Vegetation Management Committees, which include
representatives mainly drawn from rural interests, conservation interests, and government
agencies.120 In making a draft RVMP, a Committee must have regard to specified statutory
requirements relating to vegetation conservation and soil and water management.121
RVMPs are formally ‘made’ through a process of public exhibition and consultation,
followed by approval by the Minister for Land and Water Conservation.122 The Minister for
the Environment is required to inspect draft RVMPs to assess their adequacy for
threatened species protection and may make recommendations, which must be taken into
account by, but are not binding on, the Minister administering the NVCA.123
The provisions relating to RVMPs and their administration have significant potential to
affect PNF because in the future they will contain the rules affecting the industry. These
rules are likely to vary from region to region, perhaps creating problems for companies
operating across several regions, and particularly for larger companies operating in
numerous regions across the state. Further, the ongoing uncertainty associated with the
scope for future amendment of plans124 are said to be a concern to private forest owners.125
Eighteen RVMP regions had been proclaimed by May 2000,126 and it is proposed to make a
total of approximately twenty RVMPs. Only two RVMPs had been made at October 2003
with another ten plans at draft stage.127

The rules for clearing where an RVMP is in force
In a region where an RVMP is in force, there may or may not be a requirement for consent
to be obtained for a clearing proposal. The answer depends on the content of the RVMP –
which is ultimately signed off, or ‘made’, by the Minister for Land and Water
NVCA, s.51(4).
NVCA, s.27.
122 NVCA, ss.29-31,33.
123 NVCA, s.32.
124 NVCA, s.35(1).
125 Centre for Agricultural and Regional Economics Pty Ltd (2000) “Does Farm Forestry have a future in NSW?” hosted
at the New England North West Forestry web-site: <http://www.nio.com.au/forestry/index.html>.
126 DLWC (2000) Status Report for Regional Vegetation Management Plans (RVMPs), 12 May 2000, DLWC, Sydney, at p.3.
127 Riverina Highlands Regional Vegetation Management Plan, Mid Lachlan Regional Vegetation Plan and ten other plans
at draft stage. Source: <http://www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au/care/veg/vegact/vegact3.htm> accessed 2.10.03.
120
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Conservation.128 With the eventual making of RVMPs to cover the State, the requirements
for consent for PNF and other forms of vegetation clearing may vary widely across the
State - according to the applicable plan. The Act provides that an RVMP may either require
development consent to be sought for vegetation clearance in specified areas indicated in
the Plan, or it may not. In other words, requirements for development consent are
optional.129 Where a plan does not require consent for clearing, any clearing must still be
carried out in accordance with other provisions of the plan.130 In practice, plans have been
devised to take what is effectively a zoning approach, with land-use controls varying
according to the classification of the land. Principally, the rules for vegetation clearance in
an RVMP area depend on whether the proposed clearing relates to an area of ‘regional
protected land’, within which consent will normally be required. For example in the
Riverina Highlands RVMP, PNF is exempt on land specified as “unclassified land”, that is,
land that is not in a linear regional reserve or regional protected land.131
Development can be classified in a Plan as development not requiring consent (exempt
development),132 or development permissible with consent, or prohibited development.
Exempt development must follow the rule in s.76(2) EPAA, that it is: “development of a
specified class…that is of minimal environmental impact”. If a Plan makes an exemption
that, as a matter of fact, will have more than minimal impact, that exemption is invalid.133

Implications of RVMP-making for EPIs
The enactment of the NVCA has commenced a process of reducing the role of local
government in controlling vegetation clearing.134 The implications of the making of RVMPs
on the operation of EPIs, such as Local Environment Plans, are drastic for local
government. In a region where an RVMP is in force, its rules about clearing will override
any inconsistent requirements of other EPIs such as LEPs and REPs that “prohibit, restrict
or otherwise affect that clearing” - even requirements introduced in subsequent LEP
NVCA, s.33.
NVCA, s.18.
130 NVCA, s.18(2).
131 Riverina Highlands Regional Vegetation Management Plan, <http://www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au/care/veg/vegact/vegact3.htm>
accessed 2.10.03.
132 This is referred to in a note attached to NVCA, s.25(3).
133 EPAA, s.76(3).
134 Hurrell, J. (1998) “Clearing Controls and Rural Councils: Growth Opportunity or Role Reversal” 3(1) Local Government
Law Journal 135-141; Kelly, A., pers. comm., argued that unelected committees will replace democratically elected local
government.
128
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amendments.135 This rule applied regardless of whether or not the RVMP in question
requires development consent for clearing.136 The strength of these inconsistency
provisions may in some circumstances lead to a reduction in compliance requirements for
the PNF industry. It is possible that the PNF industry will in some LGAs go from being
required to obtain consent under an LEP, to not having to obtain consent at all, once
RVMPs are made. (On the other hand, in some circumstances where the LEP does not
require consent for PNF, the making of an RVMP may introduce requirements for consent
where they previously did not exist.) If an RVMP does not require consent, PNF will not
be regulated at all, unless a pollution control licence is required making the EPA a
determining authority under Part 5 EPAA (which, in practice is extremely unlikely) or a
Part 6 TSCA licence is required to harm or pick threatened species. These other forms of
regulation are addressed in Chapters 8 & 9.
If an RVMP is made that does not require consent for clearing or PNF there is little that
can be done in creating future EPIs to override its provisions.137 However, there is scope
for councils to make representations to the Minister administering the Act to influence him
to apply provisions in the NVCA to exclude,138 or partially exclude,139 their local
government area from the operation of the Act. In this way the operation of provisions of
the applicable LEP can be revived.
Nevertheless, the Act contains a number of provisions restricting the making of RVMPs,
to prevent reductions in environmental protection requirements. Firstly, where there is an
applicable EPI making provision for native-vegetation protection, the Act states that the
RVMP must provide “at least the same level of protection and conservation in relation to
native vegetation”.140 In other words, if consent is required under the LEP in a particular
zone, it must similarly be required under the RVMP. This is of little comfort if the
applicable LEP was inadequate for the purpose of ensuring ESFM, eg. not requiring
consent for PNF in any zone. Secondly, RVMPs must provide for adequate protection of
core koala habitat within the meaning of SEPP 44 for koala-habitat protection.141 Finally,
NVCA, s.20(1)(b). Note that RVMPs are defined to be EPIs : s.36(1), NVCA. Section 36(3) provides that ”a RVMP
prevails over any other EPI, whether made before or after the plan”.
136 NVCA, Division 2 of Part 2.
137 NVCA, s.20(1).
138 NVCA, s.10(2), 11(1)(b), Schedule 2.
139 NVCA, s.10(1), 11(1)(a), Schedule 1.
140 NVCA, s.27(3). Farrier, et.al. (1999) above n 32 at 368. Note that RVMPs are deemed to be EPIs for the purposes of
Part 4 of the EPAA, NVCA, s.36(1).
141 NVCA, s.27(2).
135

CHAPTER SIX ▫

THE NATIVE VEGETATION CONSERVATION ACT & PNF

▫

25

RVMPs cannot oust the operation of SEPP 14 (coastal wetlands) or SEPP 26 (littoral
rainforest), or critical habitat for threatened species, as these areas are not subject to the
NVCA. 142
The RVMP process provides a useful tool to move NSW away from micro-level, projectbased assessment. But at present there is a danger that the process may not be a particularly
strong one for biodiversity conservation on a regional basis. Controls must be instituted to
ensure that it actually takes into account the need for protection of under-represented and
rare/threatened forest ecosystems, rather than allowing increased logging under new
RVMP exemptions for PNF. Further it must be amended to prevent its present capacity to
exclude the operation of provisions of the TSCA such as s.91 licensing.143

142
143

NVCA, s.9.
NVCA, s.20(1)(a).
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The effect of RVMPs on clearing exemptions
Once an RVMP is made for an area, the NVCA states that the exemptions that were
carried over from SEPP 46 into the NVCA (e.g., the PNF exemption) cease to have
effect on that land.144 A committee can propose an entirely new suite of exemptions for
inclusion in the final RVMP, subject to Ministerial approval. Although early publicity
material from Department of Land and Water Conservation (DLWC) on the NVCA
suggested that all the existing exemptions would be contained in RVMPs,145 the Act
permits committees to redefine or delete any of these, and to draft alternative or
additional exemptions. Although this may suggest an ‘open slather’ approach to inclusion
of new exemptions, some safeguards apply to the making146 of RVMPs.147

PROTECTED LANDS PROVISIONS OF THE NVCA
Another key aspect of the regulatory framework for PNF created by the NVCA is the
‘protected land’ provisions which apply to certain steep slope and riparian lands in NSW.
These were carried over from the Soil Conservation Act 1938 with some modifications.148
‘Protected land’ is land mapped as such by the former Commissioner of the Soil
Conservation Service as meeting one of three criteria: (1) it is steep land, being generally
steeper than 18 degrees, or (2) land within 20 m of “prescribed streams” or (3) land
mapped as “environmentally-sensitive land” requiring special protection.149 The effect of
the NVCA on the third category, environmentally sensitive land categorised as ‘Stateprotected land’ is of critical importance. The protected lands provisions frequently apply
to PNF, particularly in the North Coast, because a large percentage of the commercially
viable, private-land forest estate is sufficiently steep to be mapped as protected land.150

NVCA, Schedule 4, Clause 3(3).
DLWC (1998) Native Vegetation Conservation Act – A New Era for Native Vegetation Management (No.5); Exclusions and
Exemptions, September, DLWC, Parramatta, at 1.
146 NVCA, s.33.
147 These include (1) the fact that a range of community representation exists on the RVM Committees (2) that prior to
the making of RVMPs by the Minister, there is a rather involved draft RVMP process, which includes public
notification and consultation. NVCA, s.28-30. Further, RVMPs cannot be weaker than relevant LEPs: NVCA,
s.27(3), see Chapter Nine.
148 Division 2 of Part 4 of the Soil Conservation Act 1938. NVCA, s.4, 7.
149 Soil Conservation Act 1938, s.21B(1); NVCA, s.7(1)(a) –(c).
150 Interview, Dr Ian Hannam, DLWC, 15 January 1998, Parramatta office (in person); Interview, Mr Bob Attwood,
DLWC Northern Region, 5 October 1999, by telephone.
144
145
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The NVCA divides land previously mapped as ‘protected land’ into two sub-categories:
‘State-protected land’151, and ‘regional-protected land’,152 according to whether or not the
land is subject to a RVMP. ‘State-protected land’ includes any land previously defined as
‘protected land’ under the SCA,153 plus any additional areas identified by the Minister by
Order.154
In terms of PNF, the main reason for the importance of the provisions in practice is
because the PNF exemption is not available on State-protected land.155 This is because
the NVCA exemptions were carried over from SEPP 46,156 and that policy did not apply
to protected land.157 Therefore, where there is no RVMP in force, development consent
is automatically required to clear vegetation on State-protected land.158 Neither codes of
practice159 nor property agreements can remove this requirement.160 Where an RVMP is in
force, development consent may or may not be required to clear on protected land,
depending on the terms of the Plan.161

The role of protected lands provisions
In 1995, Dr Hannam of DLWC wrote that the protected lands provisions provide a
“significant contribution” to the conservation of private forests in NSW.162 The
provisions made a contribution towards ESFM by requiring authorisation of PNF on this
particular land tenure.163 It remains to be seen whether with the making of RVMPs, the
NVCA, s.7.
NVCA, s.4.
153 NVCA, s.4(1).
154 NVCA, s 4, 7(1).
155 Farrier et.al. (1999) above n 32 at 369.
156 The SEPP 46 exemptions (which were contained in Schedule 3 of SEPP 46) are carried over into the NVCA by
NVCA, s.68, and Schedule 4, clause 3(2).
157 SEPP 46, cl.3(e) exempted ‘protected land’ from the operation of SEPP 46. (‘Protected land’ within the meaning of
SCA, former s.21AB). DLWC officers confirmed this interpretation in interviews: Mr Bob Attwood, DLWC
Northern Region, Grafton, 5.10.99.
158 NVCA, s.22. Note that some exemptions specific to protected land may be available, as those exemptions
previously available under the SCA were continued by the NVCA. The most relevant to PNF is the exemption
allowing the felling of “not more than seven trees on any area of one hectare of the protected land” and an
associated 2ha exemption. Full text reproduced in DLWC (2001) Desktop Review of Exemptions Under the NVCA,
DLWC, Sydney.
159 NVCA, s.21(1)(b), 22(2)(b).
160 NVCA , s.41(3).
161 Previously an authority was required under s.21D of the SCA to “destroy timber on protected land”.
162 Hannam, I. (1995) “Environmental Law and Private Property Management in New South Wales”, 2nd Annual
Defending the Environment Conference, Australian Centre for Environmental Law, University of Adelaide, 20-21 May
1995, Published Conference Proceedings, 223-250.
163 Statements about the contribution of the protected lands provisions must be tempered against other considerations.
Importantly, the protected lands provisions were contained in legislation aimed at soil management rather than
forest or vegetation management. The provisions were originally introduced for the purpose of preventing land
degradation and to achieve soil conservation. These provisions were later amended to provide the capacity to
achieve these objectives via the protection of native vegetation. With the passage of the EPAA in 1979, the
151
152
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NVCA will continue the same provision for ESFM that the protected lands provisions
used to provide.
There are three major issues regarding the RVMP-making process for the protection of
areas which were previously mapped as ‘protected land’ under the Soil Conservation Act.
One is the possibility that the RVMP process will involve the de-listing of areas of
protected land. The second – related to the first, but different - is the possibility that the
RVMP process could lead to the removal of requirements for authorisation or consent to
clear vegetation on protected land. A third is whether there are flow-on implications
regarding protected land status in relation to the availability of the PNF exemption in the
NVCA. These issues are addressed in turn below.
The first issue concerns the conversion of ‘state-protected land’ to ‘regional-protected
land’. By way of background, areas that were previously mapped as ‘protected land’
under the Soil Conservation Act automatically became ‘State-protected land’ with the
commencement of the NVCA. Upon the making of an RVMP, there is no automatic
conversion of ‘State-protected land’ to ‘regional-protected land’. The Act says that areas
of State-protected land ‘may’ be listed as regional-protected land. It does not specify that
this ‘must’ take place.164 This was the intention of the legislative drafters, according to
DLWC officers interviewed.165 Where land is identified as regional-protected land by an
RVMP, it ceases to be State-protected land, (if it was previously identified as such).166
However, if ‘State-protected land’ is not defined as ‘regional-protected land’ under a
Regional Plan, it is no longer ‘State-protected land’, because of the operation of the
RVMP.167 In this way, a Regional Plan could involve the de-listing of significant areas
presently mapped as State-protected land.168

Commissioner for Soil Conservation became a Part 5 determining authority in relation to its decision making on the
granting of authorities to destroy trees on protected land. With this role came a broader obligation for
environmental assessment which required consideration of vegetation on protected land from a wider perspective
than the control of erosion. In other words, the protected lands provisions were gradually adapted over time, to
accommodate additional legislative obligations on decision makers. The point is that the legislation was never
purpose built for the regulation of PNF. Nevertheless, the combination of the EPAA and the SCA enabled the
detailed environmental impact assessment of PNF proposals.
164 NVCA, s.25(6).
165 Interview, P.Wright, DLWC, 29.6.00, following discussions with Mr Peter Houghton, Manager, Land and
Vegetation Unit, Sustainable Land and Coastal Management (Information and Planning), DLWC.
166 NVCA, s.7(4)(a).
167 NVCA, s.7(4)(b).
168 NVCA, s.7(4)(b).
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Secondly, a key implication of any areas being removed from protected land status by
RVMPs, if this does eventuate, is that development consent may no longer be required to
log on these lands. This is important as logging of protected lands involves logging
particularly environmentally sensitive areas such as steep slopes (with potential for soil
erosion and water pollution), and riverine vegetation. Without a requirement for
departmental authorisation, there is no capacity to either refuse such proposals, or to
impose conditions on proposed logging. However this is not the case under the Riverina
Highlands RVMP.169
The third issue regards the effect of RVMPs on the availability of exemptions for PNF.
The de-listing of protected land could possibly result in wider availability of the PNF
exemption under the NVCA. This is because the operation of SEPP 46 exemptions such
as the PNF exemption ceases upon the gazettal of an RVMP. Some RVMPs may retain a
version of the PNF exemption, and some may choose not to make it available. It is
impossible at this point to predict the impact of the RVMP process on exemption
availability, but the Riverina Highlands Plan retains a similar PNF exemption, albeit one
that is more detailed (Appendix 6.2).

CONCLUSION
The NVCA has several features suggesting prima facie that it can assist in the task of
achieving ESFM on private land. The principal factor is that development consent is
required for all types of vegetation clearance, including PNF, enabling regulation, control
or refusal of proposals with potentially unacceptable impacts.
Advocates of alternatives to conventional regulatory approaches must note that the
enactment of the NVCA and the replacement of SEPP 46 has also reduced reliance on
the regulatory ‘consent’ approach, and has enabled resort to more flexible mechanisms
(property agreements, COPs, and RVMPs) and incentives (through the statutory Native
Vegetation Fund).
However, the Act retains four principal defects, which suggest that ESFM may be
unattainable other than in exceptional cases. The primary difficulty is with the

169
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<http://www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au/care/veg/vegact/vegact3.htm> accessed 2.10.03.
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exemptions such as the PNF exemption and the 2 hectares per annum exemption. These
militate against the attainment of ESFM (similarly, consent is not automatically required
under a code of practice or RVMP). Due to a historical quirk, rather than by design, the
PNF exemption is not available for State-protected land.170
The second defect is that in spite of an objective of preventing inappropriate clearing, the
Act fails to provide criteria by which “inappropriate clearing” can be identified. This is in
contrast to the first version of its predecessor, SEPP 46, and to South Australian
legislation, both of which specified ecological principles and criteria against which
clearing applications could be assessed.171 An associated problem is that the consent
process is not sufficiently weighted in s.79C EPAA in favour of environmental matters.
Although Part 4 decision-makers must consider the five factors listed in the EPAA, as
well as the objects of the NVCA, there is little assurance that decision makers will place
environmental considerations foremost; in short, ESD is not a required outcome.
A third problem is the fact that the Minister administering the Act is the consent
authority. The legislation fails to provide an independent consent authority. South
Australia, by contrast, has a Native Vegetation Council which guards against the
politicisation of the consent process.172 Arguably this reduces the risk that applications to
clear native vegetation will be approved on the basis of pressure, lobbying and local
political sensitivities.
A fourth problem is that DLWC is required to regulate the PNF industry with a statute
not designed specifically as a forestry-management instrument. The NVCA contains no
specific provisions for assessment and subsequent monitoring of PNF operations, such
as requirements for the preparation of Timber Harvesting Plans (THPs) and other
planning documents. Even if THPs were required to be prepared for PNF operations,
the Act does not provide mechanisms for devising, approving and auditing such plans,
other than by requiring development consent according to generic criteria of the EPAA.

NVCA, s.22.
South Australian legislation also contains a statutory presumption against the grant of development consent for
clearing affecting particular specified forms of native vegetation, i.e., clearing which offends statutory Principles of
Native Vegetation Conservation). SA Native Vegetation Act 1991, s.29 (1)(b) & Schedule 1.
172 Native Vegetation Act 1991 (SA), ss. 6-7.
170
171
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Some of these issues are further explored in Chapter Seven, which presents research
findings regarding the implementation of the NVCA in relation to PNF.

Chapter Seven

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIVE VEGETATION

CONSERVATION ACT 1997 (NSW) IN RELATION TO PNF

This Chapter presents and discusses research findings regarding the implementation of
the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (‘NVCA’) in relation to the PNF industry in
NSW during the study period. Discerning the impact of this Act is a crucial aspect of
examining the application of NSW environmental laws to PNF.
The Chapter describes issues that have arisen in a day-to-day context of applying the
NVCA to PNF. This provides some background to later suggestions for law reforms
necessary for ESFM to be achieved.1
The research objective is to test the hypothesis that in many instances, the PNF industry
in NSW was ‘under-regulated’ during the study period. This involves the propositions
that (i) the industry was subject to a legal framework inadequate to deliver ESFM, and (ii)
that the law was inadequately implemented and enforced. The previous Chapter has
already argued that in a number of senses the NVCA, as part of the legal framework for
PNF in NSW, is inadequate.
This chapter does not attempt to comprehensively survey or document the decisionmaking and administrative behaviour of the DLWC in relation to the NVCA as a whole,
nor in relation to all facets of the Act’s application to PNF during the study period.2
Instead, it focuses on DLWC’s approach to PNF in DLWC’s coastal organisational
regions - North Coast, Hunter and Sydney-South Coast.
Key findings of this Chapter were that the volume of sawlog production from PNF
activity occurring in Northern NSW during the latter part of the study period was
estimated by a senior DLWC regulator from the North Coast regional office to make up

1
2

Whilst noting that law reform, of itself, will not automatically lead to the adoption of ESFM practices.
For example, the implementation of incentives and voluntary conservation mechanisms are not discussed due to the
focus of this thesis on the implementation of regulatory controls.

to 50 per cent of total sawlog production in that Region from all tenures.3 Secondly, it
was found that all PNF logging outside protected land (ie. 100% of operations on that
land classification) in the North Coast and Hunter regions claimed the PNF exemption,
regardless of the type of logging. Therefore it was not regulated by the NVCA. Even in
spite of the operation of the exemption in the North Coast and Hunter regions, PNF
was the most important cause of native vegetation “clearing” within the category of all
types of approved vegetation clearing activity between 1999-2001 inclusive. If PNF
logging under exemption were to be included in these figures showing the most common
intended land use after clearing activity, then it is abundantly clear that PNF would have
been, by a considerable margin, the most important cause of native vegetation clearing in
those Regions.4

THE PNF EXEMPTION IN PRACTICE
Examination of the impact of the PNF exemption is crucial to a full picture of how the
NVCA has been applied, interpreted, and administered to date in relation to the PNF
industry. The previous chapter briefly described the exemption, and its precise meaning
will be discussed below.
Let us consider the availability of the PNF exemption. When is it available, and to
whom? Persons conducting forestry operations permitted by the exemption are not
required to obtain development consent. In Chapter Six we saw that the exemption is
not available on State protected land.

Elsewhere, the Act provides little guidance

regarding the process to be applied in terms of applying for exemptions, other than to
inform us that types of clearing described in Schedule 3 of SEPP 46 are “clearing that is
exempt from any requirement ... for development consent”.5 There is no other detail
regarding the process to be followed by landholders seeking to rely upon exemptions. In
particular, the Act contains no requirement that landholders must apply for exemptions.6

Interview, Mr. B. Attwood, interview, in person, Grafton DLWC Office, 23.11.00.
See: Appendix 7.1. DLWC (2001) Proposed Land Use for the Area Approved for Clearing for All Regions for period 01 Jan 2000
to 31 Dec 2000. Posted onto DLWC internet site <www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au> during March 2001. Downloaded 1.4.01.
by the author.
5 NVCA, Schedule 4, clause 3(2).
6 Under the Pesticides Act 1999 (NSW), s.115, where exemptions must be sought from the regulator.
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The Act simply provides that a person must not clear native vegetation except in
accordance with development consent.7 Thus the Act allows those who wish to use an
exemption to make a ‘self-assessment’ as to its scope, and to lawfully commence clearing
or logging under exemption without informing DLWC.8 The interpretation of
exemptions is effectively left to landholders. Many are likely to find this task difficult,
because of the complex nature of most exemptions, and their ambiguous drafting. Some
respond to this uncertainty by seeking the assistance of DLWC, with the definitional
uncertainty acting as an informal notification mechanism. If the landholder asks DLWC
whether a development application will be necessary, a site visit usually takes place, and
during that meeting DLWC will explain the factors to be applied in order to determine if
the PNF exemption is available. 9

Interpretation of the PNF exemption
Let us consider the task facing a landholder in determining the boundaries of the PNF
exemption. The exemption, headed Private Native Forestry, applies to:
The clearance of native vegetation in a native forest in the course of its being selectively logged on
a sustainable basis or managed for forestry purposes (timber production).10

There are two phrases open to diverse interpretations – “selectively logged on a
sustainable basis”, and “managed for forestry purposes”. For example, the meaning of
the term ‘sustainable’ is a matter of dispute amongst ecologists, foresters and others.
Further, it is not clear whether ‘sustainable basis’ refers to sustained timber yield or to
ecological sustainability.
In order to resolve difficulties surrounding the Act, DLWC has produced a range of
explanatory literature, and distributed it throughout rural areas. Some of this material
attempts to explain the activity-based exemptions, including the PNF exemption. In that
literature, DLWC encourages landholders to apply a self-assessment approach to the
application of the exemptions. A detailed publication entitled Definitions and Exemptions
was first published in April 1996 in order to clarify the scope of the SEPP 46
NVCA, s.21.
Environmental Defender’s Office (SA) (2000) Submission to the Review of the Regulations under the Native Vegetation Act
1991,
(Prepared by the Native Vegetation Regulations Working Group July 1999). Internet URL
<www.edo.org.au/edosa>. accessed4.1.01.
9 Interview, Mr. Rob Adam, DWLC, Sydney-South Coast office, 19.6.02, by telephone; DLWC (1999) Guidelines and
Application Form for the Assessment of Clearing Applications under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 ( booklet for
public distribution), DLWC, Parramatta, 22pp.
10 SEPP 46, Schedule 3, Clause (i).
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exemptions. Now into a second edition, the booklet expounds DLWC’s view of the
scope of the various exemptions carried over into the NVCA.11 It advises, “it is the
responsibility of the land owner to be familiar with the exemptions and to ensure that the
proposal to clear…is within the parameters of a particular exemption(s).”12 If a
landholder’s assessment of the scope of the PNF exemption is in fact incorrect he/she
could, theoretically, be liable to prosecution for clearing without consent.
In relation to the applicability of the PNF exemption, Definitions and Exemptions suggests:
To satisfy this exemption, there should be clear evidence of the implementation of the various
types of native forest land management practices that are consistent with selective logging on a
sustainable basis or evidence of an area of native forest being managed for forestry purposes.13

Other than suggesting the need for evidence of ongoing management, that statement
largely re-states the exemption. The booklet goes on to divide the exemption into two
sub-categories, named Option I and Option II. In order to claim Option I, “selective
logging on a sustainable basis”, DLWC suggests:
It would be reasonable to expect a private native forest owner to be able to furnish evidence of
the application and accomplishment of these sustainable land practices through some form of
forest management plan or the like.14

Definitions and Exemptions suggests that criteria for evaluating whether a forest is being
“selectively logged on a sustainable basis” include logging which maintains habitat value
and an uneven aged forest structure over time, which retains greater than 50 per cent of
trees greater than 40 centimetres diameter at breast height (‘dbh’) in each logging cycle,
and leaves the forest in a state from which it can recover to a similar structure before the
next cutting cycle.15
In order to claim Option II, “being managed for forestry purposes”, DLWC suggests:

DLWC (1996) Definitions and Exemptions: State Environmental Planning Policy No.46 – Protection and Management of Native
Vegetation, NSW Department of Land and Water Conservation in consultation with the NSW National Parks and
Wildlife Service, DLWC, Sydney, 24pp; DLWC (1997) SEPP 46 - Protection and Management of Native Vegetation:
Amendment No.2 : Definitions and Exemptions, DLWC, Sydney, 26pp, at p.12 .
12 DLWC (1997) above n 11 at 12. Similarly, a four page leaflet entitled Fact Sheet: Exclusions and Exemptions states:
“Landholders are advised to read and understand the meaning of the exemptions, and satisfy themselves that any
clearing they intend to carry out falls within the exemptions.” DLWC (1998) Native Vegetation Conservation Act: Fact
Sheet No.5 Exclusions and Exemptions, DLWC, Sydney, September, p.4. DLWC (1999) Staff Guidelines for the Assessment
of Clearing Applications under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997, Draft, Version 1.1, January 1999, Internal
DLWC document, unpublished, Parramatta, at p.8; The same suggestion is made in the booklet Guidelines for Clearing
Vegetation, that accompanies the clearing application form: DLWC (1999) above n 9 at 22.
13 DLWC (1997) above n 11 at 17.
14 DLWC (1997) above n 11 at 18.
15 DLWC (1997) above n 11 at 18.
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…there should be clear evidence of the continuous passage or progress through time of a
succession of stages of forest management practices; i.e. there would be evidence of some positive
action of control over the land use of the forest, or an accomplishment of reasonable forest
management practices including a record of the practices. The most appropriate evidence under
these circumstances would be a forest management plan, silvicultural and harvesting plans.16

On one interpretation, Option II was designed to provide an exemption for incidental
management practices as well as logging, in order to include thinning, roading, burning,
spraying, and fencing within this particular category of exempt clearing.
DLWC’s formal policy position regarding the PNF exemption, expressed in the
Definitions and Exemptions booklet, is that it applies only to “selective logging on a
sustainable basis”.17 In practice, a common departmental shorthand for the exemption
observed during interviews was “the sustainable private forestry exemption”.18
Departmental officers have stated during public forums on the Act and PNF, that the
exemption applies only to sustainable forestry, asserting that Option II, as well as Option
I, contains a sustainability requirement. However, this is not explicitly stated within the
text of the exemption, only in explanatory literature.19 In relation to Option II, “managed
for forestry purposes (timber production)”, the Definitions and Exemptions booklet states:
“‘managed for forestry purposes’ is taken to be managing native forest on a sustainable
basis whilst allowing timber production.”20 However it does not set out specific
indicators of sustainability in relation to this Option. The booklet asserts that in order to
be able to qualify for either limb of the exemption, private forest owners must prepare
forest management plans.21 The emphasis of the explanatory booklet, on proving and
recording evidence of ongoing management over time, implies that opportunistic logging
operations by visiting contractors that involve no ongoing intention of silvicultural
management or ongoing commercial relationship with the landholder concerned may not
claim the exemption.
A literal reading of the exemption text reveals that its latter limb, Option II (‘managed
for forestry purposes’), does not contain a sustainability requirement, despite the

DLWC (1997) above n 11 at 18.
DLWC (1997) above n 11 at 18.
18 Interview, Mr. Bob Attwood, DLWC, North Coast Region Office, Grafton, 29.11.00. (in person, notes on file).
19 Notes on a Speech given by Mr. Robert Adam, DLWC, Sydney-South Coast region, DLWC re proposed BOS Best Operating
Standards for Private Native Forestry (PNF) under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act on 21 February 2001, Candelo,
Southern NSW at ANU Forestry workshop, “The Evolving Legislative and Regulatory Environment for the
Management of Private Native Forests in NSW”.
20 DLWC, (1997) above n 11 at 19.
21 These include that logging only removes 50% of stems 40cm diameter at dbh, etc., DLWC (1997) above n 11 at 18.
16
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explanation to that effect in Definitions and Exemptions.22 This interpretation conceivably
allows virtually any form of logging or forestry under the exemption, including
clearfelling and cable logging, as long as there is some evidence of ongoing management
intent fitting the test of “managed for forestry purposes”. Opportunistic one-off logging
converting forest to other (non-forestry) land uses - such as agriculture, real-estate
subdivision, or plantation establishment - would not obtain the benefit of the exemption
as there is no suggestion of ongoing management.23
On another interpretation even these activities will not be regulated, according to internal
DLWC publications. The internal Review of Exemptions report opined that: “the wording
suggests that non-sustainable forestry is also permissible under this exemption ... Due to
the location of “or” in the exemption there is no other interpretation possible.” [i.e., “or
managed for forestry purposes”].24 The Compliance Branch was of the opinion that:
“This exemption in effect, allows any clearing of native forests without consent so long
as timber is being produced…”.25
Thomson (1999) some further observations regarding the application of the NVCA:
Anecdotal evidence from Department of Land and Water Conservation (DLWC)
officers suggests that the interpretation of this legislation is somewhat vague in practice.
[…] Given this background, it is not surprising that the procedures followed by land
owners and saw-millers/contractors in terms of logging existing timber range from the
well planned and documented to virtually ad hoc. There is considerable confusion at
present about what their responsibilities are. Discussion with local saw-millers indicated
that while some consulted extensively with DLWC and prepared harvesting plans for
their activities on private land, others have not, and have relied on years of logging
experience and common sense to ‘do the right thing’… In summary, the legislation and
on-ground logging practices surrounding private native timber harvest are something of
a ‘grey area’.26

The present exemption system is not precautionary in nature. Without a notification
mechanism, if clearing takes place on the basis of an erroneous interpretation of an
exemption, the error cannot be readily reversed.27 Although land-holders would be liable
to prosecution for unauthorised vegetation clearance, this is an ‘after the event’ response,
relying for its effectiveness on resolve to prosecute. Where landholders perceive a low

The booklet is unlikely to be binding as it will not fit the definition of extrinsic materials in s.34 Interpretation Act 1987
(NSW).
23 Interview, Mr. Terry Moody, Chair, Richmond RVC, 18.6.02, in person, DLWC, Bridge St., Sydney.
24 DLWC (2000) Review of the NVCA Exemptions, at 18.
25 DLWC (2000) above n 24 at 18.
26 Thompson, (1999) above n Error! Bookmark not defined. at 19-20.
27 Galpin, D. (1997) “Native Vegetation Conservation Bill, NSW”, 48 Impact 12-14 at 13.
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risk of detection and punishment, some will decide to make adventurous or excessive
exemption claims.
The unresolved difficulties of interpretation retained in the NVCA and its PNF
exemption are likely to encourage another group of landowners to ignore the Act and
carry on with ‘business as usual’ without contacting DLWC or applying for development
consent. Whether landowners will seek Departmental advice depends on a variety of
sociological and psychological factors such as personal values (e.g. the extent of their
acceptance of the regulation of activities on private land) and perceptions as to the level
of risk of prosecution (and the likely severity of penalty) associated with clearing without
notifying DLWC. For the Northern Region, the notion of an informal notification
mechanism is not convincing. Interviews with staff of that region suggested that only a
minority of PNF operators in that Region who log under the exemption contact DLWC
regarding their proposals.28 It is quite probable, indeed likely, that logging contractors, as
repeat players in the system, will advise the landholder that in their experience, all PNF
(except on protected lands) is exempt and thus no contact will be made with DLWC.
The breadth of the phrase within the exemption “or managed for forestry purposes”,
combined with the title “private native forestry” rather than “sustainable private native
forestry” also tend to suggest that all PNF is exempt. Findings in relation to the
popularity of the exemption are reviewed below.
The available evidence presented in this section suggests the PNF exemption is the
greatest single legislative impediment to the attainment of ESFM in the PNF industry in
NSW. Although the NVC Act, in its objects clause, refers to the principles of ESD, it is
self-evident that the precautionary principle cannot be implemented in a regulatory
environment dominated by self-regulation and self-assessment as to the application of
the law. The Department’s administrative approach taken during the study period was to
suggest a self-assessment methodology be applied by landholders in relation to the
application of the PNF exemption.

This administrative approach appears to be

incompatible with the application of the precautionary principle. Under a self-assessment
approach there is no regulatory supervision of exemption claims. There is substantial
evidence that it is difficult for landholders and even administrators to determine whether
the development consent requirements of the NVCA apply in given situations, or to
28

Interview, Mr. Bob Attwood, North Coast DLWC office, Grafton, 29.11.00.

particular activities. To rely upon landholders to seek legal advice regarding this question
– the interpretation of exemptions – is unrealistic and therefore is unlikely to be
sufficient to achieve a precautionary approach to vegetation management. It risks
vegetation clearance based on mistaken or erroneous interpretations of exemptions. To
be effective, self-assessment policies require the Department to communicate to the
regulated community an unequivocal willingness to commence enforcement action
where necessary. (see: Chapter Eight).29

RELIANCE ON THE PNF EXEMPTION
The extent of reliance on the PNF exemption
The number of forestry operations that used the PNF exemption during the study period
is unknown, because of the lack of a statutory notification requirement. Extensive
searches and inquiries failed to reveal any published or internal documentation on the
extent of exempt PNF logging.30 None of the exemption-based forms of clearing are
included in Departmental statistics showing total vegetation approved for clearing.31 As a
whole, it is unknown what area of native vegetation was cleared in reliance upon any of
the NVCA exemptions.32 Thus DLWC statistics showing total vegetation cleared with
consent under-report the true extent of vegetation clearing in NSW, as they show neither
legitimately exempt nor illegal clearing.33
Specifically in relation to the PNF exemption, interview research revealed that during the
study period in the North Coast and Hunter Regions, apart from operations on
‘protected’ land, there were no applications for development consent under the NVCA
by those involved in PNF in these Regions.34 This was because of widespread reliance
upon the PNF exemption. Another way of expressing this proposition is that in those
29
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“Prosecution of alleged offenders is considered the last option to be used by the Department. The Department’s
preferred approach is to focus on extension and education of the rural community…” Minister for Land and Water
Conservation (2000) Letter to Ecological Society of Australia, February 2000.
Part of this search involved the lodgment of an FOI request with DLWC which was refused, and later refused on
internal review.
This category of clearing is not included in regional or State-wide statistics showing the total amount of vegetation
cleared under the ambit of the NVCA in any given year. DLWC website. <www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au>. This means
that statistics released by the DLWC showing total vegetation cleared under consent under-report the true extent of
native vegetation clearing in NSW.
This could be established by comparing satellite data on clearing against the official figures of area cleared under
NVCA consents. This would provide a figure of clearing taking place (a) under exemptions and (b) illegally ,
without either consent or an applicable exemption.
Clearly, this could be established by comparing satellite data on clearing against the official figures of area cleared
under NVCA consents. This would provide a figure of clearing taking place (a) under exemptions and (b) illegally ,
without either consent or an applicable exemption.
Interview, Mr. B. Attwood, Vegetation Resource Manager, interview, in person, Grafton DLWC Office, 23.11.00.
Notes on file with author; Interview, Mr. S. Gowland, DLWC Hunter, 17.3.00.

situations where the PNF exemption was available for claim, it was claimed for 100 per
cent of PNF operations, (i.e., a 100 per cent claim rate).35 This suggests that it is highly
likely that intensive logging such as clearfelling took place under the PNF exemption in
these regions.
If we assume that only a relatively small amount of PNF occurs on protected land, the
implication is that most PNF logging in the North Coast and Hunter regions during the
study period was not regulated at all under the NVCA.
An indication of the extent of PNF logging occurring in the North Coast and Hunter
regions during the study period could be derived from the figures for development
applications for logging on protected lands. Even in spite of the considerable level of
resort to the PNF exemption, in the North Coast and Hunter regions, PNF was the most
important cause of native vegetation “clearing” of all forms of clearing activity in recent
years (1999-2001). In the year 2000, PNF was the most significant land-use intention
behind all forms of native-vegetation clearing applications received in the North Coast
(87.5%), Hunter, and Sydney-South Coast regions, especially when clearing for plantation
establishment is included.36
PNF attained this prominence even though PNF logging under exemption is not included
in these figures. An indication of the volume of PNF activity now occurring in Northern
NSW is that log production from private land was estimated by a senior DLWC regulator
from the North Coast regional office to make up to 50 per cent of total sawlog
production in that Region from all tenures.37 If PNF logging under exemption were to be
included in these figures showing the most common intended land use after clearing
activity, then it is clear that PNF would be, by a considerable margin, the most important
cause of native vegetation clearing in those Regions.38
One way to approach the question of the extent of exempt logging is to investigate the
frequency of granting of development consent for PNF in the North Coast DLWC
Note that the PNF exemption is not available on land classified as ‘protected land’, i.e. steep slope land, or land
within 20 metres of particular rivers, or land mapped as particularly ecologically sensitive.
36 See: Appendix 7.1.
37 Interview, Mr. B. Attwood, interview, in person, Grafton DLWC Office, 23.11.00.
38 See: Appendix 7.1. DLWC (2001) Proposed Land Use for the Area Approved for Clearing for All Regions for period 01 Jan 2000
to 31 Dec 2000. Posted onto DLWC internet site <www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au> during March 2001. Downloaded 1.4.01.
by the author.
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Region. Regional staff stated that there had been no applications to clear for forestry
purposes on land that was not designated as protected land. The explanation was that
most landholders already knew of the PNF exemption, or were advised of it by DLWC,
and thus relied upon it in order to avoid lodging an application for development
consent.39 Staff admitted that it is unknown how many times the PNF exemption had
been claimed, given the lack of a notification mechanism in the Act.40
An inspection of the DLWC North Coast Region’s register of applications under the
NVCA at the Grafton Regional Office revealed that between January 1998 and October
2000 there were 103 applications to log on State protected land (SPL).41 Repeated
inquiries received the response that the number of exempt operations in the same region
in the same period was “unknown”.42

DLWC documentation suggests that

“approximately 30% of the private forests and woodlands of the State” are mapped as
protected land.43 It is not possible to provide an accurate estimation or inded a precise
figure at this point of the number of PNF operations relying upon the exemption during
the study period in the region, because of the lack of a notification requirement and
associated record-keeping.
Why was the rate of reliance on the exemption so high in the North Coast and Hunter
Regions? There are two explanations. The first is that the high claim rate was the result
of DLWC not constraining use of the exemption (either due to administrative incapacity
or deliberate policy decision). The second explanation is that operating under an
exemption (as opposed to obtaining development consent) is in the economic interests
of the regulated industry, as it involves no delay or expense.
In other regions with a high level of PNF operations, such as river red gum logging
within the Murray Region, surprisingly, there were no consents granted under the
NVCA in 2000 and 2001, in spite of the fact that in at least some of that region riparian

Interview (in person) and inspection of records supervised by Mr. Bob Attwood, Vegetation Resource Manager,
Grafton Regional office of DLWC, 29.11.00.
40 Interview, Mr. Phil Redpath, Regional Ecologist, DLWC, North Coast office, 13.10.99.
41 Interview (in person) and inspection of records supervised by Mr. Bob Attwood, Vegetation Resource Manager,
Grafton Regional office of DLWC, 29.11.00.
42 Interview, Mr. Bob Attwood, Vegetation Resource Manager, Grafton Regional office of DLWC, 29.11.00.
43 DLWC (1995b). Questions And Responses On Native Vegetation Management And Protection Issues For Staff, Internal Memo,
11 August 1995.
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land is classified as ‘State protected land’.44 A VMO stated, “all [railway] sleeper-cutters
are operating under the private forestry exemption.” It was confirmed that no
applications for consent had been received from the industry in that region.45

Extent of unapproved PNF activity
No data was available regarding the extent of unauthorised (i.e., illegal) PNF activity
during the study period. A deductive approach would be necessary to estimate the extent
of such PNF activity, given three possible categories of PNF activity: (a) forestry under
NVCA consent, (b) exempt forestry and (c) unauthorised or illegal PNF.
Alternatively, the extent of unapproved clearing of all types (not just logging) could be
estimated by examining remote sensing (i.e. satellite) data showing the full extent of
clearing and deducting the area approved for clearing, and then making an estimated area
of land cleared under exemptions. The relative proportions of land cleared without
approval under exemption as opposed to cleared without approval unlawfully would
remain unknown.

Regional variations in implementation of the exemption
The interpretation of the scope of the PNF exemption appeared to differ in the SydneySouth Coast Region. This region applied a strict definition as in the booklet Definitions and
Exemptions, whilst the North Coast Region diverted from this policy position by allowing
more intensive forms of PNF to claim the exemption. The explanation for this
difference is that the volume of PNF activity occurring in the North Coast exceeds the
available administrative resources.46
Interviews with senior management of the Sydney-South Coast Region revealed the
reasons for this region’s different approach to the exemption. They claimed that DLWC
Table “Overview of consents under the NVC Act : Proposed Land Use: Logging/Forestry (Hectares), presented in
Wallace, L. (2002) “Sustainable Private Forestry Management”, Notes provided to accompany speech to Private
Forestry Reference Group, May 2002, Sydney. Derived from data posted on DLWC website at
<www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au>
45 Interview, Ms Deanne Stephens, Vegetation Management Officer, Murray Region, Albury Office, 15.9.03, by
telephone, notes with author. It was suggested that “not many operate on state protected land. Most choose not to
go there because then they’d have to go to the trouble of getting consent.” However given that a number of
participants in the industry applied for authorisation under the Soil Conservation Act 1938 in order to log on protected
lands prior to the commencement of the NVCA this raises the question of why no applications for consent under
the new regime have been received, or whether these operations are taking place without authorisation.
46 Interview, Robert Adam, DLWC, Goulburn, 14.4.00 (by telephone).
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uses the PNF exemption to extract higher standards of forestry practices from the
industry. Whilst this suggestion might at first appear counter-intuitive, it was argued that
this is possible because landholders wish to obtain the benefit of the exemption, (i.e. no
development application), and therefore are willing to negotiate with DLWC and make
concessions in relation to modification of logging practices in order to obtain the benefit
of the exemption. The South Coast Region office was said to be in a position to
negotiate upon such proposals, because the volume of PNF operations in the region is
much lower than in the North Coast Region. The officer suggested – on the basis of
conversations with senior officers of the North Coast Region - that North Coast allowed
a high claim rate on the exemption because of lack of administrative resources to cover
the far higher volume of PNF in that region.47
The use of bluff in negotiations with landholders appeared to be an important part of the
Sydney South Coast Region’s strategy – which was to assert that the scope of the
exemption is limited, and to state that consent is required for any form of forestry falling
outside the category of sustainable selective logging. However, if the Sydney-South Coast
Region’s interpretation of the exemption was subjected to legal challenge, it would
possibly fail.

Environmental implications
The PNF exemption has significant environmental implications. Without a consent
requirement there is no capacity to refuse or modify proposed logging. In short, there is
no oversight by DLWC. It appears that the impact of the exemption to date has been
significant. According to the comments of DLWC officers in an internal survey of
regional offices, the exemption “allows high conservation value forest on private land to
be logged without assessment” and it “may be used for clearfelling”.48 One office in the
Barwon Region reported, “landholders use this exemption to log vegetation of high
conservation value within corridor areas and riparian zones.”49 An internal Review of
Exemptions described the PNF exemption as the NVCA exemption with the greatest
environmental impact when measured by the estimated total area of land cleared. The
Interview, Mr. Robert Adam, DLWC, Goulburn, 15.6.02 (by telephone), reference is to Mr. Bob Attwood, North
Coast, Grafton office.
48 DLWC (2000) Summary of Comments on Desktop Audit of Exemptions (Stage 1 Review of Exemptions) Comments by DLWC
and RVC only, internal unpublished document, 115pp, at p.63.
49This will be possible because not all riparian areas are mapped as State Protected Land. DLWC (2000) Response by a
Barwon Region Office to an Internal survey distributed by Soil and Vegetation compliance Branch Regarding Problems with
Exemptions under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997, 11pp., unpublished, DWLC, on file with author.
47

area cleared under the PNF exemption was estimated to be four times larger than the
area cleared under the next most significant exemption.50
Yet the PNF exemption is merely part of a wider problem with the Act’s 34
exemptions.51 DLWC’s compliance staff argued, “the exemptions [collectively] appear to
be the most significant cause of inappropriate clearing”.52 The fact that forestry
operations in potentially high-conservation-value private forest can occur whilst
purporting to rely upon the PNF exemption is inappropriate and inconsistent with the
State Government's commitment to ESFM made in recent RFAs.53 Further, the
exemption of PNF from consent requirements is inconsistent with the promise of RFAs
to ensure that a Code of Practice would regulate private forestry.54

Summary of findings regarding PNF exemption
An unpublished internal review of the exemptions (2000) stated: “Regional staff from all
over the State have suggested that the PNF exemption is so broadly worded, and difficult
to enforce that it should be removed.”55 A substantial number of DLWC officers
involved in PNF regulation were interviewed and also referred to the ambiguity of the
exemption and the consequent implications in the field. It was variously described as
“very difficult”,56 “vague”, “unenforceable”, and even “a joke”.57
DLWC (2000) Review of the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 Exemptions (Internal Draft Report, unpublished), at p.12.
There are 34 exemptions under the NVCA that were carried over from existing legislation. When combined with
exclusions of the NVCA from particular land tenures such as state forests and national parks, and clearing authorised
under other legislation (e.g. Mining Act 1992), the total number of exempt situations climbs to sixty four. This figure
has some potential to mislead, as most exemptions will not be either (i) simultaneously available to a given fact
situation, or (ii) actually applicable to a given situation. Nevertheless, some exemptions (e.g. the SEPP 46
exemptions) can be claimed in combination. An internal report states “the SEPP 46 Minimal Tree Cutting and Rural
Structures exemptions are used to remove larger trees, for example, and the Regrowth exemption is used to remove
smaller vegetation”. DLWC (2000) above n 50 at 11.
52 DLWC (2000) above n 50 at 5.
53 NPWS (2000) Submission to the Review of Exemptions under the NVCA, NPWS, unpublished at p.6.
54 NE NSW RFA, clause 57.
55 DLWC (2000) above n 50 at 18. Although this report was initially leaked to the press, the NSW Parliament
ultimately forced its public release by passing a motion for release proposed by R. Jones MLC: Minutes of Legislative
Council, 7.3.01. The motion also forced the release of four other documents previously suppressed by DLWC: Smith,
A. (1999) Guidelines for Application of Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 Exemption to Sustainable Forestry on Private
Lands in NSW, a report to the DLWC by Setscan Pty Ltd, Armidale; DLWC (2000) A Scientific Basis for the Native
Vegetation Conservation Act 1998: Objects and Exemptions, Soil and Vegetation Access Branch, November, Internal
unpublished report; Bates, G. Franklin, N. (1999) Compliance with the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW):
Consultancy Report - Operational Phase, prepared for Department of Land and Water Conservation NSW; DLWC (2000
) Spatial Database for Monitoring of Native Vegetation Activities in NSW: a report and GIS map showing approved clearing
applications from the inception of the Native Vegetation Conservation Act in January 1998, Author: Emery, K; DLWC,
Parramatta.
56 Interview, Mr. Bob Attwood, North Coast DLWC office, Grafton, 29.11.00.
57 Interview, Anonymous DLWC officer, Head Office, in person, 6.10.00; Interview, North Coast DLWC officer,
31.3.99.
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Were difficulties with the exemptions foreseen? The exemptions were intended to reduce
the obligations of landholders to apply for consent for relatively small areas of clearing
for routine land management such as fencing and rural structures. They were also
intended to reduce the overall workload placed on DLWC that would have applied if all
clearing required consent.58 It is also plain that exemptions were devised to reduce the
economic impacts on industry, thus reducing the backlash against the policy.59
The ill-considered drafting of some of the exemptions probably arose because SEPP 46
was finalised in haste, after the Press prematurely obtained details of its imminent
gazettal.60 In the author’s opinion, it is probable that the first limb of the PNF exemption
(with its emphasis on sustainable selective logging) was drafted by the Department, but
the broader second limb (“managed for forestry purposes”) was added at the last minute
following lobbying from rural and timber interests. The impact of the exemptions has
lasted longer than was originally planned, as the exemptions were only ever intended as a
transitional provision, having effect until the gazettal of RVMPs.61 However, with the
Plans experiencing considerable delays in production, the exemptions acquired greater
longevity.
It is important to separate a critique of the legislation from critique of its administration.
It is not reasonable to criticise DLWC for problems arising from statutory defects. It is
important to emphasise the failure to date of the Parliament to clarify and amend the
exemptions. Yet DLWC may be taken to task for failures to stop clearing that did not fit
within the exemption. Another shortcoming is that DLWC has not established a Statewide system of auditing claims for exemptions from the Act. As a senior staff member in
the Hunter Region stated: “We don’t do a check on claims for exemptions.”62

DLWC (2001) Minister for Land and Water Conservation’s Review of Aspects of the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997
Community Reference Panel Report on Term of Reference 1: Review of Exemptions, p.4.
59 An interesting question for further research is to determine which parties actually put forward the proposition for
exemptions, as SEPP 46 itself was designed as a regulation to be introduced by surprise in order to prevent a round
of panic clearing that would have preceded the passage of an Act through Parliament. It is possible that the Sydney
Morning Herald, in publishing an article foreshadowing the imminent release of the SEPP, on the basis of a leaked
document, pressured the Department into gazetting the Policy earlier than it had planned.
60 The final text of the exemptions was drafted in what appears to have been a 2-3 day period, after the leaking of the
news regarding the proposed gazettal of SEPP 46 and the consequent necessity to gazette the SEPP before either
panic clearing set in or a political campaign against the instrument gathered momentum. Interview, Mr. R. Adam,
DLWC, Sydney-South Coast, 18.6.2002, by telephone.
61 This is evident from the Second Reading speech and the fact that the exemptions are contained in a Schedule headed
“Savings and Transitional Provisions”. DLWC (2000) Review of the NVCA Exemptions at p.5.
62 Interview, Mr. S. Gowland, DLWC Hunter, 17.3.00.
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It may be imagined that difficulties with the PNF exemption will fade with the making of
RVMPs. However the problems described above are likely to be perpetuated if similar
versions of the PNF exemption are included within RVMPs that fail to take account of
the hard lessons of administration during 1998 - 2002.

PATTERNS OF CONSENT DECISION-MAKING BY DLWC
This section presents and analyses findings about patterns of development consent
decision-making regarding PNF proposals. The emphasis is on the administrative
behaviour of DLWC regions in the Eastern Division, particularly the North Coast and
Hunter Regions. The emphasis of consent decision-making in those regions related to
applications for consent for logging on protected land (where the PNF exemption was
not available.)

Findings
This section examines data concerning patterns of decision-making by DLWC in relation
to applications for consent for PNF between January 1998 and December 2002. Where
relevant this data is supplemented with data regarding decision-making about all forms of
vegetation clearing under the NVCA.
A key source was the public register of consents to clear native vegetation granted under
the Act.63 However, the register provides insufficient detail, as it does not indicate the
purpose for which consents to clear have been granted. A second vital source of
additional data was publicly released by DLWC in 2001 following pressure from the
Native Vegetation Advisory Council (NVAC) and conservationists. This information
shows, among other things, the intended post-clearing land-use on a region-by-region
basis (“Native Vegetation Clearing Reports: Proposed land use - Area approved for
clearing”).64

NVCA s.15(3)(a) requires the D-G to keep a public register of applications for development consent to clear native
vegetation.
64
This
data
is
now
released
on
the
DLWC
internet
web-site
at
<http://www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au/care/veg/clearing.html.> It also shows the proportions of total clearing in each
region according to the various classes of vegetation cleared. These charts showed dominant species of vegetation.
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Relative importance of PNF as a form of vegetation clearing
According to these Native Vegetation Clearing Reports, logging was the most significant
form of clearing approved under the Act (compared to clearing for other land uses such
as cropping or grazing) in the North Coast and Hunter regions during 2000-2002, and in
Sydney-South Coast in 2002 (on an area basis). For example, in the North Coast region,
PNF accounted for 81.2 per cent of the area for which approval to clear was granted
during 2002.
Further, if taken together, applications for approval for logging and plantation
establishment65 dominated the approval statistics during 2000-2002 in North Coast,
Hunter and Sydney-South Coast regions. Applications for these land uses in the year
2000 amounted to 80.56 per cent of total area for which approval was granted in the
Hunter Region, 87.5 per cent of the total area approved in the North Coast Region,
85.19 per cent of the total area approved in the Sydney-South Coast Region.66 These
statistics do not show the actual number of applications that related to clearing in the
course of PNF as opposed to clearing for agricultural purposes. They show the area
affected by clearing for various intended land uses. (Table 4)

Relative regional importance of PNF
The most significant regions for PNF activity in NSW between 1998 and 2002, in terms
of consents granted (by area), were North Coast, followed by Hunter, then Murray, and
Sydney-South

Coast

regions.

(See

Map

in

Appendix

6.1)

According to data from DLWC (DIPNR) there were no consents granted for plantation establishment in any region
in 2002 or 2003, presumably due to the commencement of the approvals regime and Code under the Plantations and
Reafforestation Act 1999. The Native Vegetation Clearing Reports for 2000 and 2001 indicate approvals were being granted
for clearing for commencement of plantation activity. The reports are published on the Internet at
<http://www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au/care/veg/clearing.html>. The NVCA provides (s.12(l)) that clearing that consists
of plantation operations on an authorised plantation in accordance with the conditions of an authorisation under the
PRA is exempt from the consent requirements of the NVCA.
66 PNF represented 53.7%, 55.4%, and 81.22% of area for which consent was granted in the North Coast region
during the years 2000, 2001, 2002 respectively. DLWC, (2001, 2002,2003) Proposed Land Use For The Area Approved
For Clearing for 2000, 2001, 2002 (data published on DLWC internet site <www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au>. Consent
decision-making statistics downloaded from DLWC website URL <www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au>, now at
<www.dipnr.nsw.gov.au>. These statistics are presented in a summarised form in Appendix 7.1.
<http://www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au/care/veg/clearing.html>.
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Table 1 Area for which consent granted for PNF by DLWC region (hectares) 67
DLWC
Region
North Coast

1998
Area
(ha)
286

1999
Area
(ha)
2080

2000
Area
(ha)
7196

% of
total,
2000
53.77

2001
Area
(ha)
5259

% of
total,
2001
55.36

2002
Area
(ha)
2481

% of
total,
2002
81.22

Hunter

1597

2623

3158

57.15

4220

40.63

2557

52.77

SydneySouth Coast
Central West

0

55

105

7.81

806

44.31

182

49.78%

47

0

27

0.3

131

2.45

219

2.17

Murrumbidg
ee
Barwon

0

5

33

0.77

72

1.65

41

0.71

327

530

19

0.27

0

0.0

0

0.0

Far West

0

0

0

0.0

0

0.0

633

3.85

Murray

1311

67

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

Total

3568

5360

10,538

13.54

10,488

11.39

6113

10.49%

%

%

Another interesting finding highlighted above is that Murray Region had no applications
for PNF in 2000-2002, despite the existence of an active river redgum-logging industry
on private land,68 and despite approvals for PNF in 1998. In other words, this data prima
facie suggests that all such logging took place under the PNF exemption during 20002002. Further, the Table lends some weight to the proposition that the use of the PNF
exemption increased in some regions, particularly the North Coast, Murray and
Barwon.69

Consent decision-making patterns specific to PNF
When asked in face-to-face interviews, departmental officers at both the State-wide and
Regional level stated that dis-aggregated statistics (i.e. showing consent decision-making
regarding vegetation-clearing applications on an industry-by-industry basis) were simply
not available. However these statistics were eventually obtained from the Hunter and
DLWC (2003) Native Vegetation Clearing Reports, at <http://www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au/care/veg/clearing.html>, also
DLWC (2003) Proposed Land Use - Area Approved for Clearing: Proposed Land Use for All Regions for period 01 Jan 2002 to 31
Dec 2002, <http://www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au/care/veg/pdfs/clearing_landuse_dec02.pdf>; see also: Wallace, Leanne
(2002) DLWC presentation to Private Forestry Reference Group, DLWC, Sydney, 24 April 2002.
68 Interview and presentations made by Mr Ken O’Brien, Riverina Forestry Management Group to PNF Reference
Group, DLWC Head Office, May-June 2002; See also Wilson, N. (1995) The Flooded Gum Trees: Land Use and
Management of River Red Gums in NSW, Nature Conservation Council of NSW, Sydney.
69 However there are other possible explanations, including a decrease in the overall extent and intensity of PNF
activity.
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Sydney-South Coast regions and were derived for the North Coast by cross-checking
other sources including the public register.

Decision-making in North Coast Region
No applications for PNF (or indeed any other form of clearing) were refused during
January 1997 - August 1999 in the North Coast and Hunter regions.70 This pattern of
decision-making continued during January - December 2000 in the case of the North
Coast Region, with no refusals for any purpose, according to a close examination of the
NVCA consent decisions register for 2000.71

Decision-making in Hunter Region
In the Hunter Region, interview research and subsequent correspondence revealed the
following information. Of 27 applications under the NVCA for PNF operations
(between January 1998 and February 2000), all were granted consent with conditions. All
these applications were for protected land.72 In relation to all forms of vegetation
clearance proposals in the Hunter region, there were two refusals of consent during
2000.73

Decision-making in Southern Region
In the Sydney-South Coast Region, between January 1998 and April 2002, there were
only three applications for PNF - with one granted, and two pending (for selective
logging on part-protected, part-unprotected land). The region made use of exclusion
zones to protect threatened species, covering 13 per cent of area applied for. Earlier,
under SEPP 46 (between August 1995 and December 1997), three applications for
clearfelling (integrated harvesting including woodchipping) were refused. 74

DLWC (2000 ) Spatial Database for Monitoring of Native Vegetation Activities in NSW: a report and GIS map showing approved
clearing applications from the inception of the Native Vegetation Conservation Act in January 1998, Author: Emery, K; DLWC
Parramatta, at p.3.
71 DLWC (2001) Public Register of Clearing Applications under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997: Records of all
applications received for the period January to December 2000. The register shows that there were 0 refusals in the North
Coast region and 2 refusals of consent in the Hunter region during that period.
72 Interview, Mr. S. Gowland, DLWC Hunter region, 23.3.00. Notes on file with author.
73 Department of Land & Water Conservation (2001) Public Register of Clearing Applications under the Native Vegetation
Conservation Act 1997: Records of all applications received for the period January to December 2000.
74 Interview, Robert Adam, DLWC, 14.4.00; Letter from DLWC to author, 13.4.00.
70

Research revealed that clearing for plantation establishment was the largest category of
all clearing applications in 1998-2001, but in 2002, PNF was the most prominent
category of all clearing applications.

Treatment of all types of clearing applications by DLWC
The pattern of granting consent in the North Coast and Hunter regions is consistent
with broader patterns of administration under the Act to grant consent to most
applications under the Act.
Up to October 2000, the great majority of all applications to clear vegetation under the
NVC Act received approval. Of a total of 1525 applications, 91.6 per cent of those
conclusively determined were granted consent with conditions (at October 2000). Only
2.16 per cent were refused, 1.57 per cent were rejected prior to formal assessment, and
4.65 per cent were withdrawn by the applicant. A breakdown of approval decisionmaking relating specifically to PNF across the state is not publicly available.
Table 2 Cumulative decision-making under
the Native Vegetation Conservation Act,
State-wide, from Jan 98 to Oct 2000 (all land
uses) 75
Decision made
Rejected

Number
involved
24

of

decisions Percentage
of
decisions made
1.57

Refused

33

2.2

Consent with conditions

1397

91.6

Withdrawn

71

4.6

Total

1525

100%

total

The Table shows that the dominant pattern of administration of the Act has been to
grant development consent with conditions, rather than to refuse proposals. By
comparison, the approval rates under SEPP 46 were lower, at 61 per cent of resolved
applications in its first year (’95-96), and 78 per cent in its subsequent year of operation

75

Clearing application decisions 1 January 1998 – 11 October 2000. From data provided by DLWC to author from
statutory register of consent decisions.

(’96-97).76 The rate of refusal in other jurisdictions such as South Australia has historically
been much higher - as high as 97 per cent at times (under the earlier Vegetation
Management Act 1985 (SA), for those applications to clear relatively intact native
vegetation with an understorey).77 More recent evidence shows that the refusal rate in SA
is now lower, in 1998-1999 being only 30.45 per cent for broad-acre clearing, and 68.55
per cent for isolated tree clearing.78
How are statistics that largely relate to land-clearing relevant to PNF? It is not possible to
extrapolate from the DLWC’s approach to administration of the NVCA in general to its
administration in relation to PNF. There is some possibility that its approach to PNF
could be atypical. However it is possible to discern some overall patterns in the approach
to the granting of development consents to clear native vegetation for all purposes. Few
applications were refused or rejected, comprising only 4 per cent of the total applications
during the period 1998-2000. We can assume that it is most likely that PNF proposals
followed the general trend of the vast majority of applications receiving consent. The
limited data above at p.18 supports this conclusion. Thus the treatment of PNF
proposals under the Act depended in practice on the imposition of conditions on
consents.79

Cautions in interpretation of consent statistics
Interpretation of consent statistics must proceed cautiously. Firstly, the statistics tend to
under-report the extent of refusal of vegetation-clearing proposals as they do not reflect
the significant number of landholders who were interested in clearing vegetation, but
who were dissuaded from making clearing applications for various reasons.80 These may
DLWC (1997) Annual Report 1996-7, p.31. One possible reason for the increase in the rate of consent under SEPP 46
and the NVCA was the fact that SEPP 46 was amended twice, to reduce the stringency of environmental
assessment required – with the list of environmental matters requiring mandatory consideration in assessment being
considerably shortened. See also Hannam, I. (1995) Land clearance and State Environmental Planning Policy Number 46
Protection and management of Native Vegetation, paper presented to Planning Law and Practice Short Course University
of NSW, 23pp.
77 State of the Environment Advisory Council (eds.) Australia: State of the Environment Report, 1996, an independent
report to the Commonwealth Minister for the Environment, CSIRO Publishing, Melbourne, at 6-39. This Act was
superseded by the Vegetation Act 1991, and under that Act, according to the SOE Report “the few applications for
broadacre clearance have been refused.”
78 Native Vegetation Council (SA) (1999) Annual Report 1998-1999, Native Vegetation Council (SA), Adelaide, p.8. In
the previous year (1997-1998) the extent of refusals was much lower still, with only 6.63% of broadacre scrub
clearing refused, and 44.54% of isolated tree clearing refused: Native Vegetation Council (SA) (1998) Annual Report
1997-1998, Native Vegetation Council (SA), Adelaide, p.8. Note that these figures are calculated on a different basis
in SA, and relate to the percentage of hectares permitted to be cleared v hectares for which clearing was refused.
79 Review of these decisions would require an examination of particular application files, a task which lies outside the
scope of this research project.
80 Interview, Mr. Bob Attwood, DLWC North Coast Region, 13.10.99.
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have included concerns about the application process, or because of a hard line taken by
departmental officers, with certain landholders told informally that their clearing
applications had little chance of success if not modified substantially - due to the
conservation of significant vegetation.
Secondly, the statistics gloss over the possibility that the total area eventually sought for
clearing may be less than the area that landholders originally sought to clear.81 This is due
to the influence of pre-application site visits on the decision-making of landholders
intending to clear vegetation. Thirdly, the area approved for clearing may be considerably
less than the area that landholders applied to clear.82 Fourthly, another possibility difficult to credit yet often stressed by DLWC in public relations - is that clearing may
not proceed, despite successful applications for consent.

Achievements of the NVCA
In many instances the NVCA and its predecessor SEPP 46 prevented the clearing of
important habitats. For example, according to Dr. Hannam: “In some cases the SEPP
has been able to prevent the clearing of …‘old growth’ E.fastigata - E.viminalis forest for
woodchip. In others, it has prevented the destruction of important habitat (e.g. Koala
and Brush-tailed Phascogale). Further cases involve important remnants adjacent to
nominated wilderness areas.”83 Daishowa in a number of instances applied for approval
to clear under SEPP 46 in order to conduct forestry operations on private land in
Southern NSW and in at least three instances consent was refused.84

Conditions on consents
DLWC has attempted to improve the standard and sustainability of PNF logging
operations that require consent in a number of ways, principally by imposing conditions
on consent. Once an application to clear is foreshadowed to DLWC by a landholder, it is
standard practice to require a site visit and pre-application interview. The site visit and
associated site assessment enables appropriate conditions to be selected.
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The latter

involves an officer surveying the land to be logged, determining what species are present,
Interview, Mr. Phil Redpath, DLWC North Coast Region, 13.10.99.
Interview, Mr. Phil Redpath, DLWC North Coast Region, 13.10.99.
83 Hannam, I. (1995) above n 76 at 22.
84 NPWS letter to DLWC, 21 March 1996, Re: Clearing of Native Vegetation under SEPP 46, Harris Daishowa
application for the Rockton property. (Southern Zone).
85 DLWC (1999) above n 9.
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82

the size of particular trees, and areas to be protected. There are two main categories of
conditions – those for mitigating impacts on threatened species, and those for mitigating
soil erosion and water quality impacts.86
Applications to clear are assessed by DLWC with the aid of computerised ‘objective
decision support systems’ to assist and enable statutory decision-making.87 These decision
support systems operate in combination with threatened species location databases
enabling DLWC to more readily justify its decision-making in relation to threatened
species.88 These reduce the prospect of the exercise of excessive discretion by individual
officers, and help to systematise the agency’s approach.
Departmental documents indicate that all clearing approvals are granted conditionally.
These conditions generally require the retention and replanting of trees within the
approved area to ensure, among other things, preservation of habitat, and protection
against land degradation.89 Data regarding the specifics of imposition of conditions on
PNF approvals was not available. DLWC officers stated that some PNF applications
were subjected to site-specific conditions for threatened species conservation.
An important aspect of setting conditions for consent to PNF involved applying the
Interim Best Operating Standards for PNF (‘BOS’) published in 2001, (to be replaced by the
Forestry Operating Standard).90 These standards have the stated aim of ensuring the
sustainability of PNF operations, and providing consistency in conditions attached to
development consents for PNF. According to DLWC, landholders are “encouraged” to
use the Interim BOS, but it seems are not required to do so.91 The BOS are designed to
streamline the approval process, as applications conforming to the BOS “generally
should not require the imposition of additional conditions of consent” except in special
Logspert is a decision support system, developed by DLWC to facilitate selection of appropriate conditions.
Ross, J., Hannam, I., (1997) “Multiple Objective Decision Support Systems Used in the Management of Temperate
Forest Ecosystems in South East Australia”, in S.A. El-Swaify and D.S Yakowitz (eds.), Multiple Objective Decision
Support Systems for Land, Water and Environmental Management, St.Lucie Press, Delray Beach, Florida (in press).
88 The approach of DLWC to applying threatened species legislation is addressed in Chapter Nine.
89 DLWC (1999) Staff Guidelines for the Assessment of Clearing Applications under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997, at
55. DLWC media release “North Coast Database Clarifies Native Vegetation Clearing Applications”, 7 March 2001,
DLWC Grafton Office, which states “Approvals are always conditional”. This position is substantially paraphrased
in Minister for Land and Water Conservation (1999) Media release, 17 December, “Native Vegetation Clearing
Applications Increase” at p.1.
90 DLWC (2001) Interim Best Operating Standards for Harvesting of Private Native Forests, June, 42pp, DLWC, Sydney. The
proposed Forestry Operating Standards (FOS) will operate in conjunction with the Exemption Operating Protocol
(EOP). See <www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au> accessed 23.4.03. DLWC (2002) Private Native Forestry: Forest Operating Standard,
August, DLWC, Sydney, 19pp.
91 DLWC (2003) Private Native Forest Harvesting, <www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au>, accessed, 23.4.03.
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circumstances.92 The standards address threatened species planning, heritage planning,
identification of exclusion zones (e.g. steep areas, wetlands, heath), silvicultural standards,
drainage feature protection, habitat management outside exclusion areas, roading, log
dumps and snig tracks. However the BOS have been criticised on the grounds of
providing inadequate protection for old-growth forest, rainforest and threatened species
habitat.93
In applying conditions to approvals to clear native vegetation, DLWC must be mindful
of the recent decision of the Land and Environment Court in Carr v Minister for Land and
Water Conservation which emphasised implied restrictions on the extent to which a
consent authority can impose conditions which significantly alter the development for
which consent is being sought.94 In this Class 1 merits appeal, Pearlman CJ overturned a
DLWC consent on the grounds that specific conditions imposed on that consent to
mitigate environmental impacts excessively modified the original application, and thus
had no valid basis in law. The consent was invalid because: “[t]he development which
was the subject of the development consent is significantly different from the
development which was the subject of the development application.”95
It remains open to a consent authority to impose conditions so that it “modifies details of
the development”, but it does not authorise a modification of the substantial nature of a
development. Yet as Pearlman CJ observed, such questions are a matter of fact and
degree in each case.96 The message is that DLWC must be ‘reasonable’ in its imposition
of conditions, so as not to impose too many conditions on an application, or conditions
that substantially alter the nature of an application. As a result, DLWC’s strategy is likely
to shift to pre-application negotiations so that the application submitted is closer to that
which will be approved (e.g. the area applied for and the area eventually granted).97

DLWC (2001) Interim Best Operating Standards for Private Native Forestry, p.5.
North East Forest Alliance (2001) “Shoddy Logging Standards Condemned”, Media Release, 4.1.01, at
www.nccnsw.org.au; Rainforest Information Centre (2001) Comments on proposed logging standards, World
Rainforest Report, January, at <www.rainforestinfo.org.au/wrr2001/wrr_jan>.
94 Carr v Minister for Land and Water Conservation (unreported, Land and Environment Court, NSW, Pearlman CJ, 22 May
2000, (No. 10675 of 1999) at paragraph 56 applying Mison & Ors v Randwick City Council (1991) 23 NSWLR 734 at
737.
95 Applying Mison & Ors v Randwick City Council (1991) 23 NSWLR 734 at 737.
96 Carr v Minister for Land and Water Conservation (unreported, Land and Environment Court, NSW, Pearlman CJ, 22 May
2000, (No. 10675 of 1999) at paragraph 56.
97 DLWC (2000) Implications for Undertaking Clearing Assessments as a Result of the Findings of the 'Carr' Case, Briefing Paper
provided to the NVAC, Tabled 24.11.00, DLWC, Sydney. Yet if DLWC goes too far in terms of making guarantees
to applicants regarding the prospects of success of modified applications, they will be in danger of unlawfully
fettering their decision-making discretion.
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LAW REFORM SUGGESTIONS FOR THE NVCA
Sometimes industry representatives run an argument that PNF should be removed from
coverage of the NVCA because of the dissimilarity of forestry and broad-acre land
clearing. This argument draws attention away from the need to provide some sort of
environmental impact assessment of forestry. Some PNF industry participants view any
level of regulation as an impediment and a disincentive to economic activity.98 The
development-consent process is too often incorrectly conflated with an outright
prohibition. Such positions are often backed up by misleading references to the sanctity
of private property ownership that ignore numerous other laws that control activities on
private land. Without coverage of PNF by the NVCA, oversight would be left to the
vagaries of local government regulation. The majority of NSW local governments appear
to be are reluctant to regulate PNF (see Chapter Eight).

Improving the PNF exemption
Some steps have been taken by DLWC to address problems with the PNF exemption.
First, DLWC conducted an internal review of exemptions by seeking the opinions of
regional office staff.99 Secondly, public education efforts have been conducted to control
the PNF exemption by clarifying it in a leaflet and a detailed booklet, Definitions and
Exemptions. The Sydney-South Coast Region in particular has attempted to limit
exemption claims by reference to this booklet.100
Thirdly, in order to reform all the exemptions under the NVCA, including the PNF
exemption, the NSW Premier announced a review in July 2000. A Community Reference
Panel (CRP) and an Independent Scientific Group (ISG) carried out the review.101 In
October 2001, the CRP reported and delivered an additional report on the PNF
exemption. It concluded: “[t]he PNF exemption as it exists is an inappropriate
mechanism for managing and controlling this industry sector.”102 Similarly, the report of
the Independent Scientific Group (ISG) found “there is no scientific justification for this
See Submissions to Private Native Forestry Reference Group, chaired by DLWC, Sydney, May-June 2002.
DLWC (NSW) (2000a) A Scientific Basis for the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1998: Objects and Exemptions, Soil and
Vegetation Access Branch, November, Internal unpublished report, 51pp; DLWC (NSW) (2000b) Review of the Native
Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 Exemptions, Soil and Vegetation Access Branch, Internal unpublished document,
DLWC, Sydney 56pp, incl. Appendices. DLWC (2000) above n 48.
100 Notes on a Speech given by Mr. Robert Adam, (2001) above n 19.
101 DLWC (2001) Community Reference Panel Report, above n 58; DLWC (2001) Independent Scientific Group (ISG) Minister’s
Review of Exemptions: Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997: Final Report, 36pp.
102 DLWC (2001) Minister for Land and Water Conservation’s Review of Aspects of the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997
Community Reference Panel Additional Report on Private Native Forestry (Term of Reference 1: Review of Exemptions), October,
DLWC, Sydney, at p.5.
98
99

exemption. It …may result in significant impacts on biodiversity and ecosystem function
values.”103
Reform of the PNF exemption with a view to achieving the ESFM objective will involve
either its complete deletion, or a substantial limitation of its scope. These choices are
now discussed in turn.104

Deletion of the exemption
One of the key reforms necessary to create a legal framework that encourages and
requires ESFM is the deletion of the PNF exemption in its present form. Industry has
argued that the removal of a broad-based PNF exemption would have adverse economic
consequences. They have lobbied for its retention.105 These arguments are based on a
predictable commercial self-interest.
The CRP cited a lack of specialised expertise to address the technical issues involved, and
the PNF exemption was referred to a third body, the Private Forestry Reference Group.
This group was constituted on a model of stakeholder representation rather than
disinterested policy experts, and was heavily weighted towards industry interests.106
DLWC and the Minister accepted all of the recommendations of this industry-dominated
PNF Reference Group107 particularly its proposed retention of a broad-based exemption
for PNF, subject to minor limits on logging intensity and affected environments.108 The
new rules will continue to exempt the majority of PNF from consent requirements.109
The exemption will not be available in very narrowly-defined “scheduled areas” of
environmental significance.110

DLWC and Independent Scientific Group (2001) above n 101 at 16.
Either option could be achieved by regulation, without the need for an amending Act: NVCA, s.67(3).
105 Forest Products Association NSW (2002) Exemption Process for Sustainable Forestry: FPA Framework, FPA, Sydney,
20.5.02, 8pp at p.1; Bruskin, S. (2002) Submission to the Private Native Forestry Reference Group, Institute of Foresters
Australia, Northern NSW Branch, 24.5.02, 5pp at 1.
106 Minister for Land and Water Conservation, John Aquilina, (2002) “New Reference Group to Review Private
Forestry Exemptions in Veg Act”, Media Release, 28 March 2002, 2pp.
107 DLWC website, <http://www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au/care/veg/ privateforests/exemptions/index.html>, visited 11.2.03.
108 DLWC (2002) Private Native Forestry Exemption Operating Protocol, August, 18pp, DLWC, Sydney.
109 The exemption will apply where specified conditions are met, including a requirement that the average basal area of
the forested area will not be reduced below 12m2/ha. However the scope of environmental impact associated with
the proposed exemption is unlikely to be minor. For example, the NPWS observed that “as some forests may have
basal areas of 40 m2/ha or more, the potential reduction to 12 m2/ha cannot be considered minimal.” NPWS
(2002) Dissenting Statement in Draft Exemption Operating Protocol, above n 108 at 24, 28.
110 These include narrowly defined versions of rainforest vegetation, riparian areas, ‘protected land’, as well as under
represented vegetation communities, and HCV old-growth.
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There is little point in requiring detailed assessment of small-scale activities with minor
impacts. Yet there will be difficulties in attaining ESFM if a broad-based PNF exemption
is retained. These difficulties will involve (i) problems of interpretation by landholders
(e.g. their capacity to identify areas where the exemption is not available, such as underrepresented vegetation communities), (ii) problems of enforcement, and (iii) problems of
administration. A senior DLWC regional officer interviewed rejected the idea that a
broad exemption should be retained because of limited administrative resources. He
stated that in his experience, “if there was no PNF exemption, it would be easier and
simpler to administer the Act.”111 Without an exemption, DLWC field officers would not
face complex problems of interpretation of its scope. Allegations of illegal logging could
be resolved simply by considering if a landholder had development consent and had
complied with the conditions of that consent.

Retaining a limited exemption
As we have seen, industry supports a broad-based exemption. A compromise is a limited
form of exemption. But what form of exemption can be compatible with ESFM? As
long as the exemption is without an ecological sustainability threshold, it will be
inconsistent with the Act’s exhortation that its objects are to be carried out “in
accordance with” the principles of ESD.112
To meet the definition in the EPAA of exempt development, any retained exemption
must apply only to small-scale operations with minimal impact.113 The Independent
Scientific Group doubted if this was possible, stating: “this activity [PNF] is beyond the
scope of a simple exemption to allow small scale, minimal impact routine activities.”114
This test of minimal impact is derived from the EPAA. Any retained exemption must be
consistent with the objects of the Act, and with the provisions of Part 4 EPAA through
which the NVCA operates. The EPAA permits exemptions in RVMPs to be
exemptions of only minimal impact. This is because RVMPs are environmental planning
Interview, Mr. Bob Attwood, North Coast DLWC office, Grafton, 29.11.00.
NVCA, s.3. A plausible argument can be made that the present exemption is inconsistent with object 3(c) “to
protect native vegetation of high conservation value", and object 3(f): “to prevent the inappropriate clearing of
vegetation.” See further, DLWC (2000c) Review of the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 Exemptions (Internal Draft
Report) at p.49.
113 DWLC (2000) Advice to Regional Vegetation Committees: Number Four: Draft Protocol for Drafting and
Reviewing Exemptions, 23 October, 2pp, plus Addendum, June 2001, 3pp.
114 DLWC and Independent Scientific Group (2001) above n 101 at 16.
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instruments, and the Act provides in s.76(2) that “An environmental planning instrument
may provide that development of a specified class or description that is of minimal
environmental impact is exempt development.” The Macquarie Dictionary defines
‘minimal’ as “pertaining to, or being a minimum. Least possible. Smallest. Very small.
Negligible.”115 Examples of exempt development having only minimal impact provided
by Planning NSW are “small fences, barbecues and pergolas”.116 It is doubtful whether
PNF fits into such a category.
Only a strictly limited form of exemption is likely to be compatible with NSW’s
commitment to ESFM made in the RFAs.117 These arguments are presented in internal118
and external119 DLWC reports. In 2000, DLWC advised RVMCs that exemptions should
be available only in circumstances of “minimal environmental impact”.120
One way of ensuring an exemption would apply only to minimal-impact and small-scale
activities is to apply a narrow-volume and area-based cut-off. For example, Tasmanian
Regulations provide that an approved forest practices plan is not required where
operations are low-volume timber-harvesting operations, covering less than one hectare
p.a. or less than approximately five truckloads.121
An effort to identify a framework for defining sustainable selective PNF logging in NSW
was carried out by a consultant to DLWC (Dr Andrew Smith), with the aim of clarifying
the scope of the PNF exemption.122 Smith’s lengthy report examined the present PNF
exemption and concluded that even the “sustainable forestry” leg of the PNF exemption
“lacks detail and does not consider the full range of forest values identified in the
Montreal process.”123
The Smith report proposed that a new regime for oversight of PNF forestry involve a
requirement that any timber harvesting take place in accordance with an approved
Macquarie Dictionary (2001) Federation Edition, p.1216. Minimum is defined as “the least quantity or amount
possible, assignable, allowable, etc.”
116 Planning NSW (2003) “Development assessment categories”,
<http://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/planningsystem/asstcategories.html>, internet accessed 11.2.03.
117 NE RFA, cl. 57.
118 DLWC (2000c) above n 112 at 63-64.
119 DWLC (2000d) Advice to Regional Vegetation Committees: Number Four: Draft Protocol for Drafting and Reviewing Exemptions,
23 October, 2pp, plus Addendum, June 2001, 3pp.
120 DWLC (2000d) above n 119 at 1.
121 r.3, 5 Forest Practices Regulations 1997.
122 Smith, A. (1999) above n55.
123 Smith, A. (1999) above n55 at 13.
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harvesting plan valid for a five-year period. Such a plan could only be prepared by
licensed forest-planning consultants, and would include prescriptions for environmental
protection and maintenance of all forest values. Such plans would be part of a longerterm PNF Management Plan (PNFMP) requiring DLWC approval. Approval of further
harvesting plans in the future would be subject to satisfactory completion of post-harvest
monitoring of conditions laid out in the first harvesting plan.
However, the report was never acted upon. One DLWC officer interviewed suggested
that this was because it suggested logging protocols which represented a political and
economic threat to public land forestry, as higher standards for PNF might result in
pressure for higher standards for public forestry. It was further alleged that the shelving
of the report followed lobbying of the Minister and Director-General by the Forest
Products Association.124

Using exemptions to extract improved performance
Exemption provisions can be applied appropriately if they do not result in a diminution
of environmental protection standards. Steinzor has argued that exemptions in
environmental law are usually appropriate only in terms of reducing procedural
requirements rather than substantial environmental protection obligations. The PNF
exemption under the NVCA however removes substantive requirements and therefore
fails this test. Instead a ‘quid pro quo’ approach to granting exemptions has been
suggested, requiring proof of superior, or equivalent environmental protection outcomes
under the exemption. This solution is “…to ask them [firms] to demonstrate that a
significant portion of the costs saved through exemptions will be used to make the
achievement of superior performance possible.”125
In this vein it may be possible to make exemptions available in return for agreement to
enter into property agreements under Part 5 NVCA. This approach is consistent with
achieving a greater environment protection outcome than would have otherwise taken
place.
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Interview, Anonymous DLWC officer, Head Office, in person, 6.10.00.
Steinzor, R. (1998) “Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to SelfControl” 22 Harvard Environmental Law Review 103-202 at 194.

Notification mechanism
The NVCA enables those who wish to claim an exemption to make a ‘self-assessment’
as to its scope.126 It appears DLWC is infrequently informed by landholders about
proposed exemption-based logging.127 The solution is a ‘notification mechanism’ - a
requirement that logging proponents seeking to rely on the exemption notify DLWC 30
days prior to commencing logging. A notification mechanism should also be included in
future RVMPs, where the same problems of (incorrect) subjective interpretations of
exemptions are likely to arise.128
There is a body of internal departmental opinion suggesting that there are frequently
poor standards of logging operations in the PNF industry in NSW (see Chapter Four).
One DLWC officer described “the generally low level of forest management skills and
opportunistic approach to timber harvesting common in the industry”.129 Provided such
opinions are accepted as valid, such a situation poses risks that a revised PNF exemption
allegedly confined to sustainable forestry, yet based on self-assessment mechanisms (i.e.
without a notification mechanism) will be unworkable and ineffective.
Any workable system will require some form of formal oversight such as review of
timber harvesting plans or certification. Even if an exemption were to be retained, an
associated notification requirement would facilitate checks on the appropriateness of
exemption claims, enabling DLWC to advise landholders of the applicability or otherwise
of the PNF exemption, giving it time to take action if it disagreed with a proposal to
clear.130 At present, many landholders have significant financial incentives to select a
liberal interpretation of the PNF exemption.
A notification mechanism would also provide information-gathering benefits. It would
enable DLWC to compile information about clearing under exemptions in a systematic
way, and to calculate total 'clearing' under the PNF exemption.131 This would facilitate

Environmental Defender’s Office (SA) (2000) above n 8.
Interview, Mr. Bob Attwood, DLWC, North Coast Region Office, Grafton, 29.11.00. (in person, notes on file).
128 EDO (1997) A Proposed Model for Native Vegetation Conservation in NSW, September, section 2.9; This was suggested
by environmental groups during debate on the NVC Bill, who suggested that landholders seeking to clear or log
under an exemption in RVMPs be required to notify the Department. Hansard, 5.12.97, p.99.
129 DLWC (2000) above n 48, Comments of DLWC officer No.12 , pp.63-64.
130 Environment Defender's Office (1997) above n 128 at section 2.9.
131 This category of clearing is not included in regional or State-wide statistics showing the total amount of vegetation
cleared under the ambit of the NVCA in any given year.
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production of more accurate data about overall clearing rates, in turn permitting better
monitoring and management of native vegetation in NSW.132
A notification mechanism would not correct all problems associated with the PNF
exemption, for several reasons. Firstly, it is not equivalent to development consent.
Notification does not offer an opportunity for a regulator to refuse permission, nor to
impose conditions. Secondly, it relies upon the honesty of landholders. It will not expose
deliberate illegal clearing outside the scope of the exemption. Thirdly, a danger of broadbased exemptions is that they will always be subject to creative interpretation.133 A
revised exemption for ‘sustainable private forestry’ only would solve a minority of
problems associated with the present clause, as “sustainable” is an inherently ambiguous
concept.
To best facilitate enforcement of the notification approach it would be necessary to
require persons relying upon the PNF exemption to obtain an exemption certificate from
DLWC. These would be granted only if proposed clearing genuinely fell within the scope
of the exemption. This approach retains the power to require development consent if an
exemption claim is not appropriate. This certificate model is applied in NSW pollution
control and pesticides regulation.134
Critics may argue that this represents a de facto development consent process.135
However it differs in that it remains optional for DLWC to investigate a notified PNF
proposal, whereas the consent approach requires a detailed examination of proposals.
Further, the notification process would be simpler than the consent process, as appeal
mechanisms would not be available.136

EDO (1997) above n 128 at section 2.9.
A perfect example is the so-called “2 hectare exemption”. DLWC’s document on the review of exemptions stated:
“The Department is of the view that the exemption allows the clearing of one two-hectare area of land, whereas
some landholders have measured tree canopies or trunk areas and have then cleared the number of trees whose
canopy or trunk would fit into two hectares.” See also: Woodford, J. (2001) “Plundered Forests at Mercy of
Farmers”, Sydney Morning Herald, 23/1/01, p.3.
134 Pesticides Act 1999 (NSW), s.115, especially s.115(2)(b). Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW), s.284.
Under the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW), and the Pesticides Act 1999, persons seeking an
exemption must apply to the EPA. It is for the EPA to decide if exemptions are available, not the owner of the
land. The EPA must be satisfied that non-compliance with the standard provision will not have any significant
adverse effect on the environment. Exemptions are time limited, may be subject to conditions and must be
approved by EPA Board.
135 This was the position adopted by the NSW Farmers Federation during the negotiations preceding the enactment of
the NVCA.
136 Environmental Defender’s Office (SA) (2000) above n 8.
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Codes of Practice
Another option for a retained-but-improved exemption under the NVCA is to replace it
with a Code of Practice (COP), made by regulation. There is no requirement for
development consent for operations in compliance with a Code in certain situations.137
Under a statutory COP made under the NVCA, consent is not required for clearing
where there is no RVMP in place.138 Where an RVMP is in force, consent requirements
will depend on the plan, but PNF may be exempt if a COP is fully adopted by a plan.139
COPs under the NVCA do not apply to protected land. This means many PNF
operations cannot be regulated with a COP. On this basis, DLWC announced in 2000
that it would not develop a Code for PNF.140
DLWC’s official rationale for the COP mechanism is to assist “where an industry
specific approach to clearing is needed.”141 A COP for PNF made under the NVCA
would be insufficient for the achievement of ESFM. The statutory provisions for COPs
involve no additional environmental protection requirements to the development
consent rules. This form of Code of Practice would amount to a highly-detailed
exemption, admittedly clarifying what at present is extremely vague and uncertain. The
consent process offers a better route for the application of a Code (or Best Operating
Standards).
The RFAs for NSW stipulate a requirement that a Code of Forest Practice is put in place
for PNF within five years. The objective was to achieve some level of equivalence
between PNF and public forestry requirements. However a COP made under the
NVCA would not amount to such a Code, because it would not ordinarily impose a
consent requirement.142 The meaning of Code applied in the RFAs is a document setting
out in prescriptive terms appropriate forestry practice, involving consent requirements. A

NVCA, s.21(2)(b); 25(2)(c).
NVCA, s.21(2)(b).
139 RVMPs may adopt or incorporate provisions of a COP as part of the Plan : NVCA, s. 25(2)(c). However, an
RVMP cannot amend the provisions of a Code, either adding environmental protection requirements or removing
them: NVCA, s.38(4).
140 Ms Leanne Wallace, DLWC, Executive Director, Regional and Commercial Services, Letter to National Parks
Association NSW and Nature Conservation Council NSW, regarding PNF, 16.10.00, 1pp.
141 Department of Land and Water Conservation (NSW) (1997) A Proposed Model for Native Vegetation Conservation in New
South Wales : A White Paper, DLWC, July, 26pp, at p.19.
142 For example, as is required in the UNE NSW RFA, clause 57.
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Forest Practices Code, such as applies in Tasmania, requires PNF operators to prepare
and gain approval for, a forest practices plan.

Summary regarding the PNF exemption
The present PNF exemption is inconsistent with notions of ESFM. Continued
availability of a broad-based exemption on a self-assessment basis is inherently
problematic. In order to evaluate the sustainability of proposed forestry operations it is
essential to have an approval process of some sort. It is not reliable to delegate
determination of sustainability to industry.
The most desirable option for reform includes the following components:
(1) deletion of the exemption, or limiting the scope of the exemption by regulation, so
that it applies only to forestry involving lower environmental risks such as selective
logging, or forestry that is independently certified as ecologically sustainable;
(2) a requirement that all applications for consent for PNF be accompanied by timber
harvesting plans (THPs) or forest practices plans (FPPs) prepared by independent
FPOs;
(3) a requirement that such FPOs be appropriately qualified, licensed and independent;
(4) a requirement that all PNF timber be branded or marked as coming from private
property; and
(5) a requirement that timber contractors and processors must also be part of the
compliance chain, as in Tasmania (see Chapter Eleven).

Insertion of an onus-of-proof within development assessment process
In order to achieve a standard of ESFM in the PNF industry in NSW, it will be necessary
for those applications subject to a consent requirement (i.e. those that could not meet the
criteria of a tighter PNF exemption) to be subject to an ‘onus of proof’ test. This would
involve a statutory presumption against vegetation clearing in high-risk circumstances,
enabling a precautionary approach to regulating PNF. 143
The counter-argument is that there is a difference between outright vegetation clearance
and forestry, as there is no intention in forestry to create a permanent removal of native
143

Native Vegetation Act 1991 (SA), ss.26-29, Schedule 1 (Principles of Clearance of Native Vegetation).

vegetation. Yet some forestry can alter forest ecosystems substantially. Legislators are not
absolved from the need to ensure that the NVCA restricts biodiversity loss by placing
adequate controls on the PNF industry.
At present, the NVCA fails to take a precautionary approach to environmental risk, by
not defining “inappropriate vegetation clearance”.144 The solution is to insert ‘Principles
of Native Vegetation Conservation’ against which consent decisions must be made.145
The first version of SEPP 46 contained a test that development consent could not be
granted if the consent authority was “satisfied” that a particular area under application
“does have” or “does contain” particular ecological values.146

Summary of Essential Content requirements
In summary, the most advantageous options for reform include:
•

deletion of the NVCA’s PNF exemption, or limiting its scope to extremely small
scale and low volume forestry involving lower environmental risks;

It is imperative to provide a definition of “inappropriate clearing”, i.e. filling out the objects of the Act in s.3(f). For
example an amendment could be made that “inappropriate clearing is clearing which offends the Principles of native
vegetation conservation set out in Schedule X.” This would amount to a statutory presumption against vegetation clearing
in high risk circumstances (eg. acid sulphate soil or salinity risk area, or where clearing would affect an endangered or
vulnerable regional ecosystem).
145 Nowhere does the NVC Act specify that the clearing of particular classes of native vegetation of high conservation
and biodiversity value is prohibited. Nor are there any circumstances specified in which there is an outright
prohibition on native vegetation clearing. There ought to be some such circumstances, at a minimum for the
protection of endangered ecological communities. Such an approach would be supported by the fact that NSW is
obliged under the NHT Partnership Agreement with the Commonwealth to establish mechanisms to ensure
compliance with the goal of “no clearing of endangered ecological communities”. Natural Heritage Trust Partnership
Agreement between Commonwealth and NSW, Attachment A: Bushcare: the National Vegetation Initiative Clause 5.1(c),
Performance Indicators: Environment, at p.3-4. The NVCA could place a ban on the clearing of endangered
ecological communities as defined and listed under the TSCA in much the same way as Queensland legislation, the
Vegetation Management Act 1999 (and Regulations). That Act provides some protection for “endangered regional
ecosystems”, (and previously also applied to “of concern regional ecosystems”). Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld)
(assent 21 December 1999, commencement by proclamation 15 September 2000); Vegetation Management Amendment
Act 2000 (Qld) (assent 13.9.00), Vegetation Management Regulations 2000 (Qld). Vegetation Management Act 1999, s.5.
Another provision, relating to ‘of concern regional ecosystems’ was removed at the last minute from the legislation.
It previously read: “of concern regional ecosystem” means a regional ecosystem that is prescribed under a regulation
and has either—(a) 10% to 30% of its pre-clearing extent remaining; or (b) more than 30% of its pre-clearing extent
remaining and the remnant vegetation remaining is less than 10 000 ha. (s.5)
146 Hannam, I. (1995) above n 76 at 8. This approach of defining the circumstances in which clearing would be
inappropriate, is contained in the SA Native Vegetation Act 1991, ss.26-29, Schedule 1.(Principles of Clearance of
Native Vegetation). The Native Vegetation Council is required to have regard to the statutory principles and “must
not make a decision that is seriously at variance with those principles.” The SA Act provides eleven statutory
“Principles of Clearance of Native Vegetation” contained in Schedule 1. These commence by stating “Native
vegetation should not be cleared if, in the opinion of the Council…” any one of the eleven factors is present, for
example “(a) it comprises a high level of diversity of plant species”. Native Vegetation Act 1991 (SA), s. 29(1). This
general rule is subject to an exception which relates to the clearance of isolated plants where a satisfactory proposal
for their replacement is made: Native Vegetation Act 1991 (SA), s.29(4).
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•

in the event that a revised PNF exemption (reduced in scope) is retained, to
insert a notification mechanism requiring those seeking to rely on a curtailed
PNF exemption to notify regulators;

•

a requirement that all applications for consent for PNF be accompanied by
timber harvesting plans or forest practices plans prepared by independent FPOs;

•

a requirement that such FPOs be appropriately qualified, licensed and
independent;

•

an ESFM Code addressing threatened species questions, and requiring surveys
by qualified flora and fauna experts;

•

adopting a precautionary approach of requiring non-exempt forestry that exceeds
a specified risk threshold to meet an onus of sustainability during the
development consent decision-making process (implementing the risk-based
tiering of assessment principle); and

•

a requirement that timber contractors and processors must be part of the
compliance chain.

CONCLUSION
The main findings presented in this Chapter were that, during the study period:
•

All PNF logging outside protected land (ie. 100% of operations on that land
classification) in the North Coast and Hunter regions claimed the PNF
exemption, regardless of the type of logging. Therefore it was not regulated by
the NVCA. In the North Coast and Hunter regions, DLWC appears to have
failed to adequately clarify the PNF exemption, due to its policy of allowing selfassessment as to the scope and application of exemptions, and its general failure
to audit reliance on the exemption.

•

Compliance officers and regional offices have asked for the PNF exemption to
be abolished, due to compliance difficulties and the environmental impact of
exemption-reliant forestry.

•

A combination of PNF logging and private plantation establishment formed the
majority of clearing applications made in the North Coast, Sydney-South Coast
and Hunter regions.

•

All the development applications for PNF in North Coast and Hunter Regions
involved logging on State protected lands.

•

There were no instances of refusal of applications for consent for PNF in the
North Coast or Hunter regions.

•

The strategy for managing the impact of PNF operations granted consent is to
impose conditions on consent. This means that the landholder’s proposal may be
significantly modified and subjected to constraints. However with this strategy
comes a high risk of non-compliance, given the lack of a process to audit
compliance with conditions.

Explanations for the high rate of reliance on the exemption in the North Coast and
Hunter Regions involve a certain amount of educated guesswork due to the lack of
available data or studies by the Department. Nevertheless there are two logical
explanations. Firstly, the high claim rate was due to DLWC failing to restrict resort to the
exemption. Secondly, it is self-evident that industry participants would be keen to obtain
the benefit of exemption for their operations because of the lower economic and
administrative cost of not having to obtain development consent.
Such findings have necessary implications for attainment of the goal of ESFM. There is
some evidence that that there was a significant regulatory failure, particularly in regulating
the environmental impacts of PNF in NSW during the study period. This had two main
causes–shortcomings in the legislation, principally the PNF exemption, and to lesser
extent shortcomings of administration. The latter cannot realistically be addressed by law
reformers, who must concentrate on amendments to the law that will guide and direct
future administrative behaviour.
With regard to the institutional framework, there is a risk that consent authority
arrangements are insufficiently independent to rule out the scope for political
interference and Ministerial direction in the consent decision-making process. The South
Australian model of an independent Native Vegetation Council as decision-maker is a
relevant alternative.
The Act does not adequately provide for ESFM primarily because of the defective PNF
exemption clause. Adherence to ESD principles including the precautionary principle
could be achieved with reform of the PNF exemption, and with a clearer definition of
“inappropriate clearing of vegetation”.

Further, the Act does not amount to best-practice legislation for ESFM as it contains no
percentage targets for protection of particular under-represented vegetation types. Nor
does it provide generic principles to guide the Minister and DLWC in deciding whether
or not clearing should be approved, other than its broad and somewhat conflicting
objects. The failure to set targets means that the NVCA fails to attain a preventative
approach to biodiversity conservation. In order for a genuine framework for ESFM to be
created, it will be necessary to address these defective aspects.
The present emphasis of the NVCA is on management of native vegetation clearing, not
the prevention of clearing. The Act takes a procedural rather than substantive approach to
native vegetation management and habitat protection. Whilst forestry on private land is a
legitimate land use (when compared to outright clearing for other purposes), it remains
the case that without sufficient guiding principles in the legislation indicating what
amounts to “inappropriate vegetation clearance” there is a danger that the consent
mechanism may come to represent little more than a bureaucratic hurdle before clearing
can commence - even in circumstances where a precautionary approach would suggest
that it be restricted or even prohibited.147
The future of the NVCA will lie in the detail of RVMPs. That subject was not amenable
to examination, as most RVMPs had not been completed during the study period.148
Most draft plans have adopted a zoning approach based on ecological mapping and
ecological sensitivity. With clearing and logging rules tailored to the issues raised by
mapped vegetation communities, a more specific and precautionary approach will be
possible. However with such complexity has come a bureaucratic desire to delegate some
of the decision-making, particularly in relation to the application of exemptions and the
consent threshold.149 Therefore some plans incorporate a range of self-assessment
mechanisms, for example in relation to vegetation communities.150 Other questions of

Much has been written about the “culture of consent” in local government and in this context there is clearly a
danger of repetition of the problems, because decision making under the NVCA is effectively under Part 4 of the
EPAA. (These matters are discussed in Chapter Nine).
148 The detail of RVMPs was not selected as the focus of study in this thesis, for several reasons. Primarily most of the
plans were not complete during the period of research and writing and therefore it would have been difficult to
discuss such a ‘moving target’. Further it would be difficult to generalise about the approach taken by the range of
plans, as each plan is likely to adopt a slightly different approach and different zonings.
149 That is, the threshold past which consent will be required.
150 The Mid Lachlan plan is the most commonly cited example. According to DLWC this could involve selfassessment (where the area to be affected is less than 400 hectares) or a formal development consent process (over
147

self-assessment and self-regulation are raised by the PNF exemption and the future
direction of its reform.
In relation to the NVCA, Bates and Franklin warned that:
Regional planning is a slow and resource intensive process, carrying with it dangers of
parochialism, lack of competence, under-resourcing and inconsistencies between regions.151

Questions of self-assessment and self-regulation need to be separated from the question
of the most appropriate role for economic instruments such as conservation incentives
and forest-stewardship payments.
It is necessary to design a native vegetation and forestry strategy that contains a range of
instruments including regulation, extension services, conservation agreements, and
incentives that target particular aspects of the spectrum of the regulated community.
Some people within the regulated community will be more responsive to certain policy
instruments than others.
In response to critics who state that the Act is excessively ‘regulatory’ and fails to offer
enough incentives for landholders, it needs to be said that the NVCA already contains
provision for a Native Vegetation Management Fund with monies to be primarily
allocated to encourage entry into statutory conservation agreements under the Act.152
This is supplemented in its operation by the Revolving Fund established under the
Nature Conservation Trust Act 2001.153
Sole reliance upon incentives, education and encouragement, in a rejection of regulation
and the consent pathway as ‘excessively coercive’ would be unlikely to produce adequate
results in terms of native vegetation conservation.

154

Questions of enforcement and

compliance with the NVCA in relation to PNF are further explored in Chapter Eight.
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151 Bates, G. Franklin, N. (1999) above n55 at 120.
152 NVCA, Part 7, Division 3.
153 Nature Conservation Trust Act 2001 (NSW), ss.10, 11.
154 Bates, G. Franklin, N. (1999) above n 55.
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Chapter Eight

ENFORCEMENT OF THE NATIVE VEGETATION

CONSERVATION ACT 1997
INTRODUCTION
This Chapter presents research findings regarding compliance with the NVCA by the
PNF industry during the study period. The focus is on patterns of enforcement of the
legislation by DLWC in relation to the PNF industry. This information is supplemented
by data relating to other clearing activity regulated by the Act. Such an examination is
necessary in order to compare the Act on paper with the Act in practice. The findings
contribute to our understanding of whether PNF in NSW was ‘under-regulated’ during
the study period.
The main finding is that during the study period, in the regions examined, DLWC
appeared to avoid punitive approaches to enforcement of the Act both in general but
also in relation to PNF in the North Coast and Hunter regions. A major source of
compliance difficulties was found to be the imprecise drafting of the PNF exemption.

COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
One must distinguish between the terms compliance and enforcement, as these terms
have implications for the strategy adopted by the regulator. Compliance involves full
implementation of the requirements of legislation by landholders and industry.
Enforcement comprises the range of actions taken by government and/or others to
achieve compliance by the regulated community.1
Compliance-focussed regulatory strategies are forward-looking or pro-active in that they
emphasise the end result sought, as opposed to strategies that emphasise punishment
after the event. They apply the tools of landholder extension and education in relation to
regulatory responsibilities, the provision of information and assistance regarding
legislation, and involve activities directed at the promotion of compliance such as site
visits and informal negotiation. A particular aspect of a compliance-based strategy is a
1

International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (INECE) (1992) Principles of Environmental
Enforcement, Chapter One, author US EPA, published INECE, at <www.inece.org/enforcementprinciples.htm>.

conscious decision to offer, then communicate and deliver positive incentives for
compliance.
Compliance with the NVCA has been encouraged by means of site visits and other
extension activity, publicity in the rural press regarding the introduction of the Act,2
regional workshops conducted by the DLWC, as well as the residual deterrent effect
exerted by prosecutions under the previous SEPP 46 regime, and the deterrent effect
generated by enforcement action under the NVCA.
Enforcement refers to those activities of a regulator directed at ensuring the achievement
of compliance, and the correction and punishment of non-compliance. The aim of
enforcement is to generate compliance, principally through deterrence which may be
generated by inspections and surveillance, negotiation, warnings, and legal action including stop-work orders, remediation notices, civil enforcement and criminal
prosecutions.
The principle of deterrence relies upon an assumption, based on the observations of
many regulators, that in any given situation involving the application of regulatory laws,
there will be several categories of regulatee: those who will voluntarily comply, those who
will not comply, and those who comply only when they perceive that it is likely that
significant enforcement activity will be directed at them if they do not. The objective of
specific deterrence enforcement activity is to deter persons who have been found to be
in breach. The objective of general deterrence is to deter other persons from noncompliance by communicating a message that they will also be subjected to serious
consequences if they are detected in non-compliance.
It is often argued that deterrence-based enforcement has negative impacts upon the
motivation of private landholders to carry out ongoing management of land for
conservation objectives as well as production objectives.3 It is also said that it is
counterproductive in terms of improving compliance, as it may generate ‘regulatory
resistance’ and a culture of defiance amongst the regulated community.
On the other hand some journals such as the Land (in particular) have run a relentless campaign against the NVC Act,
and some of the articles and editorial comment appear calculated to discourage compliance with the Act.
3 Principally in order to address problems with feral animals and weeds. See Farrier, D. (1995) “Policy Instruments for
Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land”, in Bradstock et.al. (eds.) Conserving Biodiversity: Threats and Solutions, Surrey
Beatty & Sons, Sydney, at 337-359.
2

In response to such points Bates and Franklin have argued: “While there is a large
element of truth in the observation that positive action is best secured in a climate of
support, encouragement and incentives, it is too simplistic…Neither gentle persuasion,
nor tough sanctions, nor incentives, on their own has proved comparatively more
effective than another, or effective in absolute terms.”4
In the PNF context there are many different people with various motivations making up
the regulated community. It is difficult to generalise about what will influence
“landholders” as a group, as each will respond differently to the prospects of either
positive or negative incentives. Deterrence-based enforcement remains necessary as
breaches will inevitably occur and must be responded to in order to maintain the
credibility of the regulatory system. Some landholders will only respond to the ‘big stick’,
the coercive threat of criminal prosecution. Other landholders will even resist the ‘big
stick’, defending prosecutions vigorously (e.g. as in the Greentree matters),5 or will resist
administrative enforcement (eg. by appealing remediation orders.6
There are other reasons why deterrence-based enforcement remains necessary. Even
with large maximum penalties set out in the statute (such as $1.1 million in the NVCA),
without active enforcement as an accompaniment, high penalties on paper will have little
influence on the regulated community. Prosecution is also necessary on the grounds of
equity, because if breaches are not punished then those who have voluntarily complied
may lose respect for the law’s failure to punish the non-compliance of others. Further, it
is necessary in the PNF context to counteract the pull of the profit motive and the
influence of private property rights ideologies. In the private land context, a significant
Bates, G. Franklin, N. (1999) Compliance with the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW): Consultancy Report Operational Phase, prepared for Department of Land and Water Conservation NSW at 94.
5 D-G DLWC v Greentree & Prime Grain Pty Ltd [1998] NSWLEC 30 (4 March 1998), Talbot J, unreported Nos. 500357 of 1997; Director-General Land and Water Conservation v Greentree & Prime Grain Pty Ltd, proceedings commenced in
Land and Environment Court, 23 March 2001 for clearing 2000 hectares of native vegetation between March 1999
and May 2000. Media Release, 23.3.01. Note that an earlier prosecution of Mr Greentree was discontinued following
negotiations between the defence and prosecution. See also: D-G DLWC v Greentree & Anor [2002] NSWLEC 102,
Nos. 50039-40 of 2001 and 50053-54 of 2001; Greentree v D-G DLWC [2002] NSWLEC 53; No. 10169 of 2002;
Greentree v D-G DLWC [2002] NSWLEC 93 revised- 26/07/2002, No.40039 of 2002, 0040 of 2002.
6 Slack-Smith & Anor v D-G DLWC [2003] NSWLEC 189, No. 40856 of 2002, (22 August 2003), Talbot J (judicial
review proceedings); Buttsworth v D-G DLWC [2003] NSWLEC 169, No. 10552 of 2002 (9 July 2003), Talbot J
(class one proceedings; part-heard). Note that in the case of the Greentree matters, the defendant was particularly
well financially resourced. According to the transcript of an ABC radio programme, in 2000 “It's estimated that last
year, Ron Greentree harvested the biggest private wheat crop in the world. Mr. Greentree is also Chairman of the
biggest grain handling company in New South Wales, Graincorp.” ABC Radio National (2000) “Trees, Water,
People and the Way We Farm”, Background Briefing, Program #10/2000, April 9, 2000, Produced by Stephen
Skinner, Internet URL <http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/bbing/specials/landclr/default.htm>.
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number of landholders may not comply if enforcement activity is not visible and
vigorous7 because of their objections to being regulated by government. These
individuals often perceive regulation of activities on freehold land as inappropriate and
illegitimate.8 Particularly in this context and because of the prevalence of these attitudes,
where government seeks to impose environmental protection requirements onto the
management of private property, compliance is unlikely to be perceived as a priority
without an active enforcement effort. Otherwise rules will be regarded merely as
voluntary or optional suggestions. This point has been made before. In 1955, Marver
Bernstein stressed the importance of enforcement to the success of a regulatory program,
arguing:
The attitude of [a government agency] toward its enforcement responsibilities affects its entire
regulatory program. Unless it demonstrates a capacity to enforce its regulations, they will be more
honoured in the breach than in the observance. Those who discover that violations go undetected
and unpunished will have little respect for the [regulatory scheme] and will violate regulations with
impunity if it is to their financial or commercial advantage.9

If there is some enforcement activity, there is a higher probability that the ecological
objectives of legislation will be achieved.10 A strong approach to enforcement in the
context of regulating PNF is likely to:
•

encourage approaches to DLWC to discuss forestry proposals;

•

encourage more development applications and fewer exemption claims;

•

encourage a higher rate of compliance with conditions of consent;

•

reduce the number of ‘creative’ claims on exemptions; and

•

improve forestry standards on private land.

Deterrence-based enforcement activity can provide important outcomes. Firstly, it
communicates ‘specific deterrence’, i.e. convincing an offender not to repeat or continue

A Canadian court judgement regarding occupational safety standards states: “if the regulations were not enforced by
the use of sanctions, they would come to be perceived not as regulatory requirements but merely as statements of
aspiration.” Re Industrial Hygiene Decision No.167 (1975), 2 W.C.R. 234 at 252 cited in D Saxe, (1990)
Environmental Offences: Corporate Responsibility and Executive Liability, Canada Law Book Co., Aurora, Ontario at 26.
8 Priestley, S. (2000) “Compliance with the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 in the Central West Region, Dubbo,
NSW, A Regional Officers Perspective”, presentation notes, unpublished, November.
9 Bernstein, M. (1955) Regulating Business by Independent Commission, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 306pp. at
224. Another commentator put it as follows: “All the laws on earth do not amount to much if they are not enforced,
or if the enforcement lacks teeth.” Flatt, V., (1995) “A Dirty River Runs Through It (The Failure of Enforcement in
the Clean Water Act)”, 25 British Columbia Environmental Affairs Law Review 1 at 5.
10 In asking about the sufficiency of enforcement, one must not forget that even if there was full compliance, this will
not necessarily result in the achievement of ESFM objectives if the legislation itself does not require performance to
this standard..
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their offending behaviour. In Piva v Brinkworth, a prosecution under the Native Vegetation
Act 1991 (SA), Duggan J of the Supreme Court of South Australia observed:
In order for legislation such as that under discussion to succeed, there must be effective means of
enforcement... Often the clearing of land in circumstances such as this will result in a lasting
commercial gain to the landholder. Mitigating factors can be allowed for, but the emphasis on
general and individual deterrence remains a vital consideration.11

Secondly, enforcement activity communicates and promotes ‘general deterrence,’
warning other regulated parties not to offend. Hopefully it will be of sufficient magnitude
to suggest that it will not be profitable to breach the regulations.12 The importance of
general deterrence has been emphasised in a number of court decisions regarding
vegetation-clearing offences,13 and in particular in appeal decisions which increased the
quantum of penalties, in order to exert a greater general deterrence effect.14
Enforcement involves both primary and secondary deterrence purposes - educating both
the offender and the community about the law, “so that the law will come to be known
and obeyed”.15

Piva v Brinkworth (1992-93) 59 SASR 92 at 96, per Duggan J.
Gunningham, N. (1989) “Asbestos Mining at Baryulgil: A Case of Corporate Neglect ?”, in P. Grabosky and A.
Sutton (eds.) Stains on a White Collar: Fourteen Studies in Corporate Crime or Corporate Harm, Hutchinson Australia,
Milsons Pt at 208-236 at 228.
13 Byron Shire Council v Vos [1998] NSW LEC 322, No. 50128 of 1998, Sheahan J., 5 November 1998, Ballina Shire
Council v Davfast Pty Ltd (1998) 251 NSW LEC, 9 October 1998, Ryde City Council v Calleija (1998) 99 LGERA 360,
Byron Shire Council v Sommerville (1999) 97 NSWLEC unreported decision No. 50127 of 1999, 8 February 1999,
Sheahan J; Canterbury City Council v Saad ( 2000) 112 LGERA 107, Kuringai Municipal Council v Beaini [2001] NSWLEC
35 Land and Environment Court of NSW, Unreported No.50028 of 2000, 1 March 2001, Bignold J., D-G DLWC v
Robson, Newman, and Newman Quarrying [1998] NSWLEC (unreported, 8 August 1998).
14 In Piva v Brinkworth (1990), the Supreme Court of SA an appeal against sentence (fines totaling $41,020 for clearing
210 hectares) for two separate offences was dismissed. Arguments that the monetary penalties imposed were
excessive were rejected. At first instance the magistrate rejected a plea that no conviction be recorded, stating: “In
the case of breaches of regulatory legislation (such as the Native Vegetation Management Act) general deterrence as well
as specific deterrence is paramount.” Cited in Piva v Brinkworth (1992) 59 SASR 92 at par 8. See also: Dal Piva v
Maynard [2000] SASC 349 SCGRG-00-655 (2 November 2000) at p.8, para 41. [100%]. Further, see Witte v B.E.
Arnold, Supreme Court Tasmania, No.A84/1996 where a probation order was overturned and a $10,000 fine
imposed.
15 Walden v. Hensler (1987) 163 CLR 561, Brennan J at 570.
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Table 1: Factors Affecting Compliance16
Type of Factor

FACTORS
MOTIVATING
COMPLIANCE

ECONOMIC

* Desire to avoid a penalty.
* Desire to avoid future liability.
* Desire to save money by using
more
cost-efficient
and
environmentally-sound practices.
* Desire to increase profits and
access new niche markets by
selling products independently
certified
as
environmentally
sustainable.

SOCIAL/MORAL

* Moral and social values for
environmental quality.
* Societal respect for the law.
*
Clear government will to
enforce environmental laws

* Lack of social respect for the law.
* Lack of public pressure for
environmental protection.
* Lack of government willingness to
enforce environmental laws in the
rural context.

PERSONAL

* Positive personal relationships
between regulatory agency staff
and industry staff.
* Desire to avoid legal process.
* Desire to avoid the stigma of
enforcement,
and
adverse
publicity.

* Fear of change.
* Inertia.
* Ignorance about requirements.
* Ignorance about how to meet
requirements.
* Doubts about extent of predicted
environmental impacts.

FORESTRY SPECIFIC
FACTORS

MANAGEMENT

BARRIERS TO COMPLIANCE
AND
FACTORS ENCOURAGING
NONCOMPLIANCE
* Lack of funds.
* “Cost of compliance” 17
*
Greed/desire
to
achieve
competitive advantage.
* Competing demands for resources.

* Lack of logger concern.
* Lack of logger knowledge.
* Lack of landowner knowledge of
regulations.18
* Jobs and training dedicated to
compliance.
* Bonuses or salary increases
based
on
environmental
compliance.

* Lack of internal accountability for
compliance.
* Lack of management systems for
compliance.
* Lack of compliance training for
personnel.

.

Derived from International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (INECE) (1992) above n 1.
Phillips, S.; Egan, A. (University of Maine) (2002) “Factors Affecting Best Management Practices Compliance in
Maine: A Survey of Licensed Foresters and Loggers”, paper presented to Forestry Best Management Practices Research
Symposium, April 15-17, 2002, Atlanta, Georgia. “Foresters and loggers reported lack of logger concern to be one of
the top rated reasons for non-compliance. Lack of landowner knowledge / concern was also highly ranked.”
18Phillips, S.; Egan, A. (University of Maine) (2002) “Factors Affecting Best Management Practices Compliance in
Maine: A Survey of Licensed Foresters and Loggers”, paper presented to Forestry Best Management Practices Research
Symposium, April 15-17, 2002, Atlanta, Georgia. “Foresters and loggers reported lack of logger concern to be one of
the top rated reasons for non-compliance. Lack of landowner knowledge / concern was also highly ranked.”
16
17

Likelihood of breaches
Examination of questions of compliance is important because there are several factors
suggesting the likelihood of breaches of the Act is high, as follows:
•

There are frequently substantial financial incentives to breach the Act, because
logging or forest clearing for plantation establishment will produce immediate
income, whereas the consent path represents delays and conditions restricting the
scope and volume of harvesting.

•

Impatient landholders may be encouraged to commence clearing without
approval because of delays in obtaining consent from DLWC. These can amount
to up to one year.19

•

Industry associations have not pressured their members to comply with the
legislation; rather they have campaigned and lobbied for its repeal,20 and for
retention of broad exemptions.

•

Self-assessment aspects of the Act (such as exemptions, and provisions of certain
RVMPs) require landholders to undertake complex tasks of evaluation and
decision-making for which they are unlikely to have appropriate skills or support.

•

With the remoteness of the regulated area, and the large number of properties
that are regulated, there is difficulty in detecting breaches. 21

•

There is some evidence that the majority of the PNF industry comprises smallscale operators (landholders and logging contractors) who are supplying small-tomedium sawmills.22 Particular compliance difficulties arise with the smallest
operators as their knowledge and institutional capacity to undertake ESFM
practices are usually more limited.23 One DLWC officer from the Sydney-South

Notes on a Speech given by Mr Robert Adam, DLWC, Sydney-South Coast region, DLWC re proposed BOS Best
Operating Standards for Private Native Forestry (PNF) under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act on 21 February 2001, at
Candelo, Southern NSW at ANU Forestry workshop, “The Evolving Legislative and Regulatory Environment for
the Management of Private Native Forests in NSW”.
20 This is evident from statements made by NSW Farmers Association during the 2003 election campaign: eg. NSW
Country Hour ABC Radio, 12.24pm, 10.3.03, Mr. Mal Peters, NSW Farmers Association, referring to “the 'Gestapo'
in the bush trying to catch farmers out”.
21 Audit Office of New South Wales (2002) Performance Audit Report: Department of Land and Water Conservation: Regulating
the Clearing of Native Vegetation, Audit Office, Sydney, p.42.
22 A survey conducted for ABARE in 1999 found that small and medium sized sawmills in the Southern RFA region
purchased most of their hardwood logs from private land forest operations (69% of the intake in medium sized
mills. ABARE (1999) Sawmill Survey: Southern Region A project undertaken for the Joint Commonwealth NSW
Regional Forest Agreement Steering Committee as part of the NSW Comprehensive Regional Assessments, project
number NS 21/ES, RACAC (NSW) and PM&C (Commonwealth), at p.8.
23 The poorest performing operators in terms of environmental performance in Tasmania, across the forestry industry
are the small independent private property operations. This statement is consistently made in Annual Reports of the
Forest Practices Board. See Chapter Eleven. Note that the reporting practices of the large private forestry operators
within a self-regulatory system may hide many of their malpractice. In the USA, large tracts of private forests land
are actually owned by large forestry multinationals, such as in Maine where 8 million acres are privately owned
19

Coast Region with experience working on PNF described “the generally low level
of forest management skills and opportunistic approach to timber harvesting
common in the [private] industry.”24
With such factors increasing the likelihood of non-compliance, there is a need for
DLWC to have an effective compliance and enforcement strategy.

Detection of breaches
An important question relating to the administration of the NVCA is to ask how DLWC
becomes aware of PNF operations in the first place. Without a notification mechanism
attached to exemptions, it may not hear about exempt PNF activity. Landholders can
choose if they wish to apply for consent or, if they will, rely on the PNF exemption on
the basis of a self-assessment as to its scope. Landholders run the risk of prosecution if
they cannot legitimately claim the PNF exemption.
Interviews with DLWC officers suggested that there was no organised strategy for
detection of offences during the study period. Instead, an ad hoc method of detecting
offences applies, involving detection by DLWC officers driving through the area (as in
the Greentree prosecution), and upon haphazard reporting of clearing by neighbours (as in
the Locke and Harrison matters).25 The NSW Audit Office stated “DLWC’s compliance
and enforcement efforts have been characterised by a reactive approach (responding to
allegations), rather than a pro-active approach (based on systematic monitoring or
audit).”26
The inherent difficulty of detecting vegetation changes on private land due to access
restrictions can be overcome with an ‘eye in the sky’ - aerial photography or satellite
remote sensing. DLWC used remote sensing during the study period to monitor changes

native forest described as forestry companies as “industrial forest”, and Oregon where 5 million acres are privately
owned native forest. M. Lansky, (1993) “Myths of the Benign Industrial Clearcut”, in W. Devall (ed.), Clearcut: the
Tragedy of Industrial Forestry, Sierra Club Books & Earth Island Press, San Francisco, CA, pp. 47-49 at 47.
24 DLWC (2000) Summary of Comments on Desktop Audit of Exemptions (Stage 1 Review of Exemptions), Comments by DLWC
and RVC only, internal unpublished document, at 63, Comments by DLWC Officer No.12 (Compliance Officer),
Sydney-South Coast Region.
25 D-G DLWC v Greentree & Prime Grain Pty Ltd [1998] NSWLEC 30 (4 March 1998), Talbot J, unreported Nos. 500357 of 1997; D-G DLWC v Locke & Harrison [1998] NSWLEC 147 (26 May 1998) No. 50095 of 1997, Unreported,
Talbot J.
26 Audit Office NSW (2002) above n 21 at 47.

in vegetation.27 However, the primary purpose overwhelmingly lay in an intention to gain
accurate data on the extent of vegetation clearing and overall rates of vegetation
clearance, rather than to embark upon a satellite-assisted breach detection programme.28
Yet an automatic satellite monitoring alert system could be readily devised to provide a
map of recent changes in vegetation cover.29 DLWC has stated that it has the capacity to
monitor vegetation-clearing using satellite data it receives every 26 days.30 However it
appears that this capacity was under-utilised during the study period.
Towards the end of the study period in 2001 there was a restructuring of compliance
activity and the appointment of regional compliance officers tasked with developing
regional compliance plans.31 Departmental material suggested that additional methods of
surveillance would be employed by these officers including spot audits, fly-overs and
satellite imagery.32 Although DLWC had started to discuss systematic satellite detection
Environmental Research Information Consortium (1998) Rates of Clearing of Native Woody Vegetation in NSW 19951997, ERIC, Deakin West, ACT. In a letter to the Chairman of the Native Vegetation Advisory Council (NVAC) in
November 2000, the Minister stated that satellite imagery was being used to monitor clearing throughout NSW.
Minister for Land And Water Conservation, Letter to NVAC, 15 November 2000, p.2. R. (MP) Amery, Letter to
Native Vegetation Advisory Council. 2000, Minister for Land and Water Conservation: Sydney. p. 3pp.
28 Minister for Land And Water Conservation, Media Release, 25 August 2000, p. 1. Nevertheless satellite images were
used by the prosecution (unsuccessfully) in D-G DLWC v Ramke [1999] NSWLEC 22 (16 February 1999), 50071 of
1998, Talbot J. and in Pye. In D-G DLWC v Pye, part of the prosecution case was compiled using satellite remote
sensing, in order to show the difference in vegetation cover following clearing activity. Satellite imagery was used as
an adjunct to evidence produced from on ground and aerial inspections, and the investigation was commenced
following a report to the Department. D-G DLWC v Pye [1998] NSWLEC 292 (24 November 1998) at pars 6-10.
29 It is possible to program a computer into which remote sensing data is input to produce maps which indicate the
change in native vegetation cover in a given region, only on private land, between a designated time period “A” and
a later period “B”. Behn, G., McKinnell, F. H., Caccetta, P. and Verne, T. (2000) “Mapping Forest Cover”,
Proceedings of the 10th Australasian Remote Sensing and Photogrammetry Conference, paper no 97, pp. 190-203; Interview, Dr
P. Beerworth, ANU, Faculty of Geosciences, 16.4.2000; Davies, C.; Hoban, S.; Penhoet, B. (1999) “Moving
Pictures: How Satellites, the Internet, and International Environmental Law Can Help Provide Sustainable
Development”, 28(4) Stetson Law Review 1091.
30 DLWC (2001) Draft Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 Compliance Policy, Version M, August, p.7.
31 Ibid.
32 DLWC, (2000) “Natural Resource Compliance Strengthened in North Coast Region”, Media Release, 7 September
2000. The dark side of these changes was decision to disband the Soil and Vegetation Compliance unit in Parramatta
(and for its relocation to rural NSW, ultimately Wellington in the Hunter Valley) one day after the leaking and
publication in the Herald in 2001 of a story based on reports written by that unit describing the negative impacts of
the exemption provisions on compliance. (see Media Release, Richard Amery, Minister for Agriculture), That report
was entitled: DLWC (2000) Review of the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 Exemptions, Soil and Vegetation
Access Branch, Internal unpublished document, DLWC, Sydney; DLWC (2000) A Scientific Basis for the Native
Vegetation Conservation Act 1998: Objects and Exemptions, Soil and Vegetation Access Branch, November, internal
unpublished report; Woodford, J. (2001) “Plundered Forests at the Mercy of Farmers”, Sydney Morning Herald,
23.1.01, p.3; see also Daily Telegraph, 24.1.01; Interview, anonymous DLWC officer, Parramatta, by telephone
24.1.01. There is a suggestion here that the officers involved were being punished, as the move created an indirect
pressure on staff to resign if they were unprepared to move to rural NSW. The Compliance Unit was to be
disbanded. However in the DLWC’s PR spin, it was to be “centralised” with other Sydney native vegetation units as
a new Central Native Vegetation Management unit - in a triumph for Country Labor’s regional employment
strategy. According to NCC Native Vegetation Officer, Paul Kravchenko, “I am aware that virtually most of the
DLWC veg officers are going to resign.” (Email to author 14.2.01.) A thinly veiled threat was made by NSW
Farmers: "To relocate officers to a country town such as Wilcannia or Walgett will put them in a position where
they'll
experience
the
direct
implications
of
>their
decisions."
Media
release
at:
<http://www.nswfarmers.org.au/press/cw-2001-008.asp>. See further, Local Government and Shires Association Weekly
Circular, No.11 of 2001, p.39, 16.3.01 announcing that the Central Native Vegetation Management unit of the
Department would be relocated to Wellington.
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of offences by 2001, and the development of more sophisticated compliance and
detection strategies, it remains doubtful whether DLWC’s compliance efforts during the
study period transcended haphazard reporting and detection of breaches.

Evidence of breaches
Examination of DLWC’s approach to enforcing compliance becomes all the more
important given strong evidence of numerous breaches of the NVCA. By October 2000,
according to data presented by DLWC to NVAC, there had been 471 alleged breaches of
the Act since the commencement of the Act in January 1998.33 The Compliance Manager
stated that these were estimated to be only one-third of the total number of actual breach
incidents, with the shortfall partly due to failures of some regional offices to report
breaches to Sydney.34 By April 2002 there had been a total of 705 alleged breaches.35 The
number of breaches alleged per annum has grown, from 125 in 1998 to over 225 in
2001.36 This may illustrate increased awareness of the legislation amongst the community
and increased surveillance by DLWC – but it may also indicate more breaches of the Act.
In relation to the rate of breaches by the PNF industry the available data was limited.
DLWC’s Soil and Vegetation Compliance Manager stated that the majority of alleged
breaches of the Act in the North Coast region concerned infringements in the course of
selective logging operations.37 Unfortunately there is no specific statistical evidence about
the compliance rate of the PNF industry with the NVCA. This is because DLWC
appears not to compile such data for particular industries.38
There are other indicators of difficulties in relation to compliance with the Act. Firstly,
the area of vegetation cleared during alleged breaches between January 1998 and August
2000 was estimated by DLWC to be 33,000 hectares. Secondly, there was some limited
evidence in relation to non-compliance (other than blatant clearing without consent),
Data provided by DLWC to Native Vegetation Advisory Council, October 2000, unpublished.
Dr Ian Hannam, interview, at DLWC Parramatta, 6.10.00.
35 Audit Office NSW (2002) above n 21 at 45, based on DLWC briefing notes provided 24.5.02 to Audit Office. In late
June 2002, Dr Smith, the Director-General stated to an Estimates Committee of the NSW Parliament that there had
been 805 alleged breaches . General Purpose Standing Committee No.5 Estimates: Land and Water Conservation, 26.6.02,
p.18.
36 Audit Office NSW (2002) above n 21 at 45.
37 Dr Ian Hannam, interview, at DLWC Parramatta, 6.10.00
38 It is a theoretical possibility that patterns of enforcement relating to the PNF industry were widely divergent from
the general patterns of enforcement under the Act, ie. that this industry was subject to vigorous enforcement action.
However this is unlikely because of the extent of problems faced by DLWC in enforcing the Act against this sector
caused by the operation and interpretation of the PNF exemption.
33
34

particularly clearing in breach of conditions of consent. This data is again not specific to
PNF. A DLWC audit conducted in the Central West in 1999 found that 66% of
landholders had not complied with one or more of the conditions of approval, or had
cleared after requests for approval had been refused.39

ENFORCEMENT TOOLS
The NVCA provides for administrative, civil and criminal enforcement. It makes
adequate provision for the implementation of a graduated approach to enforcement by
DLWC, with a range of enforcement options apart from prosecution.
The ability of a regulatory agency to implement this approach and thereby to efficiently
target scarce enforcement resources to the cases most deserving of attention (and
avoiding the ‘sledgehammer to crack a nut’ scenario in others) depends fundamentally
upon the credibility of its threats to escalate the severity of enforcement action up the
enforcement pyramid (Figure 1) in response to non-cooperation.40 These requests can
only have any force if it is apparent to landholders that severe consequences (e.g.
prosecution or remediation directions) are likely to flow from non-cooperation.

39
40

Audit Office NSW (2002) above n 21 at 44.
Ayres, I., Braithwaite, J. (1992) Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, Oxford University Press, New
York.

Figure 1 Enforcement Pyramid 41

Licence
revocation
Licence
suspension
Criminal penalty
Remedial civil penalty
Administrative enforcement:
remediation notices, orders,
directions
Warning Letters
Investigations, inspections
and examination
Negotiation and settlement
Education and persuasion
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Ayres, I., Braithwaite, J. (1992) above n 40, with adaptations by Gilligan, G.; Bird, H. and Ramsay, I. (1999) “The
Efficacy of Civil Penalty Sanctions Under the Australian Corporations Law”, Trends and Issues In Crime And Criminal
Justice No. 136, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra.

Administrative enforcement
The range of administrative enforcement mechanisms available to DLWC includes
warning letters, stop-work orders42 and remediation direction notices43, and property
agreements.
Another device in the administrative enforcement toolkit is the compliance bond.
DLWC could impose conditions requiring lodgement of a bond or other security to
ensure compliance with conditions placed on consent to clear.44 Such bonds would be
forfeited if conditions of consent were not complied with. There is a need for this
measure to be applied as DLWC audits have indicated low rates of compliance with
conditions.45 DLWC had not taken advantage of the provisions during the study period.46
The use of bonds in order to ensure compliance with conditions of consent is applied in
the mining, pollution-control,47 plantations,48 and urban-planning contexts.49

Civil enforcement - tools
An alternative to criminal proceedings is the use of the Act’s civil enforcement
provisions. Civil proceedings may be brought in the Land and Environment Court either
by the DLWC or third parties (in fact “any person”), for an order to remedy or restrain
breaches of the Act including threatened or apprehended contraventions.50

NVCA, s.46(5). The maximum penalty is 1000 penalty units plus 100 units per day of a continuing offence.
NVCA, s.47(4). The maximum penalty is 1000 penalty units plus 100 units per day of a continuing offence. Further
it is an offence to obstruct an authorised officer in their investigation of possible contraventions of the Act or
regulations: NVCA, s.61(4).
44 Under EPAA s.80A(6), 93(2).
45 An audit of parties granted NVCA development consent in the Central West found 68% had not complied with
conditions of consent. A compliance officer observed it was that the category of landholders who were most
strongly opposed to the notion of regulation of activities on freehold land who most commonly interpreted the
granting of consent “as a ‘green light’ for commencing clearing operations without reading the conditions of consent.”
Priestley, S. (2000) above n 8.
46 Apart from using a bond to ensure the retention of significant vegetation, a bond can be used to ensure the
completion of particular works such as fencing or weed control. This approach was suggested in SA by a review of
legislation. Native Vegetation Working Party (1999) Native Vegetation Act (Enforcement, Appeals etc) Amendment Report
1999, Report to Minister for Environment and Heritage (SA), unpublished, Adelaide, at pp.26-27.
47 The POEO Act 1997 (NSW)), Part 9.4 provides the EPA and regulatory authorities (ie. local government) with
power to demand payment of financial assurance before it issues a licence. The assurance may be in the form of a
bank guarantee or bond or other security. Financial assurances are designed to secure or guarantee funding for
works e.g. remediation that is required by a licence.
48 Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999, s.46. Charges on land can be made to secure payment of financial contribution
to local government. The Registrar-General acts on instruction of Minister to register a charge on land title to secure
payment. The charge is lifted when payment is made.
49 Under EPAA, s.80A(6), 93(2). An example of their application is described in Canterbury City Council v Saad (2000) 12
LGERA 107 at 117 where a $1,000 bond was applied (unsuccessfully) in order to secure the retention of 2 mature
trees in an urban construction context.
50 NVCA, s.63(2). In relation to civil proceedings, breach of the Act is defined to include a breach of any of the
following: an RVMP, a Code of Practice, a development consent to clear native vegetation or (state or regional)
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Civil enforcement proceedings have many advantages for the regulator. Civil proceedings
confront fewer procedural obstacles as fewer protections are available to defendants than
in criminal proceedings. Further, civil proceedings in NSW may be brought in response
to threatened or apprehended breaches of legislation. Also interim court orders (i.e.
interlocutory injunctions) may be sought.51 Most importantly, there is a lower standard of
proof (on the balance of probabilities). Given the inherent evidentiary difficulties in this
area, there is therefore greater chance of obtaining an order against a defendant. Also
there is greater opportunity to incorporate remedial environmental measures as part of
the sentencing outcome.
In addition to allowing enforcement proceedings to be brought by the regulator, s.123
EPAA also allows third parties to seek judicial review of decision-making processes.
Objectors may appeal a decision to grant development consent - for example on the
grounds of unreasonableness or failure to take into account relevant considerations. Such
s.123 EPAA proceedings can be brought only seeking to challenge the procedural
validity of a decision to grant consent, in judicial review but not in merits review.52

Criminal enforcement - provisions of the Act
The NVCA provides that “a person must not clear” native vegetation except in
accordance with a development consent that is in force or a native vegetation code of
practice.53 The main categories of offences are failing to obtain consent, or breach of
conditions of a consent.54 Some failures to obtain consent may arise from a defendant
neglecting to check whether PNF is proposed for State-protected land, or to ensure that
the PNF exemption is genuinely applicable to a proposed operation.

protected land, a condition of a development consent to clear, a stop work order, or a remediation direction notice.
NVCA, s.63(1)(b).
51 The Land and Environment Court is empowered to make a broad range of enforcement orders: Land and
Environment Court Act 1979, s.23.
52 At present, only applicants for consent to clear native vegetation are entitled to commence merits appeals – in
relation to decisions to refuse consent or to impose conditions on consent. EPAA s.97(1), Carr v Minister for Land
and Water Conservation (unreported, Land and Environment Court, NSW, Pearlman J, 22 May 2000, (No. 10675 of
1999). Only if a particular class of vegetation clearing were to be defined as designated development in an RVMP,
could merits appeals be initiated by third party objectors. EPAA. s.98(1).
53 NVCA, s.21(2). This provision does not apply to vegetation clearing undertaken on State protected land or land to
which a RVMP applies, or where one of the numerous exemptions and exclusions is applicable.
54 A breach of Part 2 of the Act which sets out requirements for development consent is an offence under the Act.
NVCA, s.17(1).

The PNF Exemption and enforcement
An essential component of an effective law is that it is readily enforceable, i.e. it is simple
to distinguish between situations involving compliance and those involving noncompliance. Interviews, internal documents, and close examination of the legislation all
suggest that, in the PNF context, the NVCA does not possess this attribute.
The breadth and ambiguity of the PNF exemption - discussed in the previous chapter have caused significant difficulties in the field, according to several internal departmental
documents. The Internal Review of Exemptions observed: “Regional staff from all over the
State have suggested that the PNF exemption is so broadly worded, and difficult to
enforce that it should be removed.”55 In a survey of all DLWC operational regions, five
regions reported difficulties in the interpretation and/or implementation of the PNF
exemption.56 Most DLWC officers interviewed by the author referred to its ambiguity,
describing it as “very difficult”,57

“unenforceable”, “useless”, and “a joke”.58 The

exemption is said to be unenforceable as its boundaries of operation are indeterminate.59
Collectively, the activity-based exemptions of the NVCA were described by an internal
report as: “the most problematical part of the Act in terms of achieving compliance.”60
Whilst comments regarding the difficulties with the exemptions were on the public
record for several years in isolated places, it was not until March 2001 that they were
made public with any prominence. At that time the Sydney Morning Herald reported on the
contents of two ‘leaked’ internal compliance unit papers concerning the exemptions.61
This publicity, combined with growing internal and public criticism of the exemptions
was the catalyst for the announcement in June 2001 by the Premier of a formal review of
the exemptions.62 The PNF exemption was criticised for its indeterminacy by both

DLWC (2000) Review of the NVCA Exemptions, at p.18.
(North Coast, Hunter, Sydney-South Coast, Murray, Murrumbidgee). DLWC (2000) above n 55 at 49.
57 Interview, Bob Attwood, North Coast DLWC office, Grafton, 29.11.00.
58 Interview, Anonymous DLWC officer, Head Office, in person, 6.10.00.
59 DLWC (2000) Response by a Barwon Region Office to an Internal survey distributed by Soil and Vegetation Compliance Branch
Regarding Problems with Exemptions under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997, 11pp., unpublished, DWLC, on file
with author.
60 DLWC (2000) Review of the NVCA Exemptions, at p.5. The review of exemptions was announced by the Premier in
July 2000. (Transcript of Speech by Premier Bob Carr at Annual Conference of NSW Farmers Association 17 July
2000 at p.10) reported in Stephenson, A. “Carr plan for land clearing draws fire” Sydney Morning Herald, 18.7.00, p.3.
61 DLWC (2000) Review of the NVCA Exemptions; DLWC (2000) A Scientific Basis for the NVCA: Objects and Exemptions,
Woodford, J. (2001) “Plundered Forests at the Mercy of Farmers”, SMH, 23.1.01, p.3.
62 Evidence of creative interpretation of many of the exemptions is abundant. Even the responsible Minister admitted
in a media release of 30 August 2000: “Some of the exemptions are poorly defined and open to interpretation. There
are also concerns about the cumulative impacts of the exemptions and how they are being monitored and complied
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bodies set up to review the NVCA exemptions - the Independent Scientific Group, and
the Community Reference Panel (‘CRP’).63
In relation to the Act as a whole, over time the use of exemptions appears to have
become widespread and those using them have become bolder. The internal Review of
Exemptions report (2000) stated that alleged breach reports were indicating “use of the
exemptions over a much greater area; increasing use of a combination of exemptions in
order to clear more land; clearing just outside the exemptions so that prosecution is
unlikely; and more creative application of the exemptions.”64
Staff reported that the PNF exemption “attracts all kinds of interpretations from
landholders and their logging contractors”.65 These difficulties mirror broader systemic
problems with other activity-based exemptions.66
But such conflict will only occur where the department seeks to restrict application of the
exemption in the face of an expansive interpretation by landholders. Research presented
in the previous chapter revealed a marked difference between the approach taken to the
PNF exemption by the South Coast Regional Office and that taken by the North Coast
Regional Office. In the North Coast and Hunter regions, it appears there was a laissezfaire stance of allowing self-assessment. In these regions, during the study period, 100per
cent of PNF logging in these regions relied upon the PNF exemption - where it was
available on non-protected land.67 At its worst, this involved DLWC turning a blind eye
to the impact of logging under exemption. It is explicable (but perhaps not completely
defensible) because in the North Coast, PNF activity is at its highest and departmental
resources to assess forestry proposals are most stretched.68

with.” Richard Amery, Minister for Land and Water Conservation, “Review of Native Vegetation Clearing
Exemptions Underway”, Media Release, 30 August 2000, p.1.
63 DLWC (2001) Independent Scientific Group - Minister’s Review of Exemptions: Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997: Final
Report, 8 March, 36pp; DLWC (2001) Minister for Land and Water Conservation’s Review of Aspects of the Native Vegetation
Conservation Act 1997 Community Reference Panel Additional Report on Private Native Forestry (Term of Reference 1: Review of
Exemptions, October, DLWC, Sydney, 9pp; Nature Conservation Council of NSW (2001) Towards Best Operating
Standards for Private Native Forestry, NCC submission on DLWC’s Draft Best Operating Standards for Private
Forestry, 60pp., unpublished, March, Author: Pugh, D.
64 DLWC (2000) Review of the NVCA Exemptions, p.12.
65 DLWC (2000) above n 24 at 63, Comments of DLWC Officer No.12, Sydney-South Coast Region.
66 The exemptions were described in D-G DLWC v Crawford by Talbot J as “convoluted, obscure and difficult to
construe” in D-G DLWC v Crawford at p.19.
67 The exemption was not available on State protected land.
68 This explanation was offered by Interview, Mr R. Adam, DLWC, Sydney-South Coast, 18.6.2002, by telephone.

Hawkins’ writing suggests that regardless of the detail of the law in statutes or court
decisions, the law is worked out in practice by negotiation.69 A distinction is drawn
between negotiated compliance and enforced compliance.70 This former analysis (negotiated
compliance) is applicable in the PNF context because compliance with the law was not
obtained through enforcement. But it most closely resembles a scenario of ‘negotiated
non-compliance’, a term invented by Gunningham to explain where regulator and
regulatee come to an unspoken agreement not to apply the legislation to the letter.71
On the other hand, in the South Coast Region DLWC was able to adopt a tough stance of only allowing PNF exemption claims meeting the strict definition of selective logging
in the Definitions and Exemptions booklet – by playing a game of bluff, apparently with
some success.72
In such instances where DLWC seeks to enforce a narrow interpretation of the PNF
exemption, it is constrained because of awareness of the likely difficulty in successfully
prosecuting unauthorised forestry outside the scope of the PNF exemption. In the
context of an exemption claim, it would be very difficult to prove which actions amount
to a breach.
When confronted with a breach report and subsequently encountering regulatory
resistance from landholders in the form of exemption claims, DLWC faces the dilemma
of whether to attempt to prosecute landholders for exceeding the scope of this uncertain
exemption. The leaked Internal Review of Exemptions stated that in the course of
investigations of alleged breaches of the Act, the PNF exemption was very commonly
raised by landholders, second only in incidence to the ‘minimal clearing’ (or ‘2 hectare’)
exemption.73 These exemption claims are significant because 51per cent of investigations
into reported alleged breaches were abandoned following the assertion of exemptions.74
Yeager, P. (1991) The Limits of Law: the public regulation of private pollution, Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK, at
295 cites Hawkins, K (1984) Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution, Clarendon
Press, Oxford.
70 Yeager (1991) above n 69 at 295.
71 Gunningham went one step further describing a situation of negotiated non-compliance in a mining regulation case
study: where agency and regulated party colluded to ignore legal requirements: Gunningham (1987) “Negotiated
non-compliance: a case study of regulatory failure”, (1987) 9 Law and Policy 69.
72 Interview, R Adam, 15.6.02; Observations of the author at ANU Private Forestry field day, Candelo, 21.2.01.
73 DLWC (2000) Review of the NVCA Exemptions, p.12.
74 DLWC (2000) Review of the NVCA Exemptions, at p.11. Where reported, the average area of investigation into a
breach which was discontinued due to SEPP 46 exemptions was 18 hectares. At p.11, it states: “The total area of
alleged breaches for which investigations were discontinued due to SEPP 46 exemptions is estimated to be about
2500 hectares, although this is less than 10% of the total area of reported alleged breaches. Note that this does not
69

The internal DLWC Exemptions Review stated “According to advice from regional staff,
every breach investigation is significantly affected by the exemptions...” 75
In a submission to the review, one DLWC regional officer wrote: “This [PNF]
exemption is so … lacking in any definition that logging on non-protected lands is
effectively unregulated by the NVCA. It would be absolutely impossible to convict
anyone for alleged breaches that involve forestry.”76
It is departmental policy that the onus for determining whether proposed clearing is
within the scope of the exemption rests with the landholder -

an onus that is

underpinned by the ultimate, if remote, threat of prosecution. The DLWC Staff Guidelines
state:
Although the exemptions should be explained to the landholder, the landholder must be satisfied
that a proposal conforms to the exemptions. DLWC staff should not endorse, in writing, that a
certain proposal is exempt…If the landholder is unsure if an exemption applies then they should
make an application.77

Ultimately, DLWC has chosen this course because the legal consequences of a mistake as
to the scope of an exemption will ultimately fall on the landholder. It is evident that
DLWC does not wish to provide further potential criminal defences for landholders
based on ‘acting in reliance upon Departmental advice’.78 Interviews with regional staff
revealed that DLWC in the South Coast region has advised landholders that a
management plan must be prepared if PNF logging is to proceed under exemption.
DLWC is encouraging landholders to take positive steps to think through the possible
environmental impacts of different logging practices, and to adjust their logging

include cases which are currently under investigation, in which some landholders have cleared large areas and rely
heavily on exemptions.” DLWC (2000) above n 73 at p.12. On the basis of estimates provided by the Compliance
Branch in the Exemptions Review Report, the NCC calculated that the extent of illegal clearing was 33,000 hectares
annually for all forms of clearing:.( p.11 at footnote 59).
75 DLWC (2000) Review of the NVCA Exemptions, at p.11. Where reported, the average area of investigation into a
breach which was discontinued due to SEPP 46 exemptions was 18 hectares. Page 11 states: “The total area of
alleged breaches for which investigations were discontinued due to SEPP 46 exemptions is estimated to be about
2500 hectares, although this is less than 10% of the total area of reported alleged breaches. Note that this does not
include cases which are currently under investigation, in which some landholders have cleared large areas and rely
heavily on exemptions.” DLWC (2000) above n 73 at p.12. On the basis of estimates provided by the Compliance
Branch in the Exemptions Review Report, it is possible to calculate that the extent of illegal clearing was 33,000 hectares
annually for all forms of clearing: Review of the NVCA Exemptions, p.11 at footnote 59.
76 DLWC (2000) above n 24 at 63, Comments of DLWC Officer “Number 5”.
77 DLWC (1999) Staff Guidelines for the Assessment of Clearing Applications under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997,
June, published, DLWC, Parramatta, 88pp. at 8.
78 This scenario has already created problems for DLWC. An internal DLWC report on the exemptions stated that
“Potential prosecutions have been abandoned because of the combination of exemptions and statements made
within the published material which are inconsistent with the exemptions, for example, the Cassidy and Malouf
cases.” Review of the NVCA Exemptions, p.6.

(‘clearing’) proposal, rather than have the Department complete the paper-work for
them.79
Persons not entitled to the PNF exemption may claim it with impunity if there is
inadequate enforcement. In those regions where DLWC takes the position that anyone
can claim the PNF exemption on non-protected land, it is effectively signalling that no
harm will come to those who choose a liberal interpretation. Conversely, stringent
compliance activity could encourage landholders and logging contractors to be cautious
about claiming the exemption.
It remains doubtful whether, as a matter of law, DLWC could overcome the broad
definition of the exemption and successfully prosecute a landholder for failing to act
within its scope. DLWC’s narrow interpretation of the PNF exemption expressed in
Definitions and Exemptions is unlikely to be legally binding. This is because it is unlikely to
fall within the definition of extrinsic materials that could be relied upon by a court as a
definitional aid.80 There is no case law on the scope of the PNF exemption which can be
relied upon for assistance in interpretation.

OTHER ENFORCEMENT ISSUES
Proving pre-existing vegetation
Another particular difficulty in conducting a prosecution for breach of the Act is the lack
of baseline data regarding pre-existing native vegetation. The difficulty is in proving that
certain native vegetation existed on a site prior to clearing, an issue raised by the NSW
Notes on a Speech given by Mr Robert Adam, DLWC, Sydney-South Coast region, DLWC re proposed BOS Best Operating
Standards for Private Native Forestry (PNF) under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act on 21 February 2001, at Candelo,
Bega Valley, Southern NSW at workshop organised by ANU Forestry, “The Evolving Legislative and Regulatory
Environment for the Management of Private Native Forests in NSW”.
80 DLWC (1997) SEPP 46 - Protection and Management of Native Vegetation: Amendment No.2 : Definitions and Exemptions,
DLWC, Sydney, 26pp. Its precise status would be determined by a court by reference to provisions of the
Interpretation Act 1987 which permits courts to refer to extrinsic materials such as a parliamentary “explanatory note”
(i.e. explanatory memorandum) to resolve statutory ambiguity: Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), s. 34(2). However, that
Act stresses that any such “explanatory note” must have been “laid before, or furnished to the members of, either
House of Parliament by a Minister or other member of Parliament introducing the Bill before the provision was
enacted or made”. Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), s.34(2)(e). The Explanatory Note (i.e., explanatory memorandum) which
accompanied the Bill contains absolutely no discussion of the intended meaning and scope of any of the SEPP 46
exemptions. (NSW Parliament, (1997) Native Vegetation Conservation Bill 1997: Explanatory Note. There is no
evidence that the booklet entitled Definitions and Exemptions was ever circulated to the Parliament by the Minister
introducing the NVC Bill. Strictly speaking, a court could not use the booklet to resolve ambiguities in the
exemption, but would be required to take the strict legal interpretation of the text of the exemption.
79

Audit Office,81 and arising in some of the SEPP 46 prosecutions.

82

Similar problems

have been reported interstate.83 The issue is of particular concern where DLWC would
seek to establish that logging which had taken place did not meet sustainability criteria
such as retention of 50per cent of stems.84 In broad terms, the answer to these sorts of
problems is to insert evidentiary deeming provisions, e.g. deeming that native vegetation
pre-existed clearing, with the onus on the defence to prove otherwise.85
A review of the South Australian Act recommended adoption of a civil standard of proof
for native vegetation offences:
a lesser standard of proof [i.e. a civil standard] will clearly result in a greater number of successful
matters, particularly given the nature of the contraventions under the Native Vegetation Act. For
example, there are rarely any eyewitnesses, other than the defendant, and it is often difficult to
prove who is responsible for the clearance and when it occurred. The evidence is often collected
some time after the clearance and it can be very difficult to demonstrate the exact position of the
vegetation before clearance.86

ENFORCEMENT FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
There is limited information that specifically describes the extent of enforcement activity
that was undertaken directly in relation to PNF, as this data is not separately compiled by
DLWC. However an internet search showed that no prosecutions for PNF had taken
place without consent or in breach of conditions of consent during the study period
either under the NVCA or under SEPP 46.87 In the North Coast and Hunter regions for
which detailed enforcement statistics were gathered by means of interviews it appears
that DLWC applied only administrative enforcement techniques to non-compliant PNF.

Interview, Bob Attwood, North Coast DLWC office, Grafton, 29.11.00, (in person); Audit Office NSW (2002)
above n 21 at 43: “It can be very difficult to prove, after the event, that none of the many exemptions applied to an
area of cleared land.”
82 D-G DLWC v Pye [1998] NSWLEC 292, 24 November 1998, Lloyd J. No. 50128-9/97 at paras 5-10.
83 A review of the South Australian Act stated, regarding evidentiary difficulties: “For example, there are rarely any eye
witnesses, other than the defendant, and it is often difficult to prove who is responsible for the clearance and when
it occurred. The evidence is often collected some time after the clearance and it can be very difficult to demonstrate
the exact position of the vegetation before clearance.” Native Vegetation Working Party (SA) (1999) above n 46 at
11.
84 This criteria is contained in the booklet, Definitions and Exemptions, 2nd edition, at p. 18. In some instances, the North
Coast Region conducts forest survey transects as part of the site visit if informed that the landholder intends to log
under the exemption. The purpose is so that baseline data is on file to enable a future prosecution for logging
operations which have exceeded the scope of the exemption. However no such prosecutions have taken place.
85 Native Vegetation Act 1991 (SA), s.34; Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld), s.67.
86 Native Vegetation Working Party (SA) (1999) above n 46 at 11.
87 Internet search and detailed review of all prosecution decisions by keyword “Director-General Department of Land
and Water Conservation” listed on Australian Legal Information Institute website, <www.austlii.edu.au>, various
dates, 2001-2003.
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Interviews with staff responsible for compliance revealed some PNF-specific data. The
Director of Soil and Vegetation Compliance stated in interview that by October 2000
several warning letters had been issued in relation to PNF. Some related to logging
without consent where logging took place in purported but improper reliance on the
PNF exemption, and others concerned breach of conditions attached to consents for
logging on protected land.88
In the North Coast Region, enforcement efforts to November 2000 had focussed on
warning letters, stop-work orders and remediation directions in preference to
prosecution. Nevertheless DLWC legal staff visited the region in order to investigate
several matters with a view to prosecution.89
In the Hunter Region, interviews of senior management in March 2000 revealed a
preference for the use of warning letters; nothing else had been used in relation to PNF.
Specifically, there were no stop-work orders, no prosecutions and no remediation
directions. Three warning letters had been sent, two relating to logging without consent.90
It is unlikely that such actions were sufficient to exert a strong general deterrent effect to
encourage applications for consent by the PNF industry. Further, there was no auditing
of exemption claims. Nor were there efforts to test the scope of the PNF exemption in
the courts.
This information, although inconclusive, suggests that enforcement methods used in
these regions in relation to PNF were probably consistent with the general approach to
enforcement of the NVCA across the entire State, which, in relation to all forms of
vegetation clearance, was as follows. By October 2000, there had been only one
prosecution formally commenced (and none completed)91 and only nine stop-work
orders issued for alleged offences against the NVCA.92 One hundred and twelve warning
Interview, Dr Ian Hannam, Director Soil and Vegetation Compliance, DLWC, 5.10.00, by telephone.
Interview, Bob Attwood, North Coast DLWC office, Grafton, 29.11.00, (in person).
90 Interview, Steve Gowland, DLWC Hunter, 17.3.2000 (by telephone and fax). Enforcement activity between 1
January 1998 and March 2000.
91 The first prosecution under the NVCA was proceedings against Greentree and Prime Grain Pty Ltd for clearing 2000
hectares of native vegetation. Director-General Land and Water Conservation v Greentree & Prime Grain Pty Ltd,
proceedings commenced in Land and Environment Court, 23 March 2001 for clearing 2000 hectares of native
vegetation between March 1999 and May 2000. Media Release, 23.3.01. Note that an earlier prosecution of Mr
Greentree was discontinued following negotiations between the defence and prosecution.
92 Interview, Dr Ian Hannam, Director Soil and Vegetation Compliance, DLWC, 5.10.00, by telephone. A newspaper
report provided similar data: by August 2000, there were 401 reports of illegal clearing. The Department considered
that 270 of these clearances were illegal, had sent 82 warning letters, and issued nine stopwork orders since January
1998. Woodford, J. (2000) “Carr drags the chain on illegal land clearing”, SMH, 29.08.00, p.1.
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letters had been sent, in response to a total of 471 alleged breaches of the Act.93 At April
2002 there had been little change in these patterns of enforcement. By that time there
had been 705 alleged breaches, in response to which 141 warning letters had been sent.
Seventy-one per cent of alleged breaches involved no further action being taken. Twentyone per cent of allegations were responded to with a warning letter (see Table 2).
Table 2 Results of Alleged breach
investigations 1 January 1998 to 30 April
2002 (State-wide)
Action taken
No further action

Number
breaches
499

of

alleged

Percentage

Warning letter

147

21

Remediation agreement

23

3

Stop-work order

10

1

Direction for remedial 16
work
3
Property agreement

2

71

1

Prosecution commenced

7

1

Total

705

100

(still under investigation)

105

Source: DLWC advice to NSW Audit Office 94

The fact that the number of alleged breaches of the Act increased steadily every year
between 1998 and 2001, from just over 130 per annum in 1998 to around 230 in 2001,
lends weight to the suggestion that there was limited deterrent effect being generated by
the Act, partly because of limited coercive enforcement.95 The increase in the number of
breaches alleged could also reflect increased enforcement activity in 2001, and may also
reflect increased reporting by the community of suspected breaches. At this stage there is
insufficient evidence to support a firm conclusion based on these propositions.
The question remains whether the number of prosecutions is an adequate indicator of
the degree of diligence of enforcement activity. It is not a complete or sufficient
Data provided by DLWC to Native Vegetation Advisory Council, October 2000, unpublished.
DLWC Briefing Notes provided to NSW Audit Office, 24 May 2002, as reproduced in Audit Office NSW (2002)
above n 21.
95 Statistics presented in table in Audit Office NSW (2002) above n 21 at 44.
93
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indicator. Yet it remains a crucial element of evaluating the extent of enforcement. Some
level of prosecution activity is essential in order to encourage compliance. One might
expect that DLWC would have carried out some prosecutions for unauthorised PNF and
PNF operations in breach of conditions. But there were no prosecutions in relation to
PNF under the NVCA during the study period. In relation to alleged non-forestry
breaches of the NVCA, seven prosecutions had been commenced by April 2002.96 In
other jurisdictions under similar forestry or vegetation-protection legislation, there was a
higher level of enforcement than that applied under the NVCA during the study period.
For example, in Tasmania, in relation to PNF offences alone, there were a total of 38
notices, 3 fines and 9 prosecutions during the study period (1997-2002).97 In South
Australia during 1999-2000 alone there were 13 prosecutions in response to allegations of
illegal native vegetation clearing.98
It is likely that the general deterrence effect in operation under the NVCA was limited
during the study period as there appears to have been little use made of the criminal (or
civil) enforcement provisions of the Act, particularly in relation to the PNF industry. The
strategy was reliant upon the deterrent effect of administrative actions such as warning
letters and to a lesser extent notices and stop-work orders combined with the residual
deterrence effect from the SEPP 46 prosecutions (see Appendix 8.1). Some of these
prosecutions were still being concluded during the study period and may have exerted
some deterrent effect against illegal vegetation clearance.
Towards late 2000, there was some evidence of a toughening of resolve at DLWC, with
the hiring of regional compliance staff,99 the review of exemptions by the CRP and ISG,

NSW Audit Office (2002) above n 21.
In 2001-2002 there were fines imposed ($1000, $1500) for two separate offences under the FP Act in relation to
offences on private land. (Tasmania FPB Annual Report 2001-2002, p.26). In 1997-1998 there were 11 notices and
three prosecutions for logging breaches on private land. (FPB Annual Report 1997-1998, p.18). In 1998-99 there were
18 notices, 1 fine by the Board and 5 prosecutions for logging breaches on private land (FPB Annual Report 19981999, p.25). In 1999-2000 there were 4 notices, 2 fines by the Board, and 1 prosecution for logging breaches on
private land (FPB Annual Report 1999-2000, p.24. Fine under s.47B Forest Practices Act 1985 (Tas). In 2000-1 there
were 5 notices and zero prosecutions on private property. (FPB Annual Report 2000-2001, p.24). Going slightly
further back, in 1995-1996 there were 10 prosecutions commenced and 25 notices issued in relation to private
property offences. (FPB Annual Report 1995-6, p.15). Nevertheless, in that jurisdiction there also seemed to be a
tendency to avoid imposing fines and commencing prosecutions, rather a preference for either no penalty, a warning
letter or notices to make good.
98 Native Vegetation Council (SA) Annual Report 1999-2000, (2000) at 12-13. There were 141 allegations of illegal
clearing made, of which 42 cases were investigated in detail. 1 matter was settled, and 1 dropped.
99 However, in September 2000, the Department issued a series of announcements that they would be strengthening
the compliance units across the state by adding 20 extra staff.This was to bring the total number of compliance
officers covering all legislation (including the Water Management Act) to 64. DLWC, (2000) “Natural Resource
Compliance Strengthened in North Coast Region”, Media Release, 7 September 2000. However these numbers are
misleading as they refer to the administration of other legislation as well as the NVCA. In addition it is not clear
96
97

and the commencement of the first prosecution under the Act in March 2001.100 By 2002
the freeze on prosecution activity had clearly been lifted - with six prosecutions
commenced under the NVCA by July 2003. Yet none of these prosecutions related to
PNF, involving instead mainly agricultural clearing.101

Administrative enforcement findings - general
As we have seen from Table 2, DLWC showed a tendency to avoid ‘coercive’
enforcement of the NVCA in general during the study period. There was a preference
for administrative enforcement, or no enforcement, in response to breaches. 92 per cent
of responses to alleged breaches between January 1998 and April 2002 involved either
warning letters or no formal action at all.102 The capacity of DLWC to successfully apply
administrative techniques as compliance tools depends on the extent to which the
Department demonstrated a willingness to resort to more coercive enforcement
responses.
Although the question of the extent to which landholders cooperated with administrative
enforcement actions and requests was not examined systematically in the research phase
of this thesis, some evidence came to hand of instances of non-cooperation with requests
that landholders sign a property agreement under Part 5 of the NVCA containing
remediation clauses following the detection of breaches of the Act.103 Section 47 of the
Act enables the Director-General to issue a mandatory direction to landholders, and
more recently there have been appeals by landholders to the Land and Environment
Court against directions to carry out remedial work.104 A North Coast officer recounted

that they take account of the 20 staff lost with the relocation of the Compliance unit from Parramatta to Wellington.
See DLWC Media release, 29 July 2002, “DLWC Compliance Training”.
100 D-G DLWC v Prime Grain Pty Ltd & Ors; Greentree v D-G DLWC [2002] NSWLEC 93 revised- 26/07/2002,
No.40039 of 2002, 0040 of 2002; D-G DLWC v Greentree & Anor [2002] NSWLEC 102, Nos. 50039-40 of 2001 and
50053-54 of 2001; Greentree v D-G DLWC [2002] NSWLEC 53; No. 10169 of 2002.
101 Director-General DLWC v Leverton Pastoral Company Pty Ltd [2002] NSWLEC 212 (18 September 2002) (involving 325
hectares of Belah and Bimble Box woodlands $5,000 fine); Director-General of National Parks and Wildlife & Director
General DLWC v Wilkinson & Anor [2002] NSWLEC 171 (27 September 2002); Director- General DLWC v Greentree
[1998] NSWLEC 30 (4 March 1998) Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, Talbot J, Nos.50035-7 of
1997; D-G DLWC v Bailey [2003] NSWLEC 160, Nos. 50073-50074 of 2002 (1 July 2003), Talbot J; Director-General
Department Of Land And Water Conservation v Jackson And Ors [2003] NSWLEC 81, Nos. 50014-50019 of 2002 (31
March 2003), Bignold J. See DLWC (2002) Annual Report 2001-2002, p.29.
102 It is not suggested here that all alleged breaches in fact amounted to genuine breaches of the legislation, as a matter
of law or fact.
103 Email from anonymous North Coast region DLWC officer, 17.6.02,. reproduced in Appendix 8.3.
104 Slack-Smith and Another v D-G DLWC[2003] NSWLEC 189, No. 40856 of 2002, (22 August 2003), Talbot J (judicial
review proceedings) ; Buttsworth v D-G DLWC[2003] NSWLEC 169, No. 10552 of 2002 (9 July 2003), Talbot J
(class one proceedings; part-heard).

difficulties in obtaining compliance following an incident involving unauthorised clearing
of up to 20 hectares of native vegetation including rainforest on steep slopes:
Various blokes from this office went out to prepare a remediation plan, and Mr. [X] {the
landowner, name deleted} said, well you can stick that up your a----. And now we've apparently
missed the 2 year court registration limitation [for commencement of a prosecution].105

In the SEPP 46 prosecutions, DLWC placed an emphasis on pursuing court orders for
site remediation by consent rather than seeking substantial fines. Several of the successful
prosecutions secured the entry of the defendant into consent orders, which involved
signing a property agreement with DLWC. By associating property agreements with
criminal proceedings, the potential exists to unintentionally create a perception amongst
the rural community that property agreements are associated with criminal penalties,
perhaps affecting the rate of voluntary entry into such agreements.106

Civil enforcement - findings
Given the advantages of civil enforcement discussed above (at page 13), intuitively one
might expect that if few criminal prosecutions were occurring, then civil enforcement
would have been more frequently employed. However, despite the more economical
nature of civil proceedings, there is no evidence that they were used by DLWC during
the study period against any form of illegal vegetation clearance.
This omission may be due to a mental association on the part of regulators of civil
enforcement with the relatively notorious “any person” provisions in NSW laws enabling
judicial review by NGOs and environmentalists. With this cultural view of civil litigation
there may have been a tendency to overlook the more obvious potential of civil
enforcement provisions for the regulator.107
Further, during the study period there were no third-party (i.e. non-DLWC and nonapplicant) judicial review actions by NGOs or concerned citizens to challenge the grant
of consent to conduct PNF. This is most likely because of the poor prospects of success
(due to the broad discretion allocated to decision-makers under s.79C EPAA) and the

Email from Anonymous North Coast DLWC officer 17.6.02, Reproduced in Appendix 8.3.
Bates, G. Franklin, N. (1999) above n 4 at 110-111.
107 Bates, G. Franklin, N. (1999) above n 4. This consultants’ report by academics from Sydney University Law Faculty
was suppressed by the Department until a Parliamentary order in March 2001 forced its release.
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risk of adverse costs orders, as well as non-legal barriers to litigation such as lack of
resources and information with which to enforce the law.

Compliance on Protected lands
At this point we briefly review the residual effect of prosecutions under the protected
lands provisions of the Soil Conservation Act. Prior to the enactment of the NVCA, PNF
was partly regulated under the protected lands provisions and partly under SEPP 46.
Regulation on protected lands is relevant as many members of the PNF industry during
the study period would probably have been aware that DLWC had enforced protected
lands provisions in the recent past (e.g. during 1996-1997).108 Thus there may have been
some residual deterrent effect in operation during the study period.
Under the former protected lands regime, there were at least four prosecutions for
offences occurring in the course of commercial PNF operations.109 Of these, two related
to clearing riparian vegetation.110 The most significant penalty was imposed in Simpson v
Gatacre, involving fines of $10,000 for breach of conditions of authority in the course of
PNF on protected lands.111 In Hannam v O’Connor & Veness (1995), fines totalling $4000
were imposed for unauthorised PNF on protected land.112
DLWC’s approach to enforcing the protected land provisions must be distinguished
from its approach to forestry elsewhere. DLWC and the PNF industry had
accommodated themselves to the protected lands provisions since the 1970s. The
NVCA regulating PNF elsewhere was a new development. However we have seen how
in the North Coast and Hunter regions there was a very high claim rate on the PNF
exemption where it was available on non-protected land. Thus it appears little changed
for the PNF industry in these regions upon the commencement of the NVCA. In other

During 1996-7, eight alleged breaches of protected lands provisions were reported. This resulted in one successful
prosecution in the Land and Environment Court and one statutory notice to rehabilitate, and the issuing of warning
letters in six other cases. Section 15A powers to order rehabilitation of illegally cleared land were exercised once
during 1996-7. DLWC (1997) Annual Report 1996-7, p.31.
109 Simpson v Gatacre (1992) 74 LGRA 320; Hannam v Adam & Ors 1996 Unreported No.50026 of 1996; Simpson v Love,
Land and Environment Court, Nos 50312-6 of 1990, per Bignold J. Bornoldt v Tweed Shire Council, Land and
Environment Court, No.40088 of 1988, per Hemmings J; Hannam v O’Connor and Veness, Land and Environment
Court, No.50025 of 1995, per Pearlman J.
110 Simpson v Love, Land and Environment Court, Nos 50312-6 of 1990, per Bignold J; Hannam v Adam, Land and
Environment Court, No.50026 of 1996, per Bignold J.
111 Simpson v Gatacre (1992) 74 LGRA 320. In this case the offence was held to be one of strict liability. Further the
defendant was liable for having caused trees to be felled by contractor.
112 Appendix 8.2 provides the details of prosecutions relating to forestry on protected land.
108

words, activity on protected land was regulated, just as it always was, and PNF elsewhere
was left effectively unregulated, because of the operation of the PNF exemption.
Awareness amongst the industry of protected lands provisions is relatively high because
of the fact that they have been in place since 1972;113 a number of prosecutions have
taken place, and landholder-education materials have been distributed over a relatively
long period of time.114 The key question is the extent to which DLWC improved the
regulation of PNF on non-protected land, thereby expanding the reach of the regulatory
net.

The SEPP 46 Prosecutions and PNF
Although there were no prosecutions under the NVCA during the study period, there
were 16 prosecutions carried out under its predecessor, SEPP 46.115 The majority of
these related to vegetation clearance in the course of agriculture, and none related to
PNF.
During the study period, some SEPP 46 prosecutions were still in progress, with
judgements being delivered as late as February 1999.116 The results of these prosecutions
were becoming known in the rural community. Although none of the prosecutions
related to PNF activity, had the courts imposed large penalties in relation to illegal
agricultural clearing, this would indirectly have sent a message to the PNF industry.
The Land and Environment Court imposed relatively low fines for general vegetation
clearing offences under SEPP 46, when compared with results in other jurisdictions.117.
Under that instrument, the largest fine imposed on a corporation was $35,000,118 and on

The protected lands provisions in Part 4, Division 2 (now repealed) of the Soil Conservation Act 1938, commenced
operation in July 1972 by virtue of the Forestry, Soil Conservation and other Acts Amendment Act 1972 (No.26 of 1972).
114 Interview, Dr Ian Hannam, Director Soil and Vegetation Compliance, DLWC, 15.1.98, (in person), Parramatta.
115 Appendix 8.1 provides the results of the SEPP 46 prosecutions in detail. During 1996-7, 40 alleged breaches were
reported which resulted in 13 warning letters and 6 legal proceedings were commenced, with 2 successful
prosecutions secured, and others pending. DLWC (1997) Annual Report 1996-7, p.31. The defences raised to
prosecutions under SEPP 46 were the application of various exemptions, the defence of honest and reasonable
mistake of fact, and that of existing use rights. Lee, E.; Baird, M.; Lloyd, I. (1998) “State Environmental Planning
Policy No 46 – Protection and Management of Native Vegetation”, 15(2) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 127
at 131-134.
116 DG DLWC v Waroo Pty Ltd [1999] NSWLEC (unreported, 25 February 1999.
117 In particular, comparison with SA prosecutions is warranted. In the Brinkworth prosecution of 2003, a penalty in
excess of $270,000 was imposed (on appeal).
118 D-G DLWC v Orlando Farms Pty Ltd & Ors, unreported Nos 50040,50041,50042,50045-50053 of 1997.
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an individual was $10,000.119 On at least six occasions, a guilty verdict was delivered but
no conviction was recorded, due to the application of s.556A Crimes Act 1900.120 The
average fine imposed in the event of a conviction (including matters in which s.556A
Crimes Act was applied) was $6238.121 The Department did not appeal any of the lower
sentences imposed.122
Section 556A Crimes Act (now s.10 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999) allows a trial
judge to take into account the character of defendant or the “trivial nature of the
offence” or other extenuating circumstances to make an order dismissing a charge
despite having found that an offence was committed. The application of s.556A in these
prosecutions ignores the serious nature of vegetation-clearing offences. They are also in
conflict with Land and Environment Court decisions stating that s.556A should not
normally be applied in the environmental context.123 Yet DLWC did not appeal the
decisions in which s.556A was applied.124 During these prosecutions, DLWC preferred to
negotiate “better environmental outcomes” such as property agreements and consent
orders for site remediation, in preference to pursuit of larger fines.
A factor in weighing the severity of the penalty imposed is the imposition of orders that
the offender pay the prosecution’s costs.125 The impact of consent orders for the
remediation and conservation of native vegetation must also be taken into account, as
well as consent orders to enter into property agreements. However, the global effect of
these decisions was that SEPP 46 probably did not exert sufficient general deterrence to
alter decision-making in the PNF industry.

D-G DLWC v Rial, Harris, Crawford, & Windouran Pastoral Company Pty Ltd (1998) 99 LGERA 130.
Six instances, not counting DG DLWC v Ikaro.
121 Removing the influence of the decisions in which s.556A was applied, the average fine was $10,076.
122 One possible amendment to the Act would be to link the sentencing formula to the area and significance of the
vegetation illegally cleared and to the associated increase in value of land, as is the case under the Native Vegetation
Act 1991 (SA), s.26. Such a reform would assist in generating a deterrent effect, and in reducing the risk that fines
are internalised as a cost of doing business. This principle is discussed in EPA v Aaron Plant Hire & Earthmoving Pty
Ltd [2000] NSWLEC 122 (10 May 2000), Unreported, No. 50129 of 1998. Fines should reflect the economic gains
associated with illegal clearing, and should seek to nullify that gain.
123 Simpson v Love, Land and Environment Court, Unreported, Nos. 50312-50316 of 1990; Walden v Hensler (1987) 163
CLR 561; Bellingen Shire Council v North, Pearlman J., Land and Environment Court NSW, 16 February 1999; Piva v
Brinkworth (1992) 59 SASR 92.
124 Unlike other agencies in a similar position in SA and Tasmania.
125 Crimes (Sentencing Procedures) Act 1999, s.43(6)(e).
119
120

Although there were a number of prosecutions under SEPP 46, it is also the case that
there were many alleged breaches that were not prosecuted.126 While many of these may
have been trivial there may also have been a considerable proportion of serious incidents.
One of these involved extensive clearing of forest in 1996 on a 500 ha site on slopes of
up to 26 degrees, without authorisation under SEPP 46. No prosecution occurred on the
basis that the vegetation cleared fell within the ten-year-old regrowth exemption.

127

Neighbours contested this assertion.128
The SEPP 46 prosecutions relied upon the offence provisions of the EPAA, particularly
s.125. The defendants in each of these matters were charged with failure to obtain
development consent as required by cl.6(1) SEPP 46, in breach of s.76(2) EPAA, being
an offence under s.125(1) EPAA. The maximum penalty for breach of SEPP 46 was
$110,000. The maximum penalty for unauthorised vegetation clearance under the
NVCA is now $1.1 million (10,000 penalty units) plus a possible further daily penalty to
a maximum of $110,000 per day of a continuing offence,129 with the potential for
imposition of court orders for replanting of vegetation, secured with a bond if
necessary.130

Criminal enforcement: discussion
Attempts to assess the performance of DLWC on the basis of prosecution results do not
provide a complete picture of the department’s compliance record. However, it is still a
necessary step to set out prosecution results. The data helps to assemble a picture of the
deterrent effect on the regulated community during the study period. The low penalties
imposed and the fact that few convictions involved PNF suggest that it is unlikely that
the legislation had a major deterrent effect on the PNF industry, especially when set
against the potential financial gain from logging.
Under SEPP 46, 129 alleged breaches were reported to Head Office between August 1995 and December 1997.
Data provided to Native Vegetation Advisory Committee, for meeting on 26.8.99, Agenda Item 4.2. During 1996-7,
40 alleged breaches were reported which resulted in 13 warning letters and 6 legal proceedings were commenced,
with 2 successful prosecutions secured, and others pending. DLWC (1997) Annual Report 1996-7, p.31.
127 Director General DLWC (Mr Col Gellatly) (1995) Letter to Ms Robyn Kruk, Director-General NPWS, Letter
regarding SEPP 46 and the Plantations Joint Venture Scheme, File No.DGC95/1058, 22 December 1995.
128 Interview, Mr. Jim Morrison, Nature Conservation Council NSW Representative, Tenterfield Regional Vegetation
Management Committee, 14.8.01, by telephone.
129 EPAA, s.126(1), penalty increased from previous level of 1000 penalty units to new penalty of 10,000 penalty units
by the Environment Planning and Assessment Amendment Act 1999, No.72 of 1999. The NVCA also applies the penalty
provisions of the EPAA : NVCA, s.17(2). Therefore there is some ground to suggest that if prosecutions were
brought under the NVCA the sentence imposed is likely to be greater than those imposed in the SEPP 46 matters,
because of the new increased maximum penalty.
130 EPAA, s.126(3). However, where those prosecutions are brought in the Local Court, instead of in Class Five of the
Land and Environment Court, the NVCA provides that the maximum penalty is $110,000: NVCA, s.64(2).
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How can patterns of enforcement of the NVCA be explained? Suggestions that the
reason for the low number of prosecutions was due to “few” breaches are inaccurate. By
April 2002 there had been over 700 breaches alleged, involving all types of land use.
Although some of these either involved no actual breach, or amounted to technical or
minor breaches, more sophisticated explanations must consider the impact of the PNF
exemption. Serious difficulties arose from the ambiguous drafting of this exemption. Its
uncertain scope limited DLWC’s capacity to prosecute unauthorised logging even where
the activity was considered to fall outside the scope of the exemption.
Perhaps DLWC should have initiated a trial prosecution directed at clarifying the scope
of the PNF exemption.131 On the other hand, there were grounds for regarding the PNF
exemption as “unenforceable” - that any prosecution confronting a defence based on this
exemption would have inevitably failed.132
Environmental agencies are often reluctant to prosecute ‘borderline’ cases, preferring to
concentrate on clear-cut breaches.133 This is for several reasons: they prefer to avoid the
risk of adverse costs orders, and they wish to ensure that the credibility of legislation is
not called into question, undermining the fragile deterrent effect exerted by offence
provisions. Yet such accounts still do not explain why there were no prosecutions for
unauthorised PNF on protected land during the study period, a situation where the PNF
exemption was not applicable.134
Nevertheless, explanation of DLWC’s pattern of enforcement is best achieved by
reference to a range of factors in addition to technical legal issues. The question needs to
be seen in its broader social and political context. Some breaches must have been
sufficiently serious to warrant a more rigorous application of administrative, civil or
criminal enforcement techniques. But many of these breaches were not subject to such
However based on the legal analysis presented in this chapter, such litigation may have been futile, and could have
exposed the PNF exemption as applicable to any form of forestry where timber is produced rather than only
sustainable private forestry.
132 In a submission to DLWC’s Internal Review of Exemptions, one DLWC Regional officer wrote: “This [PNF]
exemption is so … lacking in any definition that logging on non-protected lands is effectively unregulated by the
NVC Act. It would be absolutely impossible to convict anyone for alleged breaches that involve forestry.” DLWC
(2000) above n 24 at 63, Comments of DLWC Officer “Number 5”.
133 Observations of the author from participant observation at Victorian EPA Legal Section, October 1995.
134 Given that breaches of the PNF exemption were described as “virtually impossible to prosecute” [etc], accordingly
we would expect the majority of enforcement activity to have related to protected land – where the exemption is not
available.
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action. The literature on regulation suggests that the key factors affecting agency
behaviour in implementing legislation are practical, cultural, organisational, and
political.135 According to the literature, agencies typically seek to avoid the development
of adversarial attitudes between regulator and regulatee.136 Cotterrell has remarked that
policies of accommodation are “clearly revealed in virtually all studies of regulatory
agencies”.137 He wrote: “[t]he entire regulatory process is seen by regulatory agencies to
depend on cooperation, goodwill and the mutual appreciation of problems”.138
In relation to PNF in particular, one DLWC officer described an internal culture of
wishing to avoid imposing regulatory requirements.139 This undoubtedly stemmed from a
reluctance to apply stringent regulation on private land, particularly where it had not been
imposed previously. He remarked upon a cultural desire to avoid commencing
prosecutions in order “to maintain some credibility” with the rural community, by not
“going too far”. The necessity to tread warily increased because the introduction of the
NVCA occurred simultaneously with controversial reforms to water law that also
antagonised some landholders.140
In the literature it is argued that vigorous law enforcement on private land may
paradoxically generate a backlash, resulting in lower levels of compliance.141 In the PNF
context there is little evidence of overzealous enforcement during the study period. The
situation is better characterised as one in which there was little vigorous enforcement. In
spite of this, a broad-based political campaign was still waged by rural interests against
the legislation, exacerbating a situation in which virtually any amount of enforcement
activity, including simple property inspections, would generate resistance and conflict.142
The desire on the part of the department to be seen as “friendly to landholders” was
mentioned by agency staff. This arises partly from the history of DLWC as successor to
the Soil Conservation Service, which had an identity as a rural extension service, with a
Yaffee, S. (1982) Prohibitive Policy : Implementing the Federal Endangered Species Act, MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, p.214.
136 Cotterrell, R. (1992) The Sociology of Law, 2nd ed., Butterworths, London, p.267.
137 Cotterrell, R. (1992) above n 136 at 267.
138 Cotterrell, R. (1992) above n 136 at 267.
139 Interview, Mr Martin Fallding, ex DLWC Hunter staff member, 27.9.00, notes on file with author.
140 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW). Interview, Mr Martin Fallding, ex DLWC Hunter staff member, 27.9.00, notes
on file with author.
141 see: Chapter Three.
142 By contrast, in Tasmania, industry appears to broadly support the forest practices legislation and its enforcement as
the law involves a degree of self-regulation and compensation provisions that sweeten the elements of coercive
enforcement. See Chapter Nine.
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“positive role” of helping farmers, as opposed to DLWC which has the potentially
conflicting roles of extension service and regulator.143
Grabosky and Braithwaite’s 1986 study of some 96 Australian regulatory agencies, Of
Manners Gentle, found that a tendency to avoid prosecution was common.144 Grabosky
wrote: “Generally, Australian regulatory executives overwhelmingly rejected a law
enforcement ideology…Prosecution, we were consistently told, was a ‘last resort’.”145
Farrier et.al. argue that the traditional practice of NSW agencies has been very similar.146
DLWC appears to have adopted a position at the lenient end of Braithwaite &
Grabosky’s typology of regulatory agencies, which displays a continuum from
‘cooperative appeasers’ to ‘vigorous enforcers’.147 Yet there are difficulties in applying a
blanket label to describe the culture or approach of a department such as DLWC.
One reason to be wary of broad generalisations regarding DLWC’s enforcement style is
because of the scope for variations in the approach of individual officers, and between
various levels of officers within the Department. The influence of particular officers
cannot be discounted in explaining regulatory strategies adopted in response to particular
incidents. Numerous sociological studies have emphasised the importance of the
discretion of individual officers that is exercised in view of the on-going relationships
between regulator and regulated community.148 This is particularly the case with DLWC
staff that live and work within the regulated community in relatively isolated rural
locations.
Interview, Mr Martin Fallding, ex DLWC Hunter staff member, 27.9.00, notes on file with author.
Grabosky, P., Braithwaite, J. (1986) Of Manners Gentle: Enforcement Strategies of Australian Business Regulatory Agencies,
Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 260pp.
145 Grabosky, P. (1993) “Australian Regulatory Enforcement in Comparative Perspective”, ch.2 in Grabosky, P,
Braithwaite, J. (eds.) (1993) Business Regulation and Australia’s Future, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, at
10. This is consistent with a British survey of enforcement of environmental and OH&S legislation by Hutter (1989)
which again showed prosecution was used as a last resort: Hutter, B. (1989) Variations in Regulatory Enforcement
Styles, 11 Law and Policy 153 cited in Ingleby, R.; Johnstone, R.(1995) “Invocation and enforcement of legal rules” in
R. Hunter, R. Ingleby and R. Johnstone (eds.), Thinking About Law: Perspectives on the History, Philosophy and Sociology of
Law, Allen & Unwin, Sydney,157-173 at 164-165.
146 Farrier, D., Lyster, R., Pearson, L. (1999) Environmental Law Handbook: Planning and Land Use in NSW, 3rd edition,
RLCP, Sydney at 67. In a 1989 review of OH&S enforcement in NSW, Gunningham described a broad philosophy
of “advice and persuasion” … He wrote that the regulatory agencies “have been… particularly reluctant to invoke
criminal sanctions against employers who break the law.” Gunningham (1989) above n 12 at 231. He wrote that
these policies were ineffective: “self-regulation and the ‘advise and persuade’ philosophy have failed in relation to
the asbestos industry…” (at 227).
147 Grabosky, P., Braithwaite, J. (1986) above n 144.
148 Hawkins, K. (1984) above n 69; Hawkins, K; Thomas, J. (eds) (1984) Enforcing Regulation, Kluwer Nijhof, Boston,
Mass.; Black, J. (2001) “Enforcing Regulation: Principles and Practice”, Seminar Paper, RSSS Law Programme,
ANU; Bell, J. (1992) “Discretionary Decision Making: A Jurisprudential View”, 89-111 in Hawkins, K. (ed.) The Uses
of Discretion, Clarendon Press, Oxford, at p.91.
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Vegetation Management Officers (VMOs), the front-line officers in implementing the
legislation, were most often described as enthusiastic about enforcing the legislation.149
Managerial officers were described as sometimes keen to overturn recommendations of
VMOs to reject applications to clear vegetation.150 One source referred to “some extreme
conflicts” between VMOs and regional managers. He argued that some managementlevel officers had “not much idea about native vegetation”, partly because of their
backgrounds in soil conservation or public administration.151
One of the difficulties for DLWC staff in implementing a more rigorous enforcement
stance is DLWC’s apparent lack of resources with which to do so. In November 1999,
the Ecological Society of Australia alleged that the compliance branch of DLWC was not
able to pursue many breach allegations to prosecution due to staff cuts and
redeployment.152 More recent evidence from 2002 supports this view, with one officer
complaining that serious breaches of the Act (such as an incident where 20 ha of
vegetation including rainforest and wet sclerophyll were cleared on steep slopes in the
Hunter Region) could not be pursued because of insufficient organisational capacity.153
The Legal Branch apparently explained: “the Greentree prosecution is consuming all of the
resources of the legal branch”.154 Several papers in the theoretical literature have noted
the pressure to adopt a conciliatory approach when agency resources are meagre.155
Another explanation for DLWC’s seemingly ambivalent attitude to prosecutions is its
lack of a clear organisational policy on compliance. For the first two years of the study
period DLWC had no formal prosecution or compliance policy in place, unlike the EPA
or the DPP. A policy would have made the task of ensuring compliance easier for
individual officers seeking to take action against breaches. By December 1999 a draft had
been released but this had not yet been finalised two-and-a-half years later in September
2002.156 The policy originally stated “every effort will be made to resolve breach matters
Interview, Mr Martin Fallding, ex DLWC Hunter staff member, 27.9.00, notes on file with author.
The approach of DLWC officers to administering the NVCA in relation to agricultural clearing may not be the
same as its approach in relation to PNF.
151 Interview, Anonymous ex DLWC staff member, 23.9.00, notes on file.
152 Dr. C. Morris (1999) Ecological Society of Australia Inc., Letter to Premier of NSW regarding enforcement of the Native
Vegetation Conservation Act 1997, 2pp.
153 At Upper Pappinbarra in the Hastings Council area, Hunter Region. See Appendix 8.3.
154 Appendix 8.3.
155 Wilson, J., Rachal, P. (1977) “Can the government regulate itself?”, 46 The Public Interest 3 at 6; Cotterrell, R. (1992)
above n 136 at 266; Yaffee, S. (1982) above n 135 at 104.
156 DLWC (1999) Soil and Vegetation Compliance Policy (Draft), December, 9pp.
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by negotiation.” Further, it stated “only in extreme circumstances will prosecution be
considered”, for example in the case of repeat offending, significant environmental harm
or where a satisfactory result cannot be obtained by negotiation or stop-work order.157 It
stressed the use of non-statutory measures such as extension and warning letters, stating:
“in those circumstances where a landholder agrees to undertake rehabilitation measures
as recommended by DLWC, DLWC should not generally pursue legal action.”158 The
policy was criticised by the EDO for placing an excessive emphasis on negotiation and
conciliation.159 The essence of the test in the NSW EPA and Commonwealth and State
DPP policies is that a decision to prosecute should be made on the basis of whether (a)
there is a prima facie case with reasonable prospects of success, and (b) whether
prosecution is in the public interest.160 DLWC’s policy was later revised to take account
of this critique; however, at the time of writing it remained in draft form.
Associated with DLWC’s lack of resources for compliance purposes was the lack of
resources that it could allocate to developing a policy for the achievement of ESFM in
the PNF industry. With a lack of clear policy direction on PNF, staff would have found
implementing the Act in relation to the PNF industry more difficult. DLWC’s seemingly
accommodatory approach to breaches and to exemption claims during the study period
may have to some extent stemmed from a lack of commitment on the part of senior staff
at head office to addressing the issue of the potential impacts of PNF, and therefore of
enforcing the rules that applied to it. A North Coast officer, who suggested this arose
from the “complete lack” of any policy directive in relation to PNF from senior
management, described enforcement of the Act as “lax”. He described DLWC’s overall
attitude to PNF as “laissez-faire”.161
An additional factor undermining the capacity of field officers to present a firm position
regarding the law has been the impact of frequent amendments to legislation over the
seven years since the commencement of SEPP 46 in August 1995. These required many
landholders to comply with the protected lands provisions, to then understand three
different versions of SEPP 46, and later to comply with the NVCA and more recently to
DLWC (1999) above n 156 at p.1.
DLWC (1999) above n 156 at p.8.
159 EDO and NCC (NSW) Joint Submission on the DLWC’s Draft Soil and Vegetation Compliance Policy, December.
160 Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1998) Prosecution Policy and Guidelines at 4. Note that DLWC
could argue that limiting the number of prosecutions is in the public interest, on the basis of reducing the
expenditure of public funds.
161 Interview, Phil Redpath, ecologist, DLWC Grafton (North Coast Region Office), 31.3.99.
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158

consider the controls set out in RVMPs and draft RVMPs. The changes have caused
confusion amongst the regulated community, and may have undermined the ability of
DLWC staff to stringently enforce the law where necessary.
Another reason to be wary of generalisations about DLWC’s stance is because of
regional variations. According to one informant “much depends on the whole district
level culture” in each region.162 As seen above, there is evidence that the Sydney-South
Coast Regional Office (in contrast to the North Coast Region) adopted an assertive
stance in relation to landholder’s claims for the PNF exemption. In the North Coast
there was no evidence of active encouragement of applications for consent in response
to inquiries. As a result the PNF exemption was used by 100% of landholders on nonprotected land. Still, the Regional Manager refuted the suggestion that his office may not
have been interested in enforcement, stating, “most of my staff’s time is tied up in
investigating and following up breach allegations.”163
Even though regional offices may have spent substantial time on breach allegations,
during the study period it was difficult to get a prosecution approved. The decision to
commence a prosecution under the NVCA belongs to the Director-General (D-G).
There is a possibility that reluctance to take a robust approach to compliance issues in
relation to PNF may have been related to the leadership of the department. The NSW
Audit Office commented in 2002 on the fact that Dr Bob Smith was simultaneously
Managing Director of State Forests and D-G of DLWC. It stated “there is the potential
for a conflict of interest, including… in relation to consideration of exemptions for
private native forestry.”164 Whether these involvements of the Director-General actually
influenced enforcement decisions cannot be established.165

Interview, Mr Martin Fallding, ex DLWC Hunter staff member, 27.9.00, notes on file with author.
Interview, Bob Attwood, North Coast DLWC office, Grafton, 29.11.00. As evidence of the Region’s toughness an
example was cited of DLWC refusing to lift a stop work order despite landholder demands, and of insisting on
conditions of consent to protect a threatened eucalypt species that led to a plantation company abandoning a $135
million project. It was suggested that the company in question insisted on 100% removal of all trees and would not
accept zones for tree retention that were proposed by DLWC.
164 NSW Audit Office (2002) above n 21 at 37.
165 The reasoning lying behind this comment is as follows. If PNF standards are tightened considerably this will reduce
the role that private forests can play as a pressure release valve for the timber supply difficulties that exist on public
land in NE NSW. PNF will not be as easy to pursue as an alternative source of supply to logging in State Forests.
Such reasoning is bolstered by the fact of DLWC’s rejection of the Smith report which proposed a method for
achieving ESFM within the PNF sector and would have introduced stricter standards to the PNF industry in NSW:
Smith, A. (1999) Guidelines for Application of Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 Exemption to Sustainable Forestry on
Private Lands in NSW, a report to the DLWC by Setscan Pty Ltd, Armidale, 128pp.
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Importantly, the D-G’s decision is subject to Ministerial influence and direction.166 This
factor appears to provide a large part of the explanation for the low level of prosecution
activity. According to an anonymous compliance officer interviewed in September 1999,
“some prosecutions” under the NVCA had been commenced, but were later
discontinued in response to “an unwritten policy” directive from “up the line [of
management]”.167 It was stated under condition of anonymity that a Ministerial directive
had been issued that all current prosecutions be discontinued and that no further
prosecutions be commenced.168
This policy emerged more explicitly in 2000 in a letter signed by the then Minister for
Land and Water Conservation in February. He wrote: “Prosecution of alleged offenders
is considered the last option to be used by the Department. The Department’s preferred
approach is to focus on extension and education of the rural community in terms of its
obligations under the Act...”169 In an interview in April 2000, the then Minister expressed
a preference for resolving matters by negotiations aimed at securing remediation
agreements, on the basis of: “getting a real environmental income [sic] rather than a scalp
for our prosecution branch.”170
The political reasons for DLWC’s negotiation- rather than enforcement-based strategy
arose mainly from the limited public support for the Act, particularly in rural areas of
NSW. The ill-will of the regulated community towards SEPP 46 has already been
described. This distrust continued under the NVCA, for example with incidents such as
the blockading of DLWC compliance staff in early 2003 to prevent them from carrying
out (or leaving) a property inspection at Nyngan in the Central West.171 The long-term
effect of such resistance to enforcement upon the stance of regulators is accepted as
considerable in the theoretical literature. The legal sociologist Cotterrell described a “lack

Another form of political intervention is that which results in the abandonment of prosecutions once commenced.
This was alleged by conservation interests in relation to the discontinuance of the prosecution in DLWC v Greentree.
It is alleged that negotiations took place between DLWC Deputy Secretary Susan Kemp and lobbyist and
representative of Greentree, Mr. Lawrie Brown, a former employee of Pollmark research, who had previously
worked for Agriculture Minister the Hon. Richard Amery. Following these negotiations the prosecution was
discontinued.
167 Interview, 26.8.99 , Anonymous, DLWC officer. (by telephone).
168 Interview, 26.8.99 , Anonymous, DLWC officer. (by telephone).
169 R.Amery MP, Letter to Ecological Society of Australia Inc regarding alleged breaches of the Native Vegetation Conservation Act
1997. 2000, Minister for Land and Water Conservation. 2pp.
170 Skinner, S. (2000) “Trees, Water, People and the Way We Farm”, Background Briefing, Program #10/2000, April 9,
2000, ABC Radio National, Internet URL <http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/bbing/specials/landclr/default.htm>.
171 Skinner, S. (2003) “Bulldozers, Trees and Making a Quid”, Background Briefing, ABC Radio National, 14.9.03,
9.10am.
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of unequivocal public support” as a key factor tending to create an accommodatory
approach to the implementation of legislation.172
The decision not to prosecute breaches of the Act appears to have been motivated by a
political desire by government to differentiate the NVCA from its predecessor.173 SEPP
46 was hated within the rural community for a variety of reasons, but amongst these
appears to have been a relatively active level of enforcement. As SEPP 46 was so
despised – a fact evident from a review of articles in the rural press, particularly The Land
- the government faced a political imperative to differentiate the NVCA from it. One
way of achieving this was to create a perception that the NVCA was “different”, as it
would not be enforced in the same way.
The risk that serious breaches of the legislation may not be met with an appropriate
enforcement response because of the political unpalatability of strongly enforcing the Act
could be excluded by placing the responsibility for such decisions in the hands of an
independent statutory officer or agency with status equivalent to that of the Director of
Public Prosecutions (DPP).174 An Office of the Forestry Regulator with responsibility for
law enforcement on both private and public forests was suggested by the NSW ESFM
Expert Working Group. At present in NSW, environmental offences are not handled by
the DPP. The prosecution capacity of the NSW EPA provides a model for reform. The
EPA is a statutory authority, governed by a statutory board. It is the Board’s task to
determine whether or not the EPA should institute proceedings for serious ‘Tier One’
offences.175 The legislation creating the EPA states that it is not subject to the control
and direction of the Minister in respect of decisions to institute criminal and related
proceedings.176 The EPA appears to have a more vigorous record of prosecuting
offences under the legislation it administers.177
Cotterrell, R. (1992) above n 136 at 269.
In particular, it has been speculated that political factors include the desire of the Labor government to maintain its
hold on a number of rural regional seats in order to maintain power. Interview, J. Benson, ESA representative on
NVAC, 17.6.02, by telephone.
174 For example, for fear of offending the rural community because of a desire to win or returning various marginal
rural or regional electorates in NSW.
175 Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991, s.16(d).
176 Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991, s.13(2)(c).
177 Whilst there is no attempt to make a direct comparison it is interesting to note that the EPA ran significantly more
prosecutions (under the POEO Act) in each year of the study period. During 2000-01, 55 prosecutions were
conducted in relation to matters not involving motor vehicles. In 1999-2000, 60 such prosecutions were conducted, in
1998-99, 39 such prosecutions were conducted, and in 1997-98, 55 such prosecutions were conducted. NSW EPA
(2001) Annual Report 2000-2001, EPA, Sydney, p.65. However there are likely to be other causes for more
prosecutions by the EPA such a greater number of offences committed against pollution legislation than vegetation
legislation. Under the POEO Act, the average penalty for the 40 prosecutions carried out by EPA during 1999-2000
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In a report commissioned by DLWC, the consultant academics Bates and Franklin
argued strongly that the Department adopt a graduated enforcement strategy in which
warning letters, stop-work orders, remediation notices and civil proceedings are applied
prior to the institution of criminal prosecutions. It was advised that the latter be reserved
for more serious and flagrant breaches of the legislation.178 The rationale of the pyramidal
enforcement strategy is that if the regulated community is aware of the existence of a
graduated-response policy of increasing severity that poses a credible threat, it is more
likely to voluntarily comply without the need for coercion. This enables more strategic
allocation of scarce agency enforcement resources, and increases the power of agencies
in negotiation with the regulated community.179
However, for its success, this strategy is predicated upon a credible threat of coercive
enforcement - where the regulator is perceived as willing and likely to initiate swift and
severe enforcement action against more serious breaches. It is likely that DLWC's lowkey approach to enforcement ultimately undermined its capacity to apply a pyramid
strategy to raise PNF standards. Without a visible record of vigorous enforcement it is
unlikely that threats made in negotiations would have been considered credible.
According to one rather cynical officer: “Our valued rural clients have worked out that
it’s all bluff- that when push comes to shove, we won’t be doing it.”180
Another possible underlying reason for reluctance in relation to enforcement was
suggested by Farrier, who submitted that the fact that the NSW Government is not yet
offering a comprehensive scheme of stewardship payments to landholders affected by
native vegetation laws is an important factor.181 As there is no ‘quid pro quo’ on offer,
government finds it difficult to justify a strong stance against offenders.182
was $15,668, whereas during 1998-1999 it was $26,601. Major fines included $60,000 awarded against Norco dairy
farms: Environment Protection Authority v Norco Co-op Ltd (2000) 108 LGERA 137. A finding of contempt of court for
not complying with an order requiring remediation of a waste storage site against Alan Keogh resulted in a jail
sentence Environment Protection Authority v Keogh [2000] NSWLEC 237, Unreported No.50088A of 1998, Decided
20/10/2000, Cowdroy J; see also Environment Protection Authority NSW (2000) Annual Report 1999-2000.
178 Bates and Franklin (1999) above n 4 at 121.
179 Fisse, B. (1993) “Rethinking Criminal Responsibility in a Corporate Society: An Accountability Model”, in P.
Grabosky and J. Braithwaite (eds.), Business Regulation and Australia's Future, Australian Institute of Criminology,
Canberra at 260-262.
180 Email, Anonymous DLWC North Coast officer, 1.8.03, on file .
181 Nevertheless moves in this direction have been taken in the form of the Native Vegetation Fund, Part 6, NVCA;
and the pilot Environmental Services Scheme under which grants can be made for the provision of environmental
services by landholders.
182 Prof. Farrier was interviewed by Skinner, S. (2003) “Bulldozers, Trees and Making a Quid”, Background Briefing, ABC
Radio National, 14.9.03, 9.10am; transcript at <www.abc.net.au/rn>.

CONCLUSION
One of the hypotheses posited in Chapter Five arising from the literature review was that
the law applying to PNF in NSW is often inadequately implemented and enforced. It
cannot be said that this proposition is entirely applicable to all aspects of administration
of the NVCA applying to PNF during the study period. The proposition invites an
overly-broad generalisation about the behaviour of an entire agency, which tends to
oversimplify a complex picture. DLWC has over 100 regional offices and confronts a
variety of situations across those regions.183 Further, the approach of the agency has
varied over time.
A second difficulty is that the data available regarding the specifics of PNF enforcement
was limited. DLWC has not dis-aggregated its compliance data so as to provide
information about the compliance rate of particular industries. Therefore patterns of
enforcement regarding the PNF industry must be derived from overall patterns of
enforcement. Reliance upon the broad patterns of agency behaviour is likely to be
relatively safe, as it is improbable that PNF was consistently subject to more rigorous
enforcement. This general information obtained from various published sources was
supplemented with information gleaned from interviews with individual regional officers
regarding the specifics of PNF enforcement, both State-wide and in particular regions.
A third difficulty involved actually obtaining data about enforcement patterns, specifically
about PNF. The political sensitivity of the subject of PNF meant that when DLWC staff
were asked for information about enforcement of the NVCA in relation to the PNF
industry, they often replied that information either did not exist (i.e. it had not been
compiled) or that it was not publicly available. Sometimes it was suggested that a FOI
request was necessary if the researcher was to insist on obtaining the information.184
In spite of the above qualifications, the broad findings were that DLWC showed a
tendency to avoid coercive enforcement. The main features of enforcement of vegetation
laws during the study period (not just in relation to PNF) were as follows. Firstly, there
was a tendency to respond to alleged breaches of the NVCA with either no formal
183
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DLWC website: <www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au/regions/index.html>.
Interview, Mr. Todd Spencer, Compliance Officer, DIPNR Murray Region, Deniliquin, 15.9.03, by telephone, notes
with author.

action or with administrative measures (such as warning letters).185 Secondly, there was a
total failure to explore the possibilities of civil enforcement. Thirdly, the overall level of
prosecution activity under the NVCA in relation to all forms of unauthorised clearing
(not just forestry) was very low relative to that which occurred under SEPP 46.
Specifically in relation to PNF, no prosecutions were launched under the NVCA, or
under SEPP 46.186 This avoidance of commencing prosecutions involved a policy
emphasis on negotiation and resolution of matters. DLWC also discontinued a number
of prosecutions under SEPP 46 and was reluctant to appeal adverse judgments or
inadequate sentencing.
DLWC’s strategy of emphasising non-coercive compliance appears to have been
relatively ineffective, as there was little decrease, if any, in the number of breaches of the
Act alleged. In fact, the number of breaches alleged has grown each year that the Act has
been in operation.187 This suggests the need for stronger approaches to enforcement, and
perhaps closer consideration of incentives-based strategies if ESFM is to be achieved in
the PNF sector. The lack of commitment to enforcing PNF law ultimately flows from
the low political priority attached to the question of private forest management. As Dr
Hannam of DLWC said: “the majority of political interest, financial and human resources
are heavily biased towards the public forest area.”188
The next chapter turns to examine the influence and effectiveness of regulation of PNF
by local government under the EPAA. These controls are important as they may apply
in instances where the PNF exemption under the NVCA is claimed.

It is not suggested here that all alleged breaches in fact amounted to genuine breaches of the legislation, as a matter
of law or fact.
186 Yet by April 2002 the political bar on commencement of prosecutions had been lifted and six prosecutions had
been commenced, although all of these related to forms of clearing other than PNF. This change of policy roughly
coincided with a Ministerial reshuffle that saw the Hon Richard Amery replaced by the Hon John Aqulina as
Minister for Land and Water Conservation.
187 This may be due to better detection techniques and higher rates of reporting of alleged breaches than any change to
overall levels of offending.
188 Hannam, I. (1995b) “Environmental Law and Private Property Management in New South Wales”, paper presented
to 2nd Annual Defending the Environment Conference, Australian Centre for Environmental Law, University of Adelaide,
20-21 May 1995, Published Conference Proceedings, 223-250.
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Chapter Nine

REGULATION OF PNF BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNDER THE ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING

AND ASSESSMENT ACT 1979 (NSW)

INTRODUCTION
The regulation of private native forestry (PNF) by local government under the
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (‘EPAA’) takes place in the shadow of the
Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (‘NVCA’).1

However, land-use planning law

administered by local government and the Minister for Planning2 remains important to
the PNF industry because of the present extent of the loopholes in the NVCA,
particularly the widespread reliance on the PNF exemption.
NSW land-use planning law is made up of 3 parts: the Environmental and Planning
Assessment Act 1979 (‘EPAA’), regulations under the Act, and Environmental Planning
Instruments (EPIs). There are three categories of EPIs: State Environmental Planning
Policies (SEPP); Regional Environmental Plans (REP); and Local Environmental Plans
(LEP).3
This suite of instruments affects PNF in several ways. Firstly, in those instances where
the vegetation-clearing controls of the NVCA are not applicable, e.g., due to
exemptions, the planning controls of the EPAA may apply, depending on the content of
applicable EPIs. The application of EPIs by local government provides an important
‘safety net’ role in the legal framework for PNF. Depending on the location, particular
local councils play an important role in overseeing PNF. Further, the EPAA is important
to regulation of PNF in that the Act operates as the baseline development-control
Local government’s capacity to regulate PNF will be greatly restricted by the making of RVMPs under the NVCA,
(but remained significant during the study period, prior to the making of significant numbers of RVMPs) (see
Chapter Six). Likewise its control over plantation developments has been severely limited by the Plantations and
Reafforestation Act 1999, s.47, 51.
2 Note that in 2001, DUAP assumed the trading name of Planning NSW. Then in May 2003, DUAP was merged with
DLWC to form the Department of Infrastructure, Natural Resources and Planning (DIPNR) (see Chapter Four).
This Chapter refers to DUAP because this was the name of the Department during the majority of the study period.
3 Note that in addition, RVMPs made under the NVCA are also defined as EPIs: NVCA, s.36(1).
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mechanism through which other statutes including the NVCA (see Chapter Six) and the
TSCA (see Chapter Ten) operate.
This chapter is set out as follows. First, aspects of the law applying to PNF administered
by local government are explained, including a review of the law relating to development
control by local government. Policy questions regarding the appropriateness of applying
planning law to the regulation of PNF are discussed. Research findings regarding the
regulation of PNF by local government during the study period are then presented.
Finally, we examine data regarding enforcement and compliance activity by local
government against unauthorised PNF.

INTERACTION OF NVCA AND LEPS
The regulatory regime applicable to a given private forestry proposal depends first on
whether the NVCA applies or not. If forestry is already subject to consent requirements
under the NVCA (i.e. where the PNF exemption does not apply), there is no need to
examine the LEP or SEPPs. This is because development consent cannot be required
under both NVCA and EPAA.4
In those regions where an RVMP has not yet been made,5 LEPs still have a considerable
role in areas where the PNF exemption is claimed, particularly in the North Coast and
Hunter regions (see Chapter Seven). In these cases it remains necessary to examine the
provisions of the applicable EPI, such as the LEP, Tree Preservation Order, or SEPP.
As discussed in Chapter Six, the passage of the NVCA has already marginalised local
government and LEPs in control of PNF and other vegetation clearing.6 Over time, the
importance of LEPs for control of PNF will decline further, with the progressive gazettal
of more RVMPs across the state, with the eventual scenario not too far into the future of
almost complete exclusion of local government regulation.7 The inconsistency provisions
NVCA, s. 23(1) is an inconsistency provision applying where there is no RVMP in place. It has the effect that where
consent is required under the NVCA, that requirement cannot be augmented by consent requirements from
another source, such as an EPI. Native Vegetation Conservation Bill 1997, Explanatory Note, p.5.
5 It appears that progress has been slow against targets originally set by the Minister. At the time of writing, only one
RVMP has been finalised: Mid Lachlan RVMP was made in December 2001, Drafts of the North-Lachlan Bogan
RVMP, Riverina Highlands RVMP, Moree RVMP, Walgett RVMP have been placed on public exhibition during
2002. Source: DLWC website: <www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au>, accessed 17.7.02.
6 Hurrell, J. (1998) “Clearing controls and rural councils: Growth opportunity or role reversal” 3(1) Local Government
Law Journal 135-141.
7 A further complication flows from the fact that the boundaries of RVMP regions and Local Government areas
(LGAs) are not identical. Accordingly, the average RVMP region will contain at least one LGA, and possibly up to
4

of the NVCA regarding LEPs are such that local government will be prevented from
having a role in controlling vegetation-modification even where on an objective basis an
RVMP fails to adequately regulate logging and clearing (see Chapter Five).8 If an RVMP
does not require consent for forestry, the LEP cannot impose additional requirements.9
In these regions, LEP provisions will have no effect, to the extent of the inconsistency.10
Similarly, where an RVMP requires consent, the LEP cannot impose stricter
requirements. Yet, as was explained in Chapter Five, there are some safeguards. Where
there is an applicable EPI making provision for native vegetation protection, the Act
states that the RVMP must provide “at least the same level of protection and
conservation in relation to native vegetation”.11 This is of little comfort if the applicable
LEP was inadequate for the purpose of ensuring ESFM.

LAND-USE CONTROL UNDER PART 4 EPAA
The main approach taken by councils in relation to environment protection on privatelyowned land has been a regulatory approach, involving development control.12 The main
planning tools available to local government with the capacity to affect PNF are zoning
and associated development-consent requirements.
The main planning tool employed is zoning, which aims to regulate land uses, allowing
only uses compatible with the dominant economic activities and environmental capacity
of particular areas, principally by separating incompatible land uses. Within a particular
mapped area of land, allocated a particular zoning, only specified forms of development

three. Therefore in some LGAs, the LEP provisions relating to private forestry will apply only in part of the shire,
being that portion for which an RVMP has not yet been made. LEPs may in future also have importance where
particular local government areas have been either wholly or partially excluded from the operation of the NVCA. In
these instances, where the land is not ‘state protected land’, the LEP may contain applicable consent requirements.
NVCA, Schedule 2. At the time of writing (at July 2002) there were no local government areas totally excluded from
the NVCA.
8 One concern about the development of RVMPs is the likelihood that many of them will employ a “self assessment”
methodology under which the landholder will decide whether the legislation is applicable. On the other hand,
RVMP making could raise environmental standards in some regions because if it contains a consent requirement for
PNF, this may mean increased regulatory requirements in those LGAs where consent was previously not required.
9 NVCA, s.20(1)(b).
10 NVCA, s.36(3). See also Farrier, D., Lyster, R., Pearson, L. (1999) The Environmental Law Handbook, 3rd edition, p.
369.
11 NVCA, s.27(3). Farrier, et.al. (1999) above n 10 at 368. Note that RVMPs are deemed to be EPIs for the purposes
of Part 4 of the EPAA, NVCA, s.36(1).
12 Binning, C., Young, M. (1999) Beyond Roads, Rates and Rubbish: Opportunities for Local Government to conserve native
vegetation, National R&D Program on Rehabilitation, Management and Conservation of Remnant Vegetation,
Research Report 1/99, Environment Australia, Canberra; Binning, C., Cripps, E., Young, M. (1999) Opportunity
Denied: Review of the Legislative Ability of Local Government to Conserve Native Vegetation, Research Report 2/99, National
Research and Development Program on Rehabilitation, Management and Conservation of Remnant Vegetation,
Environment Australia, Canberra.

are permitted ‘as of right’ without development consent, whilst others are either
permitted only with the consent of council or completely prohibited.
Traditionally, in planning law, development-consent requirements applied only in urban
contexts, but in recent decades consent requirements have been selectively extended to
higher-impact activities in rural areas.13 Despite the gradual evolution of local
government’s role to include environmental-protection objectives and rural conservation,
much rural land remains within general purpose zones such as the 1(a) zone in which
agriculture and usually forestry are permitted without consent.14 These activities, with
their capacity to damage native vegetation and important habitats, have traditionally been
unregulated by local government, and frequently remain so. A typical objective of a rural
1(a) zone is “to encourage the productive and efficient use of land for agriculture”.15 In
some LEPs such objects have more recently been tempered by objectives of habitat
conservation, e.g. “to protect, conserve and enhance natural and scenic resources,
wildlife habitat refuges and corridors”.16
The laissez-faire attitude of many LEPs to PNF activity within the rural 1(a) zone reflects
deeply-held attitudes in rural Australia that stem from ‘property rights’ ideologies, that
rural production activities are ‘as of right’ uses of the land.17 There is a perception that
requiring development consent for activities on private land, particularly forestry and
agriculture, is not legitimate as it implies a violation of rights and privileges traditionally
associated with freehold ownership.
The Australian Forest Growers suggest that the “requirement for planning consent sends
unnecessarily negative connotations of forestry…” Further, they argue that: “The
variation between consent requirements from one local government area to another, the
possibility of frequent change in consent requirements, the risk of refusal of consent and
the potential for onerous consent conditions to be applied are all major impediments to

Farrier et.al. (1999) above n 10 at 376.
For example, Bellingen LEP 2003, cl.11 development control table: forestry is permitted without consent within zone
1(a1) agricultural protection zone, 1(a2) secondary agriculture zone.
15 Cowra LEP, Zoning table, zone 1(a).
16 Nambucca LEP 1995, zone 1(a1).
17 Bruskin, S. (2002) Submission to the Private Native Forestry Reference Group, Institute of Foresters Australia, Northern
NSW Branch, 24.5.02, 5pp at 3. See also: Australian Forest Growers (2002) A Three Tier Option for an Exemption for
Private Forestry: Submission to DLWC Private Native Forestry Reference Group, 8.5.02, 6pp.
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investment in plantation development or the management of regrowth forests.”18 They
assert that PNF should be recognised as an ‘existing use’ that pre-exists planning
requirements (p.29, below).

Plantation forestry and LEPs
A significant proportion of LEP zoning tables distinguish between plantation forestry
and other forestry.19 For example many LEPs state that pine plantations require consent,
but other forestry or plantations involving native species do not require consent.20 Such
requirements are now largely obsolete, given that local government’s role has been
reduced by the Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999 (PRA). Industry representatives
interviewed stated that strict LEP requirements constituted a disincentive to plantation
investment.21 ‘Authorised plantations’ are exempt from all of the provisions of the
EPAA22 and associated EPIs.23

When is Part 4 consent required for PNF?
Where the development consent requirements of the NVCA do not apply, the
applicable regime depends on the content of relevant EPIs made under the EPAA,
principally the LEP. The consent requirements of LEPs vary according to the local
government area in which forestry is proposed, and the zoning of the land. Other
consent requirements may also apply because the land is mapped under a SEPP for
Australian Forest Growers NSW Chapter (1999) Promotion of private forestry in NSW, internet publication URL
<http://www.afg.asn.au/Site%20files/policy.html>, 18 February 1999 Authors: Francis Clarke, Brian Furrer,
Accessed 20.3.02.
19 Elsewhere, other LEPs may require consent for forestry, but not for ‘farm forestry’ or ‘farm wood-lots’, or “the
planting of trees for wind breaks or firewood, or for other purposes incidental to farming” : Culcairn LEP 1998. The
Mulwaree LEP, in the rural 1(a) zone permits “tree planting (including planting for the purpose of growing farm
woodlots of up to 10ha each), but not including planting for the purpose of forestry” Mulwaree LEP 1995, Cl.9
(zoning table)
20 More recent LEPs were drafted to encourage tree farming and plantation development, and to distinguish that
activity from harvesting of native forests. For example, in the Culcairn LEP 1998, “tree farming” is permitted
without consent in the Rural 1(a) Zone. By implication other forms of forestry require development consent.
However, the planting of trees for purposes incidental to farming such as the planting of trees for windbreaks or
firewood are not included within the definition of forestry in the plan and therefore do not require consent.
21 Interview, 28.2.00, Mr. Hugh Daneke, Joint Venture plantations officer, State Forests of NSW, in person, at ANU
Farm Forestry Symposium. Along with requirements for s.49 contributions relating to roads, which the Plantations
and Reafforestation Act 1999 enables councils to levy in relation to plantation development.
22 PRA, s.47. Specifically, consent under Parts 4 or 5 EPAA is not required for authorised plantations or for ‘exempt
farm forestry’: s.47(2)(a),(b).
23 The PRA states that “plantation operations carried out on an authorised plantation cannot be prohibited or
restricted” by an EPI: see PRA, s.47(2)(c). A debate took place over a proposed amendment that would have
prevented clearing in areas zoned environment protection under an LEP. It was rejected by government members
who argued that the NVCA states that an RVMP must provide for the same level of environmental protection as
that provided by an EPI. Hansard, Council, 30.11.99, p.124. Tree preservation orders made by local councils have
no application to plantations authorised under the PRA, as the Act excludes plantations from the impact of the
EPAA: see PRA, s.47. Nor can TPOs apply to clearing in the course of plantation establishment where that clearing
is taking place on authorised plantations or as ‘exempt farm forestry’.
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particular environmental protection, e.g. SEPP 44 (koala habitat) or SEPP 26 (littoral
rainforests).24
There are three possible categories into which a development may fall under these EPIs prohibited development,25 development permissible only with consent,26 and
development for which consent is not required.27 Development that does not require
consent must still be carried out “in accordance with” the terms of relevant EPIs.28 If
consent is not required for the proposed undertaking, then PNF29 may be, but is not
automatically regulated by Part 5 EPAA.30 Part 5 may be triggered where an environment
protection licence is obtained which authorises non-point-source water pollution from
new forestry works (as opposed to existing works).31
In practice, the main determinant of whether consent is required or not is the zoning of
the land in question under the LEP. In relation to PNF, the most relevant zone is Rural
1(a), the main rural zoning within which much of the forested private land in NSW
falls.32 Many LEPs explicitly state that forestry does not require consent in the Rural 1(a)
zone.33 (A survey of 107 LEPs was conducted and the results are set out in Appendix
9.1). However, numerous LEPs contain a variety of environmental protection zones

Farrier et.al., (1999) above n 10 at 358, 360.
EPAA, s.31, 76B.
26 EPAA, s.76A.
27 EPAA, s.26(1)(b), 76(1).
28 EPAA, s.76(1).
29 A point of comparison between the legal requirements applicable to forestry on private and public land is that for a
long period during the 1990s, there was a requirement that EIS be produced for public land forestry operations
(within State Forests). However EIS have never been produced for PNF under NSW law, although this obligation
also probably applied to larger PNF operations. Since changes introduced by the Forestry and National Park Estate Act
1998 (‘FNPE Act’), provisions of Part 5 EPAA no longer apply to State Forests, and as a result this difference has
dissolved. Parts 4 & 5 EPAA do not apply to public forestry covered by an integrated forestry operations approval,
nor do they apply to the granting of such approval. FNPE Act, s.36(1) states that Part 5 EPAA does not apply,
whilst s.36(2) states that an EPI cannot affect forestry operations subject to that Act.
30 If an undertaking requires development consent or is a prohibited development, then it is not an activity for the
purposes of Part 5 EPAA. Severn SC v Water Resources Commission (1982) 47 LGRA 257; Kindergarten Union NSW v
Sydney City Council (1984) 51 LGRA 381.
31 Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997, s.52(2), Regulations may make provision excluding the issue of
environment protection licences from the operation of Part 5 EPAA. POEO (General) Regulations 1998, r. 45
states: “The EPA is not a determining authority … in respect of an approval …that consists of the issue of an
environment protection licence … so long as the licence authorises only the same or substantially the same work or
activity, and level of work or activity, as was being carried out immediately before the application for the issue of the
licence was made.” See also EPAA, s.76(1) (Attached Note). Part 5 will apply if the project meets the definition of
“activity” set out in s.110(1) to be carried out by a public authority or by a private authority, where some additional
form of government approval is required. See Farrier, D. (1993) Environmental Law Handbook, p.350.
32 Zone 1(f) is not relevant to private land forestry as it applies to State Forest and other Crown timber lands classified
under the Forestry Act 1916.
33 The Richmond River LEP states explicitly that forestry is permissible without consent within 3 of 4 rural zones.(
cl.9) Ditto the Copmanhurst LEP 1990 in the Rural 1a zone. In the Nambucca LEP 1995, cl.11, forestry is explicitly
permitted without consent in the Rural 1(a1) zone, as it is in the Tenterfield LEP 1996, cl.9.
24
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(zone 7(x)) within which forestry is subject to consent or prohibited.34 The ‘forestry
zone’ (‘1(f)’) typically included within LEPs is not applicable to private forestry as it only
applies to public forests managed under the Forestry Act 1916.35
Under Part 4 EPAA, anything that meets the definition of ‘development’ may require
consent depending on the applicable EPIs. If the undertaking amounts to ‘development’,
then consent is required when an EPI so specifies.36 Will forestry meet the definition of
development? Most LEPs put the question beyond doubt by explicitly specifying forestry
within the zoning table as one of the controlled categories of development. The question
of exactly which activities are controlled turns around the definition of “forestry”. Many
LEPs adopt the Model Provisions, which define it as “arboriculture, silviculture, forest
protection, the cutting, dressing and preparation, other than in a sawmill, of wood and
other forest products and the establishment of roads required for the removal of wood
and forest products and for forest protection.”37 Forestry is defined within many LEPs in
similar terms.38
Another scenario is presented in LEPs where the zoning table does not explicitly state
whether consent requirements attach to forestry. Here, forestry is neither specified as not
requiring consent, nor listed as a prohibited development. It falls within an unnamed
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For example, forestry is prohibited in Hastings LEP 2001, Zone 7 (h) Environment Protection - Habitat, but
permitted with consent in Zone 7 (d) Environmental Protection - Scenic. In the Kiama LEP 1996 forestry is
prohibited in Zone No 7 (e) Rural Environmental Protection (Hinterland) and Zone No 7 (l) Rural Environmental
Protection (General), however in the former zone “tree plantations and harvesting” are permitted with consent. In
the Tweed LEP 2000, forestry is permitted with consent in Zone 7(1) Environmental Protection - Habitat zone, but
faces a special onus of proof of necessity and consistency with plan and zone objectives against clause 8. See also:
Farrier, D. (1993) above n 31 at 258.
“This zone identifies land dedicated as State forest and managed by the Forestry Commission of New South
Wales.”
EPAA, s.4(1), 76A(1). The EPAA declares in s.76A(1) “If an environmental planning instrument provides that
specified development [eg. forestry] may not be carried out except with development consent, a person must not
carry the development out on land to which the provision applies unless such a consent has been obtained and is in
force.”
EPAA Model Provisions, 1980, cl.4(1); Farrier, D. (1993) above n 31 at 68, 81. EPAA. s.33., See also s.117(2)
Direction regarding adoption of the Model Provisions. “Forestry operations” is a broad term encompassing many
different activities which in common usage might include clearfelling, selective harvesting, and other silvicultural
management techniques such as thinning, spraying of herbicides insecticides or fungicides, burning, the application
of mammal poisons such as ‘1080’, as well as techniques of plantation establishment such as ripping, planting and
direct seeding.
As defined in the Dictionary contained in Great Lakes LEP, ‘forestry’ means “the cultivation, growing and tending
of trees and shrubs, and includes forest protection, the cutting, dressing and preparation of wood and other forest
products otherwise than in a sawmill, and any construction or maintenance of roads required for the removal of
wood, forest products and forest protection.” For example, the same definition is applied in the Singleton LEP.

residue of developments requiring consent (the ‘innominate use’ category).39 In this
situation forestry will require consent only if it amounts to “development”.40
A strong case can be made that most PNF will constitute development for the purposes
of this test, and therefore Part 4 consent requirements will apply. If the LEP employs
the terminology “forestry” elsewhere, or adopts the Model Provisions and its definitions
which themselves define forestry, this implies that forestry is also intended to be
regulated as a development within innominate use categories. Actions controlled by such
environment protection provisions in an EPI automatically amount to ‘development’. 41
In cases where forestry is not mentioned at all in the LEP and Model Provisions are not
incorporated, a review of the definitional provisions of the Act itself (s.4) suggests that
forestry would fall within the definition of development as “the carrying out of a work in,
on, or over land”42 and therefore Part 4 consent requirements may apply. 43 The case law
suggests that most forestry operations will amount to a work.44

Joint-venture forestry and the Crown clause
With the recent expansion of plantation development by the Forestry Commission under
joint venture (JV) with landholders, rules contained in Part 5A, EPAA ‘Development by
the Crown’, are relevant. This Part states that a consent authority, when considering a
DA made by or on behalf of the Crown, must not refuse the application except with
written approval of the Minister for Planning, nor impose a condition on consent, except

Example taken from Deniliquin LEP 1997, cl. 9, Rural 1(a) zone.
An example is the Great Lakes LEP 1996, cl.8 (which says that consent is required for all development not included
in items 2 or 4 - the categories of consent not required or outright prohibition).
41 Therefore section 26 provides a means to bypass the previously restrictive definition of development. Section 4(f)
says that anything regulated under s.26 constitutes development - and therefore requires consent. Farrier, et.al.(1999)
above n 10 at 166.
42 As defined in the Dictionary contained in Great Lakes LEP, ‘forestry’ means “the cultivation, growing and tending
of trees and shrubs, and includes forest protection, the cutting, dressing and preparation of wood and other forest
products otherwise than in a sawmill, and any construction or maintenance of roads required for the removal of
wood, forest products and forest protection.” For example, the same definition is applied in the Singleton LEP.
43 EPAA, s.26(b).
44 A significant body of case law relating to the interpretation of Part 5 EPAA has decided that forestry is an “activity”
requiring assessment under that Part. The definition of “activity” contained in Part 5 is identical to that of
“development” under Part 4. EPAA, s.110(1), s.4(1). By analogy, the case law regarding the meaning of “activity” is
relevant to determining whether forestry operations constitute “development”. In Jarasius [No.1] it was accepted by
the parties that the various components of intensive timber harvesting operations in a State Forest were ‘activities’
within the meaning of Part 5 of the Act. Jarasius v Forestry Commission of NSW [No.1] (1988) 71 LGRA 79 at 90.
Similarly, in Evans & Spicer v Forestry Commission “clearing land of timber” was held to constitute “an activity”
attracting Part 5 EPAA. This case was an appeal against the rejection of a licence application for permission to clear
vegetation on leased Crown land under the Forestry Act 1916. A majority of the Court of Appeal ruled that the
vegetation clearance was “an activity” for the purposes of s.111 of the EPAA.
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with the written approval of the Minister or the applicant.45 These JV initiatives in some
cases involve logging of native forest prior to plantation establishment. In the case of
private forest logged by the Commission under a JV contract, the Crown clause may
apply, thus requiring that approval be granted. “The Crown” includes public authorities
and public utilities.46 The Crown clause will apply to JVs in which the Commission
applies for consent (which will normally be the case).47 The application of the PRA to
these scenarios will depend on whether prior logging is defined as plantation activity
under that Act.

DEVELOPMENT CONTROL AND PLANNING
Determination of development applications
Where development consent is required, it must be obtained by means of a development
application to the consent authority (in most cases the local council).48 It is an offence to
carry out development on land that is subject to a requirement for development consent
without a valid consent, or to carry out development outside the scope of that consent
and its conditions.49
The consent authority can determine the application by granting consent unconditionally,
granting consent subject to conditions50, or refusing consent.51 Particular provisions apply
to the attachment of conditions to a development consent, but principally these are that
the conditions must relate back to the statutory factors for consideration listed in s.79C.52
If consent is granted, then the development must be carried out in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the consent and in accordance with the terms of the relevant
EPIs.

EPAA, Part 5A, but particularly s.115I.
EPAA Regulation 2000, r.226(1).
47 Farrier et.al.(1999) above n 10 at 189-190; Hogg, P.W. (1989) Liability of the Crown, 2nd edition, Law Book Company,
Sydney, at pp.247-264.
48 EPAA, s.76A, 78A(1).
49 EPAA, ss.78A(1), 125.
50 EPAA, s.80A(1).
51 EPAA, s.80(1)(b).
52 EPAA, s.80A(1).
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Matters for consideration
The EPAA, in Part 4, Division 2, sets out the decision-making procedure regarding
development proposals requiring consent. Having received a development application
(‘DA’), a local council must “take into consideration” relevant matters from the range of
decision-making factors listed in s.79C of the Act53 as well as those listed in the EPAA
Regulation.54 These include the provisions of any applicable EPI, the likely impacts of
the development (environmental, economic or social), the suitability of the site for
development, and the public interest.55 Decisions must also be made considering the
objects of the Act, which include, to encourage “the protection of the environment” and
“ecologically sustainable development”…”56 Following amendments in 1997 the heads of
consideration in s.79C were dramatically narrowed from 31 matters to a shorter, less
precise list of five points.57 Of particular relevance to PNF was the fact that the previous
considerations included s.90(1)(n) requiring that DAs be considered in light of “whether
any trees or other vegetation on the land should be preserved”.
Important amongst the provisions of applicable EPIs that must be considered are the
stated objectives of LEPs, as well as any objectives attached to specific zones. Many
LEPs contain quite comprehensive general, and zone-specific environmental protection
objectives, which provide some guidance and structure to decision-making. Many LEPs
also list a range of additional specific environmental protection considerations for
consent decision-makers, such as “the protection of areas of nature conservation
significance”.58 Some go further, with vegetation protection provisions that impose a
rebuttable presumption against the grant of consent to clear vegetation. Such clauses
mean that greater weight will be placed on vegetation and habitat-retention matters than
is usually the case under s.79C.59

EPAA, s.79C(1).
The EPAA Regulation 2000, cl.92 which replaced EPAA Regulation 1994, cl.65 now no longer requires councils to
take into account “the effect of the development on… the habitat of any…protected fauna, and the means to be
employed to protect them from harm, or to mitigate the harm.” as was previously the case, but merely requires
specified councils to take account of the NSW Coastal Policy 1997: A Sustainable Future for the New South Wales Coast.
55 EPAA, s.79C(1).
56 EPAA, s.5(a).
57 The heads of consideration were previously contained in EPAA, s.90.
58 The Cooma LEP 1999 requires consideration of “the protection of areas of nature conservation significance or of
high scenic or recreational value, and of items of heritage significance,” as well as soil erosion and the effect of the
development on vegetation, timber production, land capability and water resources. Cooma LEP (Rural)1999,
Schedule 2.
59 Farrier, D., Byron, N., (1992) A Review of the Legislative and Regulatory Framework Affecting Forest Management on Private
and Leasehold Lands, Consultants’ Report to the Resource Assessment Commission Forest and Timber Inquiry, No.
FTC 92/20, RAC, Canberra, cites Tumut and Tumbarumba LEPs, at p.25.
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Another integral part of the assessment of PNF operations under Part 4 is an assessment
of the likely impact of forestry on threatened species and their habitat against a statutory
eight-part test with a view to determining whether an SIS should be prepared for
consideration.60 When making consent decisions by reference to s.79C EPAA,61 consent
authorities are also assisted by non-binding guidelines issued by DUAP.62 These
guidelines recommend that councils take into account “flora and fauna”, including the
“maintenance of biodiversity”.63
The scope of decision-making obligations of consent authorities has been determined in
numerous appeal decisions, most arising from judicial review challenges by third-party
objectors.64 Because of statutory restrictions on merits review, third-party objectors often
attempt to run arguments in judicial review proceedings that sail as close as possible to
merits review - i.e. Wednesbury unreasonableness - a decision so unreasonable that no
reasonable decision-maker could have reached it.65 The record shows there is usually
significant difficulty in proving a breach of s.79C on this basis.66

Eight factors listed in s.5A EPAA must be taken into account in order to decide whether there is likely to be a
significant effect on threatened species, populations or ecological communities, or their habitats. Consideration of
the likely impact of logging against the eight-part test is discussed in Chapter Nine regarding the TSCA.
61 Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (NSW) (DUAP) (1998) Guide to s.79C, DUAP, Sydney. These matters
include the following: the provisions of EPIs and draft EPIs, environmental impacts, wilderness, a range of factors
relating to threatened species, soil erosion, public submissions, the public interest.
62 Note that the Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (DUAP) was re-named Planning NSW during 2001.
63 The DUAP guidelines present 21 possible considerations including numerous sub-factors. DUAP (1998) above n 61.
These guidelines exhibit even-handedness in balancing environment and ecology - whilst one heading is “flora and
fauna” including “maintenance of biodiversity”, another head of consideration is “economic impact” including
“economic income” and “employment generation”. (at pp. 6 & 8)
64 Third-party objector appellants are entitled only to commence judicial review proceedings to challenge the legality of
consent decision-making processes, ie. whether correct procedures were followed or whether there was an error of
law, rather than whether the decision was correct and preferable. Decisions of a consent authority can be appealed
to the Land and Environment Court in merits appeal (Class 1) or judicial review (Class 4) proceedings. Third party
enforcement is facilitated by EPAA, s.123. However, merits appeal proceedings are usually only available to
development applicants. Unless the development is designated development (which private forestry is most unlikely
to be. A development is designated if it falls within any of the categories listed in Schedule 3 of the Regulations or is
considered to be a designated development under the terms of the relevant LEP. Designated developments are
generally 'high impact' developments, requiring an EIS and providing for public participation rights.
65 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. The High Court ruled in Minister for
Aboriginal Affairs v Peko Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 that “A court must proceed with caution when reviewing an
administrative decision on the ground that the administrative body did not properly weigh up the relevant
considerations, lest it exceed its supervisory role by reviewing the decision on its merits.”
66 Farrier et.al. (1999) above n 10 at 203-4. The decision must have been completely “unreasonable”, that is, “so devoid
of plausible justification that no reasonable person could have taken that course”. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 at 290. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR
611 at 626 Gleeson CJ and McHugh J said: “Someone who disagrees strongly with someone else's process of
reasoning on an issue of fact may express such disagreement by describing the reasoning as `illogical' or
`unreasonable’… If these are merely emphatic ways of saying that the reasoning is wrong then they may have no
particular legal consequence.”.
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Section 79C does not indicate that particular weight must be given to environmental
factors above social or economic factors.67 If a council explicitly gives lower priority to
environmental considerations, this is lawful, provided that the consent authority can
establish that it in fact gave consideration to all relevant factors listed in s.79C. There is
no rule stating that if a proposal raises a serious issue in relation to one of the s.79C
factors, consent must be refused.68 Further, even if a development raises a question of
the application of the principles of ESD, such as the precautionary principle, there is
nothing to say that these principles outweigh the application of other considerations in
s.79C.69
For a consent to be valid the council must have taken into consideration (i.e. merely
considered) the factors in s.79C, where they are relevant,70 and no irrelevant matters.71
There must be “proper, genuine and realistic consideration upon the merits” by the
decision-maker of relevant considerations.72 The question of the quality of consideration
of s.79C matters required of a consent authority was recently addressed by the Court of
Appeal in Weal v Bathurst CC, where Priestley JA held that “taking relevant matters into
consideration called for more than simply adverting to them. There had to be an
understanding of the matters and the significance of the decision to be made about them,
and a process of evaluation, sufficient to warrant the description of the matters being
taken into consideration.”73 On this basis, a ‘tick the box’ approach to implementation of
s.79C is not appropriate.
Although LEPs contain environmental protection objectives there are often
inconsistencies with other zonal objectives aimed at economic development.74
Particularly within the general rural 1(a) zone - with a few notable exceptions –the
drafting of most LEPs fails to ensure that economic objectives do not outweigh less
Parramatta City Council v Hale (1982) 47 LGRA 319.
Bauer Holdings v Sydney City Council (1981) 48 LGRA 356.
69 Greenpeace Australia Ltd v Redbank Power Ltd (1994) 86 LGERA 143 (Pearlman J).
70 Parramatta City Council v Hale (1982) 47 LGRA 319. See also Randwick Municipal Council v Manousaki (1988) 66 LGRA
330; Bauer Holdings Pty Ltd v Sydney City Council (1981) 48 LGRA 356.
71 The classic case of invalidation on the grounds of failure to take into account relevant considerations is Parramatta
CC v Hale where a consent was invalidated by the Land and Environment Court because councillors failed to seek
the advice of their planning staff. See: Farrier et.al. (1999) above n 10 at 56-58; Weal v Bathurst City Council (2000) 111
LGERA 181 at 185.
72 Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 14 ALD 291 at 292, per Gummow J.
73 Weal v Bathurst City Council (2000) 111 LGERA 181 at 201 per Priestley JA at para 80; citing Parramatta City Council v
Hale (1982) 47 LGRA 319, King v Great Lakes Shire Council (1986) 58 LGRA 366 at 384; Currey v Sutherland Shire
Council (1998) 100 LGERA 365 at 374-5.
74 Kelly, A.; Farrier, D. (1996) “Local Government and Biodiversity Conservation in New South Wales”, 16(4)
Environmental and Planning Law Journal, October, 374-389 at 380-382.
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tangible environmental concerns, such as the problem of biodiversity loss through
habitat destruction.75
There is a broad discretion available to councils in consent decision-making. This is
reinforced by the case law regarding the weight that must be accorded to environmental
protection objectives of LEPs.76 The Land and Environment Court has generally been
unreceptive to proceedings claiming that particular consent decisions were at odds with
zonal objectives contained in LEPs. In Schaffer Corp Ltd v Hawkesbury SC, Pearlman CJ set
a notably high hurdle. Her Honour held: “a development will generally be consistent with
the objectives if it is not antipathetic to them. It is not necessary to show that the
development promotes or is ancillary to those objectives, nor even that it is
compatible.”77 Nevertheless this decision has been criticised, and may not represent good
law.78

Role of ESD objectives in decision-making of councils
Does NSW planning law require councils making decisions on PNF proposals to take
into account principles of ESD, such as the precautionary principle? Following
amendments in 1997, the objects of the EPAA now include “to encourage…ecologically
sustainable development.”79 However, the Act does not direct that any consent decisions
arrived at must be in conformity with the ESD principles.80 Consideration of the ESD
principles (which are not included in s.79C) must be read into the decision-making
process from the objects clause of the Act, via general principles of statutory
interpretation and administrative law.81 It appears to be on this basis that Fisher
Kelly, A. (1999) “Councils, Costs and Zonal Objectives: the Poverty of Technical Disputes under NSW Planning
Law”, paper presented to the Land and Environment Court and Environmental Law 1979-1999 Conference, 27-28 August
1999, pub. Nature Conservation Council NSW, Sydney.
76 Kelly and Farrier (1996) above n 74.
77 Schaffer Corp Pty Ltd v Hawkesbury SC (1992) 77 LGRA 21 at 27.
78 Farrier et.al. (1999) above n 10 at 92 argue that the decision represents a mis-application of the Court of Appeal
decision in Coffs Harbour Environment Centre Inc v Coffs Harbour City Council (1991) 74 LGRA 185, per Clarke J.
79 EPAA, s.5(a)(vii). See also ss.79B(5) consideration by DG of NPWS in concurrence decision making, s.112D, 112E.
80 Stein, P., Mahony, S. (1999) “Incorporating Sustainability Principles in Legislation”, in Leadbeter, P., Gunningham,
N., Boer, B. (eds.) Environmental Outlook No.3: Law and Policy, Federation Press, Sydney, 57 at 72. By contrast with the
EPAA, the Water Management Act 2000 explicitly states that its objects include the far more active objective, “to apply
the principles of ecologically sustainable development” [emphasis added]. Further, water management committees
under that Act are under a statutory duty to exercise their functions “consistently with the principles of ESD”:
s.14(3).
81 The only section of Part 4 of the Act which explicitly mentions ESD is the clause relating to concurrence decision
making by the DG of NPWS regarding threatened species matters. In deciding whether or not to grant concurrence
to a proposed development consent which has involved SIS preparation, the D-G of NPWS is obliged to take into
account the principles of ESD. EPAA, s.79B(5)(g); 112D(g) refers to the principles of ESD as defined in Protection of
the Environment Administration Act 1991, s.6(2). Further, the term ESD is not defined in the EP&A Act, by contrast to
other NSW legislation which defines the term by reference to the PROTEA Act 1991.
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concluded that the objects clause in s.5 EPAA “represent[s] a constraint on decision
making”.82
In an attempt to bolster the relatively restrained drafting of s.5 EPAA, many LEPs and
some SEPPs include additional reference to the ESD principles. Also, obligations to
consider ESD arise from the Local Government Act 1993 (‘LGA’). Councils must consider
the expressed purposes of that Act, which “require councils, councillors and council
employees to have regard to the principles of …[ESD] in carrying out their
responsibilities”.83
The lack of an explicit requirement to make decisions in accordance with the principles
of ESD within the EPAA leads to a conclusion that the Act is not sufficient to ensure
compliance with the principles of ESFM set out in Chapter Five - principles which,
together with the scientific literature on native forest ecology, dictate a precautionary
approach to forest management.
Montreal Process criteria dictate that in order for ESFM to be achieved, legislation must
provide for “forest planning and environmental impact assessment”.84 The specific test is
criterion 7.1(b), being the extent to which the legal framework supports ESFM by
providing for periodic forest-related planning, assessment and policy review. In NSW,
this responsibility is shared between local government under the EPAA, and by DLWC
under the NVCA.
In those situations where the PNF exemption is claimed and local government does not
require consent, there is clearly a failure against criterion 7.1(b). Yet in other situations,
where some level of assessment takes place, the criterion is not sufficiently specific to
enable a determination of whether the legal framework supports the attainment of
ESFM.

Fisher, D. (2000) “Considerations, Principles and Objectives in Environmental Management in Australia”, 17(6)
Environmental and Planning Law Journal (December) 487-501 at 493.
83 Local Government Act 1993, s.7(e). The principles of ESD are defined in the Protection of the Environment Administration
Act 1991, s.6(2). Although one of these principles is the precautionary principle, it is unlikely to have much impact
as again the requirement is to merely consider such matters.
84 Montreal Process criteria 7.1.b.
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ADMINISTRATION OF THE EPAA
Consent requirements relating to forestry contained in LEPs
Research was conducted to determine council requirements for approval of PNF within
LEPs, particularly within the Rural 1(a) zone. A total of 107 different local councils were
surveyed to determine their consent requirements in the main rural zone, the 1(a) zone.
A map in Appendix 9.1 indicates the councils surveyed, and a detailed chart lists the
requirements of each council surveyed, as well as providing an explanation of the survey
methodology.

Table 1 Summary of consent requirements
for private forestry in the 1(a) zone by
DUAP region
DUAP Region
North Coast
Hunter and Central Coast
Illawarra and South Coast
Western (portion only)85
Sydney
(rural-urban fringe)86
Total

Percentage
of
requiring consent
15.8% (n=19)
38.4% (n=13)
85.7% (n=14)
27.1% (n=59)
100% (n=2)

councils

38.5% (n=107)

State-wide, the majority of councils surveyed (69 of 107, i.e. 64.5%) during the study
period did not require the grant of development consent before forestry could proceed in
the general rural zone (1(a)) (Table 1). On a regional basis, the majority of councils in the
North Coast Region (84.2%) and Central Coast and Hunter regions (61.5%) and the
parts of the Western Region (72.9%) surveyed did not require applications for
development consent for private forestry, unlike the majority of councils on the South
Coast and Illawarra Region (85.7%). 87 Some councils changed their LEP requirements
during the course of the study period.88 Detailed findings are contained in Appendix 9.1.

Appendix 9.1 explains the survey methodology. In summary, only a portion of Western and Central Division
councils were surveyed because not all LGAs are sites of PNF activity.
86 The councils surveyed were Hawkesbury and Wollondilly. See Appendix 9.1.
87 A combination of research techniques was used in order to obtain the data including review of documents at DUAP
headquarters, Sydney, review of LEPs on the Australian Legal Information Institute internet site, corroborated by interviews
with strategic planners, in some cases confirmed by writing to Council. By way of comparison, an earlier survey of local
government controls over PNF appears in a 1993 Commonwealth EIS for licences to export woodchips from NSW MidNorth coast. Of 23 respondents in the Mid North Coast region, 13 LGAs required no consent for intensive forestry for
woodchips within the Rural 1(a) zone. Within 43.5% of surveyed LGAs, consent was required (cf 41.7% in the MidCoast/Hunter in the survey above). Commonwealth Environment Protection Agency, Environment Assessment Branch
(1994) Environmental Assessment Report on the Export by Sawmillers Exports pty ltd. of woodchips produced from silvicultural operations in
State Forests in Northern NSW and from private forestry operations, DEST, Canberra, July, 46 pp.
88 Between 1997-2002 one council (Bellingen) changed its position on consent for PNF several times (Interview, Alf
Said, Office of Private Forestry, at DLWC Bridge St, Sydney, 26.4.02, in person). See also Radio interview, ABC
Mid North Coast, Port Macquarie, Graham Robinson 9.07am, 4 September 2002, Interview with Jillian Cranny,
Bellingen Shire Council about the Council decision to remove development consent requirements for logging on
private rural land. According to a transcript, Cranny said “235 people were opposed to this move and it's a big issue
for Bellingen community. This decision would mean council would lose control over haulage trucks using local
narrow roads. One of the small remaining koala communities is in this shire.”
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Environmental protection zones
In order to accommodate conservation objectives, councils have, to varying degrees,
mapped land within specific-purpose ‘environmental protection zones’ (‘EP zones’,
zones 7 (x)). Section 26(e) EPAA permits councils to make provision for ‘protecting or
preserving trees or vegetation’ within an LEP. Section 26(e1) permits provision for
protection and conservation of flora and fauna, particularly threatened species, within
LEPs. Indeed, a Ministerial direction under s.117 EPAA requires councils to create EP
zones within their LEPs.89 The number and type of EP zones included within LEPs
varies widely from council to council.90 They include vegetation conservation, habitat,
scientific, scenic/escarpment, water catchment, wildlife refuge, coastal lands protection,
wetlands, and archaeological zones.
Although the existence of such zonings shows recognition of the need for environmental
protection, the extent to which they restrict PNF in environmentally-sensitive areas may
be limited. Despite EP zones taking a more stringent approach than that typically applied
in the rural 1(a) zone, the majority of plans still permit forestry subject to development
consent91 rather than prohibiting it altogether,92 according to a survey of LEPs in the
Northern Region undertaken by the author.93 Only 41.2% prohibited forestry within EP
(habitat) zones, while 58.8% permitted it with consent. Two other LEPs contained no
EP zones at all.94 In other regions, in a minority of LEPs, forestry is permitted without
consent within EP zonings.95
It states that where a plan applies to an area “which is of ecological significance for the local government area, the
plan shall contain provisions to facilitate the conservation of that …area.” Kelly, A.; Farrier, D. (1996) above n 74 at
377.
90 Are broadly based on the zoning nomenclature set out in a 1976 Planning and Environment Commission circular.
Planning and Environment Commission NSW (1976) Circular No.13, Planning and Environment Commission
NSW, Sydney. The circular suggests ten environment protection zones and six different rural zones.
91 Forestry permitted with consent in Great Lakes LEP 1996, zone 7(c) scenic protection zone; Gunnedah LEP 1998,
zone 7(d) Environment Protection – scenic zone; Snowy River LEP 1997, zone 7 - environmental protection,
cl.19(3). Forestry permitted with consent in Hastings LEP 2001, Zone 7 (d) Environmental Protection – Scenic. In
the Tweed LEP 2000, forestry is permitted with consent in Zone 7(1) Environmental Protection - Habitat zone, but
faces a special onus of proof of necessity and consistency with plan and zone objectives against clause 8.
92 For example, forestry is prohibited in Hastings LEP 2001, Zone 7 (h) Environment Protection – Habitat; and also in
the Great Lakes LEP 1996, Zone 7(a), Wetlands and Littoral Rainforest Zone, and 7(b) Conservation zone. In the
Kiama LEP 1996 forestry is prohibited in Zone No 7 (e) Rural Environmental Protection (Hinterland) and Zone
No 7 (l) Rural Environmental Protection (General), however in the former zone “tree plantations and harvesting”
are permitted with consent. See also: Farrier, D. (1993) above n 31 at 258.
93 Only a geographically limited survey (Northern Region of Department of Planning operations) into the requirements
of EP zonings was conducted, on the basis that the most concentrated area of PNF activity in NSW is within that
region.
94 Kyogle operates under an IDO, which contains no EP zones. Interview, Strategic Planner, 30.1.02. Similarly, the
Grafton LEP cl.9 contains no EP zones.
95 Singleton LEP, Part 8 “Environment Protection and Nature Conservation”. Indexed on internet at Austlii. In
making such comparisons there is inevitably some difficulty because of variations between LEPs regarding the types
of EP zone. In order to standardise this survey, a focus was directed at ‘habitat conservation’ zones or similar, where
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It is somewhat incongruous for LEPs to permit clearing and forestry within EP zones,
especially where these are directed at habitat or vegetation conservation. For example,
the Nambucca LEP’s Environment protection - vegetation conservation zone 7(b) permits the “clearing of native vegetation” if development consent is obtained. Similar
questions are raised by environment protection - water catchment zonings in certain
LEPs that permit forestry without consent.96
In some LEPs, however, council’s discretion to grant consent is restricted by a listing of
additional environmental factors requiring consideration. In other LEPs, an “onus of
proof” approach is taken, where consent may only be granted if environmental impacts
will be minimal, or if the development cannot feasibly be undertaken elsewhere.97
For example, in the Nambucca LEP, an additional control exists in the form of a specific
clause of the LEP relating to vegetation protection.98 This clause permits native
vegetation clearance associated with forestry and agriculture in all of the rural zones
without consent except where (in summary) the land is steep, comprises a wildlife
corridor, or has particular scenic values. In these areas consent is required, but council’s
discretion to grant that consent is constrained by mandatory consideration of specified
environmental factors.99
Ultimately the question is whether EP zones are sufficient to achieve their environmental
goals. Knox and Francis, in a detailed survey of four coastal LEPs, criticised the
adequacy of EP zones, as they:
possible. However there is some difficulty in making such comparisons of any true reliability because of the
variation within types of EP zone within LEPs. Within a single plan, forestry may be permitted with consent in one
EP zone, yet prohibited in another. In the Richmond River LEP 1992, cl.9 forestry is permissible with consent in the
7(b) Scenic/Escarpment zone, but prohibited in the 7(c) Flora and Fauna Zone. In order to standardise this survey,
a focus was set onto EP zones directed at ‘habitat conservation’ or similar, where these existed within plans.
Attention on wetland or coastal EP zones was minimised.
96 Nambucca LEP zone 1(a3) Rural (Upper Water Catchment). This is not an isolated example. Similarly, in the Glen
Innes LEP, cl 9, in the Environment Protection - Water Catchment Zone, the only EP zone, forestry is permitted
without consent.
97 For example, Tweed LEP, zone 7(l), “Environment Protection – Habitat”.
98 Nambucca LEP 1995, cl.18.
99 Nambucca LEP 1995, cl. 18(2),(5). Another approach is taken by the Culcairn LEP, which states that development
for the purpose of forestry is not permitted without consent on land declared to be ‘environmentally sensitive land’.
A further layer of protection is added on such land, preventing clearing of such land without consent. Within that
LEP, to “clear land means to remove trees and other vegetation or bush rock from the land, but does not include the
eradication of noxious plants.” (Culcairn LEP 1998, cl. 26). Thus protection is provided for reptiles such as the
broad headed snake for which bush rock is an important habitat, threatened by commercial removal for sale to
nurseries and landscaping outlets. Additional specific LEP provisions for vegetation protection, for example the
Mulwaree LEP 1995 and others are discussed in Farrier (1993) above n 31 at 258-9.

show very little understanding of ecological principles…Issues such as habitat fragmentation…the
minimum viable habitat size,…the value of the understorey…the importance of the maintenance
of corridors…are overlooked in development assessment, LEP formulation, and strategic
planning generally.100

A number of explanations for the inadequacies of LEPs may be advanced. The first
reason is local politics, as “the elected councillors in rural shires are usually
agriculturalists and/or local businessmen who depend on rural endeavour for their
livelihood.”101 In many cases, local politicians would be reluctant to impose zonings on
privately-owned land restrictive of uses such as forestry - typically regarded within the
rural community as both traditional and legitimate. This is particularly the case where
regulatory action may be perceived as reducing the resale value of the land in question.
Other explanations include a lack of resources to undertake detailed ecological mapping
and planning. To some extent it is likely that such shortcomings in the design of LEPs
will be progressively rectified over time, because of statutory requirements for the
involvement of NPWS in the drafting of new LEPs. If threatened species or their
habitats will be affected, these entail that a council must consult with the DirectorGeneral of NPWS before preparing a draft LEP.102

FINDINGS REGARDING ADMINISTRATION OF THE EPAA
This section presents further research findings regarding implementation of the EPAA
by local government. There are significant difficulties in generalising about the approach
of local government to PNF. The research revealed a range of approaches and attitudes
to private forestry. The difficulty in producing meaningful results from empirical research
was hinted at in an earlier review by Kelly and Farrier, who observed, “the exercise of
discretion [by local government] is largely hidden from systematic investigation…”103
It is important to analyse the decision-making patterns of councils that require consent
for PNF. Commentators have remarked that within local government there frequently
exists a ‘culture of consent’, where the operative question in practice is not whether a DA
will receive consent, but rather which conditions will be attached to the consent.104

Knox, S., Francis, K. (1997) “A Review of the Effectiveness of Environmental Protection Zones in Four Coastal
Local Government Areas”, 2 Local Government Law Journal 134-147 at 147.
101 Giblin and King (1987) “The Viability of Planning Control and Reservation as Options in the Conservation of
Remnant Vegetation in NSW” in Saunders, D., Arnold, G., Burbidge, A., Hopkins, A. (eds.) Nature Conservation : The
Role of Remnants of Native Vegetation, Surrey Beatty, Sydney, ch.27, 295-304 at 300.
102 EPAA, s.34(2).
103 Kelly and Farrier (1996) above n 74 at 380-382.
104 Kelly and Farrier (1996) above n 74.
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A sub-survey of decision-making by Northern Region councils was conducted to gather
data on implementation of the EPAA and TSCA, within a centre of significant PNF
activity. A series of identical letters105 was sent to councils in DUAP’s Northern Region.
The replies106 confirmed that between January 1996 and October 1999, only four of a
total of eighteen councils in the Region required consent for PNF under rural 1(a) zones
in their LEPs.107 There were only eighteen development applications for PNF during the
study period. All were approved, although some were subject to conditions imposed
following consultation with NPWS.108
Thus despite the fact that most PNF in Northern NSW during the study period was
proceeding under NVCA exemption, and is potentially subject to LEP regulation, the
number of DAs received by local government in Northern NSW was low. The main
reason is that 84 per cent of local councils did not require consent to be sought for
forestry in the 1(a) zone. Also it is possible that some did not apply for consent due to
existing-use claims, or even where consent was required, did not seek consent, e.g. within
selected zone 1(a) or Zone 7 (environment protection) areas.

Conditions on consents
Conditions can be imposed on consents to control the method and intensity of the
logging operation.109 Without a consent requirement, there is no opportunity to impose
any operating conditions. Many strategic planners interviewed commented that they were
unaware of the extent of PNF within their LGA, as council did not require development
consent for forestry.110
For those councils that required consent for PNF, interview evidence and
correspondence revealed that they had imposed conditions on logging which usually
were additional to those normally attached to a consent, and site-specific. For example, a
Survey results contained in table at Appendix 9.1. Copy of survey letter contained in Appendix 9.3.
On file with author. Kempsey SC, Letter , 24/9/99; Great Lakes Council Letter 29/10/99; Uralla SC, Letter,
20/9/99; Interview, Mr. Daniel McNamara, Senior Town Planner, Bellingen Shire Council, 28.9.99, in person, at
Bellingen SC Chambers.
107 Kempsey SC, Great Lakes Council, Uralla SC, Bellingen SC required consent.
108 Interview, 10 October 1999, Mr. Gary Davey, Threatened Species Unit Manager, NPWS Northern Zone. Notes of
interview on file.
109 EPAA, s. 80A, and s.79B(9) which states in effect that conditions imposed as part of the concurrence process
under the TSCA are additional to conditions imposed under s.80A by the consent authority.
110 A list of the questions posed to planners in telephone interviews is reproduced at Appendix 9.4.
105
106

PNF consent granted by the Bellingen Shire Council in November 1996 was examined
and was accompanied by 30 conditions. These included a cross-compliance111 provision
linking the consent to continued compliance with other legal requirements, particularly
an authority issued by DLWC to log protected lands.112 Specific conditions were applied
following liaison with the NPWS. These were identical to the conservation protocols
applied to operations within State Forests.113
It has been suggested that more creative use could be made of the planning system by
imposing conditions to require environmental monitoring.114 This is an example of a
‘positive planning’ approach, involving setting out positive obligations for environmental
management, as opposed to reliance upon listing prohibited activities. This approach
may be presently under-utilised.115 No evidence came to light that councils had imposed
conditions requiring either the lodgement of an environmental bond (e.g. to ensure
reforestation), or regular environmental monitoring (e.g. to establish the efficacy or
otherwise of threatened species management prescriptions).

ARE LEP REQUIREMENTS AFFECTED BY OTHER EPIS?
Impact of State Environment Planning Policies
State government makes State Environmental Planning Policies (SEPPs) and Regional
Environmental Plans (REPs),116 whereas LEPs are devised by local government
(although formally made by the Minister for Planning).117 A SEPP may only be made
where the Minister is of the opinion that the matters dealt with in the policy are “of

Young, M., Gunningham, N., Elix, J., Lambert, J., Howard, B., Grabosky, P., McCrone, E. (1996) Reimbursing The
Future: An Evaluation Of Motivational, Voluntary, Price-Based, Property-Right, And Regulatory Incentives For The Conservation
Of Biodiversity, Biodiversity Series, Paper No.9., Parts 1&2, Commonwealth Department Environment Sport and
Territories, Canberra
at 31.
112 The condition stated “A copy of an ‘authority to log’ protected lands on the property from the DLWC is to be
submitted to the council prior to the commencement of the development. Any new or updated authorities issued
during the life of the operation are also to be submitted to Council. [To ensure the legality of the development].”
However, obviously this requirement would now be modified in future conditions to take account of the
incorporation of the protected lands provisions of the SCA into the NVCA. Condition 10 of Consent on Activity
Application No.330/96 by Bellingen Shire Council, 5 November 1996.
113 Interview, Mr. Gary Davey, Northern Zone Manager, Coffs Harbour, 22.10.99; Mr. Andrew McIntyre, Threatened
Species Unit Manager Northern Zone, 22.10.99.
114 Knox, S., Francis, K. (1997) above n 100 at 145.
115 Kelly and Farrier, (1996) above n 74.
116 EPAA, s.39(1), formally by the Governor, but upon the instigation of the Director of Planning and the Minister
administering the Act: s.37 EPAA.
117 EPAA, s.70.
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significance for environmental planning for the State.”118 State government may use
SEPPs in order to raise the bar of environmental protection in situations where local
government tends to promote local economic development ahead of environmental
protection.119 The main SEPPs possibly relevant to PNF are SEPP 44 (Koala Protection),
and SEPP 26 (littoral rainforests). If these SEPPs apply, a development consent
requirement will attach to the forestry proposal.

Koala Habitat Protection
SEPP 44 (Koala Habitat Protection) is relevant to PNF, as it applies certain measures for
the protection of a species of indigenous arboreal marsupials. Made in 1995, its objective
is to “encourage the proper conservation and management of areas of natural vegetation
that provide habitat for koalas to ensure a permanent free-living population over their
present range and to reverse the current trend of koala population decline.”120 The policy
applies within 109 scheduled local government areas, including most of those in the
Eastern Division of NSW121 corresponding to the known distribution of koalas.122
It contains three main mechanisms. The primary mechanism supplements the
development consent process, i.e. it is predicated upon the existence of a consent
requirement under another EPI such as an LEP. There are several requirements which
must all exist before the development control provisions of the policy apply.123 The most
important is that the land concerned must be “land in relation to which a development
application has been made”.124 SEPP 44 applies when a DA is made involving a parcel of
land larger than 1 hectare, within a scheduled local government area.125 Before a council
may grant consent to such a DA, the council “must satisfy itself whether or not the land

EPAA, s.39(3).
In other situations, SEPPs are paradoxically used to remove consent requirements that may be contained in LEPs particular examples are the SEPP 45 - Permissibility of Mining, SEPP 4 (‘Development without consent’), SEPP
No. 34 — Major Employment Generating Industrial Development. Other examples include SEPP No. 3 —
Castlereagh Liquid Waste Disposal Depot , SEPP No. 7 — Port Kembla Coal Loader, SEPP No. 27 — Prison
Sites, SEPP No. 38 —Olympic Games and Related Development Proposals, SEPP No. 41 —
Casino/Entertainment Complex, SEPP No. 43 — New Southern Railway, SEPP No. 47— Moore Park
Showground, SEPP No. 48— Major Putrescible Land fill Sites. The use of SEPPs to override LEPs have been
endorsed by the courts in decisions such as Save the Showground for Sydney Inc v Minister for Urban Affairs and Planning
(1997) 95 LGRA 33.
120 SEPP 44, cl.3. See also: O’Connor & Leathley (1996) “The Koala”, 33(1) Australian Planner 20.
121 SEPP 44, cl.5, Schedule 1.
122 SOE Report, 1997 at 178.
123 SEPP 44, cl.6.
124 SEPP 44 cl6(b).
125 Or totalling one hectare including adjoining parcels of land owned by the same development applicant.
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is a potential koala habitat.”126 If the site is considered ‘potential koala habitat’, then the
council must “satisfy itself whether or not the land is a core koala habitat” on the basis of
information “from a person with appropriate qualifications and experience in biological
science and fauna survey and management”. 127 If core koala habitat is identified, a Koala
Plan of Management must be prepared prior to the granting of development consent.128
A council’s determination of a DA must not be inconsistent with this plan129 (see Figure
1).
If SEPP 44 is not properly taken into account in determining a DA, a consent may be
invalidated.130 In Canyonleigh Environment Protection Society Inc v Wingecarribee SC, Bignold J
held that a consent for a resort and golf course granted in breach of SEPP 44 was
partially invalid.131 The applicants successfully argued that the Council in granting
development consent had breached its obligation to satisfy itself whether or not the land
was core koala habitat. The Council ill-advisedly relied upon a report by consultants
engaged by the developers. Although prepared by a qualified expert, the report was not
sufficient in legal terms to be capable of meeting the decision-making obligations of
council.132
SEPP 44 also provides that a council may prepare an LGA-wide plan of management for
koalas for approval by the Director of Planning.133 By the end of 2001, only one council

SEPP 44, cl.7.
SEPP 44, cl.8.
128 SEPP 44, cl.9.
129 SEPP 44, cl.9(2). See also O’Connor, S., Leathley, S., (1996) above n 120.
130 Various Class 1 merits appeals to the Land and Environment Court have addressed the refusal of DA’s, on grounds
including the operation of SEPP 44. St Ives Bus Services v Kuringai Council, Land and Environment Court, Lloyd AJ,
Number 10368 of 1995, 15 November 1995. Erolmore Park Pty Ltd v. Maitland City Council, Land and Environment
Court, Pearlman J, Number 10167 of 1994, 10960 of 1995, 20 February 1996.
131 Canyonleigh Environment Protection Society Inc v Wingecarribee SC & Ors, Land and Environment Court, Bignold J,
No.40286 of 1996, unreported.
132 Bignold J held (obiter): “The crucial question…is whether the information in the…Report was legally capable of
supporting the conclusion required to be made by the Council in fulfilment of the obligation imposed on it by
cl.8(1) of SEPP No.44, that it was satisfied that the Manna Gum Forest was not core Koala habitat. An alternative
formulation of the question is whether it was reasonably open to the Council on the information in the Second Mills
Report to be satisfied that the Manna Gum Forest was not a core Koala habitat.” (p.54) However, the consultant’s
report assumed that the development proposal would be modified to avoid the Manna gum forest, rather than by
answering the question of whether the forest was core koala habitat. Bignold J observed: “the Second Mills Report
did not positively state that the Manna Gum Forest was not core Koala Habitat.” (p.52) Bignold J concluded that
the Report was “not capable of supporting the requisite conclusion of satisfaction on the Council’s part and that in
consequence, it was not reasonably open to the Council to be satisfied.” (at p.54) The council was “diverted
unwittingly from the true task posed by the statutory duty imposed by cl.8(1) of SEPP No.44 by relying upon the
suggestion (even if that suggestion were to be translated into future certainty) that the Second Respondent would
modify the golf course by retaining the Manna Gum Forest.” (p.55). The consent was held to be invalid in relation
to those components of the development which would affect koala habitat forest types . Ibid at 61.
133 SEPP 44, cl.11(1)(a), 12, 13(1).
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of 109 had done so.134 A third mechanism in SEPP 44 encourages the systematic
identification of areas of ‘core koala habitat’135 by local government.136 The Policy states
that councils “should” conduct koala surveys, and take the results regarding core koala
habitat into account when making environmental protection zones and development
control plans.137
The implementation of SEPP 44 depends substantially on the approach of each local
council as consent authority, because they decide which activities will require consent
under the LEP, and therefore become caught by SEPP 44. We have seen that in the
North Coast region, LEPs usually do not require consent for PNF. The policy’s capacity
to provide for ESFM outcomes is limited by the fact that if Part 4 EPAA consent is not
required for PNF, it cannot apply, regardless of the fact that logging may be proposed
for forest which represents ‘core’ or ‘potential koala habitat’138 (see Figure 1). There is no
accurate data available regarding the frequency with which PNF has been subjected to
the requirements of SEPP 44.139
In relation to the NVCA, SEPP 44 and PNF, the Minister for LWC is not required to
apply SEPP 44 to his/her decision-making under the NVCA, because SEPP 44 refers
specifically to “a council”.140 Further, SEPP 44 cannot apply to restrict vegetation
clearing where that clearing is authorised by a consent under the NVCA, because of an
ouster or exclusion provision in that Act.141 The Policy may only come into operation
where the NVCA does not require consent, e.g. because of a Code of Practice or an
exemption such as that for ‘private native forestry’.142

Interview, Mr. Dan Lunney, NPWS, Hurstville, 30.12.01 (by telephone, notes on file with author). See also: Lunney,
D., Moon, C., Matthews, A., and Turbill, J. (1999) Coffs Harbour City Koala Plan of Management Parts A&B, NSW
National Parks and Wildlife Service, Hurstville. Copies available from Coffs Harbour City Council.
135 ‘Core koala habitat’ means an area of land with a resident population of koalas, evidenced by attributes such as
breeding females (that is, females with young) and recent sightings of and historical records of a population”. (cl.4).
136 SEPP 44, cl.3.
137 SEPP 44, cl.15. See also: Hamilton, C., Lunney, D. and Matthews, A. (2000) “An Economic Evaluation Of Local
Government Approaches To Koala Conservation”, 7 Australian Journal of Environmental Management 47-58.
138 SEPP 44, cl.7. ‘Potential koala habitat’ is defined in cl.4 as “areas of native vegetation where the trees of the types
listed in Schedule 2 constitute at least 15% of the total number of trees in the upper or lower strata of the tree
component.”
139 Primarily because there is no centralised record keeping regarding statewide administration of SEPP 44.
140 SEPP 44, cl.7,8.
141 NVCA, s.23(1), in instances where no RVMP is in force - at the time of writing, the majority of NSW.
142 However, any RVMPs must make provision “for appropriate protection and management” of core koala habitat
identified by the Policy. NVCA, s.27(2), 32(2).
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In conclusion, SEPP 44 is unlikely at this stage to be of more than limited effectiveness
in koala protection because it is excluded wherever the NVCA requires consent, and it
only applies in those LGAs where development consent is required under an LEP. 143

143

Environmentalists have criticised the effectiveness of SEPP 44. In relation to the North Ocean Shores development
in the Tweed: see Scanlon, S. (1995) “Clearing kills koalas at North Ocean Shores”, 39(6) NPA Journal 14; (1995),
“North Ocean Shores: developer challenges protection order”, 39(5) NPA Journal 21; (1994), “North Ocean Shores:
the destruction continues” 38(4) NPA Journal 21; Wright, P. (1993) “The Slow death of North Ocean Shores”, 37(5)
NPA Journal 10. The Australian Koala Foundation (AKF) argued: “In every case to date, development has
continued in Hawks Nest/Tea Gardens where koala habitat occurs, despite the 'endangered population' listing,
SEPP 44 and the associated provisions within the current legislation.” AKF (2000) “Endangered listing doesn’t save
koalas”, Media Release, 24.7.00, <http://www.savethekoala.com/endmed.html>.

Figure 1 Summary of Application of SEPP 44 to Private Forestry
Is the proposal within one of
the 109 LGAs affected by
SEPP 44 ?
YES

NO
Does the NVCA apply ?

NO

YES

Is consent required for PNF under
the LEP for this land in this zone?

SEPP 44 does not
apply

Licensing
may
be
required
under
TSCA, Part
6
(s.91)

NO

YES

Does the land involved have
an area > 1ha ?

NO

Development
consent
decision making process
as per usual following
s.79C and s.5A ( 8 part
test - threatened species)

YES

Is it potential koala
habitat ?

NO

YES

Council “must satisfy itself whether or not the
land is a core koala habitat”

YES

Prepare plan of management. Council’s
consent decisions must be consistent with
this Plan of Management.

SEPP 26 Littoral rainforests
SEPP 26 applies to mapped “core areas” of coastal rainforest144 and a 100 metre wide
buffer, but excluding areas listed as residential land or SEPP 14 coastal wetland.145 This
SEPP has the potential to apply to PNF operations within eighteen local government
areas fronting the Pacific Ocean, from the Tweed to Eurobodalla. The policy is “a
mechanism for the consideration of applications for development that is likely to damage
or destroy littoral rainforest areas”.146 Development consent is required to “carry out
work, use land for any purpose, … or disturb, remove, damage or destroy any native
flora …” on land mapped as littoral rainforest.147 Unlike SEPP 44, the policy comes into
operation without the necessity for piggybacking on another consent requirement in an
LEP; if controlled actions are proposed for mapped land, consent is required.148 Before
consent may be granted, the concurrence of the Director-General of Urban Affairs and
Planning is required.149 SEPP 26 prevails over LEPs and REPs in the event of
inconsistency.150

REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT PLANS AND PNF
REPs can have an impact on PNF in two ways. They may impose consent requirements
for forestry, overriding an LEP which permits PNF without consent. They can also guide
the preparation of new LEPs by recommending that PNF be permitted with consent in
some situations and without consent in others.
Several REPs impose over-riding consent requirements for forestry. The main plans
involved are the Murray REP and Illawarra REP. The Murray REP No.2 - Riverine Land
requires persons to seek consent for forestry151 from local government except where
consent is required from the Minister for LWC in relation to protected land.152 The
Illawarra REP states that “development for the purposes of forestry” shall not be carried

SEPP 26, cl.4(1)(a).
SEPP 26, cl.4(1)(b). see also: DUAP website : listing of all SEPPs, 1.5.00. URL <www.duap.gov.nsw.au>.
146 SEPP 26, cl.2.
147 SEPP 26, cl.3 provides that “damage”, in relation to flora, includes lopping, topping and felling.
148 SEPP 26, cl.7.
149 SEPP 26, cl.7.
150 SEPP 26, cl.5.
151 Murray REP No.2 - Riverine Land, cl.13, part 9. The policy covers “the clearing, logging, removal or damaging of any
species of trees and shrubs that are indigenous to the River Murray floodplain”.
152 There are some other exemptions for logging and clearing regulated under other legislation eg. for logging on
Crown timber lands >2ha.
144
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out on land mapped as supporting rainforest vegetation without consent.153 It also
provides that a consent authority shall not grant consent on land being a wildlife corridor
which will involve significant tree felling or vegetation clearance, unless it has consulted
NPWS.154 The Kosciusko REP requires consent to be sought for clearance of any stand
of trees of more than two hectares on private land.155
Other REPs adopt an indirect approach of guiding the preparation of new LEPs. The
Lower South Coast REP states that all draft LEPs should “require development consent
for private forestry and include provisions to control adverse environmental impacts.”156
The North Coast REP requires the opposite, that in draft LEPs, PNF not be made
subject to consent if consent is not required for agriculture.157 These provisions only
affect draft LEPs and do not override existing LEPs which require consent for PNF.158

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPS AND SEPPS APPLYING TO PNF
The capacity of regional planning to assist in the task of achieving ESFM on private land
is potentially considerable. There is great scope for the use of REPs and SEPPs to reduce
inconsistencies that presently exist between LEPs, thereby reducing compliance costs for
business associated with regional variations in regulatory requirements. However in
practice, limited and inconsistent use has been made of REPs. Firstly, REPs do not
apply to many areas within the State. Secondly, REP requirements relating to forestry are
not consistent across the State. For example, the North Coast REP does not recommend
consent for forestry, whilst the Murray159 and Hunter REPs only contain general
provisions for the protection of native vegetation.160 On the other hand, the REP for the
Far South Coast states that LEPs should require consent for PNF and include provisions
to control adverse environmental impacts,161 and the Illawarra REP provides additional
provisions for the protection of rainforests and wildlife corridors.162

Illawarra REP, cl.14.
Illawarra REP, cl.15.
155 Kosciusko REP, cl.9(3).
156 Lower South Coast REP No.2, cl.31(b)
157 Cl.26, North Coast Regional Environment Plan 1988, Reprint No 1, 5 June 2001.
158 Clause 4(1), North Coast Regional Environment Plan 1988. EPAA s.74(1) provides: “An environmental planning
instrument may be amended in whole or in part by a subsequent environmental planning instrument whether of the
same or a different type.” Interview, Mr. Daris Olsauskas, Senior Town Planner, Bellingen Shire Council, 3.4.98. If
the LEP was already in force before the introduction of the REP, then the LEP is not impliedly amended by the
REP.
159 Murray REP No.2 Riverine Land, cl.13.
160 Hunter REP, cl.62.
161 North Coast REP, cl.26; Lower South Coast REP (No.2), cl.31(b).
162 Illawarra REP, cl. 14 (rainforests), 15 (wildlife corridors).
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Tree preservation orders
Another instrument made and administered by councils with the capacity to affect PNF
is the tree preservation order (TPO).163 TPOs have been largely superseded by broader
provisions contained in LEPs. Typically LEPs contain a provision enabling council to
make an order for tree preservation.164 A survey by ALGA (2000) of 131 councils found
that TPOs had been made by 73 councils (56 per cent of sample).165 Mather’s 1990 study
of TPOs found that 13 rural councils had no TPO, and that TPOs often only applied to
town areas.166

EXISTING USES AND PLANNING CONTROLS
Provisions relating to ‘existing uses’ are within Division 10, Part 4, EPAA, and Part 5,
EPAA Regulation 2000.167 There are two situations in which the provisions apply:
‘existing uses’ and so-called ‘existing consents’. The ‘existing use’ provisions permit
previously lawful uses of land which have overnight become prohibited under the terms
of an EPI (e.g. an LEP), to continue until they naturally come to a conclusion.168 The
‘existing consent’ provisions authorise the continuation of previous land uses regardless
of any introduction of a requirement for development consent in a subsequent EPI.169
The existing consent provisions set out guidelines for existing uses that overnight require
consent due to the introduction of a new requirement in an EPI.170 Provisions restrict the
scope of the existing consent provisions to the same extent as the existing-use
provisions; the protection of uses does not apply to uses abandoned,171 or uses
intensified or expanded.172

Under powers provided by cl.8 Environmental Planning and Assessment Model Provisions 1980; s.33 EPAA.
For example, Great Lakes LEP 1996, cl.10.
165 131 responses from 177 councils at time of survey. Source: ALGA (2000) National Local Government Biodiversity Survey,
National Local Government Strategy Implementation Project Stage 1, NSW Fact Sheet, June, ALGA, Deakin, ACT.
166 Mather, G. (1990) Rural Tree Preservation: A Study of Tree Preservation Orders in North East NSW, Total Environment
Centre, Sydney, 40pp.
167 EPAA ss106-109B, EPAA Regulation 2000, r.39-46.
168 EPAA, s.106(a), 107, 108.
169 EPAA, s.109(1). ‘So-called’ because these provisions (s,109, 109B) apply to situations where no consent was
previously required, and therefore logically there cannot have been an “existing consent”. Generally see Farrier, D.
(1993) above n 31 at 27-8,118-121; Austin, S. (1992) “Existing Use Rights: The Impact of Vaughan-Taylor and KuRing-Gai v Mobil” 33 Environmental Law News (NSW) 14-17.
170 EPAA, s.109(1) operates so that these uses do not require development consent, as long as the land was being used
for a lawful purpose immediately prior to the EPI coming into force.
171 EPAA, s.109(2)(e),(3).
172 EPAA, s.109(2),(3); see Aquatic Airways Pty Ltd v Warringah Shire Council (1990) 71 LGRA 10 at 19.
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Both depend on proof of a lawful pre-existing use. The person claiming existing-use
rights bears an evidentiary burden, and many claims are likely to be defeated due to the
inability of claimants to provide sufficient documentary evidence.173 In order to claim an
existing use, it is necessary for the landowner to establish that the existing use is lawful that all necessary approvals were obtained before it began.
In most areas of NSW where PNF proposals arise, there is a history of logging activity.174
Some private forest owners may be in a position to claim that selective logging has
occurred on their land for 50-150 years. This raises the legal question of the extent to
which previously-lawful land uses such as PNF can be either restricted or prohibited by
subsequent EPIs175 such as LEPs and RVMPs made under the NVCA.176
The protection of non-conforming existing uses is a long-standing feature of planning
law in most jurisdictions, having been imported into Australian law from English
planning law.177 In Strathfield MC v Australian Centre for Languages, Stein J described how
the Courts have sought to hold a balance between the private rights of property owners
to enjoy existing uses and the “public right of authorities to achieve reasonable town
planning objectives.”178
The effect of existing use and existing consent provisions is the insulation of PNF from
the operation of LEPs and SEPPs. Where existing uses exist, local government may be
relegated to the role of onlooker179 whilst forestry operations continue. The effect is such
that if land is rezoned from ‘general rural’ (where forestry may not require consent) to
‘environment protection’ (where forestry is prohibited or requires consent), the new LEP
provisions may not apply to forestry.
One interview subject remarked that several applications on existing use grounds had recently been rejected due to
applicant’s lack of documentary evidence. Interview, Ms Elizabeth Downing, Strategic Planner, Shoalhaven CC. On
4.1.02, by telephone. See also: Warringah Shire Council v Sedevcic (1987) 10 NSWLR 335, cited in Lee, E., Baird, M.,
Lloyd, I. (1998) “State Environmental Planning Policy No.46 – Protection and Management of Native Vegetation”,
15(2) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 127 at 131.
174 State Forests of NSW (1999) Mapping of Forest Management History Report: UNE, LNE and Southern Regions, August, A
project undertaken for the Joint Commonwealth NSW Regional Forest Agreement Steering Committee as part of
the NSW Comprehensive Regional Assessments, Project Number NA21/EH, published jointly by NSW and
Commonwealth Governments.
175 Generally see Farrier, (1993) above n 31 at 27-8,118-121; Austin, S. (1992) above n 169.
176 NVCA, s.36(1).
177 Fogg, A. “History and Nature of Planning Law”, title 14.2 Laws of Australia, Law Book Company, para [8]. NSW
Local Government Act 1919 borrowed heavily from the Town and Country Planning Act 1932 (UK). See Fogg, A.
Australian Town Planning Law: Uniformity and Change, 2nd edition, Brisbane, UQP, at 11-31.
178 Strathfield Municipal Council v Australian Centre for Languages Pty Ltd (1991) 74 LGRA 117, Stein J, at 119.
179 This analogy was suggested by Mr. Andrew Kelly, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong,
3.7.00.
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Interview research suggested that for a number of councils, existing-use provisions are an
impediment to councils seeking to impose ESFM standards on the PNF industry.180
Existing-use claims by landholders were described as having created a “grey area” of legal
uncertainty, in which councils, and elected councillors, mindful of their limited legal
budgets, and the political sensitivity of the forestry issue, have been unwilling to test the
veracity or lawfulness of existing- use claims by demanding the lodgement of a DA from
private forest owners. In practice, regardless of the letter of the law, particularly the onus
on landholders to substantiate claims of existing use,181 it appears frequently to have been
the case that the threat of existing consent claims has undermined the capacity of some
councils to require consent for PNF.182 The fact that landholders are relying upon
existing-use-right claims meant that in one council area where consent was required for
forestry in the 1(a) zone, there had been no development applications for forestry since
1994.183

Intensification of uses
Non-conforming use protections are constrained in two ways. Firstly the intensification
of existing uses is prohibited. Existing uses are only permitted to continue on the basis
that they are not expanded, intensified or increased in scope.184 Any “increase in the area
of the use made of …land from the area actually physically and lawfully used immediately
before the coming into operation of the instrument” is not authorised.185 Further, any
enlargement, expansion or intensification in the work or use of land is not permitted.186
In addition, a contemplated or intended future use of land does not amount to an
existing use.187 Again, parallel limitations apply to so-called ‘existing consents’ permitted

Interview, G. Tuckerman, Strategic Planner, Great Lakes Council, 16.7.02, by telephone, notes on file.
Warringah Shire Council v Sedevcic (1987) 10 NSWLR 335 at 337-8.
182 Interview, G. Tuckerman, Great Lakes Council, 16.7.02, by telephone, notes on file. The interviewee described one
incident at Nabiac in which logging proceeded under the NVCA’s PNF exemption, and in purported reliance upon
existing use. Council did not seek to test claims of existing use, nor did it seek to prosecute the landholder for failing
to obtain development consent. As the logging operation had already taken place, a position was taken that there
was little point in taking action, as “the horse had already bolted.”
183 The application in 1994 was for the Tureel property where consent was granted to log approximately 2000ha of
forest including old growth and rainforest, subject to numerous conditions. No FIS was required under the EFIP
Act. Interview, G.Tuckerman, Great Lakes Council, 16.7.02, by telephone, notes on file.
184 See: Lee, E., Baird, M., Lloyd, I. (1998) above n 173 at 132.
185 EPAA, s.107(2)(b).
186 EPAA, s.107(2)(c).
187 Parramatta City Council v. Brickworks Ltd (1972) 128 CLR 1 at 21-2.
180
181

under the Act.188 It is probable that the conversion of native forest to plantation would
amount to an intensification of use, on the basis of the higher yield of timber per hectare
from a plantation. Similarly, change from selective logging to clearfell woodchipping
would amount to an intensification of use.
If development consent is obtained, the Regulations provide that existing uses may be
“enlarged, expanded or intensified”189 or “changed to another use, including a use that
would be otherwise prohibited under the Act”.190 Exactly which changes in land use are
acceptable is not obvious.
The High Court considered the question of proper characterisation of an existing use in
Shire of Perth v O’Keefe.191 Decisions in relation to existing-use rights state that those rights
apply to the particular purpose for which the land was previously used. A continuation of
land use exactly as before is not required. Instead a “real and substantial purpose test” is
applied.192
In Tagget v. Tweed Shire Council the question of whether existing-use rights for agriculture
were available to protect activities on land that became subject to the operation of SEPP
14 (coastal wetlands) was addressed.193 The land in question had never been used for
growing crops, but had been used for grazing cattle.

The applicant had cleared

vegetation for the purpose of growing banana plants, and the question was whether that
amounted to a continuation of the existing use. The Court held that the applicant’s
existing-use rights were confined to grazing and did not extend to the adoption of the
use even though the use was related to agriculture. It held that to characterise existing use
as agriculture “generally” would involve an unacceptable level of generality,
encompassing activities “which differed in kind from the activities being undertaken at

Section 109(2)(c) prevents the exemption from the requirement for development consent from applying to uses
where there is “any enlargement or expansion or intensification of the use”.
189 EPAA Regulations 1994, cl.39(1)(a).
190 EPAA Regulations 1994, cl.39(1)(d); EPAA Regulations 1994, Part 5; cl.40(1), 43(a).
191 Shire of Perth v O’Keefe (1964) 110 CLR 529.
192 The identification of the purpose is not to be approached, the High Court said "through a meticulous examination
of the details of processes or activities or through a precise cataloguing of individual items or goods dealt with, but
by asking what, according to ordinary terminology, is the appropriate designation of the purpose being served by the
use of the premises at the material date". Shire of Perth v O’Keefe (1964) 110 CLR 529 at 535. See also: Cascone and
Maria Vella v City of Whittlesea. 11 AATR 174 (Supreme Court of Victoria), City of Nunawading v Harrington [1985] VR
641 at 644-3.
193 Tagget v Tweed Shire Council, NSW Court of Appeal, unreported, 3 November 1993, No.40520/92.
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the relevant date”.194 However other case law suggests that existing-use rights are to be
classified by considering the context in which classification is made, rather than adopting
a narrow definition that would restrict the use to only the precise activities shown by the
evidence.195
The Tagget case also addressed the question of intensification of uses. In future disputes
relating to the scope of existing-use rights, Tagget suggests that the facts and
circumstances of each case will be crucial in determining rights. The Court ruled that by
virtue of s.109(2) of the EPAA, the landholder was not entitled to further clear partiallytimbered land for grazing purposes without consent, as this would amount to an increase
in the use of the land, or an intensification of that use.196

Abandonment of existing uses
The second key limitation on the existing-use protections offered by the EPAA is
‘abandonment’. A use that is abandoned cannot be resumed. The Act provides a
rebuttable presumption that: “a use is to be presumed, unless the contrary is established,
to be abandoned if it ceases to be actually so used for a continuous period of 12
months.”197 This limitation applies also to existing consents.198
In relation to forestry this is a difficult matter, as forest management is not as obvious as
the ploughing of a field or the use of a building. This is one reason why existing use
rights in Tasmania have been protected with special ‘Private Timber Reserve’ (‘PTR’)
provisions in the Forest Practices Act 1985.199 These provisions insulate PTRs from the
requirements of local government planning schemes in Tasmania (see Chapter Eleven).
There are two cases that directly address the question of abandonment of existing uses
involving PNF. In Bornholdt v Tweed Shire Council, the Land and Environment Court
considered the question of abandonment of existing-use rights by lapse of time in

DLWC (1995) “Draft Cabinet Minute for a SEPP – Native Vegetation Protection and Management – Legal Advice
on Ancillary Uses With Respect to Existing Use Rights”, Confidential Memorandum, `Legal Services Branch to
Deputy Commissioner of Soil Conservation, 21 July 1995, 3pp., at p.1.
195 North Sydney MC v Boyts Radio and Electrical Pty Ltd (1989) 67 LGRA 344.
196 Tagget v Tweed Shire Council, Court of Appeal, unreported, 3 November 1993, No.40520/92 at 13.
197 EPAA, s.107(2).
198 EPAA, s.109(3).
199 Interview, Mr. Peter Taylor, Private Forests Tasmania, 6.11. 98, at PFT, Patrick St, Hobart.
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relation to selective logging of native forest.200 The landholders wished to avoid the effect
of an LEP which placed most of their land into an environment protection zone in
which forestry was prohibited. They argued that existing-use rights applied to a parcel of
land last logged 25 years before, as they had managed the forest in question for the
purpose of selective logging at a time when this would become economically feasible. It
was argued that it had been, and still was, used for forestry as timber was maturing on
the land. Hemmings J held that a future intention to log did not by itself amount to use,
i.e. that more active management was required.201 This decision also points to significant
evidentiary difficulties for landholders, particularly where there have been a number of
owners of the property over the relevant time period. 202
In the Victorian case Walker v Macedon Ranges SC, the Civil and Administrative Tribunal
also addressed the question of abandonment.203 It rejected an application for a
declaration that there was an existing-use right to timber production. The applicant
argued that forestry had been conducted continuously on the land in question. However,
the Tribunal decided that the forest in question had not been actively managed over the
previous six years. It rejected the application on the basis that existing-use rights had not
been continuously pursued, and logging under later permits had eclipsed the operation of
earlier existing-use rights. The Tribunal stated that selective logging activity in the past
would have to be virtually continuous in order to provide the foundation for a legitimate
claim of existing use. It held: “In the case of the selective harvesting of timber, because
of the passive nature of the regeneration component of the use, (which might lead the
observer to believe the land is disused), in order that the use is kept “alive”, other
activities would have to occur with some frequency – especially logging.”204
The message is that it may be difficult as a matter of law to establish existing use in the
PNF context, as merely watching trees grow with a future intention to harvest is likely to
be considered an ‘abandonment’ of any existing use. Forestry management activities such
as fencing, weeding, thinning, and road maintenance must be regular or continuous in
Bornholdt v Tweed Shire Council (1989), Land and Environment Court, unreported, No. 40088 of 1988, Hemmings J., 4
August 1989, discussed in Farrier (1993) above n 31 at 260. (This case is not covered in the 3rd edtion of Farrier.)
201 Bornholdt v Tweed Shire Council (1989) above n 200 at 9; citing Earle Cameron Investments Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council
(1981) 46 LGRA 130 at 137. Other caselaw suggests that a contemplated or intended future use of land cannot
amount to an existing use: Parramatta City Council v. Brickworks Ltd (1972) 128 CLR 1 at 21-2.
202 Bornholdt v Tweed Shire Council (1989), Land and Environment Court, unreported, No. 40088 of 1988, Hemmings J., 4
August 1989, at 12.
203 Walker v Macedon Ranges Shire Council [1999] VCAT PL 124, Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Planning
List, No.1998/3951.
204 Walker v Macedon Ranges Shire Council above n 203 at 21.
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order for an existing-use argument to be successfully maintained. The EPAA requires
more active management of land within the past 12 months in order to sustain an
existing-use claim.

DEVELOPMENT ASSESSMENT UNDER PART 5 EPAA
Where Part 4 EPAA does not apply, a PNF operation205 may be regulated by Part 5
EPAA.206 The possible application of Part 5 is an important question because of the
possibility that an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) may be required.207 Part 5
EPAA applies to activities approved by public authorities208 under some other form of
approval, which do not require development consent and are ‘likely to significantly affect
the environment’.209 If Part 5 applies, a determining authority is required to take into
account (to the fullest extent reasonably possible) the impact of logging on the
environment. If it determines that the impact is likely to be significant then an EIS must
be obtained from the proponent and considered.210

A point of comparison between the legal requirements applicable to forestry on private and public land is that for a
long period during the 1990s, there was a requirement that EIS be produced for public land forestry operations
(within State Forests). However EIS have never been produced for PNF under NSW law, although for a significant
time period this obligation also probably applied to larger PNF operations. However since changes introduced by
the Forestry and National Park Estate Act 1998 (‘FNPE Act’), provisions of Part 5 EPAA no longer apply to State
Forests, and as a result this difference has dissolved. Parts 4 & 5 EPAA do not apply to public forestry covered by
an integrated forestry operations approval, nor do they apply to the granting of such an approval. FNPE Act, s.36(1)
states that Part 5 EPAA does not apply, whilst s.36(2) states that an EPI cannot affect forestry operations subject to
that Act.
206 If an undertaking requires development consent or is a prohibited development, then it is not an activity for the
purposes of Part 5 EPAA. Severn SC v Water Resources Commission (1982) 47 LGRA 257; Kindergarten Union NSW v
Sydney City Council (1984) 51 LGRA 381.
207 No EIS is required to accompany a development application under Part 4 for PNF operations because forestry does
not amount to ‘designated development’: “designated” because of their potential to cause major environmental
impact. They can be designated either by Regulation (EPAA, s.158) or by EPI (EPAA. s.29). These developments
must be advertised, and EIS preparation and submission is required. Logging or timber harvesting activities are
highly unlikely to constitute a designated development, because to date they have not been listed within Schedule 3
of the EPAA Regulation 2000, as referred to in cl.4.
208 A condition precedent for the application of the EIA requirements of Part 5 EPAA is the existence of a relevant
determining authority, arising from requirements to obtain some additional authorisation or permit. Part 5 is
expressed in terms of “a public authority whose approval is required in order to enable the activity to be carried
out”: s.110 EPAA. If some type of approval is required, then there is a determining authority.
209 If the undertaking fits the definition of ‘an activity’, and there is a relevant determining authority, then at a
minimum there is a requirement for a consideration of environmental factors, pursuant to the requirements of
s.111(1) EPAA, which provides that a determining authority shall examine and take into account to the fullest
extent possible all matters affecting or likely to affect the environment by reason of that activity. The determining
authority is required to decide whether EIS preparation is required in accordance with criteria set out in the EPAA
and the EP&A Regulation. They may also consider DUAP guidelines: Department of Urban Affairs and Planning
(NSW) (1996) Is an EIS required ? Best Practice Guidelines for Part 5 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979,
DUAP, Sydney.
210 The application of Part 5 EPAA to the granting of a licence to pollute waters was considered and confirmed in
Brown v Environment Protection Authority and North Broken Hill Ltd, T/as Associated Pulp and Paper Mills [No.2] (1992) 78
LGERA 119. Pearlman J of the Land and Environment Court concluded that there was a duty (under s.111)for the
EPA in granting pollution control licences to comply with EPAA’s requirement to “take into account to the fullest
extent possible all matters affecting or likely to affect the environment”.(p.131).
205

Until recent amendments to the law, many of the environmental approvals which may
have been formally required for a lawful PNF operation had the potential to trigger the
operation of Part 5 EPAA.211 However, after legislative amendments, newer forms of
approvals such as native vegetation clearance consents212, and s.91 TSCA licensing213
have no capacity to trigger Part 5.214 The possibility remains that Part 5 may be triggered
where a pollution control licence ( ‘environment protection licence’) is obtained which
authorises non-point source water pollution from new forestry works (as opposed to
existing forestry works). During the study period, it appears that landholders were
discouraged from applying for licences.215

These included authorities to clear vegetation on protected land formerly issued under Soil Conservation Act 1938,
and licences to pollute water formerly issued under Clean Waters Act 1970, Pollution Control Act 1970.
212 NVCA, s.16. Native vegetation clearance consents under the NVCA do not trigger Part 5 because the
development is assessed under Part 4. Protected land authorities no longer trigger Part 5 because the protected lands
provisions have now been subsumed into the NVCA regime. The NVCA explicitly states that any clearing carried
out in accordance with Part 2 NVCA (which covers clearing and consents for clearing either where there is an
RVMP in place and where there is not) is not an activity for the purposes of Part 5 EPAA. Clearing authorised by
Part 4 NVCA, ‘Codes of Practice’ does not trigger Part 5 EPAA because it is considered to be a form of clearing
under Part 2 NVCA, subject to the development consent regime therein: NVCA, s.21(2)(b),23(3). Further, clearing
in accordance with a Property Agreement under NVCA is still subject to any development consent requirements
that may apply under Part 2 NVCA (s.41(3).
213 TSCA, s.99(5). D-G of NPWS not a determining authority for purposes of Part 5 EPAA when granting licence
under Part 6 TSCA.
214 Further, as clearing licences issued for activities on leased ‘Other Crown land’ under Forestry Act have been
abolished, these cannot trigger Part 5. See s.27G,H Forestry Act 1916.
215 Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997, s.52(2), Regulations may make provision excluding the issue of
environment protection licences from the operation of Part 5 EPAA. POEO (General) Regulations 1998, r. 45 states:
“The EPA is not a determining authority … in respect of an approval …that consists of the issue of an
environment protection licence … so long as the licence authorises only the same or substantially the same work or
activity, and level of work or activity, as was being carried out immediately before the application for the issue of the
licence was made.”
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Figure 2 Abbreviated overview of obligations for non-plantation PNF
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THE EPAA AND PNF POLICY
The RVMP provisions of the NVCA, and the PRA have challenged local government’s
involvement in PNF regulation. These Acts exhibit a clear intent to exclude local
government from development consent roles in a range of circumstances.216 Although
PNF regulation by local government may have some shortcomings, an important ‘safety
net’ role remains for local government to perform EIA under the development consent
process, particularly due to the popularity of the PNF exemption.
There is inevitably a wide range of views, approaches to, and awareness of PNF within
local governments. Nevertheless most councils did not wish to regulate PNF, and as we
have seen, often chose not to require consent for it. A key explanation lies in ‘cultural
factors’. Environmental regulation is foreign to much of rural local government
culture.217 The cliché that ‘roads, rates and rubbish’ are the traditional purview of local
government holds more than a grain of truth. A decade ago Farrier and Byron said that
the expansion of responsibilities of councils from previously narrow bases “raises
questions about the expertise of the decision-makers involved”, aside from questions of
their motivation to address non-traditional policy issues.218 Indeed many councils have
taken a conscious decision not to require consent, arguing that to do so is a disincentive
to PNF. In the words of one planner: “forestry is important to the shire. We’re keen to
encourage it.”219
Even where local government wishes to regulate PNF, it usually does not possess the
resources to employ the specialised expertise necessary to assess and monitor forestry
It is likely that industry lobbied for the exclusion of local government from regulatory roles during the enactment of
the NVCA and the PRA. The enactment of legislation to reduce the role of local government in regulating private
forestry can be partly explained by the evolution of PNF from being a relatively small-scale activity, to becoming an
almost equal partner in native timber production in parts of NSW, with associated demands by business - for
statewide uniformity of legal requirements. The desire to exclude local government regulation is the idea at the core
of RVMPs and their exclusion clauses which are broader than those in the pre-RVMP aspects of the NVCA. The
RVMPs, once made, will completely cut local government out of the picture. The legislative intention of Parliament,
evident from Hansard was that the NVCA would represent a comprehensive ‘one-stop shop’ for all NSW
requirements relating to clearing activities on private land. The Hon J. Shaw, NVC Bill: Second Reading, NSWPD
(Hansard), 5.12.97, p.90.
217 Kelly and Farrier (1996) above n 74; Giblin and King (1987) “The Viability of Planning Control and Reservation as
Options in the Conservation of Remnant Vegetation in NSW” in Saunders, D., Arnold, G., Burbidge, A., Hopkins,
A. (eds.) Nature Conservation : The Role of Remnants of Native Vegetation, Surrey Beatty, Sydney, ch.27 at 295-304.
218 Farrier, D., Byron, N. and EDO (1992) A Review of the Legislative and Regulatory Framework Affecting Forest Management
on Private and Leasehold Lands, Consultant’s Report to the Resource Assessment Commission Forest and Timber
Inquiry, No. FTC 92/20, RAC, Canberra, p.112.
219 Interview, Mr. Bruce Heise, Planner, Gloucester SC, 31.3.98, by telephone, notes on file with author.
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operations regarding either silviculture or nature conservation.220 Within the broader
context of inadequate funding for maintenance of rural infrastructure such as roads and
bridges, there is “reluctance in many Councils to spend scarce resources on a subject they
know little about—conservation planning and management.”221
Councils also find PNF regulation challenging given the broader picture of limited
resources, declining or static rate-bases, and the devolution of various responsibilities
from State to local government, e.g. pollution control.222 With limited resources, local
government in NSW is required to understand the complex legislative framework
regarding native vegetation and forestry, which in itself leads to administrative
difficulties. A 1999 survey by CSIRO Wildlife and Ecology found that “local government
officials in NSW all commented on experiencing difficulty with the complexity of the
legislative framework for managing native vegetation in the State…They questioned
council’s capacity to adequately administer all of the functions that have been prescribed
by State government.” 223
The evidence of the reluctance of most councils to regulate PNF during the study period
lies in the author's survey results showing a decision not to regulate forestry in the main
rural zoning in 64.5% of 107 councils surveyed. A 1999 CSIRO survey of councils
provides further evidence. Having asked councils whether vegetation management
amounted to ‘core business’, it found that “rural councils were firmly of the view that
vegetation management was beyond their resources or control.” The report stated: “most
rural councils were strongly of the view that the State government should be the primary
regulator of vegetation clearance on privately managed lands.”224

The National Local Government Biodiversity Survey published by the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA)
stated: “Most rural and smaller Councils lack the resources and the expertise to plan and deliver comprehensive
Local Government conservation strategies.” ALGA (1998) National Local Government Biodiversity Strategy, Berwick,M.,
with Thorman, R. (ed.), ALGA, Deakin ACT, 40pp, at p.10. The report adds: “Although many urban and coastal
Councils are better resourced, many of these Councils also lack qualified staff in ecology and natural resource
management.” An ALGA commissioned survey of 131 NSW councils in 2000 found that only 21% of councils
employed a dedicated environment officer. This figure is significantly less than the national figure of 35%. Of the
rest, 52% do not have an environment officer. The remainder (27%) share an officer with other councils. ALGA
(2000) National Local Government Biodiversity Survey, National Local Government Strategy Implementation Project Stage 1, NSW
Fact Sheet, June, ALGA, Deakin, ACT.
221 ALGA (1998) above n 220 at 14.
222 Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997, s.6(2): “A local authority is the appropriate regulatory authority for
non-scheduled activities in its area.”
223 Eighteen councils within Four regions in NSW and Queensland were surveyed - two in each - including the Lower
Hunter and Central Coast and the Murray Catchment in NSW; Binning, C., Young, M. (1999) above n 12 at 127,
Appendix A, “Needs Assessment”.
224 Binning, C., Young, M. (1999) above n 12 at p.129.
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Some councils choose to regulate PNF - for various reasons including threatened species
issues, landscape planning, water quality, and soil erosion control as well as maintenance
of roads and bridges (due to wear from logging trucks), and social amenity.
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Thus

Kempsey SC stated “Council’s reasons are of an environmental nature. Council was
concerned that with public forests becoming less available, sawmills would turn to
private lands for logs.”226 In interviews, a strategic planner stated that Council was
concerned PNF logging would become “harsher in order to make up for State Forests
restrictions.”227
A laissez-faire attitude on the part of some councils, and the stricter requirements of
others produce regional inconsistencies in regulatory requirements, with PNF
unregulated in the main rural zone by most councils particularly on the North and
Central Coast. This suggests lower levels of environmental protection in those areas
where the PNF exemption is available (and is claimed).
Consistency and uniformity in regulatory requirements are objectives which can be
justified on grounds of encouraging investment in PNF. Inconsistency in local
government requirements is frequently cited as a disincentive to investment.228 On this
basis, there is a case for the introduction of a SEPP to cover PNF logging. This would
mimic the Victorian approach of inserting a section regarding PNF into all local planning
schemes.229
The regional variation in rules also fails to exert steady pressure for an improvement in
PNF standards. At present there is no articulation by local government of a consistent
State-wide policy for PNF, let alone standards for ESFM. There is no uniform system for
production of pre-logging biodiversity surveys, EIA reports and timber harvesting plans
(THPs), nor systematic auditing of their implementation.

Letter, Uralla SC to author, 20.9.99; Letter, Great Lakes SC to author, 29.10.99; Letter, Byron SC to author,
22.10.99; Letter, Kempsey SC to author, 24.9.99 (all on file).
226 Letter, RB Pitt, Strategic Planning/Development Control Co-Ordinator, Environmental Services, Kempsey SC to
author, 24.9.99.
227 Interview, Rob Pitt, by telephone, 5.10.99, Notes on file.
228 Dept of Natural Resources and Environment Victoria (DNRE) (2001) “Private Forestry in Victoria: Strategy
towards 2020” located at URL <www.nre.gov.vic.au> on 12.3.02.
229 Local government administers the Code through Planning Schemes under the Planning and Environment Act 1987
(Vic). Amendment S13 to the State Section of all planning schemes introduced planning controls for timber
production on private lands for all local government areas in Victoria.
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The EPAA, which provides the legislative basis for local government’s involvement,
enables - but does not mandate - an ‘across the landscape’ approach of regional planning.
Kelly and Farrier concluded “there remains a strong suspicion that the history, culture
and financial position of local government will ensure that biodiversity on private land
will slowly die the death of a thousand ad hoc decisions.”230 One answer is for councils to
undertake programs of habitat mapping and identification of important wildlife
corridors, and to use LEPs as pro-active landscape-planning tools which will help to
overcome the tyranny of small decisions, particularly protecting the habitat of wideranging species.231 Another response to the present disjointed system is to make greater
use of existing powers relating to the making of REPs and SEPPs, so that planning is
undertaken on a more strategic, landscape-based scale across the State.
The use of planning law to regulate PNF is another example of NSW’s approach of
applying non-specialised, non-forestry legislation for the regulation of forestry. NSW
addresses PNF with general-purpose vegetation-clearance legislation and planning law,
by contrast with Tasmania which applies specific-purpose forestry legislation. However,
the NSW approach enables considerations of a broader range of environmental matters
than Tasmania’s forest practices legislation, which has ecological shortcomings, e.g. in
terms of protection of threatened species.232 The debate over the involvement of local
government in PNF regulation is nowhere as strong as it is in Tasmania. In that state
there has been strident opposition to the removal of local government’s capacity to
regulate private forestry with the designation of Private Timber Reserves (PTRs)233 (see:
Chapter Eleven).

Saxon, M. (1997) “The TSC Act 1995 – Is the Development Approval Process Working ?” in NCC (ed.), On the
Brink: Your Bush, Their Habitat, Our Act: Is the Threatened Species Conservation Act Working? Conference Proceedings, Nature
Conservation Council NSW, Sydney, pp.85-96 at 93; Kelly and Farrier (1996) above n 74 at 389.
231 Saxon, M. (1997) above n 230 at 93.
232 It is important that debate must also concern the content of requirements, not just about how they are delivered
and administered. In Tasmania, the recent Velvet Worm case (2001) revealed the shortcomings of the Tasmanian
Forest Practices System in taking account of threatened species issues: Giles& Weston v Break O’Day Council & Ors
[2001] TASRMPAT 115 (23 July 2001).
233 Gee, D.; Stratford, E. (2001) “Public Participation and Integrated Planning in the Tasmanian Private Timber
Reserve Process”, 18(1) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 54-70 at 68. Although this opposition may have been
partly based on the self-interest of local government, but it has also been genuinely grounded in concerns about the
capacity of the Forest Practices Code and System to deliver ESFM. In relation to Tasmania, Gee and Stratford
argued in favour of local government regulation on the basis that it provides: “better opportunities to integrate local
environmental strategies in the private forestry framework; consideration of the wider ecological and social impacts
of timber harvesting, including on adjoining properties and water bodies.” Further, in terms of biodiversity
protection, local government regulation has considerable advantages over project-by project approval of logging
under a Code, because of scope for “identification of significant environmental values at a localised scale, … e.g.,
locally significant vegetation communities.”
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While there might seem to be a prima facie case for local government to lose its role in
the regulation of PNF in NSW, on the basis of regulatory simplification, there is a need
for caution. The present breadth of loopholes in the NVCA, such as the PNF
exemption, means that some local councils are presently playing an important role in
overseeing PNF. Whilst regulation by local government has its flaws, it is better than
nothing in an imperfect world of legislative loopholes.234 Yet with the progressive gazettal
of RVMPs there is likely in the not-too-distant future to be an almost complete eclipse of
local government from PNF regulation.

COMPLIANCE POLICY AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE EPAA
A range of administrative enforcement options is available to councils under both the
EPAA and the Local Government Act 1993,235 prior to reaching for the ‘big stick’ of
criminal prosecution. These include verbal and written warnings, orders to landholders236
and Court orders.237 In addition, the EPAA provides for the instigation of civil
proceedings to restrain breaches of the EPAA.238 The breaches most relevant to PNF are
undertaking development without consent, breaching the conditions of consent, and
breaching a TPO made under an LEP.239 A lower standard of proof (‘on the balance of
probabilities’) applies, making civil proceedings an attractive enforcement option. The
Act also encourages third-party civil enforcement with open-standing provision.240
Ministerial directions can be given to a council that is failing to implement its own
LEP.241

On the other hand, advocates of the PNF exemption will argue that the exemption becomes meaningless if, despite
it, an additional layer of approvals exists in the form of local government consent requirements. They argue that
Parliament created the exemption for PNF for whatever reason, and that Parliamentary intent should be respected.
This ultimately amounts to a “question nothing” and “accept everything” philosophy.
235 The LGA provides councils with a large array of different powers to make orders, to “order a person to do or to
refrain from doing a thing.” Local Government Act 1993, s.124. Generally, see Ch.7, Part 2 of the Act. This is
supplemented by a power to issue orders to “prevent environmental damage, repair environmental damage, or to
prevent further environmental damage.” LGA, s.124. Notice must be given to the person the subject of an order,
prior to the making of the order, and an opportunity provided to make submissions. In addition, activities within
plantations accredited under the Plantations Act are insulated from the operation of local government’s power to
issue orders: Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999, s.51.
236 EPAA, s.121B. Consent authorities have broad ranging powers to make orders, particularly in order to enforce the
conditions of development consents.
237 EPAA, s.124.
238 s.127(7) EPAA.
239 For example, it is an offence under cl.10(2) of the Great Lakes LEP to breach the terms of a tree preservation order
made under cl.10(2).
240 EPAA, s.123. Provisions which permit “any person” to bring proceedings to restrain or remedy a breach of the
Act.
241 EPAA, s.117(1).
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EPIs can also be enforced under the EPAA’s criminal offence provisions. These provide
that it is an offence to breach the provisions of a planning instrument,242 punishable with
the maximum penalty for unauthorised vegetation clearance of $1.1 million plus a
possible further daily penalty to a maximum of $110,000 per day for a continuing
offence.243 There is also the option to seek court orders for replanting of vegetation,
secured with a bond if necessary.244 The decision as to whether to commence a criminal
prosecution rests with local government, as there is no independent authority in NSW
for environmental prosecutions.245 Proceedings to enforce NSW planning controls are
commenced by councils in the Land and Environment Court, which has jurisdiction to
hear such summary proceedings.246
Ample enforcement options are available to local government in NSW. But how much
use was made of these options during the study period in relation to PNF?

A limited

amount of empirical research was conducted. The data sources included (i) telephone
interviews with council planners,247 (ii) secondary sources, (iii) reports of prosecutions,
formally reported, or informally reported in internet transcripts, and (iv) replies to a
series of survey letters sent to selected councils that require consent for PNF.
Several planners commented that they did not know how much PNF activity was
occurring within their LGA.248 Some planners stated that council was unaware of how
much PNF was occurring in breach of LEP requirements, where these existed.249 It
appears that a sizeable proportion of landholders may not go to the trouble of applying
for consent for PNF. This proposition gathers some support from the findings that four
EPAA, s.125(1).
EPAA, s.126(1), penalty increased from previous level of 1000 penalty units to new penalty of 10,000 penalty units
by the Environment Planning and Assessment Amendment Act 1999, No.72 of 1999. One penalty unit is equivalent to
$110. Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), s.17.
244 EPAA, s.126(3).
245 The NSW Director of Public Prosecutions is unlikely to have a role in prosecution for a breach, as a general rule,
the DPP only run prosecutions for indictable offences. Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1986, s.8(3). NSW Crimes Act
ss.476-481 (deals with which offences are summary and which are indictable), Summary Offences Act 1988, DPP Act
and DPP Regulation 1995 r.4, ‘prescribed summary offences’.
246 These proceedings include Class 4 - environmental planning and protection - civil enforcement, and Class 5 environmental planning and protection - summary enforcement. See: Land and Environment Court Act 1979, ss.20-21.
247 Using the semi-structured interview methodology described in Chapter Four.
248 Interview, Ms. Leanne Fuller, Development Control Planner, Hastings Shire Council, by telephone, 31.3.98. Notes
on file with author.
249 Severn Shire Council. Under the LEP 1991, cl10. Accessed at <www.austlii.edu.au> on 7.12.01, private forestry
does not require consent in Zone 1(a) Rural (Agricultural Protection) Zone unless it is for a pine plantation. Also:
Letter from Severn Shire Council General Manager, 6.10.99. No changes are proposed in present redrafting of LEP.
However, in an interview, Mr. Jim Robinson, Strategic Planner, Severn Shire Council, 31.3.98 suggested that
development consent was required at that time for private forestry. Mr. Robinson admitted that some PNF
operators in the Shire are operating without development consent, but stated that Council lacks detection and
enforcement resources.
242
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councils in the Northern DUAP Region requiring consent only received eighteen PNF
applications during the study period. This low level of applications could be explained
either by claims for non-conforming uses, as well as some element of unlawful PNF
activity in breach of LEP requirements.
In areas that require consent, a combination of factors suggests that the rate of voluntary
compliance with planning controls requiring consent for PNF is likely to be low.
Traditionally PNF in NSW has been unregulated. It is probable that some landholders
will be unaware of relatively new requirements for consent.250 Even where landholders
are aware, it is necessary to take into account traditional rural attitudes that often view
regulation as an inappropriate intrusion upon private property rights.251
‘Voluntary compliance’ draws attention to the fact that under Part 4 EPAA, it is up to a
landholder to apply for consent, when consent is required. Some landholders may not
apply for consent and will proceed with the regulated activity in the hope that they will
not be detected. This may be based on rational calculation of the risk of detection versus
the return from unlawful actions, or it may derive from negative attitudes towards
regulation. Without a credible threat of detection and punishment, a section of the
regulated community will not come forward seeking consent.
The fact that both the NVCA and LEPs impose consent requirements, albeit in different
circumstances, has the potential to generate confusion and thus problems with
compliance. Some landholders using the PNF exemption will not realise that they may
require consent under an LEP. Other landholders who are aware may be sufficiently
confused by regulatory complexity that they decide that they do not need LEP consent as
they have already claimed or ‘complied with’ the PNF exemption under the NVCA. To
these persons an ‘exemption’ will logically connote an exemption from all approval
requirements. Others may be sufficiently annoyed about being exempt under one law but
subject to another, to avoid approaching council about lodging a DA.

One council officer from an area which requires consent for forestry stated that “many loggers are not familiar with
the requirement for development consent” under EPAA. G. Tuckerman, Environment Officer, Great Lakes
Council, Forster, NSW, 5.9.97.
251 The legitimacy of requirements in an area that requires consent may be called into question where the majority of
neighbouring councils do not require consent. This is frequently the case in the North Coast region.
250

Although such propositions are intuitively attractive, they are not readily susceptible to
empirical testing. A feeling for how the law plays out in practice was gained from
interview research. One council officer described a typical scenario: “If someone comes
to us asking for permission to log, we are just as likely to send them down the road to
DLWC. If DLWC say an exemption is applicable, there’s no way they would bother
coming back to council. And we have no resources to follow it up in any case.”252
Education programs are an important aspect of compliance efforts. ‘Compliance’ and
‘enforcement’ activities must be distinguished. Enforcement efforts (such as
prosecutions, warning letters, notices and orders) employ the regulatory tools of
command and deterrence, yet they are not the only method of achieving compliance. The
term ‘compliance’ refers to any measures implemented by a regulatory agency (and third
parties it might enlist) to ensure the regulatory requirements are met. Agencies can also
secure ongoing industry compliance by means of negotiation and inculcating trust as well
as by means of education and training programs and by offering incentives and
inducements.253
The reverse side of the compliance problems arising from landholder confusion is the
difficulties faced by councils. The primary difficulty for councils in enforcing LEP
requirements appears to be the structuring and operation of the NVCA’s PNF
exemption. Significant difficulties arise from the fact that there is no ‘notification
requirement’ for PNF proceeding under exemption. Therefore, DLWC is often unable to
inform councils that a particular operation is proceeding under exemption rather than
NVCA consent, as it is itself unaware that particular PNF operations are proceeding. In
order adequately to enforce and monitor LEP requirements in relation to PNF, councils
would need to be in receipt of detailed, up-to-date information from DLWC specifying
operations relying upon the exemption.254
The legislative complexity between the NVCA and LEPs also creates policy confusion
for local governments. Interviews suggested that a determinant of the compliance stance
Interview, Mr. R. Pitt, Strategic Planning/Development Control Co-Ordinator, Environmental Services, Kempsey
Shire Council, by telephone, 15.3.02, notes on file.
253 Kay, R., Alder, J. (1999) Coastal Planning and Management, Spon/Routledge, London, at pp.128-129.
254 Interview evidence suggested that at least several Councils were not in a position to track loggers using the PNF
exemption, and to ensure that they applied for consent. Interview, 12.7.02, Mr. Bruce Byatt, Planner, Greater Taree
City Council; Interview, Mr. R. Pitt, Kempsey Shire Council, 15.3.02, notes on file. Mr. Pitt stated: “We have no
effective means of policing it. It’s always been that way.”
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of local government regarding PNF is the extent of internal confusion regarding the
impact of the PNF exemption on LEP requirements. In some cases this confusion
resulted in an operational decision not to apply the consent requirement for PNF. One
council officer stated, “We haven’t controlled logging since it [the NVCA] was
enacted…We used to be out chasing bulldozers the whole time, before the Native Veg
Act came in.”255 It is for such reasons that the effectiveness of LEP regulation of PNF
depends to a large extent on the approach of DLWC and its regional offices and staff
towards exempt PNF. Criticism of DLWC may be warranted over the fact that some of
its public affairs material fail to draw landholder attention to the possibility of consent
requirements of local councils.256

Findings about regulatory compliance strategies employed
Some basic research in relation to compliance strategies adopted by various local councils
was conducted via interviews. Given the broad range of options potentially available for
securing compliance, it would be a considerable undertaking to obtain systematic data on
the regulatory compliance strategies employed by the 107 local governments surveyed for
this thesis. This aspect of the subject is not amenable to relatively simple and systematic
evaluation.257

Yet the officer from the same council stated that he was aware of the questionable legal validity of their position:
“I’m just waiting for the time when someone takes council to court in a third party action for failure to enforce its
own LEP. It’s going to happen one day.” Interview, Mr. R. Pitt, Strategic Planning/Development Control CoOrdinator, Environmental Services, Kempsey Shire Council, by telephone, 15.3.02, notes on file. As a justification it
was claimed that DLWC legal officers had issued an advice stating that the NVCA s.23 overrode the LEP
requirements. However, a close reading of that advice (supplied by the council), by the author revealed that council
was in fact advised that clearing under NVCA exemptions would still be subject to LEP requirements for consent. DLWC
(2002) Letter of Legal Advice to Kempsey Shire Council regarding Effect of Native Vegetation Conservation Act on the Kempsey
LEP, 9 January, Author : L. Paget-Cooke, DLWC, Sydney, 7pp. It was also claimed that local, regional, and head
offices of DLWC had issued inconsistent verbal and written advice on the question. In particular Council had
sought clarification from DLWC regarding the impact of the NVCA on environment protection zones. “We had a
real concern that people could now clear these zones, which we really want to protect, using NVCA exemptions
under the NVCA. Council is concerned.”
256 In particular, DLWC Fact Sheet No.5 is potentially misleading as it fails to draw attention to the fact that other
sources of a consent requirement may exist, thus implying that if clearing is exempt there is no need to obtain other
consents (from local council under LEP). When discussing the PNF exemption (on land that is not State protected
land) does not warn of the possibility of the requirement for consent from local government. It simply states “the
following clearing is exempt from the need to obtain Development Consent”. However warns the reader to refer to
the more detailed booklet “Definitions and Exemptions”. This has been brought to DLWC’s attention, but so far
the Department has not altered the document. DLWC (1998) Native Vegetation Conservation Act: Exclusions and
Exemptions Factsheet No.5, September 1998). Also, Pers. Comm., T. Holden, Policy Director, NSW EDO, 27.11.01
(by telephone).
257 Apart from the sheer number of councils, which limits attempts to make reliable generalisations about their
‘approach to enforcement’, there is considerable difficulty in devising a series of markers against which valid
comparisons of the approach of various councils could be made. A survey approach would be required, and then
the results would be of limited reliability. Participant observation based in a local government office would be the
only way of obtaining reliable data, but would only yield data from a small number of councils, even if the procedure
were repeated.
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Interviews suggested that few, if any, rural councils have a systematic approach to
monitoring or surveillance for the detection of breaches of PNF requirements. Many
council staff interviewed reported a lack of enforcement resources. This suggests that a
passive and ad hoc approach to detection of non-compliant activity is the norm. To a
large extent, reporting by neighbours or haphazard detection by council staff driving
through the area is relied upon.258 Few if any councils appear to have a published
compliance or prosecution policy. Interviewees stated that satellite monitoring or aircraft
fly-overs were not applied.259 Another issue for further research is the extent of
compliance with conditions of consent. An officer of a council that granted consent for
logging on a 2000ha property containing old-growth and rainforest on private land stated
that although consent was granted subject to many conditions, the council has no
enforcement staff, so it was unknown whether conditions were complied with.260
A small number of interviews led to discussions of enforcement and compliance which
raised some of the issues. For example, when asked what steps council had taken to
inform landowners and logging contractors about their obligations to seek consent under
the LEP, one officer from a North Coast council replied, “none”. When asked whether
council had an approach or strategy to address issues of enforcement and compliance
regarding PNF and its LEP, the officer stated “Not at all”.261 Still, these statements
cannot at this stage support broad generalisations about “the enforcement approach of
local government” in NSW towards PNF. One council may treat applications for
consent for PNF harshly, whilst others approach PNF leniently.
However, no interview subject stated that their LGA ran a vigorous compliance or
enforcement program relating to PNF activity.262 No evidence came to light of any
instance in which an order had been made under either the EPAA or the LGA in order
to enforce environmental protection conditions in relation to PNF operations. Nor did
any interviewees describe any civil enforcement activity relating to PNF.
In the 37,000 km2 area covered by Greater Taree City Council, the primary method of detection of offences is
reporting by neighbours. There is no use made of satellite monitoring, nor of aircraft fly-overs. There have been no
prosecutions, and no civil or administrative enforcement activity relating to PNF. Interview, 12.7.02, Mr. Bruce
Byatt, Planner, Greater Taree City Council.
259 DLWC have used aircraft fly-overs to audit compliance with conditions of consent for clearing in the Central West
region. See Chapter Eight. Satellite monitoring is used in other environmental enforcement contexts in other
jurisdictions: again, see: Chapter Eight. Satellite technologies such as remote sensing and GIS are employed by some
councils for other purposes, such as habitat mapping.
260 Interviews, G.Tuckerman, Great Lakes Council, 5.9.97, 16.7.02, by telephone, notes on file.
261 Interview, Mr. R. Pitt, Strategic Planning/Development Control Co-Ordinator, Environmental Services, Kempsey
Shire Council, by telephone, 15.3.02, notes on file.
262 See Appendix 9.1: Table of Consent Requirements.
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Councils may prosecute parties who fail to obtain, or to comply with a development
consent (and its conditions). A comprehensive review of reported and unreported case
law revealed that during the study period (1997-2002), local government launched no
prosecutions in the Land and Environment Court concerning unauthorised PNF.263 The
last prosecution appeared to have taken place in 1990.264
In relation to other forms of vegetation clearance in breach of LEP requirements (e.g.
agricultural clearing), there has been some prosecution activity by councils. The average
fine in the seven successful rural prosecutions (relating to tree clearance, not
unauthorised forestry) since 1990 was $10250 (Appendix 9.5). This level of penalties is
best described as low. The prosecution results suggest that the general deterrence effect
being exerted to encourage compliance with the LEP provisions is likely to be rather
small. Land and Environment Court decisions suggest an equivocal approach to
imposing severe penalties for illegal tree-felling in the rural context than in the urban
context. A comparison between the results of prosecutions for destruction of native
vegetation in the country and in urban areas reveals that penalties imposed for the
former have been lower than those imposed for the latter. The average fine for urban
tree felling was $13718, and involved far fewer trees.265
So what are the implications of these findings regarding formal enforcement of LEP
requirements?

The finding that local government has undertaken no prosecutions

relating to PNF since 1990 is almost certainly related to the (equivocal) evidence
suggesting a low level of engagement with the industry by councils (as regulators of
A review was conducted of the case law reported in the LGERA and of unreported judgments indexed on the
internet at <www.austlii.edu.au>, and at NSW Attorney General’s Lawlink website of unreported Land and
Environment Court judgements. Note that proceedings for offences against the Local Government Act (such as
s.626, failure to obtain approval), can be dealt with summarily by a Local Court or by the LEC exercising its
summary jurisdiction: Local Government Act 1993, s.691(3). Proceedings to remedy or restrain breaches of the LG Act
may be heard in either the Local Court or the Land and Environment Court: s.673.
264 Fry v Patterson, 10 October 1990, Land and Environment Court NSW, Unreported, Nos.50076-50078 of 1990, Stein,
J.
265 It is certainly lower than the average fine that was imposed in the 8 urban prosecutions of $13718. In the urban
context, in Canterbury CC v Saad, a $5000 fine was imposed for the removal of two mature trees, and in Ryde CC v
Calleija, a $15,000 fine was imposed for the removal of 15 mature trees. In Hornsby SC v Moit, a penalty totalling
$40,000 was imposed for the felling of 49 trees in urban bushland. These results indicate a different calculus of
decision making (ie. around $1000 per tree) to that applied in the cases relating to rural vegetation destruction. The
fines are certainly larger on a per-tree basis than penalties imposed in the rural context. However it must be
recognised that judicial discretion in sentencing takes into account the particular circumstances and facts of each
case. Canterbury City Council v Saad ( 2000) 112 LGERA 107, Land and Environment Court NSW; Canterbury City
Council v Saad, Land and Environment Court NSW, Unreported No. 50022 of 2000; Bignold J. (Judgment on
Sentence), 28 February 2001; Ryde City Council v Calleija (1998) 99 LGERA 360; Hornsby Shire Council v Moit, [2001]
NSWLEC 50,Unreported, Nos 50023 of 2000 and 50024 of 2000, Land and Environment Court of NSW, 26
February 2001, Lloyd, J.; see also Cameron v Lake Macquarie City Council (2000) 107 LGERA 308.
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PNF). The proposition that there is a low-key approach to both compliance and
enforcement tends to reinforce the proposition that the overall level of compliance with
LEP requirements for PNF is relatively low.

CONCLUSION
Although regulation of PNF by local government under the EPAA is not the primary
aspect of regulation of the industry, with DLWC formally playing the lead role, EPIs
administered by local government still play an important ‘safety net’ role. With the broad
scope of the NVCA’s exemption for PNF, and the widespread use made of that
exemption, this is the position at the time of writing, prior to the Gazettal of a significant
number of RVMPs. At present, selected local councils in each of the five DUAP regions
surveyed play a role in overseeing PNF, either in the main rural zone or in selected
environmental protection zones, or both.266
Yet the major finding of this Chapter is that in the North Coast and Hunter regions,
where the PNF industry is most active, local councils tend not to regulate the industry.
On this basis it can be said that overall, during the study period, the EPAA, as applied by
local government, failed to exert sustained and consistent pressure for ESFM outcomes.
The majority of one hundred and seven councils surveyed across the State (64.5 per cent)
did not require development consent before forestry could proceed in the general rural
zone (1(a)). In the North Coast DUAP Region, the majority of councils (84.2 per cent)
and Central Coast and Hunter regions (61.5 per cent) did not require applications for
development consent for PNF. Conversely, the majority of councils on the South Coast
and Illawarra Regions require consent to be sought.
The author’s survey of LEPs in the Northern Region267 revealed that within environment
protection zones, the majority of plans (58.8 per cent) permit forestry with consent268
rather than prohibit it (36.8 per cent).269

Appendix 9.2 contains a map indicating the boundaries of the DUAP regions.
Only a geographically limited survey into the requirements of EP zonings was conducted, as it is evident that the
majority of PNF in NSW takes place within the rural 1(a) zone.
268 Forestry permitted with consent in Great Lakes LEP 1996, zone 7(c) scenic protection zone; Gunnedah LEP 1998,
zone 7(d) Environment Protection – scenic zone; Snowy River LEP 1997, zone 7 - environmental protection,
cl.19(3). Forestry permitted with consent in Hastings LEP 2001, Zone 7 (d) Environmental Protection – Scenic. In
the Tweed LEP 2000, forestry is permitted with consent in Zone 7(1) Environmental Protection - Habitat zone, but
faces a special onus of proof of necessity and consistency with plan and zone objectives against clause 8.
269 Calculated from a total of 19 LEPs. Two LEPs contained no EP zones at all. Kyogle operates under an IDO that
contains no EP zones. Interview, Strategic Planner, 30.1.02. Similarly, the Grafton LEP cl.9 contains no EP zones.
266
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Even where consent is required by LEPs, little pressure is exerted for ESFM. Part of the
difficulty derives from defects in the EPAA, principally the shortcomings of s.79C. In
spite of the fact that the objects of the EPAA include to encourage “the protection of
the environment” and “ecologically sustainable development”,270 the Act (as interpreted
by the courts to date) has limited this promise. Section 79C does not mandate placing
particular weight on environmental factors above social or economic factors in the
consent decision-making calculus. A council may lawfully place lower priority on
environmental considerations in the decision-making process, provided that it can
establish that it gave genuine consideration to all relevant s.79C factors. This chapter has
argued that the EPAA does not require decision-making in accordance with ESD (or
ESFM) principles.271
For various institutional reasons, the capacity of local government to effectively regulate
PNF, even where it wishes to, is limited. Often councils, particularly smaller councils, do
not possess the resources for a broad range of environmental protection tasks. Judging
by the research findings, this would also appear to be the case for assessing and
monitoring PNF operations at a more central level. There is a strong argument for
seeking some measure of consistency and uniformity in regulatory requirements for PNF
across NSW, a task that local government regulation is inherently unsuited to, unless
regional planning (with REPs) were to be adopted with some vigour.
Another problem brought to light was inadequate coordination between DLWC and
local government over the demarcation between the NVCA and LEPs, a difficulty
caused by the PNF exemption. However, some of the difficulty with environment
protection efforts directed at PNF are of local government’s own doing - perverse
incentives generated by the present configuration of the local government rating

270
271

EPAA, s.5(a).
EPAA, s.79C(1). See Chapter Six. Stein, P., Mahony, S. (1999) “Incorporating Sustainability Principles in
Legislation”, in Leadbeter, P., Gunningham, N., Boer, B. (eds.), Environmental Outlook No.3: Law and Policy,
Federation Press, Sydney, 57 at 72. By contrast,the Water Management Act 2000 explicitly states that its objects include
the far more active objective, “to apply the principles of ecologically sustainable development” [emphasis added].
Water management committees are under a statutory duty to exercise their functions “consistently with the
principles of ESD”: s.14(3).

system272 which indirectly encourages logging and vegetation clearance in preference to
native vegetation conservation.273
In spite of these problems, we should be cautious about removing local government’s
regulatory role. The present breadth of deficiencies in the NVCA, in the form of
exemptions such as the PNF exemption, means that those local councils that require
consent for PNF could play an important supervisory role, if they take questions of
compliance seriously.

Binning, C., Young, M. (1999) above n 12 ; Young et.al. (1996) above n 111, Vol 1 at 126 ; Pearson, L. (1994) Local
Government Law in NSW, Federation Press, Chapter 5, at 134-140; Kelly and Farrier (1996) above n 74 at 384-5.
273 Binning, C., Young, M. (1999) above n 12. In NSW land used as farmland (including forestry is sometimes rated at a
lower level than used for conservation. However to date there has been no specific research carried out into the
specific question of the impact of the rating system on the decision making of landowners relating to proposed
forestry activities. Notably the categories of land tenure granted rating exemptions in the Local Government Act 1993,
s.555 such as national park, does not include informal private nature reserves. Land subject to conservation
agreements made under the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 are included, however, land subject to a property
agreement under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 is not. An additional concern is the fact that the Valuation
of Land Act 1916, s.4(1)(a) includes within the heading of “land improvements, “the clearing of land by the removal
or thinning out of timber, scrub, or other vegetable growths.” Land used for forestry (on a commercial basis) falls
within the definition of farmland for rating purposes: Local Government Act 1993, s.515(1).
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Chapter Ten

THE THREATENED SPECIES CONSERVATION ACT 1995
AND PRIVATE NATIVE FORESTRY IN NSW

Why should we care? What difference does it make if some species are extinguished, if even half
of all the species on earth disappear? Let me count the ways. New sources of scientific
information will be lost. Vast potential biological wealth will be destroyed. Still undeveloped
medicines, crops, pharmaceuticals, timber, fibres, pulp, soil-restoring vegetation, petroleum
substitutes, and other products and amenities will never come to light. It is fashionable in some
quarters to wave aside the small and obscure, the bugs and weeds, forgetting that an obscure moth
from Latin America saved Australia's pasture from overgrowth by cactus, that the rosy periwinkle
provided the cure for Hodgkin's disease and childhood lymphocytic leukaemia, that the bark of
the Pacific yew offers hope for victims of ovarian and breast cancer, that a chemical from the
saliva of leeches dissolves blood clots during surgery, and so down a roster already grown long
and illustrious despite the limited research addressed to it.

Wilson, E.O. (1992) The Diversity of Life.1

REQUIREMENTS OF THE THREATENED SPECIES CONSERVATION ACT
NSW legislators have attempted to provide some protection to forest biodiversity with
the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (‘TSCA’). This Act is relevant to PNF because
it applies on both public and private lands. As well as providing protection for listed
threatened species (an umbrella term used to describe both listed endangered2 and
vulnerable species3), it provides for the listing of endangered populations4 and both
vulnerable and endangered ecological communities5 (these categories are referred to
collectively below as ‘threatened species’)6.
The TSCA contains a large range of mechanisms and instruments including recovery
plans, threat abatement plans, and provision for the declaration of critical habitats.7

Wilson, E.O. (1992) The Diversity of Life, The Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass, at 347-8.
Endangered species are defined in TSCA, s.4(1), and listed in TSCA, Schedule 1, Part 1 by virtue of TSCA s.6(1).
3 Vulnerable species are defined in TSCA s.4(1) , listed in Schedule 2, by virtue of TSCA ss. 7(1),14.
4 Endangered populations are defined in TSCA, s.4, and listed in TSCA, Schedule 1, Part 2 by virtue of TSCA s.6(2).
5 Endangered ecological communities are defined in TSCA, s.4, and listed in Schedule 1, Part 3, by virtue of TSCA
s.6(3) .
6 Note that recent amendments to the TSCA and in turn the EPAA and NPWA by the Threatened Species Conservation
Amendment Act 2002 have altered the definitions of threatened species by adding a category of ‘vulnerable ecological
community’.
7 Including recovery plans: TSCA, Part 4; threat abatement plans: TSCA, Part 5; and provision for the designation of
critical habitat TSCA, Part 3; and joint management agreements with public authorities for the control of actions
jeopardising the survival of threatened species: TSCA, Part 7, Division 2.
1
2

Other provisions are for listing of key threatening processes,8 and the making of stopwork orders.9 Apart from these stand-alone provisions, the TSCA also operates through
provisions inserted in Parts 4 and 5 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979
(‘EPAA’) and the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (‘NPWA ’).
In terms of PNF, the most important mechanism through which the TSCA operates in
practice is the EPAA’s planning process. The TSCA requires consideration of the likely
impact of proposed development on threatened species10 in development consent
deliberations under Part 4 EPAA.11
There are two pathways under Part 4 EPAA whereby threatened species questions are
considered. Firstly, given an application for consent to log (clear) under the NVCA, the
Minister for Land and Water Conservation is required to consider a number of specified
threatened species matters during consent decision-making (see ‘8-part test’, below).
Secondly, where private forestry is exempt from the NVCA, but requires consent from a
local council under an Environmental Planning Instrument (i.e. LEP, REP, SEPP) then
that consent authority may need to consider threatened species issues during its
deliberations.
Consent authorities under Part 4 EPAA, determining authorities under Part 5 EPAA
and the National Parks and Wildlife Service (‘NPWS’)12 under TSCA Part 6, must all
consider as part of their overall deliberations the question of whether there is likely to be
a significant effect on threatened species associated with a proposed “development” (i.e.
logging). The likely magnitude of future impacts is presently assessed using a threshold
‘8-part’ test of significance contained in Section 5A of the EPAA.13 Where a person is
TSCA, Schedule 3.
TSCA, Part 7, Division 1.
10 Part 4 proposals, s.78A(8)(b), s.79C(1) ; Part 5 activities, s.111(4)(b) EPAA. The process of threatened species
assessment is described in detail in Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (1995) Threatened Species Conservation
Act: Circular A13, 22 December 1995, 8pp; National Parks and Wildlife Service NSW (1996) Threatened Species
Conservation Act: Circular No.1: 24 January 1996, 8pp, plus attachments.
11 EPAA, s.5A; ss.78A, 79B, 79C,80A (Part 4).
12 Since 24 September 2003, the NPWS is part of the DEC Department of Conservation of Environment which
comprises the National Parks and Wildlife Service, the Environment Protection Authority, the Royal Botanic
Gardens and Resource NSW.
13 There were a number of legislative amendments to the 8-part test in October 2002, likely to commence in late 2003.
These amendments have not fundamentally altered the mechanism and approach of the legislation. The purpose of
the amendments, according to the Second Reading Speech was to bring “the scale of assessment down to the local level,
reflecting the fact that long-term loss of biodiversity arises primarily from the accumulation of losses and depletions
at a local level.” Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 31 May 2002, p.2302. See: Threatened Species Conservation Amendment
Act 2002, Schedule 2, as yet largely uncommenced at 16.9.03, based on a search of NSW Parliamentary Counsel’s
Office, NSW Legislation in Force (<www.legislation.nsw.gov.au>). These amendments reduced the number of
8
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conducting activities in accordance with the terms of a development consent, they have a
defence against prosecution for contravention of threatened species legislation.14
The 8-part test is used to determine “whether there is likely to be a significant effect on
threatened species, populations or ecological communities, or their habitats”.15 If any one
or more of the eight factors raised in s.5A EPAA are answered positively, indicating that
a significant effect is likely, then the proponent must prepare16 and submit an adequate17
Species Impact Statement (‘SIS’) along with the development application18 in accordance
with the detailed requirements in the TSCA19 (see further: 8.2, below). The SIS is
designed to function as an aid to the decision-making of the consent or determining
authority, and is prepared at the developer’s expense in accordance with formal
requirements supplied by the Director-General of the NPWS regarding its form and
content (‘Director-General’s requirements’).20
In addition, if there is likely to be a significant effect on threatened species, the consent
authority must take a further step, of either Ministerial-level consultation or agency-level
concurrence, depending on which party is the consent authority. Where the development
application for PNF activity has been made under the NVCA, the Minister
administering that Act is the consent authority.21 Given a preliminary assessment of likely
significant effect on threatened species, a statutory consultation process with the

considerations listed under s.5A(2) by one, but also added another consideration at 5A(1), that “assessment
guidelines” in force under s.94A TSCA must be considered. It is on this basis that I continue to refer to the test as
an ‘eight part’ test rather than a ‘seven part’ test.
14 It is a defence to prosecution for offences under the NPWA if the offending actions (e.g. damage to habitat of
threatened species) taken was “essential for the carrying out of development in accordance with a development
consent” under Part 4 of the EPAA. See NPWA s.118A(3(b)(i). The same formula is applied in s.118C and 118D.
The equivalent applies to development under Part 5 EPAA if the activity was done pursuant to a Part 5 approval:
NPWA , s.118A(3)(b)(ii). The same formula is applied in s.118C and 118D.
15 Section 77(3)(d1) EPAA has been repealed and replaced by s.78A(8)(b) EPAA. (Environmental Planning and Assessment
Amendment Act 1997. Further, there were a number of legislative amendments to the 8-part test in October 2002,
likely to commence in late 2003. These amendments have not fundamentally altered the mechanism and approach
of the legislation. The purpose of the amendments, according to the Second Reading Speech was to bring “the scale of
assessment down to the local level, reflecting the fact that long-term loss of biodiversity arises primarily from the
accumulation of losses and depletions at a local level.” Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 31 May 2002, p.2302. See:
Threatened Species Conservation Amendment Act 2002, Schedule 2, as yet largely uncommenced at 16.9.03, based on a
search of NSW Parliamentary Counsel’s Office, NSW Legislation in Force (<www.legislation.nsw.gov.au>). These
amendments reduced the number of considerations listed under s.5A(2) by one, but also added another
consideration at 5A(1), that “assessment guidelines” in force under s.94A TSCA must be considered. It is on this
basis that the test is still referred to here as an ‘eight part’ test, rather than a ‘seven part’ test.
16 TSCA, s.109, 110.
17 A SIS must contain the information required by Division 2, Part 6, TSCA, ss.109-112 TSCA.
18 Part 4 applications: EPAA, s.78A(8)(b), Part 5 activities: EPAA, s.112(1B).
19 TSCA, s.110. See also NPWS (NSW)(1996) Information Circular No.2 – Threatened Species Assessment under the EP&A
Act: The 8-part Test of Significance, NPWS, Hurstville, November 1996, at p.15.
20 TSCA, s.111.
21 NVCA, s.14.

Environment Minister must take place prior to making the development consent
decision (see Figure 1)22.
Where a Development Application (DA) is in relation to the provisions of an EPI, and
there is a finding that significant effects are likely, the consent authority must also request
the concurrence of the Director-General (‘D-G’) of NPWS.23 That concurrence may be
granted either conditionally or unconditionally, or refused.24 In concurrence decisionmaking, the D-G is required to consider “the likely social and economic consequences”
of granting or refusing concurrence.25 The D-G is also required to “take into account”
seven other statutory factors including the principles of ESD, such as the precautionary
principle.26 It is open to the D-G or the Environment Minister (if acting in place of the
D-G) to refuse concurrence to a development.27 Following the conclusion of the
concurrence/consultation process, the application is remitted to the consent or
determining authority for evaluation,28 which can refuse, or grant consent, with or
without conditions.29
In some situations neither of the above may apply. Where Part 4 EPAA does not apply
(i.e., where PNF is exempt under the NVCA and is not regulated by an EPI), the Part 5
activity approval process may apply where Part 5 is triggered (e.g. by the granting of a
licence by the Environment Protection Authority (EPA) for non-point source pollution
of water from logging operations).30 Until relatively recently, many of the approvals

EPAA, s.79B(3), (4). This requirement only applies in relation to development likely to significantly affect a
threatened species or its habitat.
23 EPAA, s.79B(3).
24 EPAA, s.77C.
25 EPAA, s.79B(5)(h).
26 EPAA, s.79B(5).
27 EPAA, s.79B(8).
28 EPAA, s.79C.
29 EPAA, s.80(1).
30 EPAA, s.111,112B-E (Part 5) . Note that the EPA was incorporated within the Department of Environment and
Conservation (DEC), in September 2003. An interview conducted in late 1998 with high level EPA staff confirmed
that PNF operations had never been issued with any pollution control licences from the NSW EPA. Interview,
21.9.98, Ms Lisa Corbyn (Deputy Director-General EPA), Mr. Steve Beaman, EPA, Sydney. Further it was indicated
there was no intention to require operators in the PNF industry to hold licences. The staff indicated that they had
no plans for formal consultation with the PNF industry, and stated that they had no plans to offer a model licence
to operators, on the basis that PNF is not a scheduled activity under the POEO Act. Policy considerations advanced
by EPA to justify the non-licensing approach on private land include (1) limited resources mean that regulating
private as well as public land logging by licensing would be impossible (2) that the policy approach is echoed in the
POEO Act in that licensing is not required as PNF is not a scheduled activity by comparison with certain forms of
intensive forestry on State forest land. Other reasons advanced include (3) the EPA will take a ‘general oversight’
role and will investigate on a case-by-case basis if a non-trivial pollution incident comes to its notice. Note that a
number of prosecutions for water pollution crimes have been concluded by the EPA in relation to forestry
operations on State Forest. EPA v Forestry Commission, Land and Environment Court Nos. 50006-50010 of 1997 and
EPA v Forestry Commission (No.2), Land and Environment Court No.50058 of 1996, unreported, Sheehan J, 23 July
22

which may have been required for a PNF operation had the potential to trigger the
operation of Part 5 EPAA.31 However, following amendments in the late 1990s to
legislation covering soil conservation and pollution,32 the approvals that have replaced
them have no capacity to trigger the operation of Part 5 EPAA. These include native
vegetation clearance consents33, and also s.91 TSCA licensing.34 Pollution control law still
may trigger Part 5 (but this may be excluded on the making of special-purpose
regulations).35 However in practice it appears not to.36
Activities not regulated under either EPAA Part 4 or 5 but still involving the harming or
picking of threatened species or damage to their habitat are subject to the Part 6 TSCA
licensing process.37 Persons concerned are required to obtain s.91 licences to harm or
pick threatened species38

(see Figure 1). Licensing is necessary in order to avoid

conviction under the offence provisions in the NPWA , of “harming” or “picking”
threatened species, populations or ecological communities39 and damage to a mapped

1997. However none appeared to have taken place during the study period in relation to PNF, according to a search
conducted at <www.austlii.edu.au>.
31 If an undertaking requires development consent or is a prohibited development, then it will not be considered an
activity for the purposes of Part 5 of the Act. Severn SC v Water Resources Commission (1982) 47 LGRA 257; Kindergarten
Union of NSW v Sydney City Council (1984) 51 LGRA 381.
32 Approval provisions previously had the potential to trigger Part 5 included authorities to clear vegetation on
protected land formerly issued under the Soil Conservation Act 1938, licences to pollute water formerly issued under
the Clean Waters Act 1970 and the Pollution Control Act 1970.
33 NVCA, s.16. Native vegetation clearance consents under the NVCA do not trigger Part 5 because the development
is assessed under Part 4. Protected land authorities no longer trigger Part 5 because the protected lands provisions
have now been subsumed into the NVCA regime. As the protected land regime has been incorporated into Part 2
of the NVCA, (where it is treated as just another category of vegetation clearance requiring Part 4 EPAA consent)
therefore it is does not trigger Part 5 EPAA. The NVCA explicitly states that any clearing carried out in accordance
with Part 2 (which covers clearing and consents for clearing either where there is an RVMP in place and where there
is not) is not an activity for the purposes of Part 5 of the EPAA, and “Part 5 does not apply to any clearing carried
out in accordance with this Part”: NVCA, s.16. Clearing authorised by Part 4 of the NVCA, ‘Codes of Practice’
does not trigger Part 5 EPAA because it is actually considered to be a form of clearing under Part 2 of the NVCA,
and is subject to the development consent regime therein: NVCA, s.21(2)(b),23(3). Further, clearing in accordance
with a Property Agreement under the NVCA is still subject to any development consent requirements that may
apply under Part 2 of the NVCA. NVCA, s.41(3).
34 TSCA, s.99(5). The D-G of NPWS is not a determining authority for the purposes of Part 5 EPAA when granting a
licence under Part 6 of the TSCA.
35 Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997, s.52(2), Regulations may make provision excluding the issue of
environment protection licences from the operation of Part 5, EPAA.
36 Review of EPA Public Register of Environment Protection Licences, 16.9.03; conducted on-line at
<www.epa.nsw.gov.au> which revealed that for the search of all licences using the term “forestry-logging” the only
forestry operations licensed by EPA are in State Forests. The Forestry Commission of NSW holds 5 licences, one
for each RFA region. Interview, 21.9.98, Ms L. Corbyn (Deputy D-G, EPA), Mr Steve Beaman, EPA, Sydney.
Interview confirmed that PNF operations have never been issued with any pollution control licences from the NSW
EPA.
37 The s 91 licence requirement is removed in the case of projects approved under the EPAA. See ss 118A(3)(b),
118C(5)(b) & 118D(2) National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW).
38 NPWA , ss. 118A(3)(b), 118C(5)(b) & 118D(2), TSCA, s.94.
39 NPWA , s.118A(3)(a).

critical habitat of threatened species.40 The person may also be at risk of committing an
offence of knowingly damaging the habitat of threatened species.41
Where a person applies for a licence from NPWS to authorise the harming or picking of
threatened species or damage to the habitat of threatened species,42 an SIS is not
automatically required to accompany the application.43 Nevertheless, an option of
preparing and submitting an SIS with an application is available.44
Where no SIS has been supplied, the D-G of NPWS must determine whether the action
proposed is likely to significantly affect threatened species or their habitats.45 An 8-part
test of significance of impact is applied, identical to that under Part 4 EPAA. If the D-G
decides that a significant effect is likely, an SIS must be submitted by the proponent.46

NPWA ., s.118C(1). However few critical habitats have been declared: Habitat of the endangered Mitchell’s
rainforest snail on Stott’s Island Nature Reserve, and the endangered little penguin colony at Sydney’s North
Harbour. The critical habitat of the Bomaderry Zieria (plant) is being considered for listing. Source:
<www.npws.nsw.gov.au>, 1.4.03.
41 NPWA , s.118D(1). An exception is where a certificate has been granted by the D-G of NPWS stating that the
action proposed is not likely to significantly affect threatened species or their habitat, or where actions are
undertaken under a property management plan.: TSCA, s.95(2).
42 Licences for this purpose are granted under TSCA s.91(1).
43 TSCA, s.92(3),(4).
44 TSCA, s.92(4). Only where the actions proposed are to be taken on land that is critical habitat is submission of a SIS
automatically required to accompany the licence application: TSCA, s.91(1)(c), 92(2).
45 TSCA, s.94(1).
46 TSCA, s.95(1).
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Figure 1: Schematic Summary of the Interaction Between the Environmental

Planning And Assessment Act, The Native Vegetation Conservation Act, and the
Threatened Species Conservation Act in Relation to PNF
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If the finding is of non-significance, no SIS is required, and no licence is required,47 and
the D-G must issue a s.95 certificate to the effect that no significant impact is likely.48 In
deciding whether to grant a s.91 licence, the D-G is required to consider, in addition to
the contents of the SIS, “the likely social and economic consequences” of granting or
refusing the licence.49 S/he must also take into account seven other statutory factors
including the principles of ESD.50
In summary, consent authorities under Part 4 EPAA, determining authorities under Part
5 EPAA, and the NPWS under TSCA Part 6, must all consider as part of their overall
deliberations whether there is likely to be a significant effect on threatened species
associated with a proposed “development” (i.e. logging). The likely magnitude of future
impacts is presently assessed using a threshold ‘8-part’ test of significance in s.5A,
EPAA.51

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION
The ‘8-part’ test
Parliament recognised that it would be impractical, beyond a certain point, to require an
SIS for every DA involving land uses potentially affecting threatened species. Therefore
the legislation provides a threshold test with which to eliminate projects of minor
concern from detailed consideration - the 8-part test.
The test requires the consideration of eight detailed ecological questions.52 A selected
portion of section 5A, EPAA is reproduced here:
For the purposes of this Act …the following factors must be taken into account in deciding
whether there is likely to be a significant effect on threatened species, populations or ecological
communities, or their habitats:
TSCA, s. 95(2).
TSCA, s.95(2).
49 TSCA, s.97(2).
50 TSCA, s.97(1).
51 There were a number of legislative amendments to the 8-part test in October 2002, likely to commence in late 2003.
These amendments have not fundamentally altered the mechanism and approach of the legislation. The purpose of
the amendments, according to the Second Reading Speech was to bring “the scale of assessment down to the local level,
reflecting the fact that long-term loss of biodiversity arises primarily from the accumulation of losses and depletions
at a local level.” Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 31 May 2002, p.2302. See: Threatened Species Conservation Amendment
Act 2002, Schedule 2, as yet largely uncommenced at 16.9.03, based on a search of NSW Parliamentary Counsel’s
Office, NSW Legislation in Force (<www.legislation.nsw.gov.au>). These amendments reduced the number of
considerations listed under s.5A(2) by one, but also added another consideration at 5A(1), that “assessment
guidelines” in force under s.94A TSCA must be considered. It is on this basis that the test is still referred to here as
an ‘eight part’ test, rather than a ‘seven part’ test.
52 The full text of section 5.A is reproduced in Appendix 10.2.
47
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in the case of a threatened species, whether the life cycle of the species is likely to be disrupted
such that a viable local population of the species is likely to be placed at risk of extinction…
…
(c) in relation to the regional distribution of the habitat of a threatened species, population or
ecological community, whether a significant area of known habitat is to be modified or removed,
[etc…]

To answer such questions, it is necessary to know whether such a population or species
exist on a site. Yet a common feature of PNF is decision-making in the absence of
adequate data regarding threatened species and their habitats. The data set regarding
threatened species on private land is poor in terms of quality and coverage.53 Most of the
data on the occurrence of threatened species is derived from computer modelling of data
collected on the public land estate and thus has limitations - being modelled rather than
actual data.54 These problems are exacerbated by difficulties of access to private forests
for survey teams on the infrequent occasions that they have been conducted.55
To apply the 8-part test satisfactorily for even one species it is necessary to have adequate
data about it, about its interaction with habitat, about the location of such habitat, and
about which parts of that habitat are essential for its survival. Yet according to NPWS
staff interviewed it is “very rare” to have complete data, or even some relevant data for a
particular proposal on private land.56
Apart from such practical issues, there are legislative issues. Many of the operational
difficulties faced by consent authorities can be traced back to aspects of the drafting of
the TSCA and problems with the application of the criteria contained in the 8-part test.57
The TSCA and EPAA inadequately address the problem of decision-making in a context
of pervasive scientific uncertainty.58 Firstly, this is because in order to answer the 8-part
test we would usually need to have the benefit of an SIS, given the paucity of scientific
data in many situations. However, the legislation is not constructed this way – instead the
Interview, 25 October 1999, Northern Zone Threatened Species Unit staff. Notes of interview on file with author.
Interview (25 October 1999) above n 53.
55 Those issues were discussed in Threatened Plants Project: Northern Region, a report completed in 1999 for the NSW
Upper N-E RFA process. It states that the ecological survey for that report: “… was largely confined to public land,
as no formal arrangement for gaining access to areas of freehold tenure had been implemented prior to surveys
commencing…Under… [the RACAC protocol], NPWS employees were not permitted to solicit permission to
survey on private land. They were, however, permitted to survey on private land if an invitation to do so was made
by the owner.” in P Richards, (1999) Threatened Plants Project: Northern Region (a project undertaken for the Joint
Commonwealth NSW Regional Forest Agreement Steering Committee as part of the NSW Comprehensive
Regional Assessments, Sydney: Department of Urban Affairs and Planning, 1999), p 10.
56 Interview, Mr. D. Robson, Western Directorate NPWS regional TSU manager, Dubbo, 18.6.01, by telephone.
57 Interview, P. Redpath, ecologist, DLWC Grafton (North Coast Region Office), 31.3.99.
58 The difficulty of answering these questions in the 8-part test led in 2002 to amendments of the test and the inclusion
of a requirement to refer to ‘assessment guidelines’ that will “assist in the interpretation and application of the
factors. Whether these guidelines actually assist or confuse the process remains to be seen. EPAA, s.5A(1)(b);
NPWS (2003) Guide to the Threatened Species Conservation Amendment Act 2002, NPWS, Hurstville, 26pp. at p.17.
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8-part test precedes the question of whether an SIS must be prepared. The 8-part test’s
questions are answered using preliminary information only.59
The TSCA/EPAA is unclear about the extent of preliminary information and surveying
for threatened species required in order to adequately answer the 8-part test.60 The
legislation does not state whether landowners can simply supply ‘yes/no’ answers or
whether they must organise a proper survey. It is also not clear who must provide (and
pay for) this data. Landowners are not explicitly obliged to collect data in order to answer
the 8-part test, it seems, unless the consent authority requires them to.61
The legislation is also not very clear about who is responsible for correctly applying the
8-part test, i.e. whether it is the applicant or the consent authority. Section 5A EPAA
provides:
For the purposes of this Act and, in particular, in the administration of sections 78A, 79C (1) and
112, the following factors must be taken into account in deciding whether there is likely to be a
significant effect on threatened species, populations or ecological communities, or their
habitats:…

Close consideration of the legislation suggests that the 8-part test is ultimately the
responsibility of the consent authority. This conclusion flows from the fact that it is the
consent authority that administers s.79C(1) regarding consent decision-making. The key
words are “For the purposes of administration of s.79C”, which indicate that application
of the 8-part test is necessary for the consent authority to carry out its responsibilities
under that section.
This approach was applied in Byron Shire Businesses for the Future v Byron Council (the ‘Club
Med’ case), in judicial review proceedings, where Pearlman J of the Land and
Environment Court invalidated a consent granted to a development, partly on the basis
that the council had unreasonably made decisions on the basis of inadequate information
regarding 32 of 33 species using the site or predicted to do so. Her Honour found that:
Because the material before it in relation to these species pointed to the likelihood of significant
effect, but was insufficient, it was not reasonably open to the Council to conclude that there was
no likelihood of significant effect on their environment.62
Prest, J, Kelly, A. (2000) “Implementation of Threatened Species Law By Local Government in New South Wales”
17(6) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 584-601, citing Kelly, A. (1996) “New Mandates for Protecting
Threatened Species, Populations, and Ecological Communities at the Local Government Level in New South
Wales”, 2(2) Local Government Law Journal 78-94 at 89.
60 Kelly, A. (1996) above n 59 at 89.
61 However if aware of the presence of threatened species they remain in danger of committing an offence under
NPWA , s.118D of knowingly damaging the habitat of threatened species.
62 Byron Shire Businesses for the Future v Byron Council (1994) 84 LGERA 434 at 447.
59

Other case law suggests that the responsibility for ensuring that the DA is valid by way of
completeness rests with the consent authority. In the Court of Appeal in Timbarra
Protection Coalition v Ross Mining NL, Spigelman CJ set out the required approach:
A consent authority may be called upon to decide whether it has a valid application before it…In
making such a decision with respect to s.77(3)(d1) it must take into account the relevant factor or
factors in s.5A.63

The proper application of the 8-part test is necessary for the validity of the subsequent
decision regarding the DA. In the Club Med case, Pearlman CJ ruled, “the determination
of whether or not the proposed development will have a significant effect on the
environment of endangered fauna is a threshold question.”64 It was considered to be a
threshold question in the sense that (a) the test must be properly addressed prior to
proceeding to determine the development application and (b) its determination would
affect whether an SIS and concurrence is required. The Court held that a development
consent can be invalidated by improper implementation of the 8-part test.65 Her Honour
held that the test:
requires determination in order to determine in turn the question of whether the development
application conforms to statutory requirements of the EP&A Act. The council’s power to
proceed to a determination of the development application...is predicated upon having before it a
development application which complies with the statutory requirements which the Act has
imposed.66

A similar approach was applied by Talbot J of the Land and Environment Court in
Cameron v Nambucca SC, where a development consent was declared void on the basis that
the Council in question had erred in holding that a particular development was not likely
to have a significant effect on threatened species. Talbot J’s reasons for invalidating the
consent included the fact that the evidence for a likely significant effect was “all one
way” suggesting a significant effect was probable.

Timbarra Protection Coalition v Ross Mining NL (1999) 102 LGERA 52 at 68.
Byron Shire Businesses for the Future at 447.
65A very similar chain of reasoning was applied by the Court of Appeal in Helman v Byron Shire Council (1995) 87 LGRA
349.
66 Byron Shire Businesses for the Future at 447.
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Figure 2 Interaction of the TSCA and Part 4 EPAA
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His Honour also suggested that the proponent’s survey did not amount to “a proper
survey” (see below). Evidence of the presence of 18 threatened species was held to
“clearly indicate” that an SIS was required. In applying the Court of Appeal’s decision in
Helman v Byron Shire Council, he held that council had made an incorrect decision on a
question of fact (i.e. regarding threatened species) which meant that the precondition for
the making of a valid decision did not exist. In other words, insufficient information had
been gathered in order for the consent authority to be in a position to make a valid
decision.67
The upshot is that a consent authority must reject a development application and not
proceed to determine it, if the application does not comply with statutory requirements.
However, it is not fatal to a DA for it to be unaccompanied by an FIS/SIS at the time of
lodgement, as one can be lodged at an intermediate stage, prior to determination by the
consent authority.
A consent authority is unable to answer the questions posed by the 8-part test if it does
not have adequate information regarding threatened species. However, the Act does little
to force proponents to collect this information. Amendments made in 2002 will mandate
the production of “assessment guidelines” that will assist “in the interpretation and
application of the factors” of the 8-part test.68 The situation may improve depending on
the content of “assessment guidelines”69 to be considered in applying the revised 8-part
test.
An associated difficulty is the question of responsibility for the provision of data for
decision-making. Obviously, preliminary data is required in order to make the threshold
decision regarding likely significance of impacts of proposals such as PNF logging. Yet
the legislation does not clearly state which party (i.e., the proponent or consent authority)
must supply the information on which the 8-part test is to be carried out. In practice,
Cameron v Nambucca Shire Council (1997) 95 LGERA 268 at 283-284. This decision was made on the basis of
provisions of the EPAA which have since been repealed. These were EPAA, s.77(3)(d1), 77A(2), 83. The relevant
provision today is s.79B(10). However, their contemporary replacement has essentially the same effect. Where the
concurrence of the D-G of NPWS is required, for example, following a positive finding of likely significant impact
on threatened species on the basis of the 8-part test, the EPAA states in s.79B(10) that any consent subsequently
granted by a consent authority without concurrence having been obtained, is voidable. In other words, where
concurrence was required, and not obtained, then any development consent granted may be subsequently
invalidated.
68 EPAA, s.5A(1)(b); NPWS (2003) Guide to the Threatened Species Conservation Amendment Act 2002, NPWS, Hurstville,
26pp. at p.17.
69 Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995, s.94A (section not in force at time of writing on 3.4.03).
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where local government is the consent authority it appears to be the proponent which
supplies the bulk of this preliminary data at the request of the consent authority in a
report addressing the test.
On the other hand there was some evidence (although not conclusive) of a tendency for
DLWC to perform the 8-part test for PNF proponents. DLWC staff in the South Coast
and Hunter Regions stated in interviews that the DLWC, rather than the proponent,
prepares most of the documentation related to the 8-part test for PNF proposals.70
DLWC has greater resources than the average rural council, and has its own ecological
databases and ‘expert systems’ for computer-aided decision-making. This approach
appears lawful, as there is no requirement that says that a proponent must gather all the
information for the application of the 8-part test. Nevertheless DLWC’s approach
involves an implicit subsidy to industry. Usually consent authorities such as councils shift
the costs onto proponents by requiring them to complete ecological surveys. In fairness,
DLWC’s threatened species manual states that PNF proponents may be required to
obtain surveys. The extent to which such requirements have actually been imposed in
practice is unknown.
The proponent’s report (if any) addressing the 8-part test is assessed by the consent
authority. Consent authorities need not rely upon proponents for their decision-making
information, and many do not. In fact, in order to arrive at a defensible decision of no
significant effect (following the principle in Club Med) it is up to the consent authority to
supplement the information. Usually this takes place by way of desktop review of
published papers and databases. A quantity of information is available to consent
authorities in the form of ecological databases, including NPWS’ Atlas of NSW Wildlife,
and the ROTAP list of threatened plants.71 More sophisticated councils may supplement
this review using habitat- and species-prediction models, and other techniques such as
aerial photographic interpretation, and, less frequently, by resort to detailed site-specific
surveys. Further, councils and DLWC can approach either NPWS or private ecological
consultants for advice.
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Interview, Mr Rob Adam, DLWC Sydney/South Coast Region Head Office, 14.4.00; Interview, anonymous
Vegetation Management Officer, DLWC Hunter Region, 23.3.00, notes on file with author.
ROTAP – Register of Threatened Australian Plants. Interview, Mr P. Craven, Project Officer, NPWS, Southern
Directorate, Queanbeyan, 14.4.00. Many of these databases are available to landholders over the internet at
Community Access to Natural Resources Information website <www.canri.nsw.gov.au>.

The consent authority must come to a judgement (implicit or explicit) regarding the
veracity and reliability of the information supplied. However some commentators have
argued that 8-part test reports submitted by the proponent (where supplied) may not
receive critical scrutiny, or at worst, may be uncritically accepted at face value where
council is the consent authority. Some less-affluent councils, facing severe resource
constraints, will lack the time, resources and/or expertise to adequately assess the 8-part
test documentation supplied by a proponent.72
The broader literature suggests that there are often problems with the quality of some 8part test reports produced by proponents and their consultants. There is some indication
that a “tick the box” approach has its adherents. The Local Government Association
stated to a Parliamentary Committee reviewing the TSCA that “often only yes/no
answers are supplied by consultants for the Eight Part Test”.73 These slapdash methods
appear not to be confined to developers - a recent Land and Environment Court
decision refers to a council environment officer conducting an 8-part test mentally but
failing to commit the result to paper.74 The Expert Working Group on ESFM (1998)
recommended a requirement for approval (or even auditing) of 8-part tests by an
independent biodiversity agency (presumably NPWS).75
There are several issues concerning consultants engaged by proponents to prepare
reports addressing the 8-part test. There are no formal accreditation standards in the
ecological surveying and consulting industry in NSW.76 This enables under-qualified
consultants to enter the market and prepare such reports. An ecologist noted: “instances
where an unqualified applicant has prepared their own 8-part test or hired a landscape
architect, architect or horticulturalist to prepare the report.”77

Douglas, S. (1999) “Local Government and the Threatened Species Conservation Act – The Greatest Potential; the
Weakest Link”, 6(2) Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy.
73 Parliament of New South Wales (1997) Report of the NSW Parliamentary Joint Select Committee Upon the Threatened Species
Conservation Act 1995, 3 December 1997, at p.32.
74 Maule v Liporoni & Gosford City Council [2002] NSWLEC 25, 19 March 2002, No.40018 of 2001, at para 102: “ In his
oral evidence Mr Allen (the council’s environment officer) said he carried out the 8-part test required by s.5A but
did not reduce it to writing.”
75 “Inadequate surveys that fail to detect threatened species may lead to false conclusions about the significance and
level of impact. It is common for 8-part test surveys to detect only a portion of the threatened species actually
present on development sites”: Independent Expert Working Group (1998) Assessment of management systems and
processes for achieving ecologically sustainable forest management in NSW, A report undertaken for the NSW CRA/RFA
Steering Committee, Resource and Conservation Division, DUAP; Forests Taskforce, Dept. of PM&C, p.63.
76 Parliament of New South Wales (1997) above n 73 at 36-39. The Act does set out in detail requirements for the
content of a SIS.TSCA, s.110.
77 Douglas, S. (1999) above n 72.
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Amendments to the Act in 2002 introduced requirements for the Director-General of
NPWS to establish a regime to govern the accreditation of consultants preparing SISs.78
Whilst these new provisions address problems with the SIS, they do not address the
quality of 8-part test reports.79 Thus the reforms have not addressed a fundamental
underlying problem - quality control at the level of the 8-part test.
Part of the explanation for variable standards in this area is commercial pressures. The
detection of threatened species on private property is likely to be perceived by
landholders as having adverse economic consequences. These include the direct cost of
preparation of an SIS (in the order of $5,000-50,000)80 and the indirect cost of lost
timber production that would be associated with the imposition of prescriptions for the
protection of threatened species. If the SIS requirements can be averted then this also
eliminates the possibility of NPWS involvement.
There is a temptation for proponents to exploit the lack of adequate information
regarding biodiversity on private land and to simply assert that threatened species do not
exist on a site. This should put consent authorities on notice regarding the objectivity of
8-part test reports. Where the landowner is unqualified and prepares their own report,
the potential for defective analysis, as well as bias and selective attention is self-evident.
Even where a consultant is involved, it has been observed that some ecological
consultants may be willing to produce findings overly favourable to developers in order
to maintain a steady flow of work.81 The present 8-part test provisions do not address the
commercial pressures on consultants to present a case favourable to proponents. These
problems of objectivity associated with threatened species information mirror wider
issues in the planning approval system. There is an extensive literature documenting and
discussing the problems with the reliability of proponent-prepared EIS documentation.82

TSCA, s.113.
Farrier, D.; Whelan, R.; Brown, C. (2002) “Addressing Scientific Uncertainty in Local Government Decision
Making Processes”, 19(6) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 429-444 at 444.
80 The figure depends on a range of factors including the nature of the activity proposed, the extent of pre-existing
data and the area of the site. Correspondence with S Douglas, ecological consultant, ESP Planning Ltd, Hornsby, 1
May 2000, on file with author.
81 Douglas, S. (1999) above n 72.
82 Bates, G. (1995) Environmental Law in Australia, 4th edition, Butterworths, pp.179-188 provides a general survey of
potential problems in the design of environmental impact assessment regimes; see also: Raff, M. (1997) ‘Ten
Principles of Quality in Environmental Impact Assessment’, 14 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 207; Craig, D.
and others, Commonwealth Environment Protection Agency (1994) Review of Commonwealth Environmental Impact
Assessment: Analysis of Environmental Impact Assessment Practice and Procedures in Other Countries, Canberra, CEPA.
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Even where searches are completed with the utmost integrity, they may not bear fruit.
Surveys for threatened species are time-consuming and complex. The species in question
are rare and uncommon and many threatened species are cryptic (difficult to detect). For
some species, even a thorough search in core habitat may not reveal them.83 Typically,
surveys will only detect a portion of the threatened species on a site.84 In Cameron v
Nambucca SC, the council had requested the developers to submit an 8-part test for 6
threatened species that were listed by databases as potentially occurring on the site. Later
surveys by experts for the third-party objectors in fact revealed 18 threatened species.
The commercial pressures at play mean there may often be a tendency in practice for
certain proponents to deny that threatened species exist on a site, or a tendency to avoid
conducting a thorough survey for them, or any survey at all. This is a problem according
to the NSW Expert Working Group on ESFM (1998) because “Inadequate surveys that
fail to detect threatened species may lead to false conclusions about the significance and
level of impact.”85 The Working Group also noted the lack of minimum standards for
pre-logging surveys in NSW, at least on private land.86
There is some evidence of a tendency of some less ethical consultants to
opportunistically schedule surveys at times of the year when seasonally-active species will
be dormant or not present. In Cameron v Nambucca SC, the Land and Environment Court
addressed the question of scheduling fauna- and flora-surveying during mid-winter, at
time at which many species would either not be present or would escape detection due to
non-flowering, hibernation, or migratory patterns, according to some expert witnesses.
In obiter remarks, the Court held: “a proper assessment of a development site may require
investigation during more than one season and the utilisation of a range of techniques to
take account of migratory movements and seasonal variation in the detectability of
species.”87 The shortcomings of the developer’s survey formed part of the reasoning for
Talbot J’s decision to invalidate the consent and to require an SIS.

Dorrough, J.; Ash, J. (1999) “Using Past and Present Habitat to Predict the Current Distribution and Abundance of
a Rare Cryptic Lizard Delma Impar (Pygopodidae)” 24 Australian Journal of Ecology 614 at 618-621.
84 Expert Working Group (1998) above n 75 at68.
85 According to the Independent Expert Working Group (1998) above n 75 at 63: “It is common for 8 point test
surveys to detect only a portion of the threatened species actually present on development sites.”
86 Independent Expert Working Group (1998) above n 75 at 63.
87 Cameron v Nambucca Shire Council (1997) 95 LGERA 268 at 287.
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Where a local council is a consent authority it may be keen to avoid the SIS and
concurrence processes. Councils may place an unspoken priority on approving
developments, or on ensuring expansions in the rating base, and in avoiding annoying
and potentially politically-hazardous conflict with developers. This is particularly likely to
be the case with PNF proposals, which from a cultural perspective are regarded as a
routine rural activity in many areas. Further, there may be reluctance to stringently
regulate because of the perceived economically-marginal status of some PNF activity.88
To impose a requirement for SIS production involving thousands of dollars is politically
difficult. Further, local councils may avoid requiring SIS because of their lack of in-house
expertise to evaluate them, or lack of resources to engage consultants to do the same.89 It
may be easier for councils to ‘keep it simple’ by dealing only with basic 8-part test
reports.
For a combination of such reasons there is a danger that some development proposals
likely to involve a significant effect on threatened species may pass through the approvals
process without the closer scrutiny associated with production of an SIS.
In spite of these problems, litigation has occasionally provided a countervailing force for
integrity, although the practical, as well as legal barriers to third-party civil enforcement
litigation can also be considerable. Until recently, it was understood that the scope for
judicial review of threatened species aspects of consent decisions (particularly the
adequacy and accuracy of reports addressing threatened species issues submitted by
developers) was very limited, and restricted primarily to difficult-to-win challenges based
on ‘unreasonableness’ arguments.90 In particular, the Courts had been reluctant to revisit
in detail the underlying basis of findings of consent authorities that particular
developments were not likely to involve a significant effect on threatened species. 91
However, in a line of authority commencing with Helman v Byron Shire Council, and
Cameron v Nambucca Shire Council, and culminating with the Court of Appeal’s decision in
Mainly due to poor economies of scale, the ‘price taker’ position of many producers, the hidden subsidies of public
land forestry.
89 For example, one council within whose area there is a significant river red-gum resource, Balranald council, has a
staff of 6 and the staff member responsible for planning is also responsible for environmental health (i.e. waste
disposal and garbage), and infrastructure. Interview Mr. Roy Hetherington, Director, Infrastructure & Development,
28.10.03, by telephone.
90 Associated Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1848] 1 KB 223.
91 However in Cameron v Nambucca Shire Council and Helman v Byron Shire Council, such decisions had been reviewed on a
similar basis to that applied by the Court of Appeal in Timbarra Protection Coalition v Ross Mining NL (1999) 102
LGERA 52.
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Timbarra Protection Coalition v Ross Mining NL, the Courts have considerably broadened the
legitimate scope for judicial review of decision-making involving questions of the likely
significance of impacts of proposed development on threatened species. In Timbarra, the
plaintiffs (third-party objectors) challenged a decision of Tenterfield Council to grant
consent to a proposed gold mine on a site, which comprised habitat for several
threatened species. The Council had, on the basis of a negative finding on the 8-part test,
decided that an SIS was not necessary.92 The plaintiff sought to challenge this
determination by adducing additional evidence as to the likely impact of the mine on
threatened species. In the first instance, the Court held that it could not hear such
additional evidence about the likely impact of the proposal. Talbot J ruled that: “[t]he
question…is whether, based on the material relevantly before the council, it was
reasonably open to determine the question in the way it did…”.93 It was held that the
permissible scope of judicial review did not involve revisiting the facts before the primary
decision-maker.
The Court of Appeal addressed the question of the power of the Land and Environment
Court to review decisions of consent authorities about the likely impact of development
on threatened species.94 The doctrine of ‘jurisdictional fact’, which involves identifying
certain factual pre-conditions as essential for the valid exercise of a decision-making
power by a consent authority, was applied in order to widen the legitimate scope of
judicial review.95 The Court held that it was the intention of Parliament to invalidate a
development application which was not accompanied by an SIS when, on an objective
test, it should have been.96
As a result of Timbarra, courts can now reconsider the question of significant effect on
the facts before the original decision-maker and any relevant additional evidence.
Therefore the scope for consent authorities to uncritically accept the claims of

Timbarra Protection Coalition v Ross Mining NL (1999) 102 LGERA 52 at 58 per Spigelman CJ.
Timbarra Protection Coalition v Ross Mining NL & Ors [No.1] (1997) 99 LGERA 345 per Talbot J applying Tasmanian
Conservation Trust Inc v Minister for Resources (1995) 55 FCR 516; 85 LGERA 296.
94 However in an ironic twist, showing the limitations of litigation which seeks to challenge failures to comply with
procedural requirements, following the High Court decision the mining company simply lodged a new development
application, this time accompanied by a SIS. Ogle, L. (1999) “High Court win for threatened species; but Timbarra
goldmine goes ahead”, 54 Impact 4.
95 Timbarra Protection Coalition v Ross Mining NL (1999) 102 LGERA 52. See also: Corporation of the City of Enfield v
Development Assessment Commission (2000) 169 ALR 400; Pearson, L. (2000) “Jurisdictional Fact: A Dilemma for the
Courts”, paper presented to Macquarie University Centre for Environmental Law conference, Environmental Law for
the New Millennium: Rethinking Law and Practice, 10-11 August 2000, Sydney.
96 Timbarra Protection Coalition at 69 per Spigelman CJ.
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developers on the questions of the 8-part test has been narrowed considerably.97 The
ruling may exert pressure for more rigorous decision-making and for consent authorities
to demand the production of an SIS more frequently to avoid the risk of third party
challenge.98

Defects in the legislative framework
As we have seen, some of the difficulties in regulating the impact of PNF on biodiversity
stem from the difficult interface between science and law, and the manner in which the
legislation addresses these issues.99 Several principal statutory defects can be identified.
The first is the PNF exemption under the NVCA (see: Chapter Five). The level of
threatened species assessment of those PNF operations relying upon the PNF exemption
may be very limited, unless LEP consent requirements apply or the Part 6 TSCA
licensing provisions are applied by NPWS.
The second principal defect of the legislative framework is that the approach of the
TSCA is largely procedural, based on a premise that the SIS processes and its associated
information-gathering will lead to improved decision-making. Yet most proposals never
make it to the SIS stage.100 It could be argued that an SIS would be required in order to
fully answer the 8-part test in most cases, but this is not how the legislation is drafted.101
Further, the TSCA does not guarantee that habitats of threatened species will be
protected. Even if an SIS is prepared indicating that development will seriously affect
threatened species, a consent authority is not obliged to reject the development
application. Threatened species issues are only one factor of many considered by a
consent authority in its decision-making process under s.79C EPAA.102 The concurrence
requirement formalises the role of NPWS in checking and reviewing decision-making of
consent authorities in relation to threatened species matters. However, the occasions on
which concurrence has been called for in relation to PNF have been few. In relation to

Norton, C., (1999) “Court win for threatened species” 53 Impact 1-3.
Norton, C., (1999) above n 97; Prest, J, Kelly, A. (2000) above n 59 at 592.
99 See Farrier, D.; Whelan, R.; Brown, C. (2002) above n 79.
100 In fact, only 45 of approx. 700,000 development applications led to a concurrence request (i.e., 0.0064%): Second
Reading Speech, Threatened Species Conservation Amendment Bill, NSW Legislative Assembly Hansard, 31.5.02, p.2300.
101 This point was made in Kelly and Prest (2000) above n 59.
102 Parramatta City Council v Hale (1982) 47 LGRA 319; Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (DUAP) (no date),
Guide to Section 79C, DUAP, Sydney.
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the entire gamut of development proposals, the instances of concurrence having been
refused are relatively rare.103
The third difficulty is that the NPWS, the agency with primary expertise in threatened
species matters, no longer has a major role in assessment of PNF proposals under the
NVCA. Its former concurrence role under SEPP 46 has been replaced with a
requirement only for consultation at the Ministerial level, and this comes into effect only
if there is likely to be a significant effect. Thus under the NVCA, NPWS has no capacity
to veto decisions of the Minister for LWC regarding PNF proposals. Interviews with
NPWS staff revealed that this former role was often crucial:
we would put our heads together [i.e. DLWC and NPWS staff] to see how we could find a way to
reject these clearing applications. Often the only really effective tool DLWC had was to ask
NPWS to apply the Threatened Species Act [under NPWS’ concurrence role] once we had found
some threatened species on the site.104

Further, SISs, on their own, are likely to be insufficient to achieve meaningful
conservation outcomes on the ground. A primary difficulty is that an SIS may be
prepared and considered without sufficient contextual information regarding threatened
species on a regional scale. A Western Directorate NPWS manager remarked that “SIS is
the wrong level of investigation…We think it is better to place the focus on planning,
not [development] assessment. A better approach is to plan at a regional level.”105 On this
basis, the key to the effectiveness of the threatened species conservation strategy
applying to PNF is more likely to be the integrity or otherwise of the Regional
Vegetation Management planning process under the NVCA.106

The law regarding mitigating conditions on consent
An interesting question surrounds the appropriate role for conditions on consent in
order to mitigate likely impacts on threatened species. In many cases, it appears to be the
Of the total of 45 requests for concurrence, there were 5 refusals, only 2 of which were permanent. Second Reading
Speech, Threatened Species Conservation Amendment Bill, NSW Legislative Assembly Hansard, 31.5.02, p.2300.
Concurrence was refused in relation to a development proposal considered likely to adversely affect the Byron Bay
Dwarf Granminoid Clay Heath: discussed in Detala v Byron SC [No.1] (2000) 107 LGERA 385 at 391, Bignold J.
104 Interview, Ms T. Stacpoole, ex NPWS Forest Conservation Unit, Southern Zone, 22.9.03, by telephone.
105 Interview, Mr D. Robson, NPWS regional TSU manager, Western Directorate, Dubbo, 18.6.01, by telephone.
106 That question is complex and remains outside the scope of this study. However, a conservation representative on
the Manning RVMC (an Eastern Division Committee) stated that DLWC had refused to supply data on the location
of under-represented forest ecosystem types to his and other RVMCs. Interview, Mr Greg Hall, NCC NSW
representative on Manning RVMC, Elands, by telephone, 13.2.01. It was also alleged that senior DLWC
management told vegetation committees that they do not need to identify high conservation value forest on private
land fall reservation in order to meet forest ecosystem type reservation targets. Further, it is alleged that DLWC has
not informed committees which targets have not being met on public land and therefore for which the shortfall
must be met on private land.
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modus operandi of DLWC, councils and NPWS to view species-impact mitigation
prescriptions (as conditions placed on consent e.g. requiring retention of x habitat trees
per hectare) as a means to transform logging operations into activities which are not
likely to involve a significant effect on threatened species or their habitats - thereby avoid
requiring the production of an SIS. It is difficult to generalise in this area as the
application of the law depends on the facts in each particular situation. We saw above
that, in DLWC’s North Coast Region, no SISs were required for more than 100 PNF
applications up to November 2000.107 The low number of SISs prepared for PNF
operations arouses at least a suspicion that agencies are applying s.5A EPAA by
formulating conditions that purport to make impacts insignificant.
Several Land and Environment Court decisions frown upon the practice of using
conditions of consent to reduce the apparent environmental impact of development to
such a level that formal assessment requirements are avoided. This question was first
considered in depth in Drummoyne Municipal Council v Maritime Services Board,108 which
concerned the proposed expansion of a marina assessed under Part 5 EPAA. Here Stein
J, then of the Land and Environment Court, held that a determining authority may not
determine the question of whether a proposed activity is likely to involve a significant
effect on the environment under s 112(1) by reference to imposition of conditions
designed to minimise environmental impact. Stein J made it clear that it was the activity
itself that requires environmental assessment, rather than the activity as altered by
conditions of approval. He held that:
… a determining authority cannot determine the question of whether a proposed activity is likely
to significantly affect the environment by reference to the imposition of certain conditions which
may have the effect of mitigating the environmental impact. This is particularly so where such
conditions have the effect of altering or changing the application made by the proponent. To do
so would lead to absurd situations which will defeat the objectives of the legislation.109

Interview, Mr. B. Attwood, Vegetation Resource Manager, interview, in person, Grafton DLWC Office, 23.11.00.
Notes on file with author. This finding was corroborated by interview results with NPWS in which a senior North
Coast manager stated that there have been no Ministerial level consultations regarding threatened species aspects of
a PNF proposal in the Northern Zone of NPWS operations as a result of consideration under the NVCA.
Interview, Mr. Gary Davey, Northern Directorate Manager, Coffs Harbour, 22.10.99; Mr. Andrew McIntyre,
Threatened Species Unit Manager Northern Directorate, 22.10.99.
108 Drummoyne MC v Maritime Service Board (1991) 72 LGRA 186.
109 Drummoyne at 192. The Drummoyne approach was subsequently applied in Donnelly v Delta Gold Pty Ltd [2001]
NSWLEC 55, in Commonwealth of Australia v Randwick City Council [2001] NSWLEC 79 (27 April 2001) where the
Commonwealth (as a land developer ) was required by the court to prepare a SIS; and in Silverwater Estate Pty Ltd v
Auburn Council [2001] NSWLEC 60 (4 April 2001). In that decision it was noted that a condition designed to
mitigate impact that has been introduced during the course of a hearing cannot be taken into account in the decision
making process: Westport Marina Developments Pty Ltd v Concord Council (2000) 109 LGERA 451.
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The same issue of the appropriate use of conditions arose in the Club Med case, which
concerned a development application under Part 4 EPAA.110 That case (under the
former legislative regime) considered the impact of a proposed tourist resort on certain
threatened species and the question of whether a fauna impact statement (FIS), rather
than an SIS, was required.111 Pearlman CJ applied the reasoning of Stein J in Drummoyne
to find that the consent authority, Byron Council, had erred in law by attempting to
mitigate environmental impact through the imposition of consent conditions, thereby
overcoming the potential likelihood of significant effect on threatened species. The
Court held that an FIS should have been obtained and that the consent was, therefore,
invalid.112
The appropriate consideration to be paid by a consent authority to proposed ameliorative
measures when conducting the 8-part test of significance was also considered by the
Land and Environment Court in Smyth v Nambucca Shire Council (‘Smyth’).113 This case was
an appeal on a point of law against the decision of a Commissioner in Class One
proceedings to dismiss an appeal against the deemed refusal of a development
application for subdivision. It was argued that the Commissioner had erred in stating “no
provision exists [in s.5A EPAA] to take into account any ameliorative measures as part
of the 8-part test”.114
Section 5A does not explicitly refer to ameliorative measures. By contrast, its predecessor
(inserted by the EFIPA, being the repealed s 4A EPAA) required a consent authority to
consider the role of proposed ameliorative measures in deciding whether impacts would
be significant.115 However, Lloyd J accepted the appellant’s submissions in interpreting
the various factors under s 5A to require consideration of “associated ameliorative
measures which may be part of such development.”116 His Honour stated that “the focus

Byron Shire Businesses for the Future Inc v Byron Council and Holiday Villages (Byron Bay) Pty Ltd (1994) 84 LGERA 434 at
446-448.
111 Following the application of the 7 part test contained in (the now repealed) s.4A EPAA. These provisions were
inserted into the EPAA by the Endangered Fauna (Interim Protection) Act 1991.
112 Byron Shire Businesses for the Future at 447-8.
113 Smyth v Nambucca Shire Council (1999) 105 LGERA 65.
114 Smyth at 68.
115 This requirement was contained as part of the former seven part test of significance in EPAA, s.4A(e), prior to the
repeal of that section by the TSCA.
116 Smyth at 69.
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of the provision117 is on the development, which necessarily includes any ameliorative
measures which are proposed as part of such development.”118
Thus Lloyd J observed that the task of the decision-maker was to “determine for himself
whether there was likely to be a significant effect by dint of the proposed development
and its ameliorative measures” [emphasis added] .119 He concluded that a consent authority is
entitled to take into account proposed ameliorative measures in applying the 8-part test.
How then can the decision in Smyth be reconciled with the approach taken in Drummoyne
and Club Med? On one view, in order to properly resolve the question of the appropriate
role of ameliorative measures it is necessary to define strictly the decision-making process
as having two stages. These are (i) application of the 8-part test by the consent authority
under s.5A to the development as proposed by the developer (which may propose
impact mitigation measures), and (ii) the subsequent determination of the DA by the
consent authority (under s.79C, 80 EPAA), which may include the imposition of
conditions on consent.
Lloyd J’s decision in Smyth was restricted to ameliorative measures proposed by the
developer and incorporated within the development application prior to determination,
as opposed to measures imposed by the consent authority as conditions attached to the
development consent. Thus the decision in Smyth is limited in its application in so far as
it does not authorise the practice of consent authorities [or the NPWS under Part 6
TSCA licensing] of imposing conditions on consent such that significant impacts appear
to be eliminated.
Yet this is an unsatisfactory distinction and the question was further explored by Bignold
J in Donnelly v Delta Gold, where his Honour concluded that the distinction was not a
meaningful one.120 It is artificial and diverts attention from the desired statutory objective
of biodiversity conservation. In practice there is a fine line between proponents
Former EPAA, s.77(3)(d1).
Smyth at 69.
119 Smyth at 70.
120 Donnelly v Delta Gold Pty Ltd & Ors [2001] NSWLEC 55 (23 March 2001), No. 40098 of 2000, Bignold J, at
paragraph 122 said “To so state the combined effect of these decisions is, in my respectful opinion, to inevitably
expose the apparent difficulty in seeking to maintain any meaningful distinction between the different effects of an
ameliorative measure (i) introduced by way of condition of consent and (ii) one already included in the proposed
activity or development. It is this intrinsic difficulty concerning the sustainability of the distinction that I would
respectfully understand the President to have been adverting to in his judgment in the Transport Action Group
case…”
117
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suggesting conditions and consent authorities imposing them. The main point is whether,
when looking at the question objectively, it is really possible in the majority of cases to
design away any significant impacts by altering project configurations using mitigation
prescriptions such as ‘habitat’ trees. Will such modifications reduce impacts to a level
where the likely impacts are insignificant? 121
The principle applied in Club Med of stating that conditions could not be applied in order
to decide the 8-part test has some parallels with statutory limitations on formulating
conditions of consent contained in the EPAA. Part 4 of that Act limits the application of
conditions that radically modify development proposals. Section 80A(1)(g) EPAA
entitles a consent authority to attach a condition that “modifies details of the
development the subject of the development application”. However, it does not
empower a council to change a proposal into something substantially different.122 This
point was addressed in the recent decision of May 2000 in Carr v Minister for Land and
Water Conservation regarding the granting of a consent to clear native vegetation subject to
conditions under the NVCA. In this Class 1 merits appeal, Pearlman J overturned the
decision of the Minister to grant the consent in question on the basis that it is not open
to a consent authority to grant consent upon conditions which significantly alter the
development for which consent is being sought.123

FINDINGS REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TSCA
This section covers the implementation of the TSCA in two different scenarios. These
involve (i) implementation by DLWC in the course of decision-making under the

See also Westport Marina Developments Pty Ltd v Concord Council (2000) 109 LGERA 451 and Court of Appeal in
Transport Action Group Against Motorways Inc v Roads and Traffic Authority (1999) 104 LGERA 133. In Donnelly v Delta
Gold Pty Ltd & Ors [2001] NSWLEC 55 (23 March 2001), No. 40098 of 2000, Bignold J, at paragraph 121 His
Honour discussed the difficulties in this area: “There is no inconsistency in the four decisions of this Court just
discussed, the combined effect of them appearing to be that in determining a threshold question as to whether a
proposed activity or development ‘is likely to significantly affect the environment’ etc whereas it is an impermissible
approach to answer the question by reference to mitigating or ameliorative measures to be introduced by way of
conditions of any requisite approval or development consent, it is a permissible approach to answer the question by
reference to the proposed activity or development, including any mitigating or ameliorative measures that are
included in the proposal.”
122 This principle was applied in relation to an application to clear land under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997
(NSW): Carr v Minister for Land and Water Conservation (unreported, No.10675 of 1999, Land and Environment Court,
NSW, Pearlman J, 22 May 2000). According to the judgment of Pearlman J, “The applicant, Mr R J Carr, appeals
against the determination of the Minister for Land and Water Conservation granting in the applicant's favour a
development consent to clear native vegetation subject to conditions….The applicant is the registered proprietor of
land comprising an area of about 80 hectares ("the site") being lot 44 in DP 753205 and situated at Barbies Road,
Bungwahl.”
123 Applying Mison & Ors v Randwick City Council (1991) 23 NSWLR 734 at 737. The applicant, Mr R J Carr, appeals
against the determination of the Minister for Land and Water Conservation granting in the applicant's favour a
development consent to clear native vegetation subject to conditions.
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NVCA and Part 4 EPAA; (ii) implementation by local government in the course of
decision-making under Part 4 EPAA.

DLWC Assessment of PNF proposals
Because of the integration of the TSCA and the NVCA into the development-consent
process under Part 4 EPAA, the DLWC has a significant role in applying threatened
species protection law to PNF. The DLWC implements the TSCA through its role in
assisting the Minister for Land and Water Conservation as consent authority under the
NVCA. The Minister must consider the statutory factors set out in the EPAA regarding
threatened species during the consent decision-making process, to determine whether
there is likely to be a significant effect on threatened species or their habitat associated
with a PNF proposal.
The NVCA, to the extent that it adopts and applies the mechanisms of assessment of
the impact of development on threatened species that are contained in the TSCA and
EPAA, adopts both the strengths and shortcomings of that legislation. These relate to an
emphasis on the procedure rather than the substance of biodiversity protection, and also
the lack of mechanisms to enable regional level assessment of impacts on threatened
species. However, the RVMP mechanism of the NVCA could serve to fill this gap if
adequately implemented.124
DLWC has its own internal methodology for threatened species assessment. The impact
of vegetation clearing, including logging, is assessed according to the criteria laid down in
the NVCA and EPAA, under a standardised methodology set out in the lengthy Staff
Guidelines for Assessment of Clearing Applications. These guidelines, together with the
standardised clearing application form, and Interim Guidelines for Threatened Species Surveys,125
as well as computerised decision support systems (particularly the Native Vegetation
Assessment Support System ‘NVASS’) comprise a standardised methodology for
threatened species assessment. Every NVCA application is subject to a site visit. Prior to
the site visit, the TSCAB database and Atlas of Wildlife are checked to see which
threatened species are likely to occur, on the basis of records of species within a 10-15km
Chapter Six discusses the progress with the making of RVMPs in detail. In brief, at the time of writing, in October
2003 2 plans had been gazetted and twelve others were at draft stage. Of the two plans actually made, only the
Riverina Highlands RVMP actually touched upon PNF in detail.
125 Strictly speaking, applications under the NVCA are for development consent under the EP&A Act, s.78A.
124

radius of the site.126 Aerial photographic interpretation is also carried out prior to the
visit. At a site visit, transects of vegetation are surveyed if necessary, in order to identify
vegetation types, and further predict threatened species habitats.
The guidelines explain the process: “Depending on the complexity and scale of an
application, it may be necessary for the applicant to submit a flora and/or fauna survey
to DLWC that determines the presence/absence and, where appropriate, the abundance
and distribution of particular species…Surveys must be undertaken by appropriately
qualified persons.”127
DLWC’s requirements for pre-logging surveys for threatened species are tailored to the
scale and intensity of proposed harvesting.128 Selective logging proposals may be subject
to a requirement that a targeted flora and fauna survey be completed. Intensive logging
involving removal of more than 70% of the canopy, or proposals over 200ha will be
classed as ‘large’ applications. Only these large-scale proposals will be required to provide
a detailed flora and fauna survey report.129 Medium-sized applications are likely to be
required to be accompanied by a targeted flora and fauna report, which “…simply seeks
to determine whether [a particular threatened species] … is on site.”
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Because of the

cryptic, seasonal (e.g. flowering), or migratory nature of some species this approach may
have some significant shortcomings (p.17 ).

SIS production under NVCA - Findings
One important aspect of DLWC’s administration of threatened species aspects of the
NVCA is the frequency with which SIS production is required. The production of an
SIS is likely to lead to more informed decision-making. However, a high rate of
production of SISs is not synonymous with the achievement of ESFM.

TSCAB stands for ‘Threatened Species Conservation Act Biological DataBase’. See DLWC (1999) Staff Guidelines for
the Assessment of Clearing Applications under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997, June, DLWC, Parramatta, at 21.
127 DLWC (1999) Interim guidelines for targeted and general flora and fauna surveys under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act
1997, DLWC, Parramatta, at 2.
128 DLWC (1999) above n 127 at 8.
129 DLWC (1999) above n 127 at 9.
130 DLWC (1999) Guidelines and Application Form for the Assessment of Clearing Applications under the Native Vegetation
Conservation Act 1997, ( booklet for public distribution), DLWC, Parramatta, 22pp. at 13.
126

There were no findings of likely significant effect, and no SISs required, in the Hunter
Region131, or the Sydney/South Coast Region,132 or the Northern Region during the
study period.133 In the North Coast Region, no SISs were required for any of 103 PNF
applications under the NVCA during the study period prior to November 2000.134
TSCA implementation data relating to the Western regions of DLWC operations was
not systematically collected, but we have seen there were no applications for NVCA
approvals in the Murray Region despite the significant river redgum PNF-logging
industry.135
It was stated that the strategy of DLWC in the North Coast Region is to apply conditions
to development consents, so that no significant effect is likely to occur, and therefore SIS
production has not been necessary. A senior DLWC regional manager said that: “doing a
SIS wouldn’t help us. It wouldn’t provide any useful information [i.e., additional to that
retrieved from NPWS and DLWC databases].”136 Such a statement involves a working
assumption that these databases are adequate, but the predictive power of point-source
records of species occurrence is limited.137
In the Hunter Region, interview research revealed that for 27 applications under the
NVCA for PNF operations, all were granted consent with conditions and no SIS
required to be prepared. All these applications were for protected land.138 An officer
interviewed explained the non-production of SIS: “This is done for administrative
convenience, not for the science of it.”139 He added, “It is very rare for existing
information to be adequate for an objective assessment under the 8-part test”.140 In that

Interview, Mr S. Gowland, DLWC Hunter, 17.3.00.
Interview, Mr R. Adam, DLWC Sydney-South Coast, 14.4.00; Letter, 13.4.00.
133 Interview, Mr B. Attwood, Vegetation Resource Manager, interview, in person, Grafton DLWC Office, 23.11.00.
134 Interview, Mr. B. Attwood, Vegetation Resource Manager, interview, in person, Grafton DLWC Office, 23.11.00.
Notes on file with author. This finding was corroborated by interview results with NPWS in which a senior North
Coast manager stated that there have been no Ministerial level consultations regarding threatened species aspects of
a PNF proposal in the Northern Zone of NPWS operations as a result of consideration under the NVCA.
Interview, Mr. Gary Davey, Northern Directorate Manager, Coffs Harbour, 22.10.99; Mr. Andrew McIntyre,
Threatened Species Unit Manager Northern Directorate, 22.10.99.
135 Note however that in regions such as Murray there were no development applications for consent during 2000 and
2001, despite a large PNF industry based on red gum logging.
136 Interview, Mr B. Attwood, Vegetation Resource Manager, interview, in person, Grafton DLWC Office, 23.11.00.
Notes on file with author.
137 Interview, Mr., D. Robson, NPWS, Dubbo, 18.6.01., by telephone.
138 Thus everywhere else, the PNF exemption was claimed.
139 Interview, anonymous, DLWC Hunter region, 23.3.00. Notes on file with author.
140 Interview, anonymous, DLWC Hunter region, 23.3.00. Notes on file with author.
131
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region, it was reported that DLWC undertook liaison with NPWS only on large
applications of regional significance.141

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TSCA BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Data was gathered on the implementation of the EPAA and TSCA by local government
in relation to PNF in North-Eastern NSW, a centre of significant PNF activity.142 We
saw in Chapter Eight that only a minority of North Coast and Hunter Region councils
required consent for PNF in the main rural zone during the study period (p.268).

A survey (by letter) of decision-making by this minority of Northern Region councils
requiring consent revealed only 18 development applications for PNF during the study
period. All of these applications were approved, although many were said to be subject
to special conditions imposed following informal consultation with the NPWS.
Importantly, there was only one instance of a preliminary determination by a council that
proposed logging was likely to involve a significant effect on threatened species, thereby
triggering requirements for an SIS and the concurrence of the Director-General of
National Parks and Wildlife.143 Concurrence was granted, subject to the imposition of a
number of prescriptions for the mitigation of impact on threatened species.144

IMPLEMENTATION - CONDITIONS ON CONSENT
The passage of threatened species legislation has given consent authorities and the
NPWS some considerable leverage to protect threatened species. Consent authorities
may exert this leverage by (i) seeking the redesign of development proposals prior to
determination, (ii) imposing conditions of consent that modify proposals, or (iii) refusing
unsympathetic projects outright. Further, the D-G of National Parks and Wildlife may
not only impose requirements regarding contents of an SIS145 but can wield the ultimate
threat of refusing to grant concurrence.

Interview, anonymous, DLWC Hunter region, 23.3.00. Notes on file with author.
Forestry Commission NSW and Margules Groome Poyry, The Economic Impact of the New South Wales Timber Industry
(Sydney: Margules Groome Poyry, 1995).
143 As far as research could ascertain, there were no requests for concurrence relating to PNF in other regions of
NSW.
144 Interview, 10 October 1999, Mr Gary Davey, Threatened Species Unit Manager, NPWS Northern Zone. Notes of
interview, on file with author.
145 TSCA, s.111(1).
141
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Yet the evidence in relation to treatment of PNF proposals - in particular the agencies’
findings that logging was unlikely to involve a significant effect on threatened species, etc.
in the vast majority of cases – arguably reflects broader patterns of administration failing
to take advantage of the leverage of the TSCA. It suggests that the bulk of the NPWS’
administrative efforts under the TSCA to date have been directed towards assisting
consent authorities and proponents with the 8-part test rather than exercising its
concurrence role. Such assistance has led to fewer SISs. This is confirmed by evidence
provided by the NPWS to a NSW Parliamentary Committee in December 1997 by the
NPWS.146
A typical response from the NPWS to allegations of lack of sufficient attention to its
concurrence responsibilities147 is to argue that it is far better to expend limited resources
at the project planning stage than at the end of the approval process. One NPWS officer
argued that:
a large number of requests for concurrence or s 91 licences demonstrates a failure to impose
adequate protection for threatened species within the initial design of the proposal. It is clearly
logical to design such proposals in such a manner that they do not lead to a significant impact in
the first place.148

Whilst these arguments are valid they only paint part of the picture. The missing piece is
whether the use of management prescriptions can reduce impacts to a level of
insignificance. This question is essentially one for ecologists, botanists, and zoologists: on
an objective basis, is it possible to design away any significant impacts by altering project
configurations by means of mitigation prescriptions, such as filter strips, ‘habitat’ trees,
etc.? Recent scientific literature does question the efficacy and adequacy of the present
levels of forestry management prescriptions for the conservation of hollow-dependent
fauna in most jurisdictions.149 On this basis, can we be sure that existing prescriptions
even if complied with, will have the effect of altering a development to such an extent
that it will no longer be likely to have a significant effect on threatened species?
Parliament of New South Wales (1997) above n 73 at 45.
Note that the Director of National Parks and Wildlife has certainly exercised her or his discretion to refuse
concurrence on some occasions – for example, in relation to a development proposal considered likely to adversely
affect the Byron Bay Dwarf Granminoid Clay Heath: see Detala v Byron SC [No.1] (2000) 107 LGERA 385 at 391.
See also evidence presented to the Joint Select Committee on the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1997, given
on 19 September 1997 by Ms Leanne Wallace, Acting Executive Director, Policy and Planning, NPWS, reported in
Parliament of New South Wales (1997) above n 73 at 45.
148 Saxon, M. (1997) “The Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995: Is the Development Approval Process
Working?” in H Webb (ed.), On the Brink: Your Bush, Their Habitat, Our Act: Is the Threatened Species Conservation Act
Working? (Proceedings of a Conference, Sydney: Nature Conservation Council of NSW, p. 90.
149 Gibbons, P. & Lindenmayer, D. (1997) “A Review of Prescriptions Employed for Conservation of Hollow
Dependent Fauna in Wood Production Forests of Eastern Australia”, in P Hale & D Lamb (eds), Conservation Outside
Nature Reserves (Brisbane: Centre for Conservation Biology, University of Queensland, pp 497-505.
146
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The discussion of the case law above (p. 21) relating to the use of ameliorative measures
may pose problems for present administrative approaches to PNF applied by both the
NPWS and to a lesser extent by the DLWC. Nevertheless, for a host of practical and
political reasons, it is likely to remain an operational reality that the majority of effort
undertaken by consent authorities and the NPWS to protect threatened species will be to
attach conditions to development approvals.
We must remember the ultimate purpose and intent of the threatened species
legislation.150

It may be necessary to inquire whether the entire SIS process is

systematically subverted by the blanket application of management prescriptions.
Agencies such as the NPWS cannot be scientifically certain that present prescriptions are
effective in conserving threatened species, or if they are sufficient. A further uncertainty
associated with reliance on conditions is whether the consent authorities will have
adequate resources to ensure compliance with conditions.
The implications of the discussion concerning the reliance on conditions in the decisionmaking of consent authorities are as follows. Where a consent authority applies the 8part test incorrectly, it does so at the risk of invalidating the development consent.151 The
8-part test is an essential pre-condition to the exercise of power to determine a
development application. Due to the broadening of scope of judicial review proceedings
introduced by Timbarra,152 the approach of consent authorities and the NPWS to the 8part test is no longer effectively insulated from challenge. Consent authorities must be
more careful in applying the 8-part test and demanding the preparation of SISs when
required, rather than preferring as a matter of course to apply standard impact-mitigation
conditions. The big question, however, is whether the prediction that the Timbarra
decision will “improve the quality of environmental decision making” will come to
fruition.153

In many ways the apparent conflict between the Smyth and Drummoyne decisions can be explained as a conflict
between purpose and literal approaches to interpretation of legislation. From the point of view of purposive analysis
of legislation as required by the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), s.33.
151 Byron Shire Businesses for the Future v Byron Council (1994) 84 LGERA 434.
152 Timbarra Protection Coalition v Ross Mining NL (1999) 102 LGERA 52.
153 Norton (1999) above n 97 at 3.
150

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TSCA AND NPWA

BY NPWS

The licensing provisions in Part 6, TSCA are also relevant to PNF. This Part may apply if
Parts 4 and 5 of the EPAA do not apply. Licensing is necessary in order to avoid
conviction under the offence provisions in the NPWA

including “harming” or

“picking” threatened species, populations or ecological communities,154 and knowingly
damaging the habitat of threatened species.155 Landholders must also look out for
indigenous objects and artefacts as these are also protected under the NPWA and a
permit to disturb or consent to destroy must be obtained.156 The area of the impacts of
PNF on both indigenous and European cultural heritage is an important one in both
NSW and Tasmania157 but has been excluded from this study to constrain the scope of
research.
The licensing data collected from the public register suggests that during the study
period, the licensing provisions of Part 6 TSCA have had only minor application to PNF.
First, there were very few operators licensed. By June 2000 there had been only three
s.91 licences and one s.95 certificate granted for PNF throughout NSW.158 All these
applications were made in the Northern Directorate (or Zone) of NPWS operations in
NSW.159 All four applications involved a finding by the Director-General of NPWS that
the proposed logging was unlikely to significantly affect threatened species or their
habitat. The approach of the NPWS’ Threatened Species Unit (TSU) was to apply
threatened species protection prescriptions to logging operations and to attach these to
licences as conditions.160 Accordingly, the SIS and Ministerial consultation processes

NPWA , s.118A(3)(a).
NPWA , s.118D(1). An exception is where a certificate has been granted by the D-G of NPWS stating that the
action proposed is not likely to significantly affect threatened species or their habitat, or where actions are
undertaken under a property management plan.: TSCA, s.95(2).
156 Under NPWA s.86(a) it is an offence to disturb or move on any land an Aboriginal object that is the property of
the Crown. Permits to disturb must be obtained (s.87) or consent to destroy must be obtained in order to avoid
committing the offence of “knowingly destroys, defaces or damages, or knowingly causes or permits the destruction
or defacement of or damage to, an Aboriginal object or Aboriginal place” under s.90(1).
157 In Tasmania, controversy has recently arisen over plans for logging of private property containing evidence of sites
of the first contact between French explorers and Aborigines in 1792 and 1793 at Recherché Bay on the Far South
Coast.: Altman, C. (2003) The French Connection”, The Weekend Australian, 15-16 February 2003, pp.R4-6.
158 Extract of the licence register supplied by NPWS Threatened Species Unit, Hurstville, 30 June 2000. Initial
inspections of the s.104 licensing register, NPWS Head Office, Hurstville, were conducted on 15.1.98 and 23.7.99,
in person.
159 A map indicating the boundaries of the NPWS Directorates (or regions) is reproduced at Appendix 10.1. Note that
the term selected, “Northern Region” necessarily involves some ambiguity, as the boundaries of the Northern Zone
or Directorate of NPWS do not overlap with the Northern Region boundaries employed by DLWC, which again do
not coincide with those employed by DUAP in administering the EPAA.
160 Interview, 25.10.99, Northern Zone TSU staff. Notes of interview on file with author.
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under the TSCA were never activated in relation to PNF under Part 6 TSCA,161 and thus
no detailed biotic survey of sites proposed for PNF was performed under the ambit of
the licensing regime.
In summary, the findings reveal a low level of licensing activity in relation to PNF across
the whole of NSW. Given the broad distribution of threatened species throughout
forested ecosystems in NSW, it might be expected that the TSCA licensing provisions
would have had far more application on the ground. The result is unexpected as the
licensing provisions are potentially applicable to a large proportion of operators within
the industry. This is because either Part 4 or Part 5 EPAA did not catch the majority of
PNF activity during the study period (Figure 1). In the Northern Region of DLWC
operations, for the study period, there was 100 per cent reliance162 upon the PNF
exemption, in instances where it was available163 on non-protected land.164 Thus Part 4
EPAA did not apply via the NVCA.165 Further, regulation of PNF in LEPs was limited,
particularly in DUAP’s Northern Region, where most councils did not require
development consent for forestry in the Rural 1(a) zone. Taken together, these findings
indicate that Part 4 EPAA did not apply to a large proportion of the PNF industry in
Northern NSW. Also, Part 5 EPAA did not apply due to lack of licensing effort by the
Environment Protection Authority (EPA) regarding non-point source water pollution
from PNF between 1997-2003.166 One can therefore infer that Part 6 licensing provisions
probably applied to a large number of operators within the industry. If that is the case, it
is probable that, objectively speaking, significantly more forestry contractors in the region
actually required licences than were in fact licensed.167 Note that all the licensing activity
In relation to one of these operations, a document described as a Fauna Impact Statement (FIS) was prepared under
the regime created by the former EFIP Act. This is discussed in NPWS (1997) Logging By Boral Timber Division –
Section 91 Licence Application – Director-General’s Decision Report, NPWS, Northern Zone, 22pp. at p.16.
162 At present there is no publicly available data on the exact number of persons relying upon the private forestry
exemption or indeed the NVCA exemptions. The DLWC does not collect this data. Interview, Mr B. Attwood,
DLWC, Northern Region Office, Grafton NSW, 24.4.00.
163
Paragraph (i) Sch 3 State Environmental Planning Policy No 46 – Protection and Management of Native
Vegetation, ‘saved’ by cl 3(2) Sch 4 Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW).
164 The DLWC does not compile or record data on the exact number of persons relying upon the private forestry
exemption or indeed the NVCA exemptions, as the Act does not contain a notification mechanism. Interview, Mr
B. Attwood, protected lands officer, DLWC, Northern Region office, Grafton, 20.3.00.
165 NVCA, s. 15(1).
166 Review of EPA Public Register of Environment Protection Licences, 16.9.03; conducted on-line at
<www.epa.nsw.gov.au> which revealed that for the search of all licences using the term “forestry-logging” the only
forestry operations licenced by EPA are in State Forests. The Forestry Commission of NSW holds 5 licences, one
for each RFA region. Interview, 21.9.98, Ms L. Corbyn (Deputy D-G, EPA), Mr Steve Beaman, EPA, Sydney.
Interview confirmed that PNF operations have never been issued with any pollution control licences from the NSW
EPA.
167 In discussing the scope of non-regulated (or illegal) activity, one caveat which must be raised is that it is not possible
to assume that all PNF proposals will automatically involve what can be described as threatened species issues. On
the other hand, given the broad distribution of threatened species in NSW forested ecosystems, it is fair to say that
161

described above related to PNF in the Northern Directorate of NPWS operations.168
This suggests that there may have been a high level of unlicensed activity in other regions
of NPWS operations.169
These findings raise a crucial question: “How are regulatory requirements communicated
to the regulated community?” The low level of licensing of operators in the PNF
industry in NSW can be partly explained by a policy of NPWS - revealed in interviews
during the study period, at least in the Northern Region - to wait for PNF operators to
make inquiries as to requirements for licensing,170 and its failure to conduct an education
campaign within the PNF industry regarding the TSCA. A NPWS manager working on
the issue in Northern Zone admitted: “Operators don’t know the rules, and generally
don’t approach NPWS for advice.”171 The informal response of some NPWS officers to
these findings has been to state that licensing is optional, and that persons who are
required to comply with Part 6 licensing who do not obtain licences are running the risk
of prosecution for offences against the NPWA.172 This suggests a poor administrative
policy of placing the onus entirely on the proponent to approach the NPWS, and relies
excessively on compliance being motivated by fear of prosecution and financial penalties.

COMPLIANCE WITH THREATENED SPECIES PROVISIONS
Administrative enforcement
Councils and the NPWS have a number of statutory administrative enforcement tools
open to them under the EPAA, TSCA and NPWA to enforce their requirements in
relation to the protection of threatened species and habitat. Aside from issuing warning
letters, both the TSCA and the NPWA allow the Director-General to make stop-work
orders,173 and the NPWA provides for the making of interim protection orders.174 Stopin a majority of such operations, the TSCA is likely to have some application. This points at another interpretation
of the data; which is that PNF operators did not approach NPWS in relation to licensing because there were no
threatened species issues attached to their logging proposals. However, this analysis is not credible in view of the
numerous “off the record” admissions made by various NPWS staff in relation to the “under-regulation” of PNF in
NSW. Interview, Anonymous high ranking Southern Directorate staff member, 8.6.00; Anonymous high ranking
Northern Directorate staff member, 22.10.99.
168 Extract of the licence register supplied by National Parks & Wildlife Service Threatened Species Unit, Hurstville, 30
June 2000. Previous inspections of the s 104 licensing register, NPWS Head Office, Hurstville, were conducted by
the author on 15 January 1998 and 23 July 1999.
169 “Off the record” admissions were made by NPWS staff in relation to the “under-regulation” of PNF in NSW.
Interview, Anonymous high ranking Southern Directorate staff member, 8.6.00 (Interview in person, Canberra,
ACT).
170 Interview, 25.10.99, Northern Zone TSU staff. Notes of interview on file with author.
171 Interview, 25.10.99, Northern Zone TSU staff. Notes of interview on file with author.
172 Compliance with s.118D NPWA is discussed below.
173 TSCA, Part 7, Division 1, particularly s.114(1). NPWA s.91AA.

work orders may be made directing that any such “action” cease or that any proposed
action not be carried out. Such orders can be made under the TSCA where the
Director-General is “of the opinion that any action is being, or is about to be, carried out
that is likely to result in” harm to, or picking of, a threatened species, population or
ecological community, or damage to critical habitat, or the habitats of threatened
species.175
Interviews conducted with the NPWS Northern Zone revealed that there had been no
use made of techniques such as warning letters or notices to influence the behaviour of
participants in the PNF industry.176 Further, as far as could be ascertained, the NPWS did
not grant any stop-work orders in relation to PNF operations during the study period.177

Civil enforcement
Civil enforcement proceedings may involve pursuit of remedies such as injunctions178 or
declarations in order to enforce provisions of environmental legislation. For a natural
resources management agency, the advantages of civil litigation are the lower standard of
proof involved, and the absence of many of the procedural and evidentiary safeguards
for a defendant found in the criminal law.179
Section 147 TSCA provides that any person may seek orders relating to the alleged
breaches of the TSCA. Section 176A, NPWA contains a provision in identical terms
relating to the enforcement of the NWPA. Civil enforcement represents an easier, more
flexible and more efficient option for regulatory agencies than resort to criminal
prosecutions. It is often argued that criminal provisions should be reserved for dealing

NPWA , s.91B.
TSCA, s.114(1).
176 Interviews 22.10.99, 25.10.99, Mr Gary Davey, Northern Zone Manager, NPWS Northern Zone, Mr Andrew
McIntyre, Threatened Species Unit Manager Northern Directorate, 22.10.99 (by telephone).
177 This finding is consistent with a some broader evidence of occasional reluctance of NPWS to impose orders in
other arenas, shown in the Iron Gates case. On the other hand, the NPWS has imposed several IPOs in other
contexts, in relation to private farmland in NSW, and also on an area of Cumberland Plains Woodland at
Toongabbie in Western Sydney which was threatened by a subdivision proposal, and this order survived challenge in
Grand United Friendly Society v Allan (Minister for Environment), Land and Environment Court, 18 May 1998, Talbot J.,
No.40292 of 1997.
178 Preston, B. (1989) Environmental Litigation, Law Book Company, Sydney, Chapter 8; Burns, N. (1988) Injunctions: A
Practical Handbook, Law Book Company, Sydney.
179 Franklin, N. (1990) “Environmental Pollution Control: The Limits of the Criminal Law”, 2(1) Current Issues in
Criminal Justice 80 at 88.
174
175

with the worst breaches of the law.180 The dividing line between criminal and civil
enforcement has become increasingly blurred with statutes such as the EPAA providing
both forms of remedy in the alternative.181 Recently in the field of pollution control law, a
number of statutory provisions have been enacted empowering courts to grant a range of
civil remedies such as orders for restoration, compensation and damages where a
criminal offence has been proven.182
Yet there is no evidence that DLWC, NPWS or local councils in the Northern Zone,183
or indeed any Zone, resorted to civil enforcement in relation to PNF breaches by the
PNF industry during the study period.184 This may be due to a perception on the part of
agency staff that civil enforcement provisions are primarily designed for use by thirdparty objectors, meaning that their potential as a regulatory tool has been overlooked.
The open standing provisions in the TSCA and NPWA , and the litigation which they
facilitate, form an important part of the civil enforcement regime. These open standing
provisions mean that the environmental law-enforcement efforts of citizens can
supplement those of agencies such as the NPWS, DLWC, and local government,
providing that barriers such as security for costs and non-legal barriers involving access
to information and resources can be overcome.185 Yet a danger exists that these
provisions may mean that state agencies are tempted to some extent to ‘pass the buck’ to
the public.

Pain, N. (1993) Criminal Law and Environment Protection: Overview of Issues and Themes, in Gunningham,
Norberry, McKillop (eds.), Environmental Crime: Proceedings of a Conference held 1-3 September 1993 in Hobart,
pub. Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 19-29 at 27.
181 Farrier, D. (1992) “In Search of Real Criminal Law” in Bonyhady, T. (ed.), Environmental Protection and Legal Change,
Federation Press, Sydney, 79-124 at 120.
182 For example, the EPA is empowered to seek restraining orders against parties in order to uphold the objects of the
POEO Act.(s.232,233). Such restraining orders can be made subject to a charge freezing the assets of a defendant,
providing a fund for payment of fines and costs. (s.236)
183 Interview, 25.10.99, Mr. Gary Davey, Northern Zone Manager, NPWS Northern Zone, Interview, Mr. Andrew
McIntyre, Threatened Species Unit Manager Northern Directorate, 22.10.99 (with Mr. John Martindale, NPWS);
Interview, Mr. B. Attwood, Vegetation Resource Manager, DLWC North Coast Region, interview, in person,
Grafton DLWC Office, 23.11.00; interviews of local government staff as documented in Chapter Nine.
184 Internet review of Land and Environment Court judgements at the Australian Legal Information Institute,
<www.austlii.edu.au>, searches on “private forestry” “forestry”, 15 April 2003.
185 They were used to great effect to restrain environmental damage from clearing of coastal rainforest and wetlands in
Oshlack v Iron Gates Pty Ltd. See also Iron Gates Pty Ltd v Oshlack (1998), NSW Court of Appeal , 5 February 1998, No.
40485/95, (appeal by developer dismissed). However such third party rights have been wound back by legislative
amendment in a number of areas since 1995, particularly in relation to legislation applying to public forests. The
principal area in which these have been removed is in relation to forestry operations within State Forests covered by
an ‘integrated forestry operations approval’ under the Forestry and National Park Estate Act 1998. Ricketts, A.,
Rogers, N. (1999) “Third Party Rights in NSW Environmental Legislation: the Backlash”, 16(2) Environmental and
Planning Law Journal 157.
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Criminal enforcement
Aside from the use of civil and administrative enforcement techniques, there exists the
option of criminal prosecution to encourage compliance with environmental laws. The
purposes of prosecution include the communication of clear statements regarding
community standards, and secondly, the exertion of a deterrent effect on potential
offenders. However, one of the prime difficulties in attempting to devise an adequate
regulatory framework for the protection of biodiversity is that the law is increasingly
imposing restrictions on the conduct of many rural activities once regarded as
unexceptional and routine. The sudden ‘criminalisation’ of such actions may either
appear to be artificial to, or simply may not be apparent to, rural landholders who are less
convinced about the need for biodiversity conservation, or who may be unaware of the
location and distribution of threatened species.
The TSCA inserted three particular offence provisions into the NPWA . Discussion of
the criminal offence provisions is closely related to the question of licensing (above, p.5 ).
Grant of a licence immunises the licence-holder from prosecution.186 Without a licence,
any person damaging the habitat of threatened species, or harming or ‘picking’
threatened species is at risk of prosecution.187
A key issue is whether the offence provisions are drafted so as to focus the attention of
persons in the PNF industry on the need to obtain a licence where there is likely to be a
significant effect on threatened species or their habitats.188 Without a significant deterrent
effect attached to the threatened species regime, the NPWS regulatory strategy of waiting
for industry to make the first approach is likely to fail.
To discuss the impact of the offence provisions with some precision, it is necessary to
classify the offences according to whether a mental element must be proved by the
prosecution, and if so, what form it takes. This is necessary to examine (a) the practicality
and utility of embarking upon prosecutions based on the present provisions, (b) what

It is a defence to prosecution under Part 8A of the NPWA if the accused proves that the act was authorised to be
done, and was done in accordance with, a general licence under section 120 or a licence granted under Part 6 TSCA.
See: NPWA , s.118A(3)(a). The same formula is applied in s.118C and 118D. The same applies to actions done in
accordance with or was the subject of a certificate issued under section 95 (2) TSCA: see e.g. NPWA s.118A(3(a1).
The same formula is applied in s.118C and 118D.
187 NPWA , s.118A(3)(a); s.118D(2)(a).
188 EPAA, s.78A(8)(b).
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type of evidence must be presented by the prosecution in order to secure a conviction,
and (c) which defences may be raised.
Criminal offences can be classified into 3 categories – those requiring proof of mens rea,
offences of strict liability, and offences of absolute liability.189 There is a presumption
(which may be displaced) of mens rea being an essential element of every offence.190 The
classification of offences as not requiring proof of mens rea, and imposing instead either
strict or absolute liability, is a matter of statutory interpretation.191 Offences of strict
liability can be defined as: “offences in which mens rea will be presumed to be present
unless and until material is advanced by the defence demonstrating the existence of an
honest and reasonable belief that the conduct in question is not criminal, in which case
the prosecution must undertake the burden of negativing such belief beyond reasonable
doubt”.192

Offence of knowingly damaging threatened species habitat
Section 118D of the NPWA provides:
(1) A person must not, by an act or an omission, do anything that causes damage to any habitat
(other than a critical habitat) of a threatened species, population or ecological community if the
person knows that the land concerned is habitat of that kind.

Section s.118D specifically uses the words “if the person knows that the land concerned is
habitat of that kind.” [emphasis added].193 Mens rea is explicitly required by the use of the
word “knows”.194 The prosecution is required to prove knowledge on the part of the
defendant of all the essential elements of the offence.
The question of the extent of knowledge required in order to make out s.118D was
considered in Oshlack v Iron Gates Pty Ltd by the Land and Environment Court, and later
the Court of Appeal.195 The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of Stein J that in that
particular instance, the clearfelling of known habitat of threatened species amounted to a
breach of s.118D, albeit according to a civil standard of proof. This was a clear-cut case
on the facts in a situation where the developer knew of the existence of threatened
R v Wampfler (1987) 11 NSWLR 541 at 546 per Street CJ.
He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 157 CLR 523.
191 He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 157 CLR 523; 15 A Crim R 203 at 252 per Dawson J.
192 Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, Loose-leaf Service, Butterworths, Sydney, at p.249,730.
193 NPWA , s.118D(1).
194 see Gilles, P. (1997) Criminal Law, 4th edition, LBC Information Services, Sydney at 67, 776.
195 Iron Gates Pty Ltd v Oshlack (1998) NSW Court of Appeal , 5 February 1998, No. 40485/95, (appeal by developer
dismissed).
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species on the site.196 In this way it provides little guidance as to the outer boundaries of
applicability of s.118D NPWA .
A more helpful case is D-G NPWS v Schultz,197 a 1996 prosecution (under a previous
version of the legislation) for “taking” of endangered fauna (the koala) in the course of
land-clearing operations for agricultural purposes on private land. Despite the fact that
the defendants were aware of the contents of an ecological consultant’s report regarding
the population of koalas on another large block of land which they owned 2km to the
north of the subject land, Bignold J held that this knowledge did not provide a sound
basis for concluding that the defendants were put on notice regarding the likely existence
of koala habitat on the site on which clearing occurred. Neither did their failure to make
inquiries establish wilful blindness.198 This decision suggests that it may be extremely
difficult to establish knowledge on the part of a defendant.
A number of tentative observations can be made on the basis of the Schultz decision.199
The prospects of success of most prosecutions under s.118D NPWA will be slim, unless
the prosecution can produce clear evidence of knowledge of the existence of threatened
species habitat on the part of the defendant. It is evidently going to be extremely difficult
to secure a prosecution for damaging the habitat of threatened species where full mens rea
must be proved, except in the more extreme circumstances of cases such as Iron Gates.
The key policy issue arising from the legal discussion above is whether the knowledge
requirement in s.118D encourages private landowners and forestry operators working on
private land to deliberately avoid investigation of threatened species issues prior to
commencing work. The low level of licensing may be partly explained by the lack of a
deterrent effect being exerted by offence provisions of the TSCA and NPWA .
A more recent civil enforcement case (notably brought by the same litigant) was Donnelly v Solomon Islands Mining NL
& Ors [2002] NSWLEC 112 (5 July 2002), No. 40169 of 1999 (unreported), in relation to the Timbarra gold-mine
near Tenterfield. Bignold J held as follows: “I find that there have been contraventions, as earlier noted, of nine of
the conditions of the development consent and there has been a contravention of the National Parks and Wildlife Act,
s 118D.”
197 Director-General NPWS v Schultz & Schultz [1995] Land and Environment Court, unreported, Nos.50050, 50053 and
50055 of 1995, Bignold J.
198 Schultz at 12.
199 It is also useful to examine the judgment in Director of National Parks and Wildlife v Histollo Pty Ltd (1995) 88 LGERA
214; Director of National Parks and Wildlife v Histollo Pty Ltd (1995) 89 LGERA 116 in the Land and Environment
Court which relates to the offence of knowingly damaging Aboriginal relics. The decision was appealed successfully
by the defendants in Histollo Pty Ltd v Director-General National Parks and Wildlife Service, (1998) 103 LGERA 355,
Spigelman CJ, Sperling, Greg JJ. The case is another illustration of the difficulty for the NPWS in securing a
conviction where the offence provision requires proof of knowledge on the part of the defendant of all elements of
the offence.
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During the study period there were no prosecutions regarding PNF under the NPWA
/TSCA. However, in 2002 there was one successful prosecution under s.118D NPWA
for vegetation clearance - albeit in the course of a rural subdivision development. In
Director-General of National Parks and Wildlife v Wilkinson, Lloyd J made obiter remarks that
knowledge under s.118D could be inferred from the act of a defendant commissioning
preparation of a SIS.200 The defendant had been advised by both the local council and
DLWC to prepare an SIS in order to support his development applications under the
applicable LEP and under SEPP 46 in order to carry out clearing.

Offence of picking threatened species
Where a prosecution under s.118D is not possible due to evidentiary difficulties (relating
to the knowledge requirement), the NPWS can consider the fall-back position of
proceeding under s. 118A NPWA . This provision makes it an offence to harm or pick
threatened species (without a licence). Subsection 118A(1)(a) provides:
A person must not: (a) harm any threatened species, population or ecological community, being
an animal, or..

Harm is further defined in s.5(1) as follows: “harm an animal (including an animal of a
threatened species, population or ecological community) includes hunt, shoot, poison,
net, snare, spear, pursue, capture, trap, injure or kill, but does not include harm by
changing the habitat of an animal.” Thus the offence of harming fauna is not made out
where the harm is a result of modification of the habitat of the animal.
Although s.118A(1)(a) does not include harm to fauna as a result of incidental habitat
modification, the same express restriction does not apply to the provision for threatened
plant species. Sub-section 118A(2) provides:
A person must not pick any threatened species, population or ecological community, being a
plant.

“Pick” is defined in s.5 as:
pick a native plant (including a threatened species, population or ecological community) means
gather, pluck, cut, pull up, destroy, poison, take, dig up, remove or injure the plant or any part of
the plant.
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Director-General of National Parks and Wildlife v Wilkinson & Anor; Director General of the Department of Land and Water
Conservation v Wilkinson & Anor [2002] NSWLEC 171 (27 September 2002). Lloyd J at para 83. A total of fines of
$43,500 were imposed under s.118D NPWA and s.21 NVCA.

This subsection is applicable to removal and destruction of threatened species through
PNF and associated incidental injury to threatened species falling within the definition of
“pick”. On this basis a strict liability offence (or even absolute liability offence) exists, as
an alternative to s.118D which requires proof of knowledge (or a narrowly defined form
of constructive knowledge).201 The importance of these provisions protecting threatened
plants is probably higher than is realised since the majority of threatened biota now listed
under the TSCA are plants (68.8 per cent of all listed species), with numerous plant
communities now also recognised under the TSCA.202
It is useful to briefly examine s.118C, as it provides a point of contrast. Section 118C
creates the offence of damaging critical habitat. It provides: “A person must not, by an
act or an omission, do anything that causes damage to any critical habitat.” In those
instances where a map of the critical habitat concerned has been published in the Gazette,
the section provides, “it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the person
knew that the habitat was declared as critical habitat or that the person knew that it was
habitat of an endangered species, population or ecological community.” The inclusion of
this sub-section suggests that s.118C is to be interpreted as a strict liability offence.203
However, to date only two terrestrial critical habitats have been declared, neither on
private land.204
In summary, NPWA s.118A will have application to logging within threatened species
habitat only if applied by the courts to the picking of threatened plants. Accordingly, the
NPWS will be required to resort to s.118D NPWA in order to prosecute an offender

It is relevant to consider the application of s.118A and s.118D to corporations, as additional provisions of the
NPWA apply in relation to the personal liability of company directors and managers for corporate offences. Section
175B was recently improved in July 2002 so that knowledge can now be imputed or constructively applied to
company directors. However they now also have a due diligence defence available. During the study period, the
following provision applied: “If a corporation contravenes any provision of this Act or the regulations, each person
who is a director of the corporation…shall be taken to have contravened the same provision if the person knowingly
authorised or permitted the contravention.” Thus it required proof of knowledge to achieve a conviction, even if the
offence is normally one of strict liability. As much of the PNF operations in NSW are carried out by companies, the
application of a more restrictive standard of proof may have meant the Act failed to have a strong influence on
corporate behaviour.
202 There are 520 plant species listed as endangered or vulnerable, compared to only 235 animal species (Source:
NPWS Threatened Species Unit web page, <www.npws.nsw.gov.au>, accessed 1.4.03; Douglas, S.(1999) above n 72
at 2.
203 NPWA , s.118C(2).
204 Habitat of the endangered Mitchell’s rainforest snail on Stott’s Island Nature Reserve, and the endangered little
penguin colony at Sydney’s North Harbour. The critical habitat of the Bomaderry Zieria (plant) is being considered
for listing. Source: <www.npws.nsw.gov.au>, 1.4.03.
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operating without a licence, as the NPWA and TSCA fail to provide an offence of
operating without a s.91 TSCA licence.205

Additional statutory defences
Another defence is that s.91 licences are “not required for the carrying out of routine
agricultural activities”, unless an activity is prescribed by regulations.206 A regional TSU
manager stated in interview that “A lot of [PNF ] operators have argued that it is
applicable to their industry. We say that it isn’t, but no-one really knows until there is a
prosecution.”207 Other NPWS Northern Region staff stated in interview that many PNF
operators in that region had relied on the ‘routine agricultural activities’ exemption to
justify their decision not to apply for a s.91 TSCA licence.208 However, the same NPWS
staff stated that the true extent of reliance upon the exemption is unknown. 209 This is
presumably because there is no notification mechanism.

Summary of compliance discussion
The evidence suggests that there was little formal enforcement - as opposed to
compliance - activity directed at the PNF industry during the study period. If there had
been more prosecutions commenced, and successfully finalised, this might have
encouraged more operators within the industry who should have sought licences to apply
for them. In this manner, their activities would become subject to management
prescriptions aimed at reducing the negative impacts of logging.
The present drafting of the offence provisions in the NPWA makes it less likely that
prosecutions will be attempted, and as a result the legislation will exert less of a deterrent
effect on the PNF industry than it might otherwise do. The drafting appears to have
caused major difficulties for the NPWS as a regulatory agency. Research revealed that the
This is evident from a detailed examination of the text of both the TSCA and the NPWA .
TSCA, s.91(3), s. 91(6)(b). No such activities have been prescribed, after a proposal to restrict four specified
activities particularly damaging to certain threatened species was abandoned following strong opposition by the
farming community. NPWS (1997) Discussion Paper: (Proposed Initial) Prescribed Routine Agricultural Activities under the
Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995, NPWS, Revised v. 29/1/97, 14pp. The proposed activities (but only where
they where considered likely to impact on threatened species, critical habitats or threatened ecological communities
were the removal of dead standing timber and the removal of bush rocks for sale, dead timber collection or removal
for sale which may have an impact on threatened species; certain pesticide/herbicide applications, or activities
affecting the distribution of water within a naturally occurring wetland. The author attended an NPWS seminar in
Cooma in July 1997 in which the antagonism of the farming community to the proposal was extremely evident.
207 Interview, Mr G. Davey, Threatened Species Unit Manager, NPWS Northern Zone, 25.10.99.
208 Interview, Mr G. Davey, Threatened Species Unit Manager, Northern Zone, 30.4.98.
209 Interview, Mr. G. Davey, Threatened Species Unit Manager, Northern Zone, 25.10.99.
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NPWS has tended not to resort to, nor rely heavily upon, conventional enforcement
techniques such as prosecution in order to achieve compliance with the TSCA and the
NPWA .
Similarly, the knowledge requirement in the offence provisions, to the extent that there is
an awareness of it in the industry, may be perversely encouraging private landowners and
PNF forestry operators to deliberately avoid investigation of threatened species issues
prior to commencing work. In this sense the knowledge requirement runs directly
counter to the objects of the legislation.

CONCLUSION
The TSCA has provided agencies such as DLWC, councils and NPWS with greater
leverage to protect threatened species, by placing modifying conditions on development
approvals. In particular, the Act requires Part 4 consent authorities to take threatened
species questions into account in their deliberations. These provisions have probably
encouraged far greater consideration of threatened species matters by landholders
applying for approvals than was previously the case – even if this has involved only
consideration of the preliminary 8-part test. However, due to the lack of requirements in
relevant LEPs, and the exemption for PNF in the NVCA, it was found that the TSCA
applied infrequently to PNF through the Part 4 consent process.
The production of an SIS, when it occurs, enables decision-makers to engage in more
informed decision-making. However, as we have seen, SIS production has been a rarity
and thus genuinely-informed decision-making has also been uncommon. The threat of
NPWS refusing to issue concurrence combined with the expense and difficulty of the SIS
process have indirectly encouraged proponents and consent authorities to seek to steer
clear of SIS production.
The evidence presented provides some support for the hypothesis that PNF was underregulated during the study period. The principal findings revealed:


evidence of poor standards in testing PNF proposals against the 8-part test in some
instances;



a tendency for agencies to apply ameliorative conditions of consent in order to avoid
imposing SIS requirements; and



fewer PNF operations licensed under Part 6 TSCA than might have been expected,
given the low levels of regulation under Parts 4 and 5 EPAA.

Nevertheless the work presented in this Chapter is only a preliminary investigation of
one aspect of administration of legislation applying to PNF, mainly in the North Coast
Region – the centre of PNF activity in NSW.
One of the major issues about implementation of the TSCA concerns difficulties with
application of the 8-part test. These arise partly from statutory failures to delineate roles
and responsibilities for the provision of information about both threatened species and
decision-making regarding likely impacts. To some extent, recent amendments to the
TSCA are likely to improve the clarity and rigour of 8-part tests, by providing for the
development of administrative guidelines to illuminate the test. However there is no
guarantee that these guidelines will solve the problems; the difficulties involved in writing
such guidelines is evident in the fact that none have been produced on an informal level
during seven years’ operation of the Act.
The 8-part test, as interpreted by the courts to date, requires a consent authority to make
informed decisions about the likely impact of development on threatened species.
Consents granted on the basis of inadequate information can be invalidated, following
Timbarra and Helman v Byron SC. Yet there is little preliminary evidence to suggest that
these court decisions have led to behavioural change by the PNF industry or indeed
regulatory agencies when deciding whether to require SISs. This is a question for further
research.
A key finding relates to decisions not to require SISs nor to activate concurrence or
Ministerial consultation processes in relation to PNF in the North Coast, Hunter or
Sydney-South Coast regions. In the North Coast Region, during the study period, no
SISs were required for any one of a total of 125 applications examined by DLWC,
councils and NPWS collectively.210 Without an SIS, and relying only on preliminary
information applied to the 8-part test, it is probable that decisions have been made on
the basis of inadequate information about the likely effects of logging on threatened
species.
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103 applications under the NVCA, 18 applications to local government under the EPAA, and 4 licences under the
TSCA Part 6. However note that a Fauna Impact Statement was produced for the NPWS in relation to PNF by
Boral at Elands, as discussed above.

There was little licensing activity under TSCA Part 6 in the Northern and Hunter
regions, despite the widespread resort to the PNF exemption and low levels of LEP
regulation of private forestry. Only four licences were issued throughout NSW to PNF
operators. Interviews revealed that the approach of NPWS to licensing in the Northern
Directorate was to wait for the industry to inquire about licensing. This approach
effectively meant that the majority of the industry had not contacted NPWS. Such
findings give strong support to the hypothesis of under-regulation of PNF.
Neither the development-consent mechanism nor the licensing mechanisms are a
particularly good tool for systematic protection of high-conservation-value habitats, as
they have a project-level focus. Alternatives are mechanisms with a more regional focus.
For example, the ESFM Expert Working Group recommended “ecological communities
on private land which are inadequately represented in the CAR [comprehensive, adequate
and representative] reserve system should be considered for listing as endangered
ecological communities under the TSCA to facilitate protection from potential clearing
and degradation.”211 Another option available under the Act is the critical habitat
mechanism. Yet for a combination of resourcing and political reasons, only two critical
habitats have actually been listed.
Little use appeared to be made of civil and administrative enforcement techniques such
as notices and stop-work orders by NPWS in relation to PNF during the study period. A
backstop in the TSCA is the inclusion of a provision making it an offence to damage
threatened species habitat (s.118D). However, as we have seen, in relation to PNF there
have been no successful prosecutions to date under this section.212 The present drafting
of this provision may deter future attempts at prosecution, especially since the failure of
the Schultz and Histollo prosecutions.213 Yet the recent successful s.118D prosecution in
Wilkinson shows that these obstacles are not insurmountable in instances of a clear

Independent Expert Working Group (1998) above n 75 at Recommendation 3. 11.
However, note the Wilkinson prosecution discussed above n 200 in relation to non-PNF vegetation clearing.
213 Director of National Parks and Wildlife v Histollo Pty Ltd (1995) 88 LGERA 214; Director of National Parks and Wildlife v
Histollo Pty Ltd (1995) 89 LGERA 116 in the Land and Environment Court which relates to the offence of
knowingly damaging Aboriginal relics. The decision was appealed successfully by the defendants in Histollo Pty Ltd v
Director-General National Parks and Wildlife Service, (1998) 103 LGERA 355, Spigelman CJ, Sperling, Greg JJ. The case
is another illustration of the difficulty for the NPWS in securing a conviction where the offence provision under the
NPWA requires proof of knowledge on the part of the defendant of all elements of the offence.
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breach where knowledge of the contents of an SIS is undeniable.214 Still, there is an
urgent need to reform offence provisions to either make liability strict or to extend the
knowledge requirement to include recklessness. The analysis presented above showed
that NPWA s.118A(2), the “pick” offence in relation to threatened plants is a relatively
neglected provision with much potential as it does not require the prosecution to prove
knowledge on the part of a defendant.
The evidence of a lack of a compliance education campaign by agencies and authorities
directed specifically at PNF supports a preliminary conclusion of under-regulation of the
industry. With DLWC and local councils at the front-line of considering PNF proposals
under Part 4 EPAA, it is important to focus on their role in applying threatened species
provisions. The role of NPWS in terms of evaluating this category of PNF proposals has
been drastically curtailed since the removal of a concurrence role administered by the
Service in 1995-6 under SEPP 46,215 but it probably should have a greater role in terms of
regulating PNF by means of Part 6 licensing. The evidence collected raises doubts about
the overall adequacy of consideration of threatened species questions raised by PNF
activity in the North Coast Region of NSW by DLWC and councils. There was a failure
by DLWC, councils and the NPWS to require SISs to enable thorough evaluation of the
likely impacts of PNF proposals. Without SISs, and relying only on preliminary
information applied in the 8-part test, it is probable that decisions were made on the
basis of inadequate information about the likely effects of logging on threatened species.
These findings raise questions about the success of biodiversity provisions in ensuring
that the PNF industry meets goals of ESFM.

Wilkinson, above n 200; see also Carmody v Brancourts Nominees Pty Limited; Carmody v Brancourt [No. 2] [2003]
NSWLEC 84 Nos. 50057 of 2002 and 50058 of 2002, prosecution under NPWA , s.118D (non-logging).
215 During 1995-1997, NPWS actively sought to regulate PNF operations at least in the Southern Zone. A large volume
of NPWS file material at Southern Directorate office was examined by the author in 1997 which revealed that at
least 17 proposed logging or clearing operations associated with PNF or plantation establishment were reviewed by
NPWS in that region with a view to mitigating impacts on threatened species. NPWS Correspondence with DLWC,
councils and proponents on file held by author.
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Chapter Eleven

PRIVATE NATIVE FORESTRY LAW IN TASMANIA

INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews the law applying to PNF in Tasmania. This provides a useful point
of comparison with NSW law. It enables a more thorough detection of elements of
forestry legislation that are likely to be inconsistent with the attainment of ESFM.
Tasmanian law affecting PNF is more specialised and more highly tailored than its
counterpart in NSW. This is attributable to a number of factors, but mainly the fact that
private land is relatively more important for overall timber production in Tasmania.
Further, a policy decision has been taken to regulate PNF under the same broad
framework as for public forestry. Therefore PNF in Tasmania has the benefit of much of
the regulatory infrastructure applicable to public forestry.
In Tasmania, PNF is subject to a cohesive regulatory system that has been purpose-built
for forestry, rather than subjected haphazardly to a series of largely disjointed
instruments such as those incrementally introduced by the NSW Parliament.
In Tasmania, the applicable law consists of the following elements:
•

a regime of specific obligations contained within the Forest Practices Act 1985 and
Forest Practices Code applicable to both private and public forests;

•

provisions for Private Timber Reserves (under the Private Forests Act 1994) which
exempt PNF from local government regulation;

•

provisions for the registration and protection of profits à prendre under the Forestry
Rights Registration Act 1990;

•

measures to protect threatened species under the Threatened Species Protection Act
1995;

•

land use planning controls applicable to areas not designated as Private Timber
Reserves; and

•

limited measures to protect water quality and prevent water pollution.

The Tasmanian approach to implementation and enforcement of the regulatory
framework depends on fewer agencies than in NSW. It involves audited self-regulation
within a broader framework of command regulation. The key actors and agencies are the
Forest Practices Board, Forest Practices Officers (FPOs) employed by private logging
interests, the Forest Practices Tribunal, and Private Forests Tasmania (PFT) (see Figure
1) Standing outside the ‘Forest Practices System’ are local government, and the Parks and
Wildlife Service (PWS), within the Department of Primary Industries Water and Energy
(DPIWE).

Tenure of forests
Approximately 29 per cent of Tasmania’s forests are in private ownership, according to
the National Forest Inventory (2003) and the Public Land Use Commission (PLUC) (1996),
whilst 43 per cent of the total forested land in Tasmania (excluding woodland and scrub)
are held as State forests.1 The majority of the remainder are in nature reserves.(Table 1).
An earlier study for the Resource Assessment Commission Forests Inquiry (1991)
suggested that 35.7% of Tasmanian native forests were private forests.2
Table 1
Area of Tasmanian forest (’000 ha) by
tenure
Tenure

Area

%age

Private Land

922

29.1

Multiple-use public forest

1062

33.5

Nature Reserves

1105

34.9

Other Crown Land

80

2.5

Leasehold Land

0

0

Tasmanian Public Land Use Commission (1996) Inquiry Into Areas To Be Reserved Under The Tasmania-Commonwealth
Regional Forest Agreement: Background Report Part F, Tasmanian PLUC, cited by Private Forests Tasmania (1997) Private
Forests Tasmania, (Promotion Leaflet), p.5.
2 Kestel Research and Victorian Dept of Conservation and Environment (1990) Forest Clearing in Australia, Consultant’s
Report for Resource Assessment Commission Forest and Timber Inquiry, No: FTC91/02, 49pp., at p.19.
1

Total native forest

3169

100%

Source: National Forest Inventory (2003) State of the Forests Report 2003, p.38.
However, the more important issue for consideration is the ownership of productive
forests, i.e. the tenure of forests in which timber harvesting is permitted, a figure that
excludes national parks and nature reserves. From Table 2 we can see that private forests
comprise 46.5 per cent of Tasmanian forests available for logging.
Table 2 Area of native forest (’000 ha) by
tenure not legally restricted from harvesting
Tenure

Area

Percentage

Private land

922

46.47

Multiple use forests

1062

53.52

Leasehold

0

0

Total

1984

100%

Source: National Forest Inventory (2003) State of the Forests Report 2003, p.114. Note: Multiple use

forests includes areas of state forest
special reserves to protect environmental values.

reserved

from

harvesting

as

Relative commercial importance of PNF
Private land plays a much more significant role in Tasmania’s logging industry than in
other states.3 According to Private Forests Tasmania, “since 1945, over 50 per cent of the
hardwood pulpwood has been harvested from private land”4, and over 25 per cent of
total hardwood sawlog production in Tasmania has come from private land.5 According
to the Forest Practices Board, private forests accounted for 57.6 per cent of the total area

According to the Chief Forest Practices Officer “about one half of the total operations occur on private land.”
Wilkinson, G. (1999) “Codes of Forest Practice As Regulatory Tools for Sustainable Forest Management”, paper
presented to 18th Biennial Conference of the Institute of Foresters of Australia, Hobart, Tasmania, 3-8 October, at p.4.
4
Private Forests Tasmania (2002) Private Forest Facts, information leaflet, PFT, Hobart, 3pp;
<www.privateforests.tas.gov.au>, accessed 12.7.02.
5 Private Forests Tasmania (1997) above n 1, p.5.
3

of native forest logging operations in Tasmania, in 2000-01 (down from 59.25 per cent in
1999-2000), with this figure falling to 50.24 per cent in 2001-2002.6

Table 3 Native forests - area (hectares) of
operations covered by Forest Practices
Plans certified in 2001/2002 by harvesting
method, and tenure
Tenure

Partial logging

Clearfelling

Total

%age

Private Land

11130

4960

16090

50.24

State Forest

7860

8070

15930

49.75

Total

18990

13030

32020

100%

Source: Forest Practices Board (2002) Annual Report 2001-2002, p.14.
Table 3 indicates the considerable importance of private native forestry in Tasmania vis-àvis public land forestry, with over half of forestry by area of operations occurring on
private land.

Ecological importance of private forests
The crucial importance of much of Tasmania’s privately-owned forests for biodiversity
conservation was recognised in the RFA process. There were 24 forest types and 22 oldgrowth forest communities identified as a conservation priority in the Tasmanian RFA
and the Private Forest Reserve Program Strategic Plan.7 For these under-represented
forest communities, 100 per cent reservation of remnants on private land is required to
meet the JANIS reserve targets agreed upon in the Tasmanian RFA.
A Commonwealth-Tasmania steering committee concluded in 1997:
For a number of forest communities, there is insufficient area on public land to meet the shortfall
in the JANIS criteria. In summary, 17 forest communities (out of a total of 32 for which there is a
shortfall) including 15 of the 16 rare, vulnerable and endangered forest communities, 16 oldForest Practices Board Tasmania (2001) Annual Report 2000-01, p.13; Forest Practices Board Tasmania (2000) Annual
Report 1999-2000, Forest Practices Board, Hobart, p.14. The drop in the relative importance of PNF may be due to
expansions in forestry activity on public land during that time period, not due to any reductions in the extent of
PNF activity.
7 The list of under-represented forest types and the area required to be conserved on private land is reproduced in
Appendix 11.1. See also: DELM/DPWIE Private Forests Reserve Program (1998) Strategic Plan for the Private Land
Component of the CAR Reserve System, Hobart, Tasmania, 110pp., at pp.63-64.
6

growth forest communities (out of a total of 29 old-growth forest communities for which there is
a shortfall) and all 11 of the rare and depleted old-growth forest communities cannot be
adequately protected on public land. In addition most poorly reserved endangered and threatened
flora and fauna species occur on private land. All of the indicative National Estate values are
represented on private forested land.8

Sources
Sources examined in relation to PNF in Tasmania included relevant legislation,9
judgments of the Forest Practices Tribunal and the Resource Management and Planning
Appeal Tribunal (RMPAT), government reports, and secondary sources including
conference papers and articles. The Regional Forest Agreement process also involved the
production of a number of important documents which contain information regarding
various regulatory, ecological, and economic aspects of PNF.
A two-week field trip to Tasmania was conducted in November 1998. This was necessary
in order to interview relevant subjects in depth and to examine libraries, files and public
registers - to obtain better-quality information and clarify questions relating to the
Tasmanian context. The primary research site was Hobart. A number of private forest
sites in Central Tasmania (e.g. Meander Valley near Deloraine) and Southern Tasmania
were also viewed. Additional primary information came from interviews with industry,
regulators, and conservationists. Representatives of the following organisations were
interviewed: Private Forests Tasmania, Forest Practices Board, Parks and Wildlife
Service, Forest Industries Association Tasmania, University of Tasmania Law Faculty,
Tasmanian Conservation Trust, and other NGOs.
In Tasmania there is less of a ‘data gap’ regarding PNF than in NSW. As PNF is a larger
component of the timber industry, more visible and subject to greater public debate,10 it
receives more direct scrutiny and study by government, industry and NGOs. Thus there

Tasmania-Commonwealth Joint Regional Forest Agreement Steering Committee (1997) Options for the TasmaniaCommonwealth Regional Forest Agreement: A Strategic Approach, April, 179pp., at 43.
9 Since research began on this Chapter, there have been a number of legislative amendments. Since 1997 the
Tasmanian Parliament has enacted the: Forest Practices Amendment (Private Timber Reserves) Act 1998; Forestry Rights
Registration Amendment Act 1999; National Parks and Wildlife Amendment Act 1998; RMPAT Amendment Act 1998;
Regional Forest Agreement (Land Classification) Act 1998, Forest Practices Amendment Act 1999, Forest Practices (Private Timber
Reserves Validation) Act 1999; Forest Practices Amendment (Tree Ferns) Act 2001, Forest Practices Amendment (Conservation
Covenants) Act 2002, and the National Parks and Wildlife Amendment (Conservation Covenants) Act 2002.
10 Such as the controversy over the declaration of private timber reserves (PTRs) which override local planning
controls. Gee, D.; Stratford, E. (2001) “Public Participation and Integrated Planning in the Tasmanian Private
Timber Reserve Process”, 18(1) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 54-70.
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is more published primary and secondary literature as well as raw data on PNF, and most
of this is more readily accessible than equivalent information in NSW.
Further, with a more established institutional structure and a systematic approach to the
regulation of PNF - under the Forest Practices Act and the Private Forests Act 1994 - the task
of gathering information about PNF is less ambiguously allocated, with Private Forests
Tasmania and the Forest Practices Board systematically collecting data. In contrast to
NSW, statistical information regarding the administration of forestry law on private land
(e.g. the number and scale of operations conducted) is systematically published in Annual
Reports of the Forest Practices Board.

THE FOREST PRACTICES SYSTEM
Background to PNF controls in Tasmania
The introduction of export woodchipping in Tasmania in the early 1970s led to a drastic
acceleration in the rate of private native-forest logging, with only a small proportion of
logged areas on private land being regenerated and returned to production forest.11
Official and public concern about the unsustainable nature of the logging resulted in a
parliamentary inquiry by Everett and Gentle in 1977.12 Its recommendations to limit
cutting to a sustainable level were not implemented, nor was its advice to devise logging
standards to minimise environmental impacts.13 In 1982, the Commonwealth subjected
forestry for the purpose of export woodchipping to a regulatory regime in the form of
licensing subject to conditions under the Export Control Act 1982.14 In 1985, Tasmanian
controls - in the form of the Forest Practices Act 1985 and Code,15 were introduced
Miller, J. (1984) Private Forests in Tasmania, Australian Conservation Foundation and Tasmanian Conservation Trust,
Hobart, November, 15pp.
12 Everett, M., Gentle, S. (1977) Report of the Board of Inquiry into Private Forestry in Tasmania, Report to the Parliament of
Tasmania, Parliamentary Paper No.25, Government Printer, Hobart; Wilkinson, G. (2001) “Building Partnerships Tasmania’s approach to Sustainable Forest Management” in International Conference on the Application of
Reduced Impact Logging to Advance Sustainable Forest Management: Constraints, Challenges and Opportunities,
26th February to 1 March 2001, Kuching, Sarawak, Malaysia, Compendium of Conference Papers 219-226.
13 Dargavel, J. (1995) Fashioning Australia’s Forests, Oxford University Press, Melbourne at 165-6.
14 Bonyhady, “Property Rights”, ch.3 in Bonyhady, T. (ed.) Environmental Protection and Legal Change, Federation Press,
pp.41-78 at p.54.
15 Further historical perspectives on the regulation of forestry in Tasmania are provided by Hoysted, P. (1981) The
Content and Historical Development of Forestry Legislation in Tasmania, Project Report 1981/3, Centre for Environmental
Studies, University of Tasmania, Hobart, 36pp; Dargavel, J., Goddard, J., Caton, S. (1987) Allocating Forest Resources in
Tasmania: A Guide to Legislation, Regulation and Administrative Practice, CRES Working Paper No.1987/2, Centre for
Resource and Environmental Studies, ANU, Canberra, 60 pp; and Miller, J. (1984) above n 11. In 1984, the
Tasmanian Forestry Commission reviewed the extent of forest resource available on privately owned land. Forestry
Commission (1984) Report of the Assessment of the Private Forest Resource, Forestry Commission, Hobart, 20pp. Later,
Prof. Ferguson of Melbourne University reviewed PNF issues for the Tasmanian government, with a focus on
disincentives to expansion: Ferguson, I. (1988) Review of Private Forestry in Australia, Private Forestry Council, Kings
Meadow, Tasmania, 50pp.
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“reluctantly”, according to Bonyhady’s examination of primary sources, in preference to
further conditions being attached to export woodchip licences granted by the
Commonwealth.16 This action was exacted with the ultimate or underlying threat (from
the Commonwealth) of non-renewal of annual export licences.17 Perhaps in an indication
of its lack of confidence in Tasmanian laws, the Commonwealth persisted in imposing
conditions on export licences, which included PNF-specific conditions.18 Over time, the
scope of environmental concerns addressed in these licence conditions expanded. For
example, ‘transitional’ licences granted in 1996 contained conditions relating to PNF
involving:19
•

a requirement for pre-logging surveys and harvesting plans;

•

a ban on export of woodchips from private property on the Register or interim Register
of the National Estate under the Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975;20

•

a ban on export of woodchips sourced from rainforest on private land;21 and

•

a ban on export of woodchips from private operations from nine specified rare
eucalyptus vegetation communities.22

However, Commonwealth controls have now been phased out almost completely since
the signing of the Tasmanian Regional Forest Agreement (RFA) in November 1997, the
passage of the Commonwealth Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999
(EPBCA) (and consequential amendments), and the Regional Forest Agreements Act 2002
(RFAA).23

Forest Industries Association of Tasmania (1985) Submission to Members of the Legislative Council on the Forest Practices Bill
1985, Launceston, p.7.
17 Forest Industries Association of Tasmania (1985) Submission to Members of the Legislative Council on the Forest Practices Bill
1985, Launceston, p.7, cited by Bonyhady, T. (1992) above n 14.
18 These conditions were, it seems, ineffectually enforced by WEMU, the Commonwealth Department of Primary
Industry and Energy’s Woodchip Export Monitoring Unit, with a staff of two. Interview, 5.2.98 with Mr. Charles
Body, Woodchip Export Monitoring Unit, DPIE, Canberra; see also DPIE /WEMU, Annual Compliance Report 1996
and Annual Compliance Report 1995; DPIE (1997) Transitional Woodchip Export Licences 1997-99; 120pp. The author
rang Mr. Body to obtain a copy of the consultants report relating to Northern NSW export woodchipping by Boral/
SEPL listed in WEMU, Annual Compliance Report 1996 at p.17. This consultant (Price Waterhouse) was required to
audit the licensee’s reporting on compliance with environmental conditions of the licence. Mr. Body refused to
supply a copy of the report, suggesting an FOI request. I asked for the reason for refusal to supply a copy of the
document: he claimed “commercial in confidence”.
19 Five operators were licensed under the transitional licensing scheme prior to December 1997. These were Boral,
Gunns, North, Farmwood, and P.Griggs.
20 Export Control (Hardwood Wood Chips) (1996) Regulation :Transitional Licence to Export Hardwood Wood Chips to North
Broken Hill Pty Ltd, November 1996, Conditions 16 to 19 inclusive.
21 Export Control (Hardwood Wood Chips) Regulation (1996), above n 20 Condition 9(b).
22 Export Control (Hardwood Wood Chips) Regulation (1996), above n 20, Condition 11.
23 The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) provides an exemption from the EIA approval
requirements under Part 9 for “RFA forestry operations” where undertaken in accordance with an RFA : EPBC,
s.38. This exemption does not apply to forestry “in a property included in the World Heritage List”: Environment
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (‘EPBCA’), s.42(a)) or in a Ramsar listed wetland: EPBCA,
s.42(b).
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Forest Practices Act 1985
The Tasmanian Forest Practices Act 1985 (FP Act) sets out the main aspects of the
regulatory framework for forestry on private and public lands. This framework is
described in the FP Act as the “Forest Practices System of Tasmania”.24 The objectives of
the system include:
(a) an emphasis on self-regulation; ....
...(c) delegated and decentralised approvals for timber harvesting plans ....
...(g) an independent appeal process....

The Act creates a Forest Practices Board reporting directly to the Minister who in turn
reports to the Parliament25, as well as a Forest Practices Tribunal with the capacity to
review certain decisions of the Board.26 A statutory Forest Practices Advisory Council
provides advice to the Board, particularly regarding review of the FP Act.27

Figure 1 Tasmanian Institutional
Structures for PNF Administration
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Forest Practices Act 1985 (‘FP Act’), Schedule 7, ‘Objectives of the Forest Practices System of Tasmania’.
FP Act, Part 1A. Reporting provisions contained in FP Act, s.4F.
26 FP Act, s.34.
27 FP Act, s.37A.
24
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The Forest Practices Code
The FP Act enables the Board to issue a Forest Practices Code (‘the Code’) setting out the
details of appropriate timber-harvesting practice applicable on private and public
forests.28 The Code addresses issues including biodiversity, soil protection, water quality,
site productivity, and archaeological protection.29 It applies to all aspects of commercial
forestry on both private and public tenures, including roading, afforestation and
reforestation.
The Forest Practices Code is merely a series of guidelines. On its own, it has no legal
force. It is neither a statutory rule nor a regulation.30 It is unlikely that the text of the

Code alone would provide grounds for action in the event of breach.31 The Code
becomes enforceable when specifically mentioned in a Forest Practices Plan (‘Plan’) that
has been devised and certified by an authorised FPO or the Board. It is the FP Act that

makes extensive references to the Code and generates obligations to comply with it.
Apart from this, the Code is divided into mandatory requirements and advisory
recommendations. Much of the Code is not binding, employing language such as “may”
and “should”.32 Some of the requirements are merely to consider issues. For example, the
formula “will give consideration to” is used repeatedly.33 Overall, the Code takes a nonprescriptive, non-detailed approach, providing general principles rather than an
exhaustive list of requirements. For example there is no mandatory formula for retention
of tree hollows, such as ‘10 hollow-bearing trees per 2 hectares’; but instead, it contains
an ‘advisory recommendation’ that “clumps” of these trees “should” be retained where
coupes have “few other retained areas”.34 Similarly the Code has no mandatory
requirement for retention of rainforest, only several advisory recommendations for
FP Act, s.30, 31(1).
Forest Practices Code 2000.
30 The Code is a form of delegated quasi-legislation issued by the FP Board under s.30 of the FP Act.
31 Offence provisions are contained within the FP Act rather than the Code.
32 Forest Practices Code (2000), Introduction.
33 Forest Practices Code (2000), passim.
34 Forest Practices Code (2000), p.62 states: “Patches of mature forest (wildlife habitat clumps) containing habitat trees
with nesting hollows and other old growth structural elements should be retained in coupes with few retained areas
(e.g. streamside reserves, areas reserved for other values, areas reserved for operational reasons etc.).”
28
29

minimising damage to rainforest in limited circumstances.35 An exception to the general
approach is that the Code sets out minimum stream buffers.36 Also, in limited
circumstances, site-specific prescriptions may be devised for threatened species
protection if the FP Board is notified (p.31, below).

Forest Practices Plans
A distinctive feature of Tasmanian law for PNF is the requirement that regulated parties
(“responsible persons”) have forest practices plans (FPPs) prepared, and obtain
certification of them (either by the FP Board or by an FPO acting under delegation)
before commencing forestry controlled by the Forest Practices Act. The Act applies to
private native forestry whether within Private Timber Reserves (see p. 20, below) or on
other areas of private land. This includes establishment of forests, timber harvesting,
roading, or quarrying.37 Recent amendments have applied the Code to firewood logging,
tree-fern harvesting, and land clearing in excess of 1 ha.38 “Responsible persons” must
not harvest timber, or “cause or allow timber to be harvested” from land unless there is a
certified FPP for that operation.39 An exemption exists in the Regulations for small-scale
operations. However, it is more constrained than the NSW PNF exemption, applying
only to operations of less than 1 ha in area or producing less than 100 tonnes per annum,
whichever is the lesser.40 Further, the exemption does not apply to ‘vulnerable land’
which includes streamside reserves, steep slopes, highly erodible soils, and land inhabited
by threatened species.41
The legislation states that an FPP may be prepared by any person,42 but in practice most
plans are prepared by authorised Forest Practices Officers (FPOs)43 appointed by the
Board, as few other people have the expertise necessary to prepare plans in conformity
with the Code.44 Larger companies operating on private land employ their own

Advisory recommendation re rainforest relicts in streamside reserves (p.57), and recommendation that logging of
“relict or old growth rainforest should be avoided or minimised” in order to protect epiphytic plant species.(p.61).
36 The required buffer width depends on stream size classifications from 1 to 4; Forest Practices Code 2000, pp.55-56.
37 FP Act, s.17(4).
38 Forest Practices Board Tasmania (2002) Land Clearing: Changes to Legislation, Advisory Notes, 2pp. FP Board, Hobart.
Internet accessed at <www.fpb.tas.gov.au>, 18.7.02.
39 FP Act, s.17(4).
40 Forest Practices Regulations 1999, r.5. 100 tonnes is equivalent to approximately 5 loaded logging trucks.
41 Forest Practices Regulations 1999, r.3. See also Forest Practices Board Tasmania (2002) above n 38.
42 FP Act, s.18(1).
43 FP Act, s.39.
44 FP Act, s.18(3).
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authorised FPOs. Smaller companies and private landowners usually engage consultant
FPOs to prepare their FPPs.45
Once prepared, before operations may lawfully commence, the plan must be certified
(i.e. approved).46 Formally, FPPs must be certified by the Board.47 However, certification
is often made by FPOs under an instrument of delegation.48 In practice it appears most
certifications are actually carried out by FPOs.49
Nevertheless, the Board can approve, refuse, or amend a Plan by inserting additional or
different conditions.50 A landowner can appeal to the FP Tribunal in the event of the
Board or an FPO refusing to certify an FPP, or approving it subject to amendments and
conditions that restrict timber harvesting and tree clearing.51 Third parties (i.e., the
public) cannot appeal or object to the grant of FPPs or to the conditions applied to
them.52
An additional regulatory step was introduced in July 1999 to apply at the post-harvesting
stage. At the time of completion of an FPP, an FPO now is required to self-certify
whether operations were in compliance with the Code at the conclusion of operations
(the expiry of the plan).53 This certificate of compliance must be lodged with the FP
Board.54 The choice of terminology in relation to “certification” has the potential to
cause some confusion.

TASMANIA’S BROADER ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FRAMEWORK
Tasmania’s forestry legislation exists alongside a broader framework of environmental
laws known as the Resource Management and Planning System (RMPS).55 This integrated
Forest Practices Board Tasmania (1999) Annual Report 1998-99, p.28.
FP Act, 18(1)(b), 19(1).
47 FP Act, s.18(1)(b).
48 FP Act, s.43(2) allows to Board to delegate its powers and functions in relation to FPPs (Part III, Division 1) to
FPOs. Section 19(5) refers to delegation by the Board of power to certify FPPs.
49 FP Act, 19(5), 43(2). Hence the text of an explanatory leaflet stating “A FPP must be certified by a Forest Practices
Officer.” Private Forests Tasmania (2001), Forest Practices Code and Forest Practices Plans, Information Sheet, July 2001,
2pp.
50 FP Act, s.19(1).
51 FP Act, s.25(1). Upon an appeals to the FP Tribunal based on s.25 FP Act involving rare or endangered species, a
special division of the Tribunal must be convened to hear and determine the appeal: FP Act, s.34(7A).
52 FP Act, s.25(1); Environmental Defender’s Office (Tasmania) Inc (1999) Environmental Law Handbook: Your Practical
Guide to Tasmania’s Environmental Protection and Planning Laws, EDO, Hobart, p.72.
53 Forest Practices Code 2000 (p.5).
54 FP Act, s.25A.
55 Bingham, R. (1994) “Natural Resources Law and Policy in Tasmania” 1(1) Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law
and Policy 281.
45
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system of four Acts shares statutory objectives of sustainable development and
sustainable use of natural resources. The objectives include reference to the necessity for
maintenance of ecological processes and genetic diversity; and the encouragement of
public involvement in resource management.56 The RMPS comprises the following Acts:
the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 (LUPAA), the Resource Management and
Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993 (RMPATA), the State Policies and Projects Act 1993
(SPPA), the Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994 (EMPCA). Other
Acts, including the Threatened Species Protection Act 1995 (TSPA) and the Public Land
(Administration and Forests) Act 1991, are linked to the RMPS, sharing the same sustainable
development objectives.57 The TSPA obliges those who have powers or functions under
the Act to perform their functions “in such a manner as to further the objectives
specified” in the RMPS.58 Also relevant to PNF in Tasmania is the National Parks and
Wildlife Act 1970 which following amendments in 1998 is similarly linked to the RMPS
objectives.59

Planning control
Tasmanian planning-control law comprises three main statutes - the SPPA, LUPAA and
the RMPAT Act. There are three levels of planning control: State-wide sustainable
development policies made under the SPPA; local-area planning schemes made under
LUPAA, and specific land-use classifications applying within particular land-use zones
within each local government area. There is no provision for the making of regional
environmental plans equivalent to NSW’s REPs or RVMPs.
Briefly, the SPPA spells out the overarching sustainable development objectives of the
RMPS that must be observed by decision-makers.60 One broad objective is to promote
sustainable development.61 Sustainable development is defined in detail, and this
definition attempts to balance social and economic objectives against sustaining and

Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, Schedule 1; State Policies and Projects Act 1993, Schedule 1; Resource
Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993, Schedule 1; Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994,
Schedule 1; National Parks and Wildlife Act 1970, Schedule 5; Threatened Species Protection Act 1995, Schedule 1.
57 Threatened Species Protection Act 1995, Schedule 1.
58 Threatened Species Protection Act 1995, s.4, Schedule 1.
59 National Parks and Wildlife Act 1970, s.3A, Schedule 5, as amended by Regional Forest Agreement (Land Classification) Act
1998 (No. 45 of 1998).
60 Davies (1994) “Sustainable Development: The Tasmanian Legislative Response to Brundtland’s Challenge” 1(2)
Australasian Journal Natural Resources Law and Policy 161.
61 State Policies and Projects Act 1993, Clause 1(a), Schedule 1.
56

protecting ecosystem processes.62 State policies may be made which attempt to address
planning issues of concern across the State.63
The next tier in the planning system is provided by LUPAA which creates a regime for
land-use planning and development control by local government. It requires the making
of local planning schemes, in conformity with the approach of State sustainable
development policies under the SPPA. Such local schemes control land uses by assessing
a range of factors including land capability, and potential effects on the environment,
whilst remaining integrated with broader resource management policy objectives.64 Local
schemes must be consistent with State sustainable development policies made under the
SPPA. State policies prevail over inconsistent local schemes.65 Further, LUPAA requires
that planning schemes attempt to further the broader objectives of the RMPS.66 LUPAA
has the potential to apply to all parts of Tasmania except those specified in the
Regulations, or where excluded by other legislation, for example, relating to Private
Timber Reserves (PTRs) (see below, p.20 ).67
The RMPAT Act created a specialist Tribunal, the RMPAT, to hear planning appeals,
and provided it with civil enforcement powers relating to the operation of the RMPS.
For example, it can and has heard appeals against the grant of permits for PNF
operations by local government under LUPAA.68 The Tribunal has a wide range of
enforcement powers – including remediation orders, powers to restrict land use, powers
to require compliance with environmental agreements, environmental improvement
programs, and environment protection notices under the EMPCA. It also has power to
order payment of costs of remediation completed by government, and the payment of
compensation to affected third parties.69

State Policies and Projects Act 1993, Clause 2, Schedule 1.
State Policies and Projects Act 1993, Part 2. The SPPA also provides for compulsory ‘State of the Environment
Reporting’. The other key objective of the SPPA is the ‘fast tracking’ of major projects, dubbed ‘projects of state
significance’. Where a project is so designated its environmental impacts are not assessed under the normal rules of
LUPAA. Full LUPAA appeal rights and other legal rights to challenge such projects are not available in relation to
‘projects of state significance’.
64 Davies (1994) above n 60 at 171.
65 State Policies and Projects Act 1993, s.13.
66 LUPAA, s.20(1)(a).
67 LUPAA, s.4(2).
68 Gunns Ltd v Kingborough Council (2003) RMPAT, 17 March, File No:244/02P; J54/2003 an appeal by an applicant for
planning consent, whereas Giles, Weston & Dudley v Break O’Day Council & T. Denney, TAS RMPAT No. J115/2001,
23 July 2001, an appeal by third party objectors.
69 Davies, above n 60 at 173.
62
63

An essential element of effective environmental law enforcement is to provide for public
access to tribunals and courts to enable merits and judicial review of decision-making by
public authorities. Decisions under LUPAA, EMPCA, and the TSPA may all be
appealed to RMPAT under relatively liberal standing provisions.

70

For example,

objectors have a right of appeal against decisions to grant a planning permit under
LUPAA.
However, the Forest Practices System has its own tribunals and appeal processes.
Decisions of FPOs, and the Forest Practices Board,71 are appealable to the Forest
Practices Tribunal, and thence to the Supreme Court. The existence of a separate tribunal
for review of decisions made under forestry legislation is anomalous. Notably, public
third-party access to that FP Tribunal is very much restricted. For example, decisions to
certify Forest Practices Plans cannot under any circumstances be appealed by a member
of the public.72 The Tasmanian forest practices regime may be contrasted with that of
NSW, which provides third parties with “any person” standing, under provisions in
virtually all of its environmental statutes.

The extent of planning control over non-PTR PNF
The regulatory regime applicable to private forests in Tasmania depends on whether or
not they have been declared to be Private Timber Reserve (PTR) by the Forest Practices
Board (see below, p.20) . All forestry not conducted in Private Timber Reserves (PTRs),
may be subject to local planning schemes. The operation of these schemes can be
excluded by the declaration of ‘private timber reserves’ (‘PTRs’) by Forest Practices
Board under Part 2, FP Act.73 When land has been declared as a PTR, local councils are
blocked from requiring development applications for PNF.(see below, p.20) However,
Sixty three percent of the private forest resource at mid-2002 was not in PTRs.74

LUPAA, s.61(5) provided that a representation/ objection was lodged under 57(5). Similarly, TSPA, s.14 provides a
right of appeal against a range of threatened species listing decisions; EMPCA, s.48 provides civil enforcement
proceedings may be commenced by a third party (“any other person who has, in the opinion of the Appeal Tribunal,
a proper interest in the subject matter of the proceedings and desires to be heard in the proceedings”).
71 FP Act, s.4A-4H.
72 FP Act, s.25(1).
73 Private Forests Tasmania also makes PTR declarations under delegation from the Board.
74 FP Board (2002) Annual Report 2001-2002, p.13. By 2001, over 1200 PTRs covered 31% of Tasmanian private
forests: Forest Practices Board (2001) Annual Report 2000-2001, p.11. In 1998, they covered 28%; Forest Practices
Board (1998) Annual Report 1997-1998, p.6.
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According to surveys, the majority of landholders in this category plan some logging at
some stage in the future.75
Local planning schemes made under LUPAA have the capacity to affect PNF.76
LUPAA provides that “a planning scheme may regulate or prohibit the use or
development of any land.”77 The definition of “development” includes “the carrying out
of works”.78 PNF is caught by the definition of “works” as it includes “the removal,
destruction, or lopping of trees and the removal of vegetation or topsoil.”79
The planning requirements applicable to non-PTR PNF vary according to the content of
the local planning scheme and the zoning of the land. Planning schemes provide for two
classes of development applications - for which the grant of permits is either
discretionary or mandatory. The ‘discretionary’ class of development is that which a
planning authority, under its planning scheme, has discretion to refuse or permit.80 The
‘mandatory’ or ‘permitted development’ category is that to which a council, under its
planning scheme, must grant a permit, either unconditionally or subject to conditions.81
Within a typical scheme in the ‘general rural zone’, forestry is not a discretionary or
prohibited use, but rather is a ‘permitted development’. Thus it is not open to a council
to refuse a permit for such proposals.82 However, an application must still be made,83 and
the council can attach a range of conditions to the permit84 as long as these remain
consistent with the terms of the scheme85 and the objectives of the RMPS.86 For
example, in Toora Primary Industries, the Tasman Council attached conditions in
accordance with the Tasman Planning Scheme 1979 to approvals for private forestry
proposed within the Rural General Zone, mainly relating to road safety, as well as a
requirement that operations “are to be conducted in strict compliance with the FP Act
A survey of owner intentions carried out by PFT in 1996 revealed that 61% of non-PTR forest owners intended to
harvest the timber on their land. Taylor, Peter (1997) An Overview of the Private Forest Resource in Tasmania, Private
Forests Tasmania, unpublished.
76 Toora Primary Industries & North Forest Products v Tasman Council [1997] 103 TASRMPAT (27 May 1997). LUPAA does
not apply to forest practices in State Forests, because of a specific exclusion attached to the definition of “works”.
LUPAA, s.3(1).
77 LUPAA, s.20(2).
78 LUPAA, s.3(1).
79 LUPAA, s.3(1).
80 LUPAA, s.57(1).
81 LUPAA, s.58(1).
82 LUPAA, s.58(1).
83 LUPAA, s.51(1).
84 LUPAA, s.51(3A).
85 LUPAA, s.58(1).
86 LUPAA, s.51(2)(a).
75

and the Forest Practices Code.” It appears that the aim of the latter condition was to
provide leverage so that if the operation were to breach the Code, this would amount to
a breach of planning consent conditions, an offence under LUPAA punishable on
summary conviction.87 Planning authorities are under a statutory obligation to enforce
observance of their planning schemes.88 Further compliance with such conditions could
be enforced by members of the public who meet the “proper interest” test, in
accordance with the civil enforcement provisions of LUPAA.89
Decision-makers under LUPAA are obliged to make their decisions in accordance with
the objectives of the RMPS, attached in a schedule to the Act.90 Section 5 states that
decision-makers (“any person on whom a function is imposed or a power is conferred”)
must “perform the function or exercise the power in such a manner as to further the
objectives” of the RMPS. An identical clause is included in EMPCA.91
Decision-making by local government under LUPAA, whilst not constituting formal
EIA, is an important form of environmental assessment. In determining an application
for a permit, a planning authority must “seek to further” the sustainable development
objectives of the RMPS, and must “must take into consideration such of the prescribed
matters as are relevant to the use or development the subject of the application” in
determining permit applications.92 Decided case reports indicate that councils routinely
apply these objectives both as a decision-making aid and as a condition attached to
planning approval permits.93
A particularly relevant case to the discussion of PNF and local government planning
requirements is Dudley v Break O’Day Council (2001), where the RMPAT considered a
third-party appeal against the grant of planning permission for a PNF operation.94 The
appeal was partly allowed, with the Tribunal varying the permit granted to exclude the
habitat of the threatened Giant Velvet Worm. The Tribunal did not directly refer to the
LUPAA, s.63. Toora Primary Industries & North Forest Products v Tasman Council [1997] 103 TASRMPAT (27 May
1997).
88 LUPAA, s.48.
89 LUPAA, s.64.
90 Obviously, if the PNF operation in question is not subject to planning permit requirements then the sustainable
development objectives of LUPAA will not apply. Pers.comm., Mr. Michael Stokes, Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Univ.
of Tasmania, 16.8.98.
91 Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994 (‘EMPCA’), s.8.
92 LUPAA, s.51(2)(a).
93 e.g., Scheppein v Hobart City Council [1997] 95 TASRMPAT (20 May 1997).
94 F. Giles, J. Weston & T. Dudley v Break O’Day Council & T. Denney,TASRMPAT No. J115/2001, 23 July 2001 (referred
to as ‘Dudley’).
87

precautionary principle nor the sustainable development objects of the RMPS; however,
it decided that both the proposed selective harvesting and plantation operations should
not proceed on the basis of the possible impact of the forestry operations on this
threatened species. More specifically, the “potential impact” of the plantation, the fact
that the chemical use proposed was “possibly detrimental” caused the Tribunal to vary
the planning permit.
Hall, a solicitor of the Tasmanian Environmental Defender’s Office (EDO) reads more
into the decision, wrote:
The case has set an important planning precedent because it involved application of the
precautionary principle, possibly for the first time in Tasmanian environmental litigation; and it is
the first Tasmanian case where protection of a threatened species was the determining factor in
the outcome of a planning appeal. It thus represents the first definitive determination recognising
biodiversity as an important element of the ‘sustainable development’ objectives that underpin
Tasmania’s Resource Management and Planning System (RMPS).95

In summary, non-PTR PNF may be subject to local government regulation. Given that
there are 101 different local government areas in Tasmania, differing rules potentially
apply to PNF across the State subject to planning requirements under these various
planning schemes.

Is forestry subject to the objectives of the RMPS ?
Decision-makers under LUPAA are obliged to act in accordance with the objectives of
the RMPS , which are attached in a schedule to the Act.96 However, FPOs, the FP Board
and the FP Tribunal are not persons with functions or duties under LUPAA or under
the EMPCA. Therefore the RMPS sustainable development objectives under those Acts
do not apply to decision-making under the Forest Practices Act , for example, in relation to
the approval of Forest Practices Plans. A similar position exists for Private Forestry
Tasmania’s decision-making in relation to declaration of private timber reserves (PTRs)
(see below, p.20).

Hall, S. (2001) “Velvet Worms v Woodchips: Landmark Decision on Forestry and Threatened Species in Tasmania’s
Resource Management and Planning System” 279 The Tasmanian Conservationist, December.
96 LUPAA, s.5, Sch.1. An identical clause is included in the EMPCA, s.8.
95

Environmental impact assessment of PNF in Tasmania
In addition to planning controls, it is important to consider briefly the extent to which
PNF is subject to environmental impact assessment (‘EIA’) requirements. Tasmania’s
EIA provisions are contained within the Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act
1994 (EMPCA). In summary, EIA requirements do not apply to PTRs or publiclyowned forests. It is also highly unlikely in practice that forestry on non-PTR private lands
will be subject to EIA requirements, for reasons set out below.
Various forms of environmental assessment are required for the specified categories of
proposed ‘environmentally relevant activity’ - being an activity which may cause
environmental harm, whether proposed by the private or public sector, in instances
where no applicable exemptions prevail.97 ‘Activities’ are classified as either Level 1, 2 or
3. A different assessment process is applicable to each.
Level 1 activities are those activities for which a planning permit is required from local
government under LUPAA.98 Whether an activity is considered Level 1 depends on the
detail of the planning scheme in question. If the activity is not a Level 1 activity, then no
assessment will be required. Areas of private forest not exempted as Private Timber
Reserves (below, p.20) may fall within the definition of Level 1 activities if they are
considered “an activity which may cause environmental harm”, and they are subject to
planning permit requirements.99 Table 4, below, summarises the law.
Level 1 activities are subject to a limited form of environmental assessment, given the
obligation of local authorities to take account of sustainable development objectives in
their planning approval decision-making.100 A number of RMPAT decisions have upheld
Councils’ refusal of planning approval on the basis of their sustainable development
strategies or the sustainable development objectives of the legislation.101

EMPCA , s.3(1), 74(1).
Level 1 activities are by definition not Level 2 or Level 3 activities. LUPAA, s.3(1) defines ‘permit’ as follows: “any
permit, approval or consent required by a planning scheme or special planning order to be issued or given by a
municipality in respect of the use or development of any land.”
99 EMPCA, s.3(1).
100 Pers.comm., Prof. Gerry Bates, Faculty of Law, Univ. of Sydney, 16.8.98.
101 Property Tasmania v Dorset Council [1997] 97 TASRMPAT (16 May 1997); D James & Ors v Launceston City Council &
Fletcher Constructions [1997] 117 TASRMPAT ( 3 June 1997) (where it was held that the objectives of sustainable
development within LUPAA did not entail economic considerations overriding other objectives); but compare DC
Booth v Break O’Day Council [1996] 111 TASRMPAT (15 May 1996), where appeal against planning consent refusal
upheld despite sustainable development objectives.
97
98

Level 2 activities are scheduled activities with a potential to cause greater environmental
harm, and are automatically subject to EIA requirements, roughly equivalent to the NSW
concept of designated development. Requirements for the production of an
environmental impact statement (EIS) only attach to Level 2 activities. Private native
forestry is not subject to such requirements as it is not listed or scheduled as Level 2
activity in the EMPCA.102 (The Act lists “Level 2 activities” in Schedule 2, being those
industries most likely to cause serious environmental pollution.)
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EMPCA, Schedule 2, “Level 2 Activities”; Review of DPWIE website, 16.10.03, <www.dpiwe.tas.gov.au>.

Table 4 Levels of environmental assessment
of development in Tasmania
Level

Description

No Level Not a ‘work’, ‘development’, or ‘use’.
Level 1

Implications
No requirements.

Activities for which a permit is required, No additional requirements unless
under LUPAA

‘called in’ (as if Level 2)103

Level 2

Activities listed in Sch 2 of EMPCA104

EIA required.

Level 3

Activities declared and gazetted under Separate

‘fast-track’

truncated

State Policies and Projects Act as ‘Projects of assessment process.
State Significance’105

PRIVATE TIMBER RESERVES
A key aspect of the law applicable to PNF in Tasmania are provisions for the declaration
of ‘private timber reserves’ (‘PTRs’) by Forest Practices Board under Part 2, FP Act.106
Any landholder can apply to the Board for declaration of a PTR and need not establish
an existing use in order to achieve such a declaration. The aim of PTRs is to provide a
form of ‘resource security’ to private forest investors.107 Farrier and Byron, consultants
to the Resources Assessment Commission Inquiry into Forestry (1992) described PTRs
as a “special regulatory strategy designed to offer protection to …[forestry] against
demands for nature conservation.”108
When land has been declared as a PTR, local councils are prevented from requiring
development applications for PNF. Declaration of a PTR represents a form of perpetual
rezoning - in that the zoning status of a PTR cannot be reviewed during the term of the

EMPCA, s.24(1).
EMPCA , s.3(1).
105 EMPCA, s.3(1).
106 Private Forests Tasmania also makes PTR declarations under delegation from the Board.
107 FP Act, Schedule 7(h).
108 Environmental Defender’s Office (NSW), Farrier, D., Byron, N. (1992) A Review of the Legislative and Regulatory
Framework Affecting Forest Management on Private and Leasehold Lands, Consultant’s Report to the Resource Assessment
Commission Forest and Timber Inquiry, Number FTC92/20, Resource Assessment Commission, Canberra, 186pp
at 74.
103
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PTR, whereas LUPAA provides that all other zonings are to be reviewed on a regular
and periodic basis.109
As a general rule, LUPAA provides that “a planning scheme may regulate or prohibit the
use or development of any land.”110 However it also provides that planning schemes
cannot affect forestry in land declared as a PTR. Thus PTRs are subject to the Forest
Practices Code but not to local planning schemes made under LUPAA

111

By mid-2002,

1244 PTRs had been approved and were in force covering 37 per cent of Tasmanian
private forests.112
The PTR provisions were considered necessary to augment the law of existing uses. The
hardwood sawmilling industry has operated on private land in Tasmania since the early
nineteenth century.113 The existing-use provisions of LUPAA state that planning
schemes cannot prevent the continuance of any use of land which was in progress prior
to the commencement of the scheme.114 These provisions are inapplicable if the use is
intensified.115 They also state that where a use has stopped for more than two years it can
no longer be regarded as an existing use.116 The amendments to create PTRs were
designed to address such shortcomings of the existing use regime to ensure that forestry
was better protected. This was necessary given the long term nature of forest
management, and the fact that the “use” of land for forestry may not be very obvious. A
Private Forests Tasmania officer explained: “The activity on an area of forest, used for
forestry purposes, is [often] infrequent and the period between any activity may span
decades.”117
There is considerable controversy in Tasmania over the declaration of PTRs.118 At its
core lies the policy question of whether PNF should be subject to planning controls by
local government in the same way as other primary industries, or whether it is
LUPAA, s.44.
Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, s.20(2).
111 LUPAA, s.20(7)(a). “Nothing in any planning scheme or special planning order affects- (a) the management of land
declared as a private timber reserve under the Forest Practices Act 1985;”
112 FP Board (2002) Annual Report 2001-2002, p.13. By 2001, over 1200 PTRs covered 31% of Tasmanian private
forests: Forest Practices Board (2001) Annual Report 2000-2001, p.11. In 1998, they covered 28%; Forest Practices
Board (1998) Annual Report 1997-1998, p.6.
113 Rolley, E. (1993) “Private Forestry in Tasmania”, 72 Commonwealth Forestry Review 86-91.
114 LUPAA, s.20(3)(a).
115 LUPAA, s.20(6) modifies s.20(3).
116 LUPAA, s.20(6).
117 Taylor, P. (1997) “Private Timber Reserves: An overview”, Private Forests Tasmania, Hobart, unpublished, 6pp. at
p.2.
118 Gee, D., Stratford, E. (2001) above n 10.
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legitimately entitled to a parallel assessment scheme separate to that applicable to all
other developments.119 Placing PTR forestry in a privileged position, insulating it from
the planning laws with which other land-uses must comply, is justified on the basis of
providing ‘resource security’ and incentives to investment.120 It is argued that forestry
rights will be of little commercial value without a guarantee that future harvesting will be
unrestricted by planning laws.121 Whilst NSW also has specialised timber harvest
guarantee laws, in the form of the Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999, the difference is
that the Tasmanian law applies to all PNF and not just plantation activity.
Part of the reason for the controversy over PTRs relates to the disparity between the
extremely limited rights of objection of the public to PTR declarations, and the very
generous appeal and compensation provisions available to landholder applicants relating
to PNF (see below, p. 34). A landholder can claim compensation where the Board
refuses to declare a PTR122 and that refusal has been appealed unsuccessfully to the FP
Tribunal.123 Between 1985 and April 2002, there were five applications for compensation
regarding refusal to register a PTR. No compensation claims had been paid.124 Until
corrective amendments were made to the FP Act in 2002, compensation payments could
be made but there was no mechanism in place to secure the protection of the values
which had been the reason for the refusal of PTR status. There was no obligation on the
owner to protect these environmental values for which s/he had been paid
compensation.125
Only very limited objections may be made by the public to the declaration of land as a
PTR. Standing to object is significantly restricted to ‘prescribed persons’ which include
Gee, D., Stratford, E. (2001) above n 10 ; Interview, Mr. Kim Booth, Deputy Mayor, Meander Valley Council,
29.9.98, by telephone.
120 In NSW, the Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999 provides a similar regime to insulate accredited timber plantations
from the operation of a number of environmental and planning laws.
121 Taylor, P. (1997) Legislative Approaches to Supporting Private Forest Development in Tasmania, Private Forests Tasmania,
unpub., 4pp., at p.1. Given that local planning schemes are open to revision, if PNF were exposed to variation in
compliance obligations then the investment may be placed at risk, by being either devalued by limitations on
harvest. Similar thinking is applied by the NSW Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999.
122 FP Act, s.8(2).
123 FP Act, s.16(1).
124 Advice from Chief Forest Practices Officer, Mr. Graham Wilkinson. One matter concerning protection of karst
cave systems from the effects of logging involved negotiations between Government and property owner, resulting
in purchase. The Hon. Mr. Lennon MHA, Minister for Infrastructure, Energy & Resources, 24 April 2002, 2nd
Reading Speech, on the Forest Practices Amendment (Conservation Covenants) Bill 2002, subsequently enacted;
Hansard, <www.tasparliament.gov.au>.
125 The amendments mean that a landowner must enter into a conservation covenant in order to obtain compensation.
In fact, the defect went further, as it was theoretically possible for a landowner to obtain compensation for refusal
of a PTR to then sell the property, and the next owner to go through the same process, also applying for PTR status
and claiming compensation in the event of a refusal. Mr. Lennon MHA, 2nd Reading Speech, 24 April 2002, Forest
Practices Amendment (Conservation Covenants) Bill 2002, subsequently enacted.
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local government, a State authority, persons with a legal or equitable interest in the land
in question or the timber growing on it, and neighbouring landowners within 100m of
the boundary of the proposed PTR.126 In other words, although recent amendments
improved the Act permitting limited objections by neighbours, broad third-party
objections are not allowed by the legislation. This stands in contrast to the broad appeal
rights applying if the land remains under the jurisdiction of the local planning scheme
and LUPAA.
Discontent on the part of some local governments over the effects of the PTR regime
led to a series of legal challenges.127 Declaration of one particular PTR was unsuccessfully
challenged by the Meander Council in the FP Tribunal. This was successfully appealed to
the Supreme Court in 1998 in R v Pitt, McCutchan ex parte Meander Valley Council, a
decision that temporarily cast doubt upon the insulation of PTRs from local planning
schemes.128 The case revolved around the FP Act, s. 8(2)(d) which provides:
8. Grant or refusal of application for declaration of land as private timber reserve…
...(2) An application for a declaration of land as a private timber reserve shall be refused if the
Board is satisfied that ...(d) by virtue of the operation of any Act, the owner of the land is prohibited from establishing
forests, or growing or harvesting timber, on the land.

In overturning the decision of the FP Tribunal, Justice Crawford held that:
It seems clear to me that the Tribunal was in error and failed to understand, even under the first
planning scheme...that the use of this land for the purposes of forestry was prohibited by the Land
Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, unless and until the council gave permission for it to be used
for that purpose.129

Crawford J. concluded that Private Forests Tasmania had no jurisdiction to declare the
land in question a PTR, as at the time of the declaration, the use of the land for that
purpose was prohibited by the local planning scheme.130
Following the Supreme Court decision, proposals were presented for legislation to
override the decision, reinstating the conventional understanding of the legal position of
PTRs.131 This legislation was enacted, inserting new provisions into the FP Act stating
FP Act, s.7(1),(4).
Graham, A. (1997b) “Private Timber Reserves: Councils Fight Back”, 254 The Tasmanian Conservationist July, at 13.
128 R v Pitt, McCutchan ex parte Meander Valley Council, Supreme Court of Tasmania, 16 March 1998; Environmental
Defender’s Office (Tasmania) (1998) “Council Planning Schemes are Relevant When it Comes to Forestry !”, EDO
Newsletter, June, p.1.
129 Local Government Association of Tasmania (1998) “Private Timber Reserves”, Enviro Update, May, at p.10.
130 R v Pitt, McCutchan & Swan ex parte Meander Valley Council, Supreme Court of Tasmania, 16 March 1998, transcript of
reasons for judgement (delivered orally).
131 Pers. comm., Kim Booth, Deputy Mayor, Meander Valley Council, 29.9.98; Pers.comm., Evan Boardman, Local
Government Association of Tasmania, 22.9.98.
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that a planning permit requirement in a local planning scheme is not be taken as a
prohibition of forestry.132
Another challenge was made to the validity of PTRs on the basis that the Board’s
delegations to Private Forests Tasmania to make declarations of PTRs were legally
defective. This litigation was forestalled by the government issuing fresh delegations and
by retrospectively validating the declarations of PTRs that may have been defective as a
result of improper delegation to PFT.133
Another aspect of the legislative framework for PTRs is that the FP Act enables
regulations to be made to prevent any specified legislation or provisions from applying to
PTRs.134 At present no such regulations are in force.135 A similar provision states that
regulations may be made so that in relation to PTRs, any specified legislation or
provisions are not to affect the operation of certified FPPs where that plan relates to a
PTR.136
The strength of the PTR provisions is illustrated by the fact that decisions of the
RMPAT which refuse consent for forestry operations, as in McDonald v Meander Valley
Council,137 or alter the terms of permission for it, can be overridden if the forest owner
later successfully makes an application for the declaration of a PTR.

THE ROLE OF PRIVATE FORESTS TASMANIA
A key part of the institutional apparatus involving PNF in Tasmania is Private Forests
Tasmania (PFT), a statutory authority created by the Private Forests Act 1994, responsible
to the Minister for Forests. Its statutory objectives include: “to facilitate and expand the
development of the private forest resource in Tasmania in a manner which is consistent
with sound forest land management practice…”138 One of its key functions is to process

See FP Act, s.8(2A); Forest Practices Amendment (Private Timber Reserves) Act 1998; Land Use Planning and Approvals
Amendment (Private Timber Reserves) Act 1998; Forest Practices Board (1999) Annual Report 1998-99, p.15.
133 Forest Practices (Private Timber Reserves Validation) Act 1999; Forest Practices Board (1999) Annual Report 1998-99, p.16.
134 FP Act, s.12(2).
135 Forest Practices Regulations 1997 (as amended 1999, 2001), checked 17.10.03, at <www.thelaw.tas.gov.au>.
136 FP Act, s.26.
137 McDonald v Meander Valley Council [2000] TASRMPAT 124.
138 Private Forests Act 1994, s.5, Schedule 1; Private Forests Tasmania (1996) Annual Report 1995-6, p.5.
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applications for PTRs under the Forest Practices Act pursuant to a delegation from the FP
Board.139
There is a substantial level of disputation between PFT and a coalition of local councils,
environmental groups and local residents over the further declaration of PTRs. An
element of the Strategic Plan of PFT is to actively encourage applications for PTRs.140
A second, important, role of PF Tasmania is in providing regulatory services to the
under-resourced small-operator sector of the PNF industry. In order to facilitate
compliance with the Code by PNF operations of smaller landowners, PFT employs
forest practices officers (FPOs). Given that PFT has a statutory obligation to encourage
the development of the PNF industry, including providing financial assistance, the
potential exists for FPOs employed by PFT to feel pressure to enforce the Code less
than rigorously.141

Forestry Rights Registration Act 1990
The Forestry Rights Registration Act 1990 (‘FRRA’) is another important aspect of the law
applying to PNF in Tasmania. It provides for the registration142 of “forestry rights”
granted by land owners to other persons.143 Such forestry rights include ownership of
trees and/or rights to establish, maintain and harvest trees, as well as carbon
sequestration rights (since amendments in 2002).144
Forestry rights are deemed to be profits à prendre, in much the same way as they are
defined within NSW law.145 They do not confer a right to exclusive possession of the
land in question.146 The effect of the Act is to allow the legal separation of the land from

Private Forests Act 1994, s. 6(1)(c).
Private Forests Tasmania (1996) Annual Report 1995-6, p.7.
141 PFA, ss.26-30.
142 Registration under the Land Titles Act 1980 or the Registration of Deeds Act 1935.
143 Forestry Rights Registration Act 1990, s.3. See also Land Titles Act 1980, Registration of Deeds Act 1935.
144 Forestry Rights Registration Amendment Act 2002.
145 Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), s.87A, 88AB, 88EA; Real Property Act 1900, s.46,47 (for Torrens Title land). Butt, P.
(1996) Land Law, 3rd edition, Law Book Company, Sydney, at pp.461-2.
146 Forestry Rights Registration Act 1990, s.5(1).
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the timber growing on it.147 This measure is designed to encourage investment in private
forestry, because investors need not purchase land in order to conduct forestry.148
The FRRA creates another incentive for investment in PNF by enabling the attachment
of restrictive covenants to the title of private land to ensure its dedication to future
forestry production, preventing its diversion to other land uses.149 Thus the Act addresses
problems that arise from the long maturation time of forests where there is a high
probability of changes in ownership of land. Restrictive covenants protect the interests of
owners of profits à prendre against changes of management intention associated with the
sale of a property.

WATER POLLUTION LAW
The exposure of bare soil to the elements during logging, and the practice of postlogging burning, associated with intensive forestry operations, can cause non-pointsource pollution by increasing erosion and hence increasing the sediment load in watercourses.150 In NSW, water pollution from forestry on public lands is licensed under an
Integrated Forestry Operations Approval granted under the FNPE and POEO Acts.151
Tasmania does not have a separate system for pollution- control licensing. Instead, these
licensing functions are fulfilled by local government under the planning permission
system, which is integrated with the EMPCA.152 In other words, a planning permit has a
combined function, also constituting a pollution licence.153 Forestry within a PTR is not
subject to water-pollution controls under EMPCA, because local planning schemes
under LUPAA have no application. All private forestry (i.e. including within PTRs) is

In effect, this represents an implementation of recommendations made by the Industry Commission (1997) A Full
Repairing Lease: Draft Report of Inquiry into Ecologically Sustainable Land Management, Industry Commission, Belconnen,
ACT, pp. 132-133.
148 Taylor, P. (1997) above n 121 at p.1.
149 Farrier, D., Byron, N. (1992) above n 108 at 74-78.
150 Croke J., Hairsine, P., Fogarty, P. (1999) “Sediment Transport, Redistribution and Storage on Logged Forest
Hillslopes in South Eastern Australia” 13(17) Hydrological Processes 2705-2720.
151 See above, discussion of NSW law at p.Error! Bookmark not defined.. In the USA this pollution has been found
to require approvals under water pollution legislation. League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir.
2002), Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.3d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1974); See generally, Trustees for Alaska, 749
F.2d 549, 557-58 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979). See also:
Environmental Protection Information Centre (USA) (2003) “Federal Court Reigns In Logging Pollution: Water
Pollution from Logging Operations Will Require Federal Permits”, Media Release, October 15, 2003;
<http://wildcalifornia.org/html/pressreleases-list.shtml>.
152 The categorisation of activities as Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 represents a deliberate linking of the planning permit
requirements of LUPAA, and the pollution control approach of the EMPC. See also: Ramsay, R.; Rowe, G. (1995)
Environmental Law and Policy in Australia: Text and Materials, p.531.
153 Bingham, R. (1994) above n 55 at 287.
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subject to water pollution controls contained within the soil and water provisions of the
Forest Practices Code.
Non-PTR PNF operations may be Level 1 activities, depending on the local planning
scheme. Applications are made to the relevant local council and may subsequently be
‘called in’ by, or referred to, the Director of Environmental Management.154 The
pollution control responsibility in this instance is borne by local government which may
attach specific related conditions to planning permits.155 As forestry is not designated as a
Level 2 activity (in a schedule to the EMPCA), State Government is not considered
responsible to control pollution. Such control would only apply if the Board of EMPC
required conditions to be included on a planning permit issued by local government to
operate a Level 2 activity on a given parcel of land.
Another relevant consideration is the State Policy on Water Quality Management 1997, made
pursuant to the State Policies and Projects Act 1994. This policy is designed to “achieve the
sustainable management of Tasmania’s surface water and groundwater resources by
protecting or enhancing their qualities while allowing for sustainable development in
accordance with the objectives of the RMPS.”156 An objective is to apply the
precautionary principle to actions and outcomes sought under the policy.157 In relation to
non-point-source pollution from forestry operations, the policy simply suggests that
operations should be carried out in accordance with the FP Code, whilst having regard to
the policy.158 At this stage, forestry operations are not listed within the policy as a source
of diffuse water pollution. Therefore they cannot be dealt with as such.
In the Diddleum Plains case (2001), neighbouring landowners sought an injunction against
proposed logging for plantation establishment in the Resource Management and
Planning Tribunal to enforce the pollution-control provisions of the Environmental
Management and Pollution Control Act (EMPCA) against forestry operations, claiming that
logging and subsequent chemical usage would result in environmental harm in breach of

Ramsay, R.; Rowe, G. (1995) above n 152, p.531.
Macdonald, J. (1998) “Pollution Control and Hazardous Substances”, Title 14.6 in Fowler, R. and Bates, G. (eds.)
Title 14, “Environmental Law”, The Laws of Australia, loose-leaf service, Law Book Company, Sydney, at par 38.
156 State Policy on Water Quality Management 1997, Cl.5.1.
157 State Policy on Water Quality Management 1997, above n 156, cl.6.1(e).
158 State Policy on Water Quality Management 1997, above n 156, cl.34.1
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the Act.159 However, the application was withdrawn because of an undertaking by
Forestry Tasmania that logging would not continue on the subject land. This line of
argument was considered in greater detail in Dudley.160
The Code makes indirect provision for the mitigation of water pollution by providing
some protection for streamside vegetation. The ‘vulnerable land’ classification under the
Forest Practices Regulation requires the preparation of FPPs for small-scale logging that
would normally be exempt, where land is within 40 metres of a watercourse, 2km
upstream of a water supply intake, or upon a slope greater than 26 degrees (i.e.48.8 per
cent slope). Some other water-pollution provisions under other legislation appear to
apply to PNF but appear not to been implemented in practice.161

Regulation of use of chemicals
Another controversial issue associated with Tasmanian PNF, especially where native
forests are to be replaced by plantations, is the use of herbicides (such as atrazine and
simazine), and poisons to control mammal predation of seedlings such as ‘1080’ (sodium
monofluoroacetate).162 In Tasmania, control of the use of chemicals is achieved first by
registration and approval processes under the ‘Agvet Code’ of Tasmania, and second by
placing conditions and controls on use under the Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals
(Control of Use) Act 1996 (Tas).163 In addition, the State Policy on Water Quality Management
1997 made under the SPP Act states that use of chemicals along stream banks for control
of pests (including weeds) should where practical be replaced with non-chemical means.
Further, where chemical agents are to be used, they must be registered or approved
under the Agvet Code of Tasmania and applied in accordance with the Agvet Chemicals
Act.

Therefore the case is not reported at the RMPAT website or at <www.austlii.edu.au>. Instead, see: EDO
Tasmania (2001) “Case Summary- Forestry- Diddleum Plains”, EDO Newsletter, March 2001. Internet accessed
18.7.02 at <www.tased.edu.au/tasonline/edo/newsletter/march2001/.html>.
160 Dudley v Break O’Day Council, above n 94.
161 EMPCA, s.53 offence of creating an environmental nuisance; restrictions on water pollution in Inland Fisheries Act
1995 s.126(1),(3). Note also Code of Practice for Aerial Spraying and Draft Code of Practice for Ground Spraying applying to
application of pesticides.
162 Tasmania is the only state in which 1080 baiting of native species is permitted by law. See: Supreme Court appeal by
Gunns against RMPAT ruling requiring them to pay $4000 to an organic farmer to enable erection of a fence to
prevent entry of poisoned mammals: Gunns Ltd v Kingborough Council and Stuart Young [2003] TASSC 44 (26 June
2003).
163 State Policy on Water Quality Management 1997 (Tas), Cl. 44.2.
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Neither the FP Act or Code contain detailed restrictions on the use of specific chemicals
with the capacity to kill aquatic life, such as atrazine, within plantations and regrowth
forests, other than to suggest that aerial spraying should not be conducted where there is
a risk of spray-drift into streamside reserves and to state that responsible persons are to
ensure that chemicals do not enter waterbodies.164 The limitations inherent in the
statutory framework for the protection of water supplies from pollution, either by
siltation or by the application of chemicals, has encouraged some landowners adjacent to
PTRs and other forestry operations on private land, particularly those running organic
farming operations concerned about loss of their organic certification status, to seek legal
advice about the application of common law remedies such as nuisance.165 Some recent
litigation has sought to restrict the declaration of PTRs partly on the basis that the
organic certification of nearby farms would be affected.166

THREATENED SPECIES LAW
The Threatened Species Protection Act 1995 (TSPA) has the capacity to place a number of
environmental protection obligations on private forest owners. Its objectives include
ensuring that the “genetic diversity of native flora and fauna is maintained”.167 To this
end, it provides numerous mechanisms including:
•

listing of threatened flora and fauna as either endangered, vulnerable or rare;168

•

land management plans and agreements;169

•

stop-work orders in the form of Interim Protection Orders (IPOs) applying to
private land to protect any listed threatened species; 170 and

•

a fund for payment of compensation to landholders adversely affected by IPOs
or land-management agreements.171

FP Code (2000), pp.89-90. Interestingly, despite the existence of provisions for streamside reserves, the Code
suggests a number of methods for targeted application of chemicals “next to watercourses”. (p.89)
165 Interview, Ms Susan Gunter, Principal Solicitor, Environment Defender’s Office (Tasmania), Hobart, 6.11.98; Van
Son v Forestry Commission NSW (1995) 86 LGERA 108 (a successful claim for nuisance against the Commission for
pollution of a domestic water supply by siltation).
166 Gunns Ltd v Kingborough Council (2003) RMPAT, 17 March, File No:244/02P; J54/2003.
167 Threatened Species Protection Act 1995 (‘TSPA’), Schedule 1, Part 2.
168 TSPA, Part 3, Div 2. Schedules 3,4,5 contain the lists.
169 TSPA, Part 3, Div 7.
170 TSPA, Part 4.
171 TSPA, s.44, 45(13).
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The TSPA is one of three Tasmanian laws addressing biodiversity protection in forestry.
It exists alongside sections of the FP Code addressing threatened species, and the
conservation covenant provisions of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1970 (NPWA ).
It is an offence under the TSPA for a person to knowingly, without a permit take, keep,
trade in or process any specimen of a listed taxon of flora or fauna.172 "Take" is defined
to include “kill, injure, catch, damage, destroy and collect”.173 In the past, until certain
legislative amendments, this definition would appear to have included incidental habitatmodification as a form of taking.174 In order to comply with this requirement, where an
FPP acknowledged the existence of threatened species, an application for a permit
should have been made to the Director of Parks and Wildlife.175 However, no forestry
operators ever applied for a permit, and the PWS failed to take action to ensure that
permits were required.176 In any case, following the threat of legal challenge by the
Tasmanian Conservation Trust (TCT) in 2001 to enforce this aspect of the law,177 the
definition of “take” was amended to permit takings of listed threatened species without a
permit by persons acting in accordance with a certified FPP, in effect a specialised exemption
from permit requirements for forestry.178

However, it remains possible that where

persons are prosecuted for breaches of the FP Act of logging in breach of a certified
FPP, or without a plan, they could also be prosecuted for breach of the TSPA, s.51.

The Forest Practices Code and biodiversity conservation
The Forest Practices Code operates in conjunction with the TSPA. Under the Forest
Practices Regulations, land inhabited by threatened species is classified as vulnerable land,
and as a result exemptions from requirements to prepare forestry plans for small-scale

TSPA, s.51.
TSPA, s.3(1) TSPA.
174 TSPA, s.51, as amended by Threatened Species Protection Amendment Act 2001, introducing s.51(3) which provides that
“A person acting in accordance with a certified forest practices plan or a public authority management agreement
may take, without a permit, a specimen of a listed taxon of flora or fauna, unless the Secretary, by notice in writing,
requires the person to obtain a permit.”
175 Permits may be granted by the Director of Parks and Wildlife under s.35 NPW Act, also regulations for permits to
take may be made under s.61(2)(a) TSPA.
176 Interview, Naomi Lawrence, Threatened Species Botanist, Parks and Wildlife Service, Hobart, 6.11.98, in person, at
PWS Offices.
177 McGlone, P. (2002) “Amendments to the Tasmanian Threatened Species Protection Act”, 280 The Tasmanian
Conservationist
(newsletter of Tasmanian Conservation Trust), February, p.6. Reproduced at
<www.tct./org.au/n19g.htm>.
178 TSPA, s.51(3). This amendment was introduced in November 2001; Threatened Species Protection Amendment Act 2001,
November 2001. The exemption can be revoked by the Director notifying a person in writing of an obligation to
obtain a permit: s.51(3).
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production are not available.179 Where threatened species are present, requirements of the
Code creating particular obligations in the course of preparation and execution of FPPs
come into play. 180
The Code provides two main strategies: the application of logging-management
prescriptions, and reservation of particularly sensitive areas. The Code contains a general
requirement that threatened species be taken into account in the process of devising
FPPs.181 FPOs are required to check the Forest Botany Manuals, the Threatened Fauna
Manual for Production Forests (and its 1:25,000 scale maps), and the Threatened Fauna Adviser
(a computer database) to discern whether threatened species or inadequately reserved
plant communities occur or are likely to occur in the area to be logged.182 This involves a
requirement to assess the area to determine the potential habitat for rare or threatened
species.183 Where a threatened species is present, the FPO must notify the appropriate
specialist within the FP Board (“notification”), and obtain an endorsed management
prescription for the area and incorporate it into the FPP. Upon notification, the Chief
FPO (in practice, delegated FPB botanists and zoologists), must liaise with the Parks and
Wildlife Service within DPIWE to determine appropriate management conditions.184 The
staff of the Threatened Species Unit within DPIWE have an opportunity to influence
forest practices, as the Code provides that threatened species and communities will be
managed according to procedures agreed between the FP Board and DPIWE.185 The FP
Board can amend FPPs lodged for certification by inserting conditions and restrictions to
be complied with during logging.186 It is a function of the Board to “oversee standards
for forest practices plans”.187
It is now necessary to discuss issues of implementation and effectiveness of threatened
species provisions. An initial problem is that measures for habitat protection are largely
discretionary. For example, rather than specifying particular exclusion zones, the Code
Forest Practices Regulations 1997, r.3(f), 5, provide that an approved FPP is still required for low volume timber
harvesting operations (“less than 100 tonnes for each property for each year”) or for firewood logging, when the
land is classed as ‘vulnerable land’. This category includes land that “is inhabited by threatened species within the
meaning of the TSPA 1995”.
180 Munks, S.; Taylor, R. (1997) “Conserving Threatened Fauna in Production Forests: The Tasmanian Process”,
Forest Practices Board, 13pp.
181 Munks, S.; Taylor, R. (1997) above n 180.
182 Forest Practices Code (2000), p.64.
183 Forest Practices Code (2000) above n 182, p.61.
184 Duncan, F. (1998) “Rare and threatened species- the role of Forest Practices Officers”, 1(1) Forest Practices News 6;
Forest Practices Code (2000), p.64.
185 Forest Practices Code (2000), p.64.
186 FP Act, s.19(1)(c).
187 FP Act, s.4C(e).
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tends to make general recommendations, as for example: “[d]isturbance to native
vegetation in localised environments (such as rocky knolls, swamps, heaths, and stream
banks) should be avoided or minimised.”188
Pre-logging site-specific surveying is not mandatory. Rather, ‘desktop surveys’ are
acceptable. In the Dudley case, it was admitted that the FPB’s site survey took place (in
addition to the FPO’s own survey) only because of the pressure of litigation.189 It is more
than possible, in fact likely, that the data contained in the manual is incomplete,
particularly for private land. The lack of a requirement for pre-logging surveys
compounds this problem. However in some instances, site-specific surveys are
conducted by FPB specialists, if they are called out to a particular operation by a FPO.
What happens to FPPs for PNF that have become subject to the notification of FPB
threatened species specialists? Recent experience is that approximately 10-20 per cent of
PNF operations for which an FPP has been certified are subject to a site survey from
FPB botanical or zoological specialists.190 Even though there may be a large number of
requests for advice, only a small proportion of these operations actually become subject
to specialised prescriptions from FPB staff. In 1998-99, only 23.4 per cent of the total
PNF operations had specialised prescriptions designed by the FP Board zoologists.191
Whether or not as a matter of law the FPB and FPOs are bound by the precautionary
principle when designing and conducting the forestry operations on non-PTR land, it
appears that many participants in the FP System do not consider themselves bound to
take a precautionary approach to the design of environmental prescriptions.192 Even
where prescriptions have been recommended by the Forest Practices Board’s specialists,
some of these may not be adequate, as there has been little long-term scientific research

Forest Practices Code (2000), p.60.
Hall (2001) above n 95.
190 Appendix 11.3 gives detailed information in relation to the proportion of PNF operations that have been subject to
site surveying by FPB specialists.
191 There were 88 recommendations made for prescriptions relating to private land in 1998-99, applying to selected
THPs from a total of 376 THPs approved for PNF in 98/99. Forest Practices Board (1999) Annual Report 1998-99,
Forest Practices Board, Hobart, Tasmania p.17, 38.
192 Wilkinson, G. (1999) above n 3 at p. 9-10, argues that given the lack of research regarding the efficacy of
prescriptions for protection of class 4 streams, the adoption of a precautionary approach would “have an
overwhelming effect on the viability of forestry operations over much of the State.”
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into the efficacy of prescriptions.193 There is no statutory requirement that the
prescriptions applied must be up-to-date at the time an FPP is carried out.194
Some PNF operations, particularly those conducted by the larger corporations, have
been modified in order to protect threatened species. According to a Private Forests
Tasmania FPO, the picture for larger operators is as follows:
Large forest owners, such as North Forest Products (NFP), have an approach to land
management that is equivalent to the system adopted on Crown forests. The NFP Surrey Hills
area in the North West has been planned to meet the requirements of the Forest Practices Code
and has provisions for the protection of an endangered butterfly, trout spawning streams and
various historic and archaeology sites.195

In 1999 the majority of operations had generalised management prescriptions imposed
(80.7 per cent), or no prescriptions (17.0 per cent), with only 2.27 per cent subject to a
combination of prescriptions and exclusions.196 A tiny minority have part or total
exclusions in the coupe imposed, according to the data available from FPB Annual
Reports.197 No coupes were subject to total exclusion.198
The option of applying special prescriptions for threatened species protection is “rarely
available” when logging is followed by clearing for plantation or agriculture, according to
a Forest Practices Board botanist.199 In 2000-01 this was the case for more than a quarter
of PNF operations, and a year earlier involved more than one-third of PNF.200 (Even
though situations involving outright vegetation clearance are now covered by the Code
Gibbons, P. & Lindenmayer, D. (1997) “A Review of Prescriptions Employed for Conservation of Hollow
Dependent Fauna in Wood Production Forests of Eastern Australia”, in P Hale & D Lamb (eds.), Conservation
Outside Nature Reserves (Brisbane: Centre for Conservation Biology, University of Queensland, pp 497-505. Gibbons
(1999) found that in NSW the Code applied by State forests was not adequate, so that hollow bearing trees retained
were six times less numerous than the rate at which they were being inhabited by hollow dependent fauna: Gibbons,
PhD Thesis, ANU, unpub.
194 In instances where some months elapse between the approval of the Plan and its execution, there are quite
frequently improvements on what is often an inadequate scientific understanding of many species. This was a
serious problem in relation to design of prescriptions for logging of the habitat of the Mt Arthur burrowing crayfish.
See Putt, P. Tasmanian Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, on the Threatened Species Protection Amendment Bill, 20
November 2001.
195 Taylor, Peter (1998) Overview Of Commonwealth And Tasmanian Government Involvement In Private Forestry Over The Last
Twelve Years, Private Forests Tasmania, unpublished, March, at 10.
196 In 1997-8, 78% of FPPs for private land operations subject to the notification of FPB specialists were modified to
include management prescriptions for threatened species protection (In 1998-99, 80%). However, in only 3% of
cases was logging excluded from all or part of a logging coupe on the basis of threatened species issues. Tasmanian
Forest Practices Board (1998) Annual Report 1997-8, Forest Practices Board, Hobart, Tasmania.
197 The FPB’s 2002 Annual Report does not provide similar information on the extent of application of threatened
species management prescriptions.
198 Forest Practices Board (1999) Annual Report 1998-99, Forest Practices Board, Hobart, Tasmania p.38. The approach
taken in 1999-2000 and Year 2000-2001 are not specified in these subsequent Annual Reports.
199 Duncan, F. (1998) “Rare and threatened species- the role of Forest Practices Officers”, 1(1) Forest Practices News 6.
200 The statistics regarding conversion to plantation (26.7%) are for 2000-1, calculated from Forest Practices Board
(2001) Annual Report 2000-2001, p.13. In 1999-2000, the rate of conversion to plantation or agriculture on private
land was 36.0%, Forest Practices Board (2000) Annual Report 1999-2000, p.14.
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since amendments in 2001 (see below, p.40 ), the question of the application of
prescriptions in the event of plantation establishment is a separate question to that of
whether the Code is applicable.)

Duty of care and compensation issues
Compensation provisions apply to private land in relation to threatened species where
requirements for fauna and flora protection exceed the “duty of care” provisions of the
Code. The duty of care of a landowner under the Code is defined as “the fundamental
contribution of the landowner to the conservation of natural and cultural values that are
deemed to be significant under the forest practices system.”201 The scope of the duty of
care of a landowner has two aspects. The first is reservation of soil and water values to
the standard required by the Code. The second is conservation of other special values
(such as threatened species) at a level equivalent to 5% of the gross area of the property
totally excluded from logging operations, or up to 10% of the property where partial
harvesting of the reserve area is compatible with the protection of values.202 Achieving
further conservation levels above these thresholds is achieved voluntarily or through
compensation mechanisms.203

The selection of the 5% threshold appears to be

politically- rather than scientifically-based.
Where proposed forestry operations in an FPP are modified for the purpose of
threatened species protection, the FP Act and Code operate in conjunction with the
National Parks and Wildlife Act 1970 (NPWA ) to create a regime for the payment of
compensation to an “affected owner” of land.204 The NPWA provides in Part V(A) for
the payment of compensation upon entry into a conservation covenant with the Minister,
in circumstances where certification of an FPP has been refused, or has been approved
with amendments for the purpose of protecting a rare or endangered species of flora or
fauna.205 A landowner who has applied to the FP Board for certification of an FPP,
Forest Practices Code Tasmania (2000) at p.52.
Forest Practices Code Tasmania (2000) above n 201 at 52.
203 Forest Practices Code Tasmania (2000) above n 201 at 52.
204 Forest Practices Amendment (Conservation Covenants) Act 2002, and the National Parks and Wildlife Amendment (Conservation
Covenants) Act 2002. Earlier provisions from Public Land (Administration and Forests Act) 1991, s.118 inserting s.37A37L into National Parks and Wildlife Act 1970; discussed in Bates, G. (1995) Environmental Law in Australia, 4th edition,
at 221. Two other mechanisms contained in the TSPA, may generate an obligation to pay compensation where these
directly cause economic loss: interim protection orders, TSPA, s. 45(1), and land management agreements with
private landholders: TSPA, 30(2)(b), 45(1), but these appear not to have been relevant to forestry.
205 NPWA , s. 37A under definition of “affected owner”.
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termed an “affected owner”206, who has been affected by amendments to that FPP, is
entitled to apply to the relevant Minister for compensation for subsequent related
financial losses.207 A landowner in these circumstances is also an “affected owner” if
their FPP has been refused wholly or partially on the ground that it would threaten a rare
or endangered species of flora or fauna, and where an appeal to the FP Tribunal has
been wholly or partially dismissed. In such cases, where the Minister considers it
necessary or desirable for a conservation purpose, s/he has the power to enter into a
conservation covenant with an affected owner who has applied for compensation.208
Such a covenant may contain requirements for a management plan or the imposition of
management conditions upon the land.209 The covenant is registered against the title of
the property by the Recorder210 and runs with the land.211 The amount of compensation
payable is determined by a Conservation Compensation Committee, and if in dispute,
can be subjected to arbitration.212 This committee is empowered to take into account the
value of timber on the land, “any government restrictions relating to threatened species
of flora and fauna” including restrictions under the Code, and “the likely impact of a
conservation covenant”.213 Covenants are enforceable in the sense that it is an offence
not to comply with a covenant,214 and that relevant Crown employees have a statutory
power of entry and inspection.215
There are a number of limitations to the compensation provisions, as observed by the
Public Land Use Commission: “The idea of compensation is entirely consistent with the
principles of the ESFM but provision for compensation can, in theory, lead to harvesting
or clearing of habitat if the minister responsible for the National Parks and Wildlife Act
1970 refuses or fails to pay compensation.”216
Mention of the compensation provisions is perhaps an abstract discussion, with Parks
and Wildlife staff stating that no compensation had been paid for amended FPPs under
NPWA , s.37A.
NPWA , s.37C.
208 NPWA , S.37B(1). This raises the question of whether forestry can proceed if the Minister does not offer
compensation and a covenant.
209 NPWA s.37B(2)(a).
210 NPWA , s.37H.
211 NPWA , s.37G(1)(a).
212 NPWA , s.37D.
213 NPWA , s.37D(2)(c)(i),(v),(vii).
214 NPWA , s.37K.
215 NPWA , s.37J.
216 Tasmania: Public Land Use Commission (1997) Tasmania-Commonwealth Regional Forest Agreement : Assessment of
Ecologically Sustainable Forest Management Systems and Processes Independent Expert Advisory Group (Final Report): Background
Report Part G, p.20
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these provisions.217 This is because although the compensation provision is in place,
funds have not been budgeted to pay compensation; therefore the PWS appears to date
to have not recommended actions that would generate a compensation liability.218

Protection of rare forest types
Tasmanian forestry legislation itself gives no explicit protection to rare, vulnerable and
endangered vegetation communities, or old-growth forests - although some protection is
provided by the TSPA, by listing individual threatened species but not ecological
communities. The Forest Practices Code refers to these issues but does not set out specific
requirements for their protection, merely making advisory recommendations.219 It does
however set out a requirement that the site be assessed to determine which plant
communities are present and whether threatened plant species occur or are likely to
occur.220 If an FPB botanist is contacted for advice about threatened plant species, they
may refer particular parcels of forested land to the Private Forests Reserve Program
(‘PFRP’) for evaluation. Eight per cent of notifications were referred to the program for
further investigation in 2002.221
The FPP making-and-approval process takes account only of these priority-vegetation
communities on an informal basis, as there is no statutory requirement to avoid logging
of these communities. The issue is managed informally through the process of FPOs
making notifications for advice to Forest Practices Board specialists.
Issues of rare forest-types were taken up within the Tasmanian RFA, as special provision
was made for the establishment of a “Program to Protect CAR Values on Private
Land”.222 Thirty million dollars was allocated by the Commonwealth to this private forest
conservation program.223 The objective is to give “priority attention… to protecting rare,
vulnerable and endangered vegetation communities, rare and depleted old growth forests
Interview, Naomi Lawrence, Threatened Species Botanist, Parks and Wildlife Service, Hobart, 6.11.98, in person, at
PWS Offices; Tasmanian Public Land Use Commission (1996) above n 1 at 3.
218 This interpretation was confirmed in an interview with Interview, Naomi Lawrence, PWS Botanist, Hobart, 6.11.98,
in person, at PWS Offices.
219 The Code suggests the general principle that “As far as practicable, areas of retained vegetation (including wildlife
habitat strips) should include localised features associated with: threatened species; species with disjunct or unusual
distributions; sites with high species diversity; inadequately reserved communities; forests that have oldgrowth
characteristics.” (at p.59).
220 FP Code, p.60.
221 FPB (2000) Annual Report 2001-2002, p.33.
222 Commonwealth of Australia & Tasmania (1997) Tasmania-Commonwealth Regional Forest Agreement, 8 November 1997,
Attachment 8.
223 Commonwealth of Australia & Tasmania (1997) above n 222 at 33.
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and… Priority Species” as well as protecting National Estate values on Private Land.224 A
crucial point about the program is that participation was declared to be voluntary. The
RFA states that “no non-voluntary instruments will be used to achieve protection of
CAR values on Private Land without proper compensation being paid.”225
It is questionable whether incentives and a deliberately non-regulatory approach are
enough to achieve conservation of these crucial private forest remnants. Even if
approached, some landholders will not enter into management or acquisition
arrangements, according to the Tasmanian experience with the PFRP. For the 484
properties where the PFRP was interested in securing an agreement, and where
negotiations had been completed or concluded at September 2003, only 31.0 per cent
were successfully secured, whilst 69 per cent of negotiations failed (47.7 per cent of
owners were not interested, and in another 21.3 per cent of cases negotiations could not
be secured because either the price or timing was not sufficiently attractive to the
owner).226

EVALUATION OF TASMANIAN FORESTRY LAW
There are two main schools of thought about the adequacy of the framework for
regulating PNF in Tasmania. One is that the Code provides an adequate level of
environmental protection, and that a separate process of EIA is not necessary.227 The
other questions the degree to which the Tasmanian PNF sector is insulated from
planning controls under the RMPS, and its statutory sustainable development
objectives.228

It is argued that the Code, even where fully adhered to, provides

insufficient protection for environmental values for a number of reasons, essentially
because it is a forestry code and not an environmental protection code.

Commonwealth of Australia & Tasmania (1997) above n 222 at 92.
Commonwealth of Australia & Tasmania (1997) above n 222 at 91.
226 From information contained in Department of Primary Industries Water and Environment Tasmania (2003) Private
Forest Reserves Program: Progress: September 2003, Internet URL<www.pfrp.tas.gov.au/progress/index.html>.
Appendix 11.2 contains a copy of this information for September 2003.
227 Interview, Mr. Graham Wilkinson, Chief FPO, Forest Practices Board, 6.11.98, at FPB, Hobart; Rolley, E. (1993)
above n 113; Pers.comm., Mr. Stuart Kaye, Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania, 8.10.98; Tasmania:
Public Land Use Commission (1997) above n 216, p.19.
228 Hall, S. (Environmental Defender’s Office Tas. Inc.) (2002) “The Role of the Community in Environmental
Regulation”, Environment Institute of Australia Conference: Future Directions for Environmental Regulation, 31 May, Hobart, at
<www.tased.edu.au/tasonline/edo/eia.html>, accessed 18.7.02. The Conference issued a resolution containing a
suggested law reform program to address these defects of the FP System, and it is reproduced at Appendix 11.4.
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Although the Code has been subjected to a number of revisions,229 conservation interests
have drawn attention to what they see as certain uncorrected defects .230 The Code places
insufficient emphasis on ensuring ESFM as it does not meet the Montreal Process
requirement for statutory provision for conservation of special values because provisions
are not aimed at the objective: “maintain or increase the full suite of forest values”. Many
of the provisions aimed at environmental protection are merely guidelines or
recommendations (expressed as ‘should’) and are not mandatory or prescriptive (‘will’ or
‘must’).231 It permits the logging of old-growth forest and permanent removal of
rainforest, for example, in the course of plantation establishment.232 It has, for example,
not taken account of recent scientific literature that has questioned the efficacy of
Australian management prescriptions for the conservation of hollow-dependent fauna.233
Further, the Code permits environmentally-damaging practices such as clearfelling and
cable logging in all but the most extreme circumstances. It permits clearance of native
forest for plantation establishment. It permits the use of chemicals with few
restrictions.234 The Code has a legitimation purpose in that it enables industry to claim
that it is regulated under a world-class system, whilst the ecological impact may be
considerable.235

Permanent forest estate
Within many parts of Tasmania, native forests are being either cleared for plantations, or
in a lesser number of instances, cleared for agriculture or subdivision.236 This is seemingly
at odds with the goal expressed in the National Forest Policy Statement (NFPS) to
“maintain an extensive and permanent native forest estate in Australia”.237 However the
limits the NFPS set on clearing referred to public, not private land – e.g. “further clearing
of public native forests for non-forest use or plantation establishment will be avoided or
FP Act, s.32.
Hall, S. (2002) above n 228; Browne, Roland (2002) “Forestry Exemptions”, A paper presented to the 2002
Conference of the Environmental Defender’s Office (Tas) Inc., 6pp. at <www.tased.edu.au/tasonline/edo/browne.pdf>.
231 This point is acknowledged in the introduction to the Code. Forestry Commission Tasmania (1993) Forest Practices
Code, Introduction, Forestry Commission Tasmania, Hobart, at p.1.
232 See: photographs reproduced in Appendix 11.5 .
233 Gibbons, P. and Lindenmayer, D. (1997) above n 193 at 497-505.
234 Pers.comm. Tim Cadman, Native Forest Network, Deloraine, 8.10.98.
235 Forsyth describes Codes as “a legitimising tool for unaccountable forest management”: Forsyth, J. (1998) “Anarchy
in the Forests: A Plethora of Rules, and Absence of Enforceability”, 15(5) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 338349. This purpose was also suggested in relation to the British Columbia FP Code: Etkin, J. (1998) “Forest Code
Part of a Master Plan: BC's Forest Practices Code was a con from the beginning” 8(3) Watershed Sentinel, June/July,
<http://www.rfu.org/ws83.htm>, accessed 18.12.00.
236 Forest Practices Board (2002) Annual Report 2001-2002, p.14; Graham, A. (1997) “Land clearing in Tasmania”, 12
The Web, Threatened Species Network Tasmania, December at 5-6.
237 NFPS (1992) at 4.
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limited”.238 There is no Tasmanian legislative requirement to maintain perpetual forest
cover on private land.239 However there are now controls on tree clearing under the FP
Act,240 and the Board must now “monitor and report to the Minister on harvesting, the
clearing of trees and reafforestation activity in relation to the maintenance of a
permanent forest estate.”241

Clearing for plantations
In 2000-01, more than a quarter of PNF logging operations were followed by clearing for
plantation establishment or non-forest use. In the previous year, 36 per cent of PNF
operations involved this form of forest clearing and removal.242 These statistics were
confirmed by field observations in November 1998, and interviews with industry,
government and conservationists which revealed that in Tasmania plantations are often
established following the logging and clearing of native forests.243 Returns from sale of
timber from the pre-existing native forests are used to finance the subsequent plantation
establishment. It is often more economically-viable to establish plantations on the site of
native forest than on sites of cleared agricultural land. International literature suggests
that the Tasmanian approach is not unique.244

Clearing of streamside reserves and clearing for conversion to agriculture
Until recently, a loophole existed that enabled the logging and clearing of streamside
reserves retained under the Code upon completion of the main body of a forestry
operation if the owner was converting the land to agricultural use.245 However, as areas
NFPS (1992) at 21: “Whilst encouraging the retention of native forests, the Governments acknowledge that private
forest owners may wish to clear native forest for a range of economic uses. They agree that land clearing can be
permitted provided it complies with State and regional conservation and catchment management objectives, relevant
planning schemes and legislation.”
239 Tasmania: Public Land Use Commission (1997) above n 216, p.20
240 FP Act, s.17(4)(ba).
241 FP Act, s.4C (fa).
242 The statistics regarding conversion of native forest to plantation (26.7%) are for 2000-1, calculated from Forest
Practices Board (2001) Annual Report 2000-2001, p.13. In 1999-2000, the rate of conversion to plantation or
agriculture on private land was 36.0%, Forest Practices Board (2000) Annual Report 1999-2000, p.14.
243 Photographs reproduced in Appendix 11.5.
244 Carrere, R. (1999) Plantations Campaign : Ten Replies to Ten Lies: Briefing Paper, World Rainforest Movement,
Montevideo, Uruguay, at 13. See also Carrere, R. & Lohmann, L. (1996) Pulping the South: Industrial Tree Plantations and
the World Paper Economy, Zed Books, London.
245 The ESFM Expert Working Group’s RFA report stated : “[T]he lack of a mechanism for control of land clearing in
circumstances where the FP Act does not apply is of great concern. For example, streamside reserves protected as
part of a forest operation governed by a timber harvesting plan are sometimes destroyed after the plan has expired,
in order to facilitate agricultural production.” Tasmania: Public Land Use Commission (1997) above n 216, p.20;
Bates (1995) above n 204 at 221-2.
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reserved from harvesting under a previous FPP are now included within the definition of
vulnerable land, these areas are no longer potentially exempt from control and are now
regulated under the Code.246

Self-regulation in Tasmanian forest practices
It is a statutory objective of the forest practices system, expressed by the FP Act, that it
be self-funding and self-regulating.247 Yet it is a modified form of self-regulation, not
pure self-regulation.248 The sharing of various aspects of the regulatory task between the
private and public sectors is described in Table 5. The self-regulatory aspects are
integrated within a broader regulatory framework created by the FP Act requiring that
FPPs must be devised and certified before forestry may commence.

The rules addressing clearing of streamside reserves were improved by the Forest Practices Amendment Act 2001; see
Hansard, 1 November 2001 at pp.41-106.
247 FP Act, ss. 4B, 4E, 37B, Schedule 7(a) .
248 A senior industry representative argued that industry did not desire full-self regulation, and discounted it as risky
and unrealistic. Interview, Ian Whyte, Chief Executive, Forest Industries Association of Tasmania, Hobart, 12.11.98.
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Table 5 Analysis of Private and Public
Components of Tasmanian Forestry Regulation
Regulatory function

Private

Public

Rule -making

Industry input into revisions of
legislation
through
representation on FP Board.
Internal company manuals and
use of ISO 14000 EMS in large
company operations.

Legislation (Forest Practices Act
1985, and Code).

Communication of rules

Administration of rules

Via FPOs and literature
disseminated
by
Private
Forests Tasmania and the
Forest Practices Board.
Approval of FPPs by FPOs is FPB has a role in refusal,
defined as certification of variation and amendment of
plans.
FP Plans. (s.19(1), FP Act).

Approval of operations Certification function is often The FP Board can certify
(Certification of FPPs)
delegated to FPOs.
FPPs, but this function is often
delegated to FPOs.
Monitoring compliance
Self-monitoring.
When (1) Except where offences are
operations are complete, an alleged by public and others,
FPO must complete a FP Board has a compliance
certificate of compliance with role.
the FP Code.
(2) Annual random audit of
15% of FPPs by FP Board
under s.4, FP Act.
Enforcement
FPO must not certify Forest Practices Board and
compliance if operations did Chief FPO are to cause
not conform to the Forest complaints to be made (s.4G,
Practices Plan.
FP Act).
Adjudication on compliance FPO under delegation from Contravention of certified FPP
Forest Practices Board.
is a summary offence heard in
Magistrates Court (s.21(1), FP
Act)
Sanctions
Large company systems may Penalties
imposed
by
incorporate internal sanctions. Magistrates Court or by Forest
Practices Board (fines under
s.47B as an alternative to
prosecution).
Appeal function
FP Tribunal hears appeals re
granting or refusal of PTRs, re
Forest Practices Plans (i.e.
amendment,
refusal
or
variation), imposition of s.41
notices, and 3 year plans.
Evaluation and Review
Informal input into operation Forest Practices Board and
of FP System, statutory Committees.
guarantee of membership of
industry on Committees.

The self-regulatory aspect of the system is that companies and private forest owners are
entitled to employ or engage their own FPOs to devise and approve their FPPs. Larger
firms employ FPOs who are qualified to supervise and inspect forest operations on
behalf of the Board - in other words industry employs its own inspectors. Self-regulation
means that the company undertaking logging operations has usually engaged the services
of an FPO as an employee or consultant under contract. The system was summarised in
an interview with the Chief FPO as follows:
GRAHAM DAVIS (Reporter): A Gunns employee working on a Gunns coupe where Gunns
wants to log draws up the plan, certifies it and that's it?
GRAHAM WILKINSON (Chief FPO): That is the responsibility put on industry to operate
within the rules.249

Finally, the completion of FPPs is certified by FPOs engaged and employed by industry.
These supervisory roles are not carried out by government-employed inspectors, with the
exception of a small number of FPOs employed by the FP Board.
Industry-employed FPOs are placed in a difficult position of conflict between loyalty to
their employer, and loyalty to the integrity of the system involving an FPO’s
responsibility to certify an FPP and also to enforce compliance with the Code. Problems
will particularly arise in instances where it is necessary to report serious breaches of the
code, or to impose stringent prescriptions for threatened species protection. There is a
distinct possibility that such an officer could be ostracised or dismissed, or that the
contracts of a consultant FPO are not renewed in the event of insisting upon compliance
with the spirit of the code and adequate threatened species protection.250
According to a former FPO employed by the Board, only 3 of approximately 150 FPOs
throughout the State are truly independent, drawing wages from the State rather than a
company or from contracts. He stated, “The problem is that forest practices officers are
often faced with a conflict of interest, as virtually all of them work for the commercial
forest industry... Forest practices officers are not independent.”251 The FP Act provides

Comments of Mr. Graham Wilkinson, Chief FPO, FP Board to Channel 9 ‘Sunday’ Program, “Tasmanian Fire
Sale”, Reporter: Graham Davis, 09/02/2003, 9:00:00 AM. (Transcript).
250 Points raised by Putt, P., MHR, in Tasmanian Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, 20.11.01, debate on the Threatened
Species Amendment Bill 2001.
251 Manning, B. (2003) Transcript of Evidence given to Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee
Inquiry into Plantation Forestry, Wednesday, 8 October 2003, Canberra. (Mr. Bill Manning, former Forest Practices
Officer, Tasmanian Forest Practices Board, at p.503.
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that it is an offence for a person to lodge a Plan with the Board that is false or
misleading, however this is only a summary offence with a maximum penalty of $1000.252
As logging contractors are paid by the tonne, there is a disincentive for FPOs to limit the
earnings of these contractors by enforcing prescriptions that would reduce timber
volume extracted, particularly in instances where the prescription contains a requirement
that work must cease, e.g. in order to report the existence of a threatened species, such as
upon discovery of a wedge-tailed eagle’s nest. A key problem is that there is little
provision for independent inspection of compliance with FPPs, other than the annual
audit of 15 per cent of all FPPs that is performed by the FP Board. Under a selfregulatory system there may be significant disincentives for FPOs to enforce compliance
with the code.
Another difficulty is that recommendations of FP Botanists and other Board specialists
(e.g. zoologists, archaeologists) may not be taken up by the FPO devising the Plan. One
example was the FPP devised for the logging on private land, for plantation
establishment, at Reedy Marsh in Central Tasmania. In November 2002 Gunns Ltd
submitted a development application to the Meander Valley Council for operations on
that land, based on an FPP prepared by two employee FPOs.253 The Plan that was
subsequently certified by the same FPOs completely failed to mention the presence on
the site of stands of Eucalyptus ovata, E. viminalis and E. pauciflora in spite of written advice
from FPB botanists in a Special Values Flora Report which showed that most of the land
contained RFA priority-vegetation communities. According to the Chief FPO “there was
a major error. A plan was prepared and was lodged that was not a correct plan.”254

Forest Practices Act, s.45(1). One penalty unit is presently equal to $100. Section 38 of the Act governs the
appointment of forest practices officers. Section 39 provides that the appointment of an FPO may be revoked by
the Board on the grounds that an FPO has been negligent or not diligent in performing the duties of an FPO
(s.39(3)(a)), but does not provide any related capacity to fine FPOs other than through s.45(1). By comparison,
under NSW pollution control law, the penalty for knowingly providing false or misleading information to the EPA
is $120,000 for an individual and $250,000 for a corporation: Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW),
s.211.
253 Ricketts, A. (2003) “Permitted Use means open slather”, Forest Voice (publication of the Native Forest Network),
Spring, pp.8-9.
254 Comments of Mr. Graham Wilkinson, above n 249. According to Alistair Graham of the TCT, above n 249: “We
would describe [this] as the smoking gun we've been looking for, for a long time ... We've been hearing anecdotal
stories for years now that there is a systematic practice of failing to map forest types which are rare and endangered,
because it just complicates decision-making in the forest practices system.”
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Under-reporting of threatened species
As we have seen, the incentives to not report or to inadequately address threatened
species issues under a self-regulatory system are very powerful. The operation of the
Tasmanian system is premised upon the accuracy of the information presented in the
FPP by the FPO. However there are strong incentives for FPOs to under-report the
ecological richness or significance of the site in question.
This was illustrated in a recent planning-appeal decision Dudley v Break O’Day Council
(2001), which revealed an instance of serious failure by an FPO to identify vegetation of
significance within an FPP.255 In Dudley, the Resource Management and Planning Appeal
Tribunal partly allowed a third-party appeal against the grant of planning permission for a
PNF operation.256 The FPO concerned had granted his employer firm consent for PNF
to proceed. Despite recognising that the coupe fell within the known range of the rare
giant velvet worm and the endangered blind velvet worm,257 the FPO had not included
any prescriptions for their protection within the Forest Practices Plan.258 Further, the
FPO initially failed to carry out an adequate flora survey and did not detect a stand of
rare Eucalyptus Brookeriana which had conservation priority under the Tasmanian RFA.259
This case alerts one to the possibility of FPOs failing to report and map under-reserved
vegetation communities.260 In a separate incident, two FPOs were suspended by the FP
Board temporarily, it is understood, for wilful failure to map under-represented forest
types, on the basis that if endangered forest types were mapped the FPP would not have
been eligible for certification.261

Dudley v Break O’Day Council, above n 94.
Dudley v Break O’Day Council, above n 94.
257 Tasmanipatus barretti, rare, and Tasmanipatus anophthalmus, endangered.
258 Hall, S. (2001) above n 95.
259 In its judgment, the RMPAT varied the permit to exclude the habitat of the threatened Giant Velvet Worm and
restrict the proposed selective harvesting and plantation operations.
260 The annual audit does check for whether under-represented forest communities were allowed to be logged.
However this is done in a roundabout way: “If identified…, have the communities been protected?”, rather than
asking “Is an RFA priority vegetation community present on the site?”; FPP Audit Form in FPB (2002) Annual
Report 2001-2002, p.63, Question 94.
261 Forest Practices Board (2002) Annual Report 2001-2002, at <www.fpb.tas.gov.au>; Graham, A. (2003) “Endangered
Forest Types and Forestry Jobs: going, going…”, 286 The Tasmanian Conservationist, February, 5pp., at
<www.tct.org.au>, accessed 17.7.03.
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There is a need for regulation to incorporate a role for expert biodiversity agencies, so
that the conservation requirements of threatened species are taken into account.262
Otherwise persons with inadequate training, knowledge and resources will be assigned
the task of identifying, reporting and preserving threatened species when often it is not in
their economic interest to do so. In such circumstances, unless there is a countervailing
offer of a stewardship payment for landholders who conserve threatened species habitat,
self-regulation is virtually guaranteed to fail, at least from a biodiversity-preservation
perspective.
Another issue relates to deficiencies in the preparation of FPPs. One council reported
that an incident of illegal land-clearing arose because a plantation proposal straddled two
local government areas, and a declared PTR applied only to land within one LGA
because the FPP listed only one of the LGAs involved. As a result, clearing within the
other 200ha of the site was illegal. A Council committee reported that: “Council staff
have a concern that if this application is any guide, the concept of self-regulation within
the forestry industry is not performing sufficiently well. No less than 5 amendments to
the FPP have been made, there have been basic inaccuracies in the FPP relating to which
local government area is affected, which properties are within the forest coupe…”263
Nevertheless it is not suggested that the FP System in Tasmania is entirely problematic.
There are a number of indicators suggesting an intention to exert control over, or at least
to punish, inadequate forestry practices on private land. Firstly, a number of FPPs are
refused approval by the FP Board annually, and details of these refusals can be gleaned
from the occasional appeal against such refusal to the Forest Practices Tribunal.264

On this basis conservationists recommended that the responsibility for mapping rare forest types be transferred to
DPWIE. Graham, A. (2003) above n 261.
263 Kingborough Council Planning Committee, Final Report on Gunns Ltd plantation proposal, referred to in EDO
(Tasmania) Inc. (2002) Submission to Resource Planning and Development Commission Inquiry on Progress with Implementation of
the Tasmanian RFA, at p.7, at <www.edo.org.au>, accessed 15.7.03.
264 For example, J.Breen v Forest Practices Board, Forest Practices Tribunal, 9 May 2002, reported at
<www.fpb.tas.gov.au>, relating to refusal of a FP Plan due to risk of a landslide occurring on the subject property.
Other involved strengthening the streamside reserve provisions of an FPP: Oldaker v Forest Practices Board, 31 January
1995, No. 1 of 1995. Other refusals have involved under-represented forest communities: Eastley v Forest Practices
Board, 9 December 1994, re exclusion of logging from E.Ovata, A. Dealbata- Pomaderris Apetala forest (appeal
dismissed); and Webley Pty Ltd v Forest Practices Board, Forest Practices Tribunal, 22 January 1997. One refusal
involved rare or endangered plant species: MI Beams & Sons Pty Ltd v Forest Practices Board, Forest Practices Tribunal,
23 October 1996; Another involved refusal of a THP on the basis of aboriginal cultural heritage: Britton Bros v Forest
Practices Board & Tasmanian Aboriginal Land Council Aboriginal Corporation, Forest Practices Tribunal, No. 1 of 1996,
20 February 1996.
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ENFORCEMENT
There are some admirable features of the institutional structure for PNF regulation in
Tasmania, at least when compared with NSW. These include statutory enforcement
officers and regulation of the entire timber supply chain (see below). The FP Act places a
statutory obligation on the FP Board to monitor the compliance of industry with both
the FP Act and Code.265 The Board is required to commence prosecutions for breaches
against the Act, through the Chief FPO.266 As an alternative to prosecution, the Board
has the option of imposing a fine “equal, or approximately equal, to twice the amount
required to make good any damage done or any loss incurred by reason of the
commission of an offence” under the Act.267
Tasmania has a more detailed enforcement system relating to PNF than NSW. This
includes a highly-developed system of warnings and suspensions of FPOs for offences
such as approval of a deficient or, even potentially misleading, FPP.268 Forest Practices
Officers are appointed by the Forest Practices Board, and FPOs may have their
authorisation revoked by the Board on the grounds of negligence, lack of diligence in
performing their duties, if convicted of offences against the FP Act269 or for approving a
substantially flawed FPP.270

Regulation of supply chain
The Tasmanian FP system has an inbuilt advantage in terms of ensuring compliance as it
regulates all aspects of the timber supply chain including the land owner, logging
contractor and timber processor. It does this by controlling forestry undertaken by
persons deemed to be a “responsible person”. This includes a person carrying out (or
causing to be carried out) forest practices, a timber processor, the owner of the land or a
person to whom the owner has formally, under seal, assigned his or her

FP Act, s.4G(a).
FP Act s.4G(b), s.39A.
267 FP Act, s.47B, as an alternative to prosecution for offences under ss.17(4) (carry out or allow operations without
certified FPP),17(5) (timber purchaser acquiring timber produced without a certified FPP), 21(1) (failure to comply
with FPP or contravention of FPP), 21(3) (failure to comply with restocking requirements), 41(5) (failure to comply
with a make-good notice), 42(5) (failure to comply with a make-good notice confirmed by the FP Tribunal).
268 Chief Forest Practices Officer (1994) Forest Practices Act 1985: A Guide for Forest Practices Officers, Forest Practices
Board, Tasmania, at p.6.
269 FP Act, s.39(3).
270 FP Act, s.39(3); Chief Forest Practices Officer (1994) above n 268 at p.6.
265
266

responsibilities.271 In practice, FPPs are countersigned by the land owner, logging
contractor, and the buyer of the timber.272
The Act creates an offence of harvesting timber or causing or allowing timber to be
harvested without a certified FPP in place.273 The Act provides for vicarious liability of
principals for the actions of their agents or employees.274 In this manner, land owners
may be found liable for environmental offences (such as logging without an approved
FPP) committed by contractors on their land.275 A defence of due diligence is available.276
In addition, timber processors must not purchase or acquire timber that has been
harvested from land without a certified FPP.277 It is also an offence for timber processors
to cause forest practices to be carried out in contravention of a certified FPP.278 In
Arnold, a timber processor was convicted of offences against this provision and fined
$10,000 on appeal.279 Underwood J observed that:
The Act … thrusts an onus on timber processors to play their part in maintaining forestry
environment values by refusing to accept timber that has been taken without due regard having
been given to those values as reflected in the legislation and the Forest Practices Code.280

Elsewhere, his Honour explained that the miller had an obligation “to put in place an
effective system to ensure that each log that came into his mill had been harvested from
land in respect of which there was a forest harvesting plan.”281

Enforcement provisions and their application
Enforcement of the Code is the responsibility of designated Forest Practices Officers,
overseen by a statutorily-appointed Chief Forest Practices Officer.
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Ensuring

compliance with the Code is assisted by specialised FPOs (Inspecting), rather than FPOs
(Planning) - also appointed by the Board283 - who have statutory powers of entry and to
FP Act, s.17(1).
CSIRO (1997) Review of Codes of Practice For Plantation Forestry-Tasmania, p.2, CSIRO Forestry Division, Canberra.
273 This offence is punishable by a fine not exceeding 150 penalty units.
274 FP Act, s.47C(1).
275 Chief Forest Practices Officer (1994) above n 268, at p.34.
276 FP Act, s.47C(2).
277 FP Act, s.17(5).
278 FP Act, s.21(1)(b)
279 Witte v B. Arnold, Supreme Court Tasmania, No.A84/1996. The previous penalty imposed was a probation order.
280 Witte v Arnold, per Underwood J at par 17.
281 Witte v Arnold, per Underwood J at par 23.
282 FP Act, s.39A.
283 FP Act, s.38, 39.
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issue notices.284 Offence provisions are contained within the FP Act rather than the
Code.285 The primary offences are harvesting without a certified FPP,286 and harvesting in
contravention of a certified FPP.287 These are summary offences, but, importantly, the
Act is drafted so that offences need only be proved on the balance of probabilities.288
The FP Act provides a number of enforcement mechanisms – notices,289 fines imposed
by the Board,290 and prosecution leading to fines.291 The maximum penalty is $15,000 for
harvesting without a certified FPP and $10,000 for harvesting in contravention of a
certified FPP, amounts considerably lower than the maximum penalty for unauthorised
vegetation clearance in NSW.292 The Act contains provisions allowing a court to impose
orders recovering the cost of remediating damage done, or to remedy any other loss.293
Another compliance tool is the power of the Board to revoke the operation of an
approved FPP, “for any reason”, thus providing leverage to regulate logging at all
times.294
The PNF sector is the most problematic forestry sector according to the Annual Reports
of the FPB. In particular the small-sized or ‘independent’ sector of the PNF industry is
particularly problematic as far as compliance with the Code is concerned.295 The Public
Land Use Commission (PLUC) wrote: “The Forest Practices Board acknowledges that
self-regulation by a small number of independent operators and some private forest
owners has not been satisfactory. A disproportionate amount of time is spent dealing
with problems arising from this situation.”296 It is apparent from Annual Reports of the
Board that the majority of enforcement action, particularly prosecutions and fines,
initiated by the FP Board are against small, independent operators on privately-owned

FP Act, s.39A.
The Code is a form of delegated quasi-legislation issued by the FP Board under s.30 of the FP Act. It does not have
the character of a statutory rule or a regulation, and it is unlikely that the text of the Code itself would provide
grounds for action in the event of illegality. However the FP Act makes extensive references to the Code and
obligations to comply with it. Offence provisions are contained within the FP Act rather than the Code.
286 An offence against FP Act, s.17(4)(b).
287 FP Act, s.21(1).
288 FP Act, s.21(1A).
289 FP Act, s.41.
290 FP Act, s.47B.
291 FP Act, s.47B.
292 FP Act s.17(4), s.41(5). One penalty unit was $100 at the time of writing in February 2003.
293 FP Act, s.47A.
294 FP Act, s.24A.
295 However, Manning’s evidence to the Senate (2003) (above n 251) indicates a view that performance by Forestry
Tasmania on public land was not perhaps worse than performance on private land, at least by some larger firms on
private land.
296 PLUC (1997) above n 216, Chapter 4: “Monitoring and Compliance”, at p.102.
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land.297 For example, all four of the court actions commenced by the FPB during 19971998 were against independent private-property operators.298 Nevertheless, there has
been some action against larger firms involved in PNF. In 2002, the largest penalty ever
imposed by the FP Board of $50,000 was imposed on Gunns Ltd for serious erosion
arising from poor road-building practices on private land.299
Enforcement statistics show that notices are the most commonly-used method of
enforcement, apart from informal negotiation.300 Graham Wilkinson, Chief FPO, argued
that: “alternatives to prosecution are often the most effective tools for enforcement of a
forest practices system”, emphasising “corrective action” rather than punitive action.301
During the study period (1997-2002), there was greater prosecution and enforcement
activity in Tasmania in relation to PNF than in NSW, with a total of 38 notices, 3 fines
and 9 prosecutions commenced in relation to PNF (Table 6). Nevertheless, there was
also a tendency to avoid imposing fines and commencing prosecutions, rather a
preference for either no penalty, a warning letter or notices to make good.302

Table 6 Enforcement action taken by
Forest Practices Board by Type (all land
tenures)
Enforcement action taken

200102
21
serious 19

No Breach
Minor Breach, no
environmental harm
Notices issued
Fines imposed by the Board
Complaints laid through DPP

11
5
1

200001
48
34

9900

9899
7
2

9798

9697

9596

10
1
0

4
2
1

18
1
5

21
0
6

34
0
2

38
0
4

Forest Practices Board Tasmania (1995-1998) Annual Reports, various, Forest Practices Board, Hobart.
Forest Practices Board Tasmania (1998) Annual Report 1997-1998, FPB, Hobart, p.17-18. Three of the four matters
resulted in convictions for offences related to harvesting timber without an approved timber harvesting plan. The
matters were Towns, Timbs, Johnson.
299 Tasmanian Conservation Trust (2002) “Serious Breaches of Forest Practices Code on Tasman Peninsula”, 283 The
Tasmanian Conservationist, August at p.13; Graham, A., Woodfield, C. (2002) “ Whole Logs, Logging and
Loggerheads: Forestry Update”, 285 The Tasmanian Conservationist, December.
300 Forest Practices Board (2000) Annual Report 2000-01, p.23-24.
301 Wilkinson, G. (1999) above n 3 at p.8.
302 In 1997-1998 there were 11 notices and three prosecutions for PNF breaches. (Forest Practices Board (1998)
Annual Report 1997-1998, p.18). In 1998-99 there were 18 notices, 1 fine by the Board and 5 prosecutions for PNF
breaches (FPB (1999) Annual Report 1998-1999, p.25). In 1999-2000 there were 4 notices, 2 fines by the Board, and 1
prosecution for PNF breaches (FPB (2000) Annual Report 1999-2000, p.24. Fine under FP Act, s.47B). In 2000-1
there were 5 notices and zero prosecutions re PNF. (FPB (2001) Annual Report 2000-2001, p.24). By comparison,
back in 1995-1996 ,there were 10 prosecutions commenced and 25 notices issued re PNF. (FPB (1996) Annual
Report 1995-6, p.15).
297
298

Source: Forest Practices Board (1996-2002), Annual Reports.

Amendments to the FP Act in 1999 introduced a requirement for post-harvesting
lodgement of Certificates of Compliance with the terms of an FPP.303 This is certification
by an FPO upon expiry of a Plan, that forestry operations were carried out in accordance
with the Plan and the Code. This compliance mechanism was introduced, according to
the FPB, on the basis of the poor record of performance of ‘independent’ private
operations in Tasmania.304 However according to the Board, the level of compliance with
the requirement has been “very disappointing”, with one in five independent privateproperty operations not even lodging a certificate during 2001-2002.305. In 2001, only 32
per cent operators who had FPPs approved prior to 1 July 99 lodged a certificate. The
proportion for operations approved after that date was 47 per cent.306
A full picture of the operation of the FP System requires mention of recent allegations
made before a committee of the Commonwealth Senate by a former FPO employee of
the FPB regarding defects in the system of self-regulation. One of the points made
concerned the fact that the FP Board only ever receives a copy of the cover page of FP
Plans, and not the entire text of the plan concerned.307 Therefore, according to the
former officer, “It is relatively easy for a forest practices plan to be altered after being
approved… The full forest practices plan is held by the person—usually in the logging
company—who drew it up and approved it.”308 The former employee alleged that FPPs
Forest Practices Board Tasmania (1999) Annual Report 1998-99, at p.17.
The independent PNF sector is consistently identified as having “continuing deficiencies in the degree of selfregulation for operations”. Forest Practices Board Tasmania (1999) Annual Report 1998-99, at 8. The compliance
certification approach has also been successfully applied in the pollution control context in NSW, where a system of
self-monitoring of licensees is in place. POEO Act 1997 (NSW), s.65. It is an offence to supply to the regulatory
body, a certificate of compliance with conditions of a pollution control licence which is false or misleading in a
material particular, and the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply : s.65(5).
305 Forest Practices Board Tasmania (2002) Annual Report 2001-2002, p.19; where it is stated that the rate of lodgement
of certificates, “particularly by the non-industrial private sector is still not acceptable.” The Report also states
“further improvement is required” in relation to this sector: p.7.
306 Forest Practices Board Tasmania (2001) Annual Report 2000-2001, p.17.
307 Manning (2003) above n 251, p.513.
308 Manning (2003) above n 251 at 524: “I will give you an example. You would get a member of the public ring up
and complain about a particular coupe or something that was happening on private property, state forest or
wherever. In Launceston, where I was, I would ring them up in Hobart and say, ‘Have you got a cover page for this
coupe?’ I would say where it was. One of the secretaries there would hunt around through the pile of a thousand
plan face pages that we get a year—there are about 1,000 coupes logged—and might find that particular one. Then I
303
304

were frequently breached, and in some cases, the plans were amended afterwards to
legitimise the breaches which had occurred. It was further alleged that such amendments
had occurred with the concurrence of the Chief Forest Practices Officer.309
There is evidence that the nature of the Tasmanian system of self-regulation, and the
membership of industry staff on the Forest Practices Board may have compromised the
integrity of the regulator. It was alleged that in two instances the Chief FPO failed to act
upon the results of auditing of compliance with fauna-protection provisions by FPB staff
which found 80 breaches in coupes audited, so that logging could proceed uninterrupted,
to the extent that the deadline for prosecution expired.310
Conservationists have argued that the self-regulatory system employed in Tasmania is
under threat from undue influence by the forest industry. This is partly because of the
funding for the FP Board received from industry.311 The Tasmanian Conservation Trust
(TCT) suggested that “[t]he FP Act and its attendant Code and PTRs should be replaced
with a State Environmental Protection Agency, serviced by the Department of
Environment and Land Management.”312

The annual audit of FPPs
A key safeguard applied by the FP Board to measure compliance with the Code is an
annual audit of 15 per cent of all FPPs as a means of reviewing the extent of compliance.
The audit results are a measure of the quality standards set by the Board, rather than an
would say, ‘Oh, it’s Gunns at Long Reach, Gunns at Burnie’ or whoever who drafted the plan. Then I would have
to ring them and try and locate the forest practices officer who wrote the plan, who may be on leave or who may be
in Timbuktu or wherever, and ask him, cap in hand, for a copy of the plan.”
309 Manning (2003) above n 251 at 524.
310 Manning (2003) above n 251 at 505: “The Chief Forest Practices Officer had instructed the zoologist of the Forest
Practices Board to delay reports of alleged breaches to allow logging activity to go ahead. In 2000-01 I carried out a
State-wide audit of the forest practices plans for compliance with fauna protection provisions. Across the state I
found 80-plus breaches in the 40 per cent of the coupes which I audited. Sixty per cent of the coupes were not
audited because they did not have endangered species within their boundaries.” “…Why did the Chief Forest
Practices Officer instruct his subordinates not to make him aware of the breaches which occurred in 80-plus forest
practices plans until time had elapsed for their prosecution?” (p.506) Manning stated: “I took all relevant
documentation concerning my case about breaches of the Forest Practices Act to the Attorney-General. I expected
him to uphold the Forest Practices Act and refer the failures of the Forest Practices Board to the Department of
Public Prosecution. Instead, he held on to the documents for six months and took no action other than to hand
them to the former chief executive officer of the Forest Industries Association of Tasmania and now secretary of
the Department of Infrastructure, Energy and the Resources—the same department overseen by the deputy premier
and minister for forests. The only action taken by the department secretary was to remove me from my role.”
(p.506).
311 Ricketts, A. (1998) Comment and Advice on the Review Panel’s Draft Final Report (Within the Forest Practices Code Review of
Soil and Water Provisions, Tasmanian Conservation Trust, Hobart, at p.3.
312 Tasmania-Commonwealth Joint Regional Forest Agreement Steering Committee (1997) above n 8 at 158.

indicator of compliance per se.313 The Board has set a performance target for all audited
elements to be at or above a rating of 85 per cent.314 In 2002 the audit showed that,
collectively, independent PP operations, on average, did not meet the target for
streamside reserves and cultural heritage,315 and only just met the standard for fauna
protection and FPP quality.316

The audit has been criticised in several regards. Firstly the audit performed does not meet
the conventional definition of audit, which involves independent or objective third-party
verification and checking of data.317 Secondly, the audit can be criticised on the basis that
it is not sufficiently independent of the FP Board, and that the staff who conduct the
audit have no formal qualifications in environmental auditing and are too closely linked
to the timber industry.318
Thirdly, it is said that the audit schedule is structured to give a misleading impression of
higher-quality results than occurred in practice as no negative scores are attached to noncompliant events. According to a former senior FPO:
The system under which the Forest Practices Board is audited is, I believe, fraudulent and
designed to give a glowing report which misleads the parliament and public alike. There are 13
sections in the audit form and points are allotted to each section such that the total equals 100
points or 100 per cent. However, the form is designed in such a way that one could have an
operation which clear-felled the streamside reserves of the Franklin River for a kilometre but, as
long as the forest practices plan was clear in other areas, could still maintain an audited rate of 90
per cent. In other words, there is no negative weighting for environmental damage.319

FPB (2002) Annual Report 2001-2002, p.20.
Each plan is assessed for its performance against 124 questions. An indicative percentage score from 1-5 is assigned
to the audited plan for each question where : 95%-100% compliance = 1; 71-94% compliance = 2. (FPB (2002)
Annual Report 2001-2002, p.59. The rating is calculated as the proportion of the sample which contains a score of 1
or 2 . (FPB (2002), p.70).
315 The area of the impacts of PNF on both indigenous and European cultural heritage is an important one in
Tasmania but has been excluded from this study by a desire to constrain the scope of research. In Tasmania,
controversy has recently arisen over plans for logging of private property containing evidence of sites of the first
contact between French explorers and Aborigines in 1792 and 1793 at Recherche Bay on the Far South Coast:
Altman, C. (2003) “The French Connection”, The Weekend Australian, 15-16 February, pp.R4-6.
316 FPB (2002) Annual Report 2001-2002, p.21, Figure 1(b).
317 An environmental audit can be defined as : “A management tool comprising a systematic, documented, periodic
and objective evaluation of how well a project, organisation or equipment is performing with the aim of helping to
safeguard the environment.” European Commission (1999) Integrating Environmental Concerns Into Development And
Economic Cooperation, Brussels.
318 “The Forest Practices Board… has complete control over its own audit, using compromised, industry friendly
forestry practices officers who have no qualifications in environmental auditing.” Manning, above n 251, at p.505.
Two FPOs were employed for the audit in 2002, one from Private Forests Tasmania, and the other an independent
consultant. (FPB (2002) Annual Report 2001-2002, p.19).
319 Manning, above n 251, p.504.
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The audit function was also criticised by the Independent Panel’s review of the Soil and
Water provisions of the FP Code.320 On the other hand, it was largely given the all-clear
by another review of its audit protocols during 2001/ 2002.321 The theoretical literature
on environmental auditing suggests that a viable system of audited self-regulation must
include NGO and third-party involvement in enforcement.322
Yet the Tasmanian system deliberately excludes third-party participation, by means of
FOI exclusions323 and by the removal of most third-party appeal rights regarding
approval of FPPs and declaration of PTRs. The lack of third-party standing provisions
denies the public access to the courts to bring actions seeking enforcement of the Code.
The FP Board can receive complaints, but the public has no statutory right to bring
enforcement proceedings in the FP Tribunal.324 On this basis it cannot meet tests set out
in the theoretical literature for an effective self-regulation system.325

CONCLUSION
Tasmania has a detailed and unified system of forestry regulation in the form of the Forest
Practices Act 1985 and Code which applies across all tenures to include all but the smallestscale PNF activities. This is a significant advance on the complex and fragmented NSW
regime with its open-ended exemptions. Other positive aspects of the Tasmanian system
include the consistency of standards for regulation of PNF with those for public forestry,
strict limits on exemptions for PNF, and regulation of the entire timber-supply chain.
The fact that the Tasmanian FP Code applies across all land tenures gives those
enforcing it a greater mandate with which to argue that it be respected, as PNF is not
seen as having been singled out for ‘special treatment’.

Davies, P. (ed.) (1988) Forest Practices Code: Review of Soil and Water Provisions : Independent Review Panel Report to the Forest
Practices Board, June, Pub. Forest Practices Board, Hobart, at pp.11-12.
321 Mr. Clynt Wells, a forestry/environmental audit consultant with national and international experience, undertook
the review. He found that “audit procedures that follow the normally accepted protocols for an environmental
audit, and a sampling percent that exceeds the level commonly accepted for general audits”; but also found there
was “a need for special or appropriately stratified audits to reliably assess special issues”: FPB (2002) Annual Report
2001-2002, p.19.
322 Gunningham, N, and Rees, J. (1997) “Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective”, 19(4) Law and Policy
363-413.
323 Freedom of Information Act 1991 (Tas), s.32A effectively exempts the Forestry Corporation (Forestry Tasmania) and
Private Forests Tasmania from the Act, except in relation to personal information.
324 Bates, G. (1995) above n 204, at p.222.
325 One problem is that FPPs and data used to compile them are neither centrally registered nor located. Only a coversheet can be obtained from the FPB.
320

Still, there are a number of serious deficiencies in the Tasmanian approach. These
suggest that it does not represent an ideal model for reform of PNF law in New South
Wales. These difficulties relate to the lack of ESFM obligations, the deleterious
consequences for compliance associated with self-regulation, and the lack of
transparency flowing from exemptions from FOI and limits on appeal rights. The
difficulty faced by administrators of the Tasmanian system in improving standards in the
PNF industry under such a regime are evident in the research findings that the PNF
sector - particularly the small-sized or ‘independent’ sector of the PNF industry - is the
most problematic forestry sector as far as as far as compliance with the Code is
concerned according to the Annual Reports of the FPB.326
The first difficulty is the lack of sufficient specific obligations within the FP System to
ensure ESFM. The Tasmanian Code does not amount to a Code for ecological
management of forests. It permits clearfelling and replacement of native forests with
plantation monocultures. During the study period this was a major component of PNF
activity. Even with 100 per cent compliance with the Code, major ecological questions
will remain about the impacts of intensive forestry (particularly clearfelling and cable
logging on steep slopes). The Code is biased towards timber production objectives, and
appears to take insufficient account of ecological impacts such as destruction of habitat
(e.g. tree-bearing hollows).
Secondly, it is evident that other Tasmanian laws do not exert sufficient control over
PNF in order to achieve the overall objective of ESFM. This is particularly due to the
fact that forestry regulation has been excised from Tasmania’s broader environmental
law framework, the RMPS. The sustainable-development objectives applicable to other
industries, including the precautionary principle, are not applicable to most aspects of
forestry operations. This anomaly cannot be explained away by the need for specialised
regulation of forestry. Perhaps the most controversial aspect of this insulation from the
RMPS concerns the application of provisions for the declaration of PTRs under the PF
Act. The question of whether or not private forests should be subject to land-use
planning controls applicable elsewhere under LUPAA, and the question of inadequate
public-appeal rights, remain important.
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However, Manning’s evidence to the Senate (2003) (above n 251) indicates a view that performance by Forestry
Tasmania on public land was not perhaps worse than performance on private land, at least by some larger firms on
private land.

The third major problem with the Tasmanian approach to regulating PNF stems from
the selection of self-regulatory approach. These issues have been documented above, but
briefly, systems of self-regulation face the same considerable practical difficulties in
relation to monitoring and auditing of PNF as the regulatory approach, and in fact may
be more prone to regulatory failure. One cannot avoid the fact that an expansion in the
application of environmental laws will result in a decrease in timber volumes extracted.
Without a dramatic shift to greater value-added processing of timber felled, there is a
tension between environmental protection objectives and the profit maximisation
objectives of companies involved in PNF.327
The self-regulation approach in Tasmania does not contain sufficient safeguards or
measures to counteract the considerable incentives to under-report threatened species
issues. This was illustrated in Dudley v Break O’Day Council (2001), (the ‘giant velvet worm
case’) in the RMPAT, which revealed failures to include threatened species prescriptions
and failure to detect rare forest types which had conservation priority under the RFA.328
Dudley illustrates the need for regulation to grant expert biodiversity agencies a role in the
approvals process. Otherwise persons with inadequate training, knowledge and resources
will be left the primary responsibility for detecting, identifying, and reporting threatened
species, when it is usually not in their economic interest to do so.
When combined with the existing statutory secrecy provisions,329 the system of selfregulation creates an environment in which external review, evaluation and critique are
unwelcome, and creates conditions in which it is possible to turn a blind eye to breaches
of the Act and Code. There may however be some consolation for the reader in learning
that the data available on the enforcement of Tasmanian environmental law by the FP
Board, when compared to the limited and scattered data set on the enforcement of NSW
environmental laws relating to PNF, indicates at least a greater level of enforcement
activity in relation to PNF in Tasmania than in NSW. It is apparent that virtually no
prosecutions have taken place during the study period in NSW for offences relating to
Clark, J. (2003) “Planting the Softwood Competition”, paper delivered to Symposium: Win, Lose, Draw: the Fight for the
Forests, ANU, 14.10.03. See also: Porter, M. (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Free Press, New York; argues
that stricter environmental protection laws in countries such as Germany and Sweden led to industry innovation and
thus to greater international competitiveness. See also: Porter, M. (1991) “Green Competitiveness” New York Times,
5 April 1991.
328 Dudley v Break O’Day Council, above n 94.
329 Freedom of Information Act 1991 (Tas), s.32A(a),(b) exempting Private Forests Tasmania and Forestry Tasmania from
the Act.
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breach of threatened species protection laws (see: p.343.),
pollution-control laws (see: p.306), native-vegetation
protection laws (see: p.243) or environmental impactassessment laws (see: p.298), in the PNF industry.
The Tasmanian FPS is characterised by a lack of transparency, narrow appeal rights, and
potential for conflicts of interest. The audit provisions, which might have kept a check
on the operation of the system, are insufficient and in some respects unsatisfactory. At
the core of problem is the application of self-regulation in an environment where profits
are at stake. There is some evidence that the Tasmanian system is unreliable in protecting
the full range of forest values, as required by the Montreal Process criteria for ESFM .
Chapter Twelve considers a number of options for law reform to ensure ESFM in the
private forest sector in NSW. Aspects of the Tasmanian approach will be considered in
that chapter for the purposes of comparison.

Chapter Twelve

LAW REFORM:
EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
INTRODUCTION
This chapter suggests and evaluates options for law reform to improve the ecological
sustainability of PNF in NSW. The chapter is intended as a general review of possible
legal frameworks for PNF. A comparison of approaches taken in NSW (Part Two), and
Tasmania (Part Three) forms the basis for review of models for reform of the NSW
legislative and institutional framework.
Before commencing that discussion it is necessary to reveal the main premise underlying
the analysis and recommendations in this chapter. It is that if conventional or ‘command’
regulation is retained as part of the overall policy response, one must ask how existing
legislation can be improved. Part Two described and documented significant regulatory
failures of the legislative regime governing PNF in NSW. Various loopholes, exemption
clauses and shortcomings of the law itself have caused some of the regulatory failures.
Other failures were the result of administrative shortcomings and others arose as a result
of enforcement deficits.
One group of observers may conclude that such findings suggest a need to reject
conventional regulation in this context, and to replace it with other instruments such as
self-regulation and voluntary codes of practice. On the basis of a number of arguments,
including the need for adherence to the ‘precautionary principle’ in order to achieve
ESFM, it is argued that conventional regulation will remain an essential part of the policy
landscape for PNF regardless of whether other measures are also applied in this context.
On that basis, it is rational to consider how to improve existing legislation.
The most powerful reason for law reform is that without an adequate legal framework,
high-conservation-value private forests will continue to be logged without assessment, or
if they are assessed, without the application of adequate environmental protection
prescriptions. Government policy commitments to ESFM made in the RFAs and the
NFPS will not be met. If the necessary program of law reform is not completed, it is

likely that defects in the legislative framework for PNF will continue to make legislative
implementation and enforcement tasks difficult.

Criteria for assessment of legislative frameworks
Chapter Five briefly presented a number of criteria by which the contribution of
legislative frameworks towards ESFM can be assessed. These criteria were derived from
a number of sources including national policy statements, the soft international law
relating to forestry including the Montreal Process,1 and the academic literature. They
enable us to ask whether a given statutory framework requires the adoption of ESFM
practices.
Five primary criteria for ESFM on private land were identified in that chapter. These are:
•
•
•
•
•

adherence to ESD principles including the ‘precautionary principle’;
an adequate institutional framework; 2
provision for conservation of special values i.e. ‘maintain or increase the full suite of
forest values’;3
adequate compliance and enforcement provisions; and
provision for public participation.

With ‘best practice’ regulation as a criterion of ESFM, it is essential to identify its
constituent parts, otherwise it remains a self-referential objective. This task has not yet
been adequately undertaken by government in NSW in relation to PNF.4

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NSW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
With private forests less in the eye of the government and the community than public
forests, and historically surrounded by community ignorance and agency inertia, the law

Boer, B. (1997) “Developments in International Environmental Law relating to Forests”, 14(5) Environmental and
Planning Law Journal 378-385.
2 These were identified as important elements of mechanisms for conservation on private forested land in
Commonwealth of Australia and State of NSW (2000) Regional Forest Agreement for North East NSW (Upper N-E),
March 2000, Attachment 2, Clause 4, p.70.
3 DLWC (2001) Draft Best Operating Standards for Private Native Forestry, DLWC, Bridge St, Sydney, 30pp at 3; These are
protection of native vegetation of high conservation value, improvement in the condition of native vegetation,
maintenance of ecological processes, maintenance of viable populations of native species throughout their natural
ranges, management of vegetation on an ecologically sustainable basis. Pugh, D. (2001) Towards Best Operating
Standards for Private Native Forestry, Submission on DLWC’s Draft Best Operating Standards for Private Forestry,
Nature Conservation Council of NSW, Sydney, March, 60pp. at p.3.
4 The two exceptions are an expert committee’s review of questions of ESFM in NSW forestry undertaken during the
RFA process, and the Smith report (the recommendations of which were shelved and largely ignored): Independent
Expert Working Group (1998) Assessment of management systems and processes for achieving ecologically sustainable forest
management in NSW, A report undertaken for the NSW CRA/RFA Steering Committee; Smith, A. (1999) Guidelines
for Application of Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 Exemption to Sustainable Forestry on Private Lands in NSW, a
report to the DLWC by Setscan Pty Ltd, Armidale.
1

applicable to PNF in NSW has been shaped less by controversy and more by inaction.
Surrounding PNF has been what is best characterised as the uncoordinated, incremental
growth of a legislative scrub – dense in some places, patchy in others.5
In 1998 the Independent Expert Working Group on ESFM, appointed to examine NSW
law and policy during the RFA process, reached certain conclusions about the
unsuitability of NSW law for ESFM. That report stated that: “[c]urrent processes for
ensuring ecologically sustainable management of private forests are poorly developed”.6
There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the law in NSW regulating PNF is not part of a
unified system of forestry regulation applying across all land tenures. NSW has three
different tenure- and activity-specific legal regimes applicable to forestry: in State Forests
(under the Forestry Act 1916, Forestry and National Park Estate Act 1998), in plantations
(under the Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999),7 and on privately-owned forest. There
is no single law setting out the overarching framework for regulating forestry in NSW
(see Table 1). This contrasts with Tasmania8 and Victoria9 which have Forest Practices
Codes applying across all tenures. The NSW approach is mirrored in Queensland10 and
Western Australia,11 which also do not regulate PNF under a Code.12
It is unnecessarily complex for different rules in NSW to apply to PNF and to public
forestry. It is difficult to identify environmental protection benefits on private land
arising from this arrangement. Industry members justify the difference in regulatory
framework by pointing to differences in the structure of the industry operating on public

A detailed analysis of the problems with the NSW legislative framework for regulating and managing PNF operations
was provided in Part Two.
6 Independent Expert Working Group (1998) above n 4 at 11.
7 The Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999 (PRA) (NSW) applies to most land tenures (i.e. privately owned land, State
forest or other Crown-timber lands, “or any other land”). PRA, s.5(4). However it does not apply to land within 13
nominated categories, including land protected by SEPP 14 (wetlands), or SEPP 26 (littoral rainforests). PRA, s.7,
Schedule 1.
8 Forest Practices Act 1985 (Tas), Forest Practices Code (Tas) (under revision 2000); re PNF see also Private Forests
Tasmania (1997) Farm Forestry: Forest Practices Code and Timber Harvesting Plans, Information Sheet No.30, p.1.
9 Victoria, Department of Natural Resources and Environment (1996) Code of Practice: Code of Forest Practices for Timber
Production – Revision No.2, November, 68pp, DNRE, East Melbourne, at p.4. (Note that there are relevant laws
applicable in addition to Forest Practices Codes).
10 Independent Expert Panel (1999) Assessment of Systems and Processes for Ecologically Sustainable Forest Management in South
East Queensland, Commonwealth Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Queensland Department of Natural
Resources, Brisbane, Queensland.
11 Independent Expert Advisory Group, (1997) Assessment of Ecologically Sustainable Forest Management in the South-West
Forest Region of Western Australia, Department of Conservation and Land Management, Perth, Report of the
Commonwealth of Australia and Western Australian Government, 94pp.
12 Wilkinson provides a good overview of all the Forest Practices Acts and Codes across Australia: Wilkinson, G.
(1999) Codes of forest practice as regulatory tools for sustainable forest management”, in Ellis R.C., Smethurst P.J.,
Practising Forestry Today, Proceedings of the 18th Biennial Conference of the Institute of Foresters of Australia, 3-8 October 1999,
Hobart, Tasmania, at pp. 43-60.
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and private lands.13 Yet in Tasmania and Victoria14, the application of forestry law across
tenures appears unproblematic, and PNF is regulated under the same Forest Practices
Codes as public forestry.15 A similar case can be made in relation to several overseas
jurisdictions.16 In Tasmania, as we have seen, only the smallest non-commercial PNF
operations are excluded from the Forest Practices Code (see: p.357).

The NSW approach is indicative of historical patterns of land-use regulation and of a
political desire to avoid infringing upon private property rights. It is in conflict with the
National Forest Policy Statement, where governments agreed to “making the codes of
practice for wood production in public native forests applicable to private native
forests”.17 In favour of a uniform approach is the fact that ecological issues do not
respect jurisdictional boundaries such as those between private and public land.
The principle that there should be a uniform framework of environmental laws across
both private and public forests also has the benefit of simplicity, reducing administrative
confusion for regulators and regulated parties, particularly companies and contractors
operating across tenures. It could considerably reduce legal complexity. It would not be
necessary for industry and regulators to understand and apply separate rules for each
tenure. With a single Code, a higher degree of familiarity with regulatory requirements
would result across the forestry industry in NSW.
A second-best solution, still preferable to the present approach in NSW, is to apply a
specific-purpose law providing holistically for the management of PNF, such as a Private
Forests Act.18 However in NSW, PNF operations are subject to a complex, multi-layered
and often overlapping regulatory framework that has developed incrementally over time.

Observation of the author at meetings of the PNF Reference Group, March-June 2002, DLWC, Bridge St., Sydney.
Victoria, Department of Natural Resources and Environment (1996) Code of Practice: Code of Forest Practices for Timber
Production – Revision No.2, November, 68pp, DNRE, East Melbourne, at p.4. (Note that there are relevant laws
applicable in addition to Forest Practices Codes).
15 Wilkinson, G. (1999) above n 12.
16 Alaska, California, Oregon, Washington; Finland, Sweden, UK, Germany (Federal and 2 States), and British
Columbia (partial): Ellefson, P.; Cheng, A.; Moulton, R. (1997) “Regulatory Programs and Private Forestry: State
Government Actions to Direct the Use and Management of Forest Ecosystems”, 10 Society and Natural Resources 195209; Westland Resource Group (undated) A Review of the Forest Practices Code of British Columbia and Fourteen other
Jurisdictions: a Background Report, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, Ministry of Forests, Crown Publications Inc.,
Victoria, British Columbia.
17 Commonwealth of Australia (1992) National Forest Policy Statement, p.28.
18 Private Forests Act 1994 (Tas) created an industry extension body named Private Forests Tasmania, and made
provision for areas of private forest to be declared ‘Private Timber Reserves’.
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This reflects a tendency in NSW environmental law - subject to a number of recent
exceptions - for legislation to be introduced without thorough efforts to renovate
existing laws.19 Statutes applicable in a broader context in response to concerns about
vegetation clearing, threatened species decline, and pollution have been variously applied
to a range of activities on private land, including PNF.20 Such laws were not specifically
designed for regulating forestry and on some counts may not be as effective as purposebuilt legislation.21 On the other hand an argument can be made that there is also an
important complementary role for specific-purpose environmental legislation aimed at
particular environmental problems, such as threatened species protection and pollution
control.
Responsibility for administering the law for PNF is highly fragmented in NSW. During
the study period, responsibility for administration was spread between up to 5 regulatory
agencies in any one situation, each dealing with different aspects of the environmental
impact of PNF. During the study period the relevant agencies were DLWC, local
councils, NPWS, EPA and potentially DUAP and NSW Fisheries (protecting threatened
freshwater fish from the effects of non-point-source pollution of rivers from logging and
roading).22
With complexity comes a lack of integration between the regulatory requirements
imposed under each statute, and between the measures applied on public and private
forests. As an American writer observed: “Multiple agency authority …may diminish the
ability of forest resource agencies to guide the use and management of forests in an
integrative way.”23 Inter-departmental lines of demarcation limit the capacity of those
agencies responsible for only single aspects of forest ecosystems (e.g. biodiversity) to
monitor other aspects. A Department of Urban Affairs & Planning report described
another important aspect of what is a general problem in NSW environmental law - that

Abel, N., Farrier, D., Tatnell, B., Mooney, C. (1999) A Rangeland Enmeshed: The Legal and Administrative Framework of
the Western Division of NSW, DLWC, Sydney, at 71. Exceptions include the POEO Act and the NVCA.
20 EPAA, TSCA, NPWA , NVCA, POEO Act; Also the common law, particularly the law of nuisance: see Van Son v
Forestry Commission (1995) 86 LGERA 108, a private nuisance action concerning riparian rights and non-point source
water pollution from forestry operations; see also Lawrence v Kempsey Shire Council (1995) 87 LGERA 49.
21 Nevertheless, they have been enlisted for that purpose. For example, the protected lands provisions in the Soil
Conservation Act 1938 (later incorporated into the NVCA), with their general application to soil conservation have
been applied to PNF, with a certain degree of success. The protected lands provisions have now been incorporated
into the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NVCA).
22 Reforms in early 2003 led to a merger of DUAP and DLWC to form the Department of Infrastructure, Planning
and Natural Resources.
23 Ellefson, P.; et.al. (1997) above n 16 at 203.
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there are “agencies regulating sequentially within separate paradigms and issuing
approvals on the basis of differing heads of consideration, operating requirements and
standards” - with the EPAA operating in parallel with sector and issue-specific
environmental legislation.24
With numerous Acts, administered by different agencies, under different Ministries, the
capacity of government to regulate PNF operations with a coordinated and effective
policy approach is reduced.25 It also increases the likelihood of regulatory buck-passing
from one agency to another, with the result that enforcement is compromised.26
Interview evidence suggested that the PNF exemption (in its present form) under the
NVCA increased the tendency for DLWC and local government to avoid responsibility
for regulating PNF. Measures are required to develop a whole-of-government approach.
Such complexity has led to situations where even the agencies administering various parts
of the legal framework have been uncertain as to the detailed points of application of
relevant laws to PNF (‘regulatory confusion’). It is possible that regulatory complexity
has given rise to a reluctance to apply and enforce the law stringently.27
A different aspect of the same problem, that will tend to come into play under different
circumstances, is that under a multi-Act system, a reluctance on the part of agencies to
relinquish responsibilities to other agencies is frequently observed. More frequently, there
is reluctance to delegate to one another and to share information. This approach arises
from barely concealed ‘turf wars’ between agencies.28 The solution is to make the
performance and productivity of agencies dependent upon mutual cooperation, by
interlacing their role in the approvals process.

DUAP (1996) Towards An Integrated Land Use, Planning And Natural Resources Approvals Policy For NSW, Discussion
Paper, May, DUAP, Sydney at Heading 2: “The Land Use Approval System in NSW: Major Issues”.
25 Grabosky and Braithwaite (1986) found that fragmented regulatory arrangements lead to buck-passing, particularly
where there is overlap between levels of government, such as between State and local government. Grabosky, P.,
Braithwaite, J. (1986) Of Manners Gentle: Enforcement Strategies of Australian Business Regulatory Agencies, Oxford
University Press, Melbourne, at 2.
26 Many of these observations were made by the Independent Expert Working Group, above n 4. Particular problems
were revealed in my research in relation to the nexus between the NVCA and local government regulation – see
interviews with Kempsey SC in Chapter Nine. Similar comments have been made in the US context. Ellefson, P.;
et.al. (1997) above n 16 at 203.
27 However, although logically appealing, it is not possible to come to conclusions regarding “regulatory confusion” as
a cause of lax enforcement without further empirical research.
28 DUAP (1996) above n 24 at Heading 2: “The Land Use Approval System in NSW: Major Issues”.
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At the core is the issue of whether PNF should be managed under industry-sectorspecific legislation, or under legislation of more general application espousing broad
principles and processes (e.g. an Environmental Protection Act). Sector-specific
legislation has created a segmented and un-integrated approach to natural resource
management in NSW. Forestry on public land is regulated under the Forestry Act 1916,29
mining is regulated under the Mining Act 1992,30 fisheries are regulated under the Fisheries
Management Act 1994, and water use is regulated under the Water Management Act 2000.31
The problems of complexity and lack of coordination in the PNF arena are by no means
unique. Abel et.al. (1998) described similar problems in the NSW water-management
regime and proposed that water legislation be integrated with land-use planning law.32
Another paper that looked at the integration of land and water management in NSW by
some of the same authors described “a fragmented planning regime wracked by
complexity and lack of coordination.”33 A similar conclusion is applicable to the law
applying to PNF in NSW.

Landholder Confusion
Having reviewed the NSW statutory framework applying to PNF for the RFA process,
the Expert ESFM Working Group concluded: “It would be a significant understatement
to conclude that the law and policy relating to PNF is complex, confused and
inconsistent.”34
Regulatory complexity gives rise to confusion within the minds of land-holders and
forestry contractors as to their legal obligations in relation to PNF. Complexity is likely
to have resulted in reduced compliance by landholders with statutory obligations. Further
antagonism between landholders and regulators is likely to develop because of the need
to deal with numerous agencies, with sometimes indistinct lines of authority.

see also: Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999 (‘PRA’), Forestry and National Park Estate Act 1998, Native Vegetation
Conservation Act 1997.
30 See also: Petroleum (Onshore) Act 1991 (NSW).
31 Formerly under the Water Act 1912.
32 Abel, N., Farrier, D., Tatnell, B., Mooney, C. (1999) above n 19.
33 Farrier, D., Kelly, A., Comino, M., Bond, M. (1998) “Integrated Land and Water Management in NSW: Plans,
Problems, Possibilities”, 5(2) Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 153-182 at 177. As a postscript it
must be added that legislation to address these points has recently been passed by the NSW Parliament in December
2003 in the form of the Catchment Management Authorities Bill 2003, Native Vegetation Bill 2003, Natural
Resources Commission Bill 2003, all awaiting assent at the time of writing (10.12.03).
34 Independent Expert Working Group, (1998) above n 4.
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Part Two II presented some evidence of a relatively low level both of knowledge and of
acceptance of regulatory requirements within the PNF industry. Landowners in
particular, seem likely to have limited knowledge of regulatory requirements. O’Neill, a
Northern NSW forestry consultant with first hand experience of the needs of private
forest owners, argued that the complexity of the regulatory regime “results in confusion
for the forest owner, with the very real likelihood that many may continue to manage
their forests in ignorance of the legislative requirements, or even despite them.”35 If there
was greater enforcement activity in NSW, then this would have focussed attention on
obligations to comply with newer environmental laws.
Research conducted for Part Two showed that the intersection and overlap of legislative
requirements is a source of confusion for poorly-resourced landholders. This is
particularly the case with the scope of the PNF exemption, the application of the TSCA,
and the role of pollution-control law.36 The exception to the rule is the protected lands
regime which is relatively well-known by logging contractors, it has been in existence for
over thirty years, since 1972.37
As was found to be the case in Tasmania (Part Three), it is the smaller logging
contractors and landholders who are most likely to fall through the regulatory net,
because of the scale of their operations and their lack of resources to focus on
compliance obligations.
By contrast, in public native forestry there is a substantial public institutional
infrastructure designed to assist with compliance. In fact, the Forestry Commission has
assumed the role of shielding industry from having formally to apply for authorisations,
and has taken the role of ‘fall guy’ in prosecutions for environmental offences.38

O'Neill, M. (1998) “The Private Hardwood Forest Resources of Northern NSW”, 129-137 at 129 in Dyason, R.,
Dyason, L., Garsden, R. (eds.), Plantation and Regrowth Forestry: A Diversity of Opportunity, Australian Forest Growers
Biennial Conference Proceedings, Lismore, NSW, 6-9 July 1998, at 129.
36 Personal observation made from discussion of PNF issues with numerous landowners in attendance at ANU
forestry field day in the Bega Valley, at Candelo, (Kameruka Bowling Club) 23.2.01.
37 Interview, Dr. I. Hannam, 11.1.98, DLWC Parramatta Office, in person. Notes with author. Another factor in
boosting the acceptance of the protected lands provisions is that soil conservation objectives are more readily
accepted within the culture of rural land holders than biodiversity conservation.
38 Prest, J. (1995) Licensed to Kill: Endangered Fauna Licensing Under the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW) Between
1991-1995, Occasional Paper, Australian Centre for Environmental Law, Australian National University, Canberra,
at pp. 55-56, where I wrote “The Commission finances, prepares and applies for the environmental approvals that
the industry requires, plays the role of advocate for the industry in legal proceedings (see Forestry Commission v Corkill
35

In Tasmania, knowledge of regulatory requirements by the PNF industry is assisted by
two factors. In the first place, Private Forests Tasmania employs a number of Forest
Practices Officers who assist smaller operators and landholders with preparation of plans
and supervision of their execution. Also the industry is well serviced by private-sector
forest planning consultants. Secondly, the simple, unified application of the Forest
Practices Act and Code across tenures means that the gist of regulations is well known
across industry. Contractors working across all three forestry sectors (i.e. private, public,
and plantation) only need to be familiar with a single regulatory framework.

Choice of Regulatory Target
Our approach to regulating PNF partly depends on who it is we are attempting to
regulate. Typical conceptions of the private forestry participant are of a farmer or
landholder. In truth, PNF is carried out by a combination of corporations, contractors
and individuals. A well designed regulatory system will take account of the characteristics
of each broad category of regulatory target. Empirical research is required to test the
fairly reliable assumption that it is largely farmers who are being regulated and not
sawmillers or large consolidated resource companies with private forestry landholdings.39
In NSW a primary design defect of the legislation is that obligations (such as consents
under the EPAA and the NVCA) fall on the landholder rather than the logging
contractor or the sawmiller. The application of NSW laws to the landholder (rather than
the contractor) arises from the decision to anchor the operation of environmental laws
on planning law.40
At present the legislation focuses attention and responsibility for gaining approvals on
landholders who are usually only occasional participants in the PNF industry. For
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(1991) 73 LGRA 247 at 256 in Court of Appeal proceedings), and has even initiated legal actions on its behalf
designed to suppress environmental protests.”
In general it seems that forestry companies have not sought to acquire significant landholdings in NSW in order to
secure supplies of timber, because such a step has not proven necessary, as sufficient landholders have been willing
to respond to offers to enter into short-term timber supply contracts.
Nevertheless the approach of regulating on a property specific basis has some merits in terms of biodiversity
protection because of the need for site-specific surveying and prescriptions. The alternative of granting a single
prospective approval for a forestry contractor or company, regardless of the site to be logged, will ignore the need
to gather site specific information in relation to biodiversity and soils of high erosion hazard.

example, the NVCA places responsibility for gaining approvals on the landholder. 41 As
it does not set out a clear policy in relation to the vicarious liability of landholders for the
actions of independent contractors they have engaged, it will fail to exert pressure on
landholders to ensure that their contractors are complying with the law.42 Nevertheless,
the rules of vicarious liability applied in some of the SEPP 46 prosecutions would most
likely apply.43
The alternative to placing responsibility for compliance with a complex regulatory
framework on the landholder is to place compliance obligations onto repeat players harvesting contractors and sawmillers.44 In Tasmania, sawmills must ensure they only
accept timber produced by operations in compliance with forest practices law.45 A similar
approach of regulating the entire supply chain is applied in New Zealand by prohibiting
the milling of indigenous timber at sawmills unless the timber has been obtained from
operations in accordance with a registered46 sustainable-forest management plan.47
Repeat players will have greater familiarity with legislative obligations and are likely to
assist less-well-informed landholders to comply, as well as exerting commercial pressures
on them to become more compliant.

Lack of protection of ecological values
Present NSW law relating to PNF fails in many respects to protect ecological values in
private forests. The prime cause is the application of the scientifically-unjustified PNF
exemption in the NVC Act with its unclear threshold of operation. The ESFM Working
Bates, G. Franklin, N. (1999) above n 42 at 113-114. The Act provides for corporate offences but may not
adequately cover offences by non-incorporated clearing contractors engaged by landholders. For the removal of
doubt it may be necessary to insert a provision stating that a landholder shall not cause or permit unauthorised
native vegetation clearance by independent contractors or agents.
42 Bates, G. Franklin, N. (1999) Compliance with the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW): Consultancy Report Operational Phase, prepared for Department of Land and Water Conservation NSW, at 113-114.
43 There has been some judicial recognition, in decisions delivered in prosecutions for breach of LEPs and TPOs for
illegal vegetation clearance, that the responsibility to the community of professional foresters and clearing
contractors is greater, than that of private landholders who do not exclusively derive their income from logging. For
example, in Byron Shire Council v Sommerville, Sheahan J rejected a submission that a s.556A order be granted in favour
of a defendant clearing contractor on the basis that the defendant was “a professional operator who has been heavily
engaged in the relevant industry since 1991…who should have made the relevant enquiries as to any approval that
was required for the works proposed to be undertaken.” Byron Shire Council v Sommerville, [1999] NSWLEC 97 (8
February 1999) unreported decision of Land and Environment Court, No. 50127 of 1999, Sheahan J.
44 Stone, Christopher (1989) “Choice of Target and Other Law Enforcement Variables”, ch.10 in Friedland, M. (ed.),
Sanctions and Rewards in the Legal System: A Multidisciplinary approach, Univ. of Toronto Press, Toronto.
45 This is the approach taken in Tasmania, and also by the Commonwealth in regulating fisheries under the Fisheries
Management Act 1991 (Cth) (fish receiver permits), ss.91-92.
46 Registered by the Registrar of real property for a term of 50 years. Forests Act 1949 (NZ), s.67D(3). Also discussed in
Williams, D. (ed.) (1997) Environmental and Resource Management in New Zealand, 2nd edition, Butterworths, Wellington,
at p.184.
47 Forests Act 1949 (NZ), s.67C(1)(a), 67D(1)(b).
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Group summarised the situation this way: “it is quite inappropriate to leave assessments
of what constitutes sustainable forestry to those who wish to engage in these activities.”48
Although parts of the present statutory framework for PNF make reference to the
precautionary principle, it remains a fact that the regulatory landscape is dominated by
the operation of the exemption provisions of the NVCA. The PNF exemption
epitomises a lack of adherence to the precautionary principle in the present law.
The primary finding of Part Two is that (within the study regions, during the study
period) most PNF logging in NSW was not subject to approval requirements in practice.
In such cases, on areas not classified as protected land, no formal assessment of the
conservation significance of forest is conducted prior to logging. Only in a minority of
cases is PNF subject to assessment through the Part 4 EPAA process, under either the
NVCA or LEPs, or in a very small number of cases through the s.91 TSCA licensing
mechanism.
Exemption provisions for PNF must be removed or significantly modified if the law is to
facilitate ESFM. The present PNF exemption should not be given further life by RVM
committees.49

This exemption and the fact that most LEPs do not cover PNF,

particularly in the Northern and Hunter regions, mean that high-conservation-value
private forest may be logged without independent environmental assessment.

Comparison between public and private forestry compliance obligations
A comparison between the regulatory compliance obligations applying to forestry on
public land and those applicable on private land reveals one possible approach to
addressing the problem of fragmented legislative frameworks.
Public forestry in NSW has long been regulated under the Forestry Act 1916 and
Regulations, with a Code of Logging Practice applied at an operational level.50 However
in 1998 the system of approvals for public forestry was considerably amended by the
Forestry and National Park Estate Act. That Act created a system of integrated approvals
Independent Expert Working Group, (1998) above n 4 at 51.
Some RVMCs have refused to incorporate DLWC’s revised exemption and may instead be directed by the Minister
to adopt it.
50 The (non-statutory) Code of Logging Practice for State Forests and other Crown-timber lands in NSW does not
apply to logging operations carried out on privately owned land: NSW State Forests (1999) Code of Practice for Native
Forest Harvesting, State Forests, Sydney.
48
49

jointly granted by relevant Ministers (rather than government agencies).51 Under this
system, approvals under the Forestry Act 1916 were merged with those relating to EIA,
threatened species and pollution control, effectively creating a one-stop shop for
licensing of forestry within State Forests in the form of an ‘Integrated Forestry
Operations Approval’ (IFOA).52 Individual approvals for each of four RFA regions
specify the conditions under which forestry can occur in State forests or Crown-timber
lands, and contain licence conditions specifically addressing water pollution, threatened
species and fisheries protection.
This method of applying a coordinating act or umbrella statute to integrate approvals for
PNF is sound and should be investigated for PNF in NSW. One proviso is that it will be
impracticable to apply an approach to PNF identical to that relating to public forests as
the level of detail contained within IFOA approvals, such as licence conditions, is quite
considerable, running to hundreds of pages.53 Dargavel was right in stating that
regulation of PNF - on a scale similar to that applied to public forests - is unlikely to be “feasible
or enforceable”.54 The question is mainly one of selecting an appropriate level of detail
and keeping requirements and thresholds of application simple and readily applicable in
the field.
Further, if ESFM is to be achieved on private land, certain aspects of the FNPE Act’s
approach should not be adopted. One relates to the grant of exemptions from selected
provisions of environmental legislation55 - on the basis that IFOAs are expressed to last
Forestry and National Park Estate Act 1998, s.25,26,27. The legislation involved is the EPAA, Forestry Act 1916,
NPWA , Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991, and where relevant the Fisheries Management Act 1994.
This drafting gave Ministers political discretion over licences issued under these environmental laws, and created
room for politicisation of licensing decisions by regulatory agencies. See also: North East Forests Alliance (1999)
Background Paper 1: the NSW Government’s Forestry and National Park Estate Act 1998, NEFA website,
<www.nefa.org.au/brief1.html>.
52 Ricketts, A., Rogers, N. (1999) “Third Party Rights in NSW Environmental Legislation: the Backlash”, 16(2)
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 157.
53 The Eden IFOA itself is 42pp. in length but is supplemented by 3 appendices containing the terms of licences under
the POEO Act (34pp, plus schedules 84pp.), TSCA (103pp.) and Fisheries Management Act. Full text at
<www.racac.nsw.gov.au/rfa/ifoa.shtml>, accessed 9.7.03.
54 Dargavel, J.; Moloney, D. (1998) “Private Native Forests: Are we doing enough ?” 293-300 at 300 in Dyason, R.,
Dyason, L., Garsden, R. (eds.), Plantation and Regrowth Forestry: A Diversity of Opportunity, Australian Forest Growers
Biennial Conference Proceedings, Lismore, NSW, 6-9 July 1998. Dargavel later clarified this indicating that the
approach of choosing regulation of private forestry is certainly not impossible, as it is carried out effectively in
Japan, Scandinavia and Western Europe; however the questions related to the appropriateness of regulatory
framework applied. He suggested that reasons for avoiding regulation altogether were more political than practical.
John Dargavel, ANU SRES, interview 17.2.03, (by telephone).
55 The FNPE Act states that IFOAs exclude the operation of licensing provisions of the POEO Act and the TSCA.
(ss.33,34). Further the existence of an IFOA creates an exemption from Parts 4 and 5 of the EPAA (FNPE Act,
s.36) as well as exemptions from the operation of the Wilderness Act and wilderness provisions of the NPWA .
(FNPE Act, s.39 excluding certain provisions of the TSCA and NPWA ). In addition the FNPE Act exempts public
land forestry covered by an IFOA from the stop work order provisions of the NPWA and TSCA (FNPE Act,
51

for 20 years, in a purported offer of resource security to industry.56 These exclusions
from environmental legislation represent constraints on future policy making. They also
block adaptive environmental management in response to emerging scientific knowledge
about risks to species and ecosystems. Another aspect of the FNPE Act to be avoided is
its abolition of third-party appeal rights, a measure which would most probably serve to
reduce pressure for compliance with environmental legislation.57

Comparison with Tasmania’s framework for regulating PNF
It is useful to compare NSW laws for PNF with those of Tasmania (Table 1). As Chapter
Eleven explained, Tasmania has a detailed and unified system of forestry regulation in
the form of the FP Act and Code, which apply across all tenures to include all but the
smallest-scale PNF activities.58 This is a significant advance on the complex, fragmented
and often ambiguous regime in NSW. Other important aspects of the Tasmanian law are
the principle of consistency of standards for regulation of PNF with those for public
forestry, strict limits on exemptions, and regulation of the entire supply-chain.
Yet the Tasmanian system is unlikely to deliver ESFM for a number of reasons. Forestry
sits outside the RMPS and its unified system of statutory sustainable development
objectives. It is also excluded from its appeals and public participation provisions.
Further, Tasmanian law, while more uniform and subject to fewer exceptions, does not
amount to a Code for ecological management of forests. Even with 100 per cent
compliance with the Tasmanian Code, it is evident that ecological problems are
associated with intensive forestry (particularly the practices of clearfelling,59 and cable

s.37). It also excludes the operation of s.124 Local Government Act that normally gives local councils the power to
restrain certain activities.
56 In December 1999, IFOAs for Eden, UNE and LNE regions were granted until 31 December 2018. The IFOA for
the Southern region has been granted until 3 May 2022.
57 FNPE Act, s.40. This will inevitably lead to less transparency in decision-making. It raises the possibility that the
timber industry may breach environmental legislation without fear of third party enforcement actions. In the past, it
has often been public interest litigation that has revealed and proven non-compliance with environmental laws in
public forests, rather than the efforts of regulatory agencies. In relation to the Forestry Commission’s compliance
record, Bonyhady spoke of its “remarkable contempt for the law.” Bonyhady, T. (1993) Places Worth Keeping:
Conservationists, Politics and Law, Allen & Unwin, at 83.
58 The exception are private timber reserve provisions , and resource security provisions applying to public forestry
under the Public Land (Administration and Forest) Act 1991 (Tas), discussed in Bates, G., (1993) “Economic, Political
and Legal Problems with Resource Security”, ch.1 in Gardner, A. (ed.) The Challenge of Resource Security: Law and Policy,
Federation Press, Sydney, pp.7-14 at 9.
59 Clearfelling with retained habitat clusters (of 30m+ diameter) may be necessary in order to “rehabilitate an even aged
stand from a forest area that is moribund due to past harvesting of all merchantable stems or which has been
damaged or destroyed by fire or windstorm.” Smith, A. (1999) above n 4 at 72. Smith notes “Clearfelling with
habitat clusters should not be used where assessed stand structure is such that effective regeneration and growth
could be achieved through uneven-aged selection silviculture.”

logging on steep slopes). Particular problems are the lack of restrictions on logging of
old-growth forest and the fact that there is no requirement to retain a minimum number
of tree (fauna) hollows per hectare.
An important difference between the two jurisdictions is that Tasmania has no specific
native-vegetation protection legislation.60 Retention of native vegetation and vulnerable
forest ecosystems is not adequately addressed by the Code, which imposes few
mandatory controls on the wholesale conversion of native forests into plantations.61
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NVCA (NSW). Tasmania has no specific soil conservation law the equivalent of Soil Conservation Act 1938 (NSW).
Other gaps relating to post-logging clearing and conversion of streamside reserves for agricultural purposes, and the
uncontrolled harvesting of tree ferns (particularly for export), and the firewood logging industyr have been
addressed recently by amendments to the Code: Forest Practices Amendment Act 2001; see Hansard, 1 November 2001
at pp.41-106; Forest Practices Amendment (Tree Ferns) Act 2001.

Table 1 Comparison of Tasmanian and
NSW environmental laws affecting private
forestry
Requirement
Local government
planning
requirements

NSW
Depends on content of Local
Environmental Plan (LEP) and
TPOs; application restricted by
operation of NVCA and
RVMPs.
EIA requirements
Application of Part 4 EPAA is
sporadic due to operation of
PNF exemption; Part 5 EPAA is
unlikely to be triggered by PNF
operations.
Native
vegetation NVCA contains a PNF
conservation laws
exemption clause applicable to
most PNF operations (except
protected land).
Forestry legislation
No Code applicable to private
forests. Forestry legislation only
applies to public lands.

Tasmania
Depends on content of local area
plan.
Not Applicable if a Private
Timber Reserve (PTR).
Only that level of EIA applying
through the Forest Practices
Code if land has been declared a
PTR.
No native vegetation clearing law.

Forest Practices Code applies to
all forestry except smallest noncommercial
private-forest
operations.
Timber
rights Profit-à-prendre provisions in the Forestry Rights Registration Act 1990
legislation
Conveyancing Act; Plantations and
Reafforestation Act 1999
Threatened species Yes,
but
implementation Yes but a number of
provisions
difficulties related to 8-part test shortcomings
(e.g.
and independence of survey counterproductive compensation
results, and use of prescriptions clauses); implementation deficits
to avoid SIS preparation.
(failure to require licences).
Water
pollution Water pollution law applies to Water pollution law applies to
controls
PNF but is not applied in PNF but appears not to be
practice.
applied in practice.62 Water
pollution controls apply from
forestry
prescriptions
and
guidelines contained in the FP
Code. These also apply to very
small- scale logging (normally
exempt) in cases where land is
classified as ‘vulnerable land’.

To address the objective of evaluating the provision of legislation for ESFM, one
necessary action is to briefly to assess the legislation against the yardstick of the Montreal
62

Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994, s.53 offence of creating an environmental nuisance; Code of
Practice for Aerial Spraying and Draft Code of Practice for Ground Spraying applying to application of pesticides. Note also
restrictions on water pollution in s.126(1),(3) of the Inland Fisheries Act 1995 (Tas).

Process criteria. This is one means of testing adequacy of the legal framework to deliver
ecologically sustainable forest management. This comparison is set out in Table 2. One
such question is whether NSW and Tasmanian legislation provides sufficiently for
environmental impact assessment of PNF proposals sufficient to fulfil criterion 7.1.b.,
the “[e]xtent to which the legal framework provides for periodic forest-related planning,
assessment, and policy review that recognizes the range of forest values.”
Although formal provision is made in legislation of both jurisdictions for some level of
forest planning and environmental assessment of PNF, it is difficult to tell by reference
to such a criterion whether the objective of ESFM is likely to be achieved. The
Tasmanian legislation requires the production of forest practices plans but does not
require formal environmental impact assessment for PNF. Although the Code addresses
biodiversity and soil and water protection issues, and in that sense addresses part of the
above criterion, of recognising “the range of forest values”, it can be argued that it does
so superficially. In NSW, environmental assessment under NVCA is sporadic due to the
operation of the PNF exemption, and to patchy coverage under LEPs.
A judgement about the adequacy of compliance by the legislative framework with various
legal framework related criterion depends on the extent of obligations which are imposed
by those criterion. However each of the criterion set out in the Table below, being the
legal criterion agreed to in the Montreal Process, are themselves insufficiently specific to
provide much guidance and assistance in evaluating the adequacy of legislation. It is
evident that a wider perspective and broader points of reference are required in order to
test the likelihood of attainment of the objective of ESFM. Therefore such a broader
approach is followed in this Chapter.
Nevertheless a brief consideration of the legislative frameworks in each jurisdiction is
provided in Table 2. In some instances, it is clear that, especially when combined with
the broader discussion in this chapter, that the legislation of a particular jurisdiction fails
against a particular criterion. For example, it is evident that the Tasmanian forestry
legislation (the Forest Practices System as described in Chapter Eleven, as opposed to
the broader Resource Management and Planning System) fails against criterion 7.1.c.
which requires statutory provision for public participation, because it places limits on the
appeal rights of the public and as it provides for exemptions for the forestry industry

from Freedom of Information legislation. In particular the legislation for PTRs fails against
this evaluation criterion for public participation.

Table 2 Brief Evaluation and Comparison
of NSW and Tasmanian legislation
governing PNF against Montreal Process
evaluation criteria
Criteria description

Criterion number

Statutory provision 7.1.b
for forest planning
e.g. EIA
Statutory provision 7.1.c
for
public
participation
and
access
to
information
Statutory provision 7.1.d
for best practice
codes
Statutory provision 7.1.e
for conservation of
special values
(“maintain
or
increase the full
suite
of
forest
values”)
Institutional
7.2.e
arrangements that
provide capacity to
enforce
relevant
laws

NSW legislation

Tasmanian
legislation
Assessment
under Timber
harvesting
NVCA is sporadic plans only - no EIA
due
to
PNF
exemption,
and
patchy LEP coverage.
Private forests – some Limits on FOI.
provision for public PTRs limit third-party
participation
rights to judicial
review
No Code applies to Code is not an
PNF
ecological protection
code, e.g. permits oldgrowth forest logging.
NVCA,
TSCA, Application of the
POEO, EPAA all TSPA to forests
provide
some limited by institutional
protection.
But factors.
exemptions
and No
vegetation
administrative
clearance law.
practice reduce this Planning law excluded
potential.
by PTRs.
No agency solely Forest
Practices
responsible for PNF. Board and Forest
An Office of Private Practices
Tribunal.
Forestry which largely Also Private Forests
promotes
industry Tasmania.
development
DPP is involved in
(extension work).
prosecutions
(cf.
NSW).

LAW REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS

General ecological protection principles to guide law reform - Regional-scale
conservation assessment of private forests
The first key element of a revised regulatory framework for PNF management is that it
must take account of the need for regional-scale land-use planning, as opposed to the
piecemeal, small-scale project assessment of Timber Harvesting Plan or developmentconsent processes.
Such planning considers the need for improved biodiversity conservation by addressing
that issue on a regional scale rather than assessing some land in intense detail, and
conducting no studies at all in others. The regional approach was recommended by the
ESFM Expert Working Group. It stated: “ESFM cannot be achieved by relying on
project based assessment. For the precautionary principle to be implemented
effectively… a shift to bioregional planning …[is] essential.”63 Regional assessment
involves using techniques of remote sensing, aerial photographic interpretation, data
analysis using geographic information systems software, and rapid ground-based
biodiversity surveys, in order to determine which habitats remain and which have the
greatest conservation significance.64 The regional assessment approach is likely to be a
more efficient way to direct biodiversity conservation efforts over the long run. It should
also be seen as largely a responsibility of government, the achievement of which would
reduce uncertainty and financial risk to forest owners.
An initial land-use assessment process linked to a wider regional planning process would
help to identify key components of the private-land estate necessary for the
Comprehensive Adequate and Representative (CAR) reserve system.65 Attempts must be
made to reverse the fact, recognised by the RAC, that “most land use patterns in
Australia are the result of historical processes rather than systematic evaluations of

Independent Expert Working Group, (1998) above n 4 at 30.
Bennett, A. (1995) “Wildlife conservation and management on private land - facing the challenge”, Chapter 15 in
Bennett, A., Backhouse, G., Clark, T. (eds.) (1995) People and Nature Conservation: Perspectives on Private Land Use and
Endangered Species Recovery, Surrey Beatty and Sons, Sydney, 119-127 at 122; . Williams, R., Taylor, P., Wells, G. (1995)
, “A Resource Assessment for Off-Park Conservation in Queensland”, Chapter 33 , 223-228, in Bennett, A.,
Backhouse, G., Clark, T. (eds.) (1995) , above n 65 at 223.
65 Independent Expert Working Group, (1998) above n 4 at 47.
63
64

resource capability and values.”66 To some extent the RFA process identified HCV
private forest, even if it did not adequately provide for its protection (which is another
question which cannot be considered in detail in this thesis).67
A general principle which should guide revision of the law for PNF is to protect rare
forest types required for the CAR reserve system. These forest ecosystems were
identified during the RFA process as under-represented and ‘under-target’ on the public
land conservation estate, and therefore remnants on private land require conservation.68
In the Upper North-East region, 56 forest ecosystem types were identified as a
conservation priority on private land,69 and 85 types were identified in the LNE.70
Controls must be applied up-front to prevent logging of these rare forests on private
land. By definition any logging of these forests cannot amount to ESFM – because for
ecological sustainability to be achieved, a minimum level of reservation of rare and
threatened forest ecosystem types must be attained.
We cannot assume that all these significant parcels of forest land have been, or will be,
protected by secure management agreement under the RFA. One reason is because
governments agreed in the N-E RFA that private forests would be added to the reserve
system only with the agreement of landholders.71 Even if they were approached it is
likely that some landholders would not enter into management or acquisition
arrangements, if the Tasmanian experience with a better-funded ($30m) private-forests
reserve program is anything to go by. It is by no means clear that this target has been
achieved.72 Such parcels of important rare forest types may be inadvertently logged or

Resource Assessment Commission (1992) Forest and Timber Inquiry Final Report, AGPS, Canberra, Vol.1, at 427.
The reader is referred to discussion of the Tasmanian PFRP Private Forest Reserve Program and its modest rate of
success in convincing landholders to enter into various forms of protective agreements, contained in Chapter
Eleven.
68 In other words, there is a shortfall on public land so that the reserve system is “under-target” to achieve JANIS
objectives of 15% reservation of each forest type.
69 UN-E RFA (2000) above n 2, Attachment 2, “Private Land Conservation”, Table 1 “Private Land priorities for the
Upper North East CAR Reserve System”, at 70.
70 Commonwealth of Australia and State of NSW (2000) Regional Forest Agreement for North East NSW (Lower North
East), March 2000, Attachment 2, Table 2, “Private Land priorities for the Lower North East CAR Reserve System”,
at pp.70-73. This is less of an issue in the Southern Region of NSW, apart from on the South-West Slopes.
Interviews, Paul Packard, Manager Conservation Assessment and Data Unit, & Phil Gibbons, Conservation
Assessment and Data Unit, NPWS Southern Directorate, 23.1.01. (by telephone).
71 Upper N-E RFA (2000), above n2, cl. 2, Attachment 2, p.70. Further, it appears to be the case that NPWS has a
policy of not approaching landholders to seek to purchase land for reservation.
72 Department of Primary Industries Water and Environment Tasmania (2003) Private Forest Reserves Program: Progress:
June 2003, states that negotiations failed in relation to 50.6% of properties (45.2% involving owner not being
interested or being unwilling to commit, and 5.4% where property rejected as having insufficient values). Internet
URL <www.pfrp.tas.gov.au/progress/index.html>
66
67

cleared for plantation development or agriculture as there is certainly no statutory
mechanism in place in NSW to ensure that this does not take place.
A constraint placed upon policy-making is that the RFAs contain an attempt to lock in
the size of the private-land reserve system to the proportions identified in the RFA
process. The N-E RFA purports to block future restrictions on timber harvesting on the
basis of a bald assertion that the RFA had already created the CAR reserve system and
therefore there is no need to expand that reserve system.73 Under the terms of the N-E
RFAs, the NPWS is not permitted to force the landholder to sell property, exercising the
State’s powers of compulsory acquisition on the basis that a private native forest
ecosystem is ‘under-target’.74
An effort to undertake regional planning is currently being carried out to varying degrees
through the RVMP process under the NVCA.75 This is the secondary mechanism
identified in the N-E RFA for achieving targets for the conservation of rare-forest
ecosystems.76 Yet there are reasons to believe that it may not be a particularly strong
process for biodiversity conservation on a regional basis. This is largely due to the barelyscientific and politicised nature of the committee process, the retention of exemptions in
RVMPs, and statutory defects in the NVCA (see above, p.213).
The NVCA does not explicitly specify that the clearing of particular classes of
native vegetation of high conservation value is prohibited.77 There should be such
restrictions, at a minimum to protect endangered ecological communities. Such an
approach is supported by NSW’s obligation under its NHT Partnership Agreement with
the Commonwealth to meet the goal of ‘no clearing of endangered ecological
communities’.78

Further, the NVCA must be amended to prevent RVMPs from

Upper N-E RFA (2000) above n 2, at 20, cl.59.
Upper N-E RFA (2000) above n 2, at 72.
75 The NVCA, and in particular, its provisions regarding the making of RVMPs gives no formal recognition to the
concept of under-represented ecosystems, and the need for their conservation, apart from a statement that one of
the objects of the Act is to “protect native vegetation of high conservation value.” NVCA, s.3(c). NPWS officers
interviewed suggested that this could be achieved through informal means (such as membership of RVMCs, and
through comments made to DLWC during the development consent process) and non-regulatory programs (such as
NPWS applications for NHT funding to purchase significant private land). Interview, Mr Paul Packard, Manager,
Conservation Assessment and Data Unit, NPWS Southern Directorate, 23.1.01. (by telephone).
76 Upper N-E RFA (2000) above n 2, at 70, cl.8, Attachment 2.
77 Importantly, most RVMPs contain zones in which this is the case. Yet it will remain necessary to constrain selfassessment approaches (eg. leaving the task of identification of HCV forests and vegetation to landholders) and to
ensure scientific overview and review of adequacy of plans (i.e., so that all areas of under-represented forest are
included in protection zones, not just a portion). To address clearfell forestry leading to agricultural or plantation
development, the NVCA could be amended to place a ban on the clearing of endangered ecological communities.
78 Natural Heritage Trust Partnership Agreement between Commonwealth and NSW, Attachment A: Bushcare: the National
Vegetation Initiative Clause 5.1(c), Performance Indicators: Environment, at p.3-4.
73
74

excluding the operation of the TSCA, particularly s.91 licensing in order to retain the
operation of the TSCA in zones where the RVMP does not require consent. 79

Inclusion of ESD obligations
A further principle that should guide the revision of the regulatory framework for PNF
in NSW is that legislation should require decision-makers to make decisions consistent
with the principles of ESD, including the precautionary principle.80 Such an approach is
necessary if we are to avoid actions that may contribute to the decline of species particularly given the usual inadequacy of information about the distribution of
threatened species.
Although at least 47 NSW Acts contain reference to the principles of ESD,81 the
dominant tendency is merely to include the principles within objects clauses;82 or
somewhat better, to require that decision-makers “take into consideration” or “take into
account” the principles in making a particular decision. However, in order to implement
policies of ESD more strongly, amendments are necessary so as to require decisionmakers to make decisions consistent with ESD principles.
Does the legislation applying to PNF in NSW require enough of administrators to
implement ESD principles? Unfortunately it seems not. For example, although the
principles are included in legislation such as the EPAA, it is in a long list of objects, one
of which is merely to “encourage” ESD.83 This is only indirectly effective as an
exhortation to decision-makers, and provides only a limited route for judicial review of
decision-making on the grounds of failure to take into account relevant considerations.84
Such clauses are ambiguous, deal with inherently difficult concepts, and do not amount
This will require amendment of NVCA, s.20(1)(a) which excludes the operation of TSCA s.91 licensing in those
instances where an RVMP does not require consent for PNF and other vegetation removing activities.
80 A definition of the precautionary principle is contained in the Commonwealth Environment Protection and Biodiversity
Act 1999, s.391(2). See also s.6(2), Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991 (NSW). Gullet, W. (1997)
“Environmental Protection and the Precautionary Principle: A Response to Scientific Uncertainty in Environmental
Management”, 14 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 52.
81 Stein, P. (2000) “Are Decision Makers too Cautious with the Precautionary Principle ?” 17(1) Environmental and
Planning Law Journal 3-23 at 9.
82 For example, the NVCA states that its objects are to be achieved “in accordance with the principles of ESD.”
NVCA, s.3.
83 EPAA, s.5(a)(vii).
84 Willoughby CC v Minister (1992) 78 LGERA 19; Packham v Minister for the Environment (1993) 80 LGERA 205; Rohde, J.
(1995) “The Objects Clause in Environmental Legislation: The Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) Exemplified”
12 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 80-96 at 81.
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to a substantive requirement for changes of behaviour.85 This situation was summarised
by Justice Stein who observed that: “the inclusion of the [ESD] principles in Australian
legislation has been largely confined to objectives of statutes without any real guidance to
decision makers as to whether and how to apply the core principles or what weight to
give them.”86
In terms of the primary legislation in the case study, the objects clauses of the TSCA,
EPAA and NVCA all refer to the principles of ESD – with, respectively, objects to
“promote” or “encourage” and to achieve the other statutory objectives “in accordance
with” ESD.87 Yet whilst objects clauses are a relevant consideration for decision-makers,
they do not prevail over express provisions of legislation in the event of a conflict. The
prospect of a decision being invalidated on this basis is remote, as objects clauses do not
prevail over specific legislation.88 For example, at odds with provisions for ESD are the
NVCA’s exemption provisions. Also in conflict is the ‘routine agricultural activities’
exemption of the TSCA (p.343). Such provisions must be
significantly modified to enable ESFM. By providing that ESD principles have primacy,
legislators can ensure that the principles are accorded particular weight by decision
makers, rather than being merely one of a series of factors to be taken into account.89
The second, but less common way in which the precautionary principle has been
incorporated into NSW legislation is through a requirement that decision-makers must
take the principles of ESD into consideration in decision-making under certain provisions.
Some selected provisions in the TSCA and EPAA require this. First, in deciding whether
or not to grant concurrence to a proposed development consent that has involved SIS
preparation, the Director-General (D-G) of NPWS is obliged to take into account the

They could be drafted in stronger terms as a duty “to further the objects of the Act” or a duty “to achieve the
objects of the Act” rather than a duty “to take the objects into consideration”. Fisher, D. (2000) “Considerations,
Principles and Objectives in Environmental Management in Australia” 17(6) Environmental and Planning Law Journal
487-501 at 500.
86 Stein, P. (2000) above n 81 at 3.
87 NVCA, s.3(c) states that the objects of the Act are: “”to protect native vegetation of high conservation value… in
accordance with the principles of ecologically sustainable development” . The EPAA, s.5(a)(vii) states that “the objects of
this Act are to encourage …ecologically sustainable development.”. The TSCA in s.3(a) provides that the objects of the
Act include “to conserve biological diversity and promote ecologically sustainable development”.
88 This conclusion is based on application of the interpretative maxim "generalibus specialia derogant" – the principle
that a provision of general application gives way to a specific provision. This principle is applied when interpreting
provisions that occur within a single piece of legislation.
89 For example the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1975 (Qld), s.25 sets out “the cardinal principle to be observed in the
management of national parks”. This point is made in Fisher, D. (2000) “Considerations, Principles and Objectives
in Environmental Management in Australia” 17(6) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 487-501.
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principles of ESD.90 Further, in deciding whether to grant a licence to harm or pick
threatened species, the D-G of NPWS is obliged to “take into account” eight factors
including the principles of ESD, as well as the likely social and economic consequences
of the decision.91 Finally, some LEPs require selected consent authorities to “have regard
to” or “take into consideration” the principles of ESD when making decisions under
Part 4 EPAA.”92 Yet under the majority of consent-decision-making where LEPs are
not drafted in this manner, one turns to the EPAA itself, where consent authorities are
not explicitly required to take the principles of ESD into account when considering a
development application.93
Even where the particular statute has not incorporated the precautionary principle (e.g.
the NPWA ) it can be applied as a principle of statutory interpretation. For example, in
Leatch it was applied it as a principle of ESD by the NSW Land and Environment
Court.94 There are grounds for arguing that the principles of ESD can be considered as a
principle of interpretation applicable in the event of statutory uncertainty, on the basis of
their inclusion in many recent international environmental treaties and conventions, and
the principle of consistency with international law. The courts are entitled and even
perhaps obliged to interpret and apply statutes in conformity with customary
international law. 95

EPAA, s.79B(5)(g); 112D(g) refers to the principles of ESD as defined in Protection of the Environment Administration
Act 1991, s.6(2). A similar requirement applies in the Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999 which has objects (s.3) of
promoting “plantations on essentially cleared land”… “consistently with the principles of ecologically sustainable
development; and see: s.15(6)(g) regarding consideration of the principles during concurrence decision making.
91 TSCA, s.97(1)(e).
92 For example, under the Dubbo LEP, “All applications for consent for development must be assessed with regard to
the Principles of ESD in terms of land, air and water resources, biodiversity, and waste and noise matters.” Dubbo
LEP 1998: Urban Areas, cl.7. Similarly, in Tasmania, local government, in determining planning permit applications,
is bound to take the sustainable development objectives of the RMPS into account. s.51(2)(a) Land Use Planning and
Approvals Act 1993. This is based on the meaning and intent of the Land Use Planning and Appeals Act (LUPA), as
interpreted in reported decisions of the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal. However, the forest
practices system is outside the RMPS, and is not subject to its objectives.
93 EPAA.s.79C.
94 Leatch v Director-General NPWS (1993) 81 LGERA 270; Stein, (2000) above n 81 at 12; Stein, P., Mahony, S. (1999)
“Incorporating Sustainability Principles in Legislation”, in Leadbeter, P., Gunningham, N., Boer, B. (eds.),
Environmental Outlook No.3: Law and Policy, Federation Press, Sydney, 57 at 67.
95 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273; Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 72 ALJR 722 at
para [97]. Even where the principles of ESD are not explicitly incorporated in legislation, there are grounds for
arguing that the principles of ESD can be considered as a principle of statutory interpretation. This is partly in
recognition of the fact of their inclusion in virtually all recent international environmental treaties and conventions.
Barton, C. (1998) “The Status of the Precautionary Principle in Australia: its Emergence in Legislation and as a
Common Law Doctrine”, 22 Harvard Environmental Law Review 509. Sir Anthony Mason has argued that the
precautionary principle is on its way to becoming accepted as a norm of customary international law: Mason, A.
(1996) “The Influence of International and Transnational Law on Australian Municipal Law”, 7 Public Law Review 20.
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As the interpretation of the content of the precautionary principle by Australian courts
has been somewhat inconsistent to date,96 it is necessary to require more of decisionmakers than encouraging them to consider statutory objects or requiring them merely to
consider the principle as a strategy for its implementation. Instead, the legislation should
require that decisions be consistent with ESD principles. This is a stronger requirement and
there is greater likelihood that inappropriate decisions will be invalidated under such a
provision.97
An even more strongly-precautionary approach could be achieved if legislation were to
place the onus on forestry proponents to justify to some reasonable extent that proposed
activities represent only a minimal threat to biodiversity. This approach reverses the
burden of proof, and shifts the burden of information-gathering onto the proponent, the
primary party to gain economically from the proposed activity. It represents an
adaptation of the ‘polluter pays’ principle to the biodiversity preservation context.98 This
could be done in practice by linking the precautionary principle explicitly to requirements
for surveying for threatened species, and by strengthening the 8-part test and SIS
provisions.
The core idea is to put the burden of proof onto industry once certain thresholds of
precautionary standards are crossed. For example, if a threshold of 15% minimum
vegetation-cover retention was required throughout a region, and proposed logging was
to involve permanent native vegetation removal of a given threatened forest ecosystem
type thus compromising the achievement of that 15% target, then onus-of-proof
requirements would be triggered.99 This approach is applied in Western Australia in
relation to land clearing (where a 20% vegetation retention standard applies).100

Compare the treatment of the precautionary principle in Leatch v Director-General NPWS (1993) 81 LGERA 270 at
281-283; with that applied in Nicholls v D-G of NPWS (1994) 84 LGERA 397 at 418-421; or Greenpeace Australia Ltd. v
Redbank Power Co Pty Ltd (1994) 86 LGRA 143, and Bridgetown /Greenbushes Friends of the Forest Inc v Executive Director
of Conservation and Land Management (1997) 18 WAR 102, per Wheeler J.
97 Parramatta City Council v Hale (1982) 47 LGRA 319 per Moffit J. See also Farrier et.al. (1999) 3rd edition at 59, 200.
98 Pearce, D.; Markandya, A.; Barbier, E. (1990). Blueprint for a Green Economy, Earthscan Publications, London, at 156162; OECD (1975) The Polluter Pays Principle: Definition, Analysis, Implementation, OECD, Paris.
99 The Smith Report recommended that “a minimum portion (15%) of total forest cover on the property and 15% of
each Forest Ecosystem present on the Property should be retained to provide refuge areas for fauna populations
reduced by harvesting.” Smith, A. (1999) above n 4 at 61.
100 Gunningham and Young, “Mixing Instruments and Institutional Arrangements for Optimal Biodiversity
Conservation”, at 132 in Hale and Lamb (eds.) (1997) Conservation Outside Nature Reserves, Centre for Conservation
Biology, University of Queensland.
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SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR BEST PRACTICE PNF REGULATION
This section discusses options for reforming the legislation governing PNF in NSW, with
the objective of creating a legal framework sufficient to ensure that ESFM practices take
place.
The approach adopted is first to discuss the various statutory mechanisms by which
requirements could be delivered and later to discuss the necessary content of legislation
for ESFM. Four possible approaches to the regulation of PNF are considered.101 The
rationale for examining the range of options is that improved legislative frameworks
should assist in achieving improved on-the-ground environmental management.102
The regulatory models explored are:103
•
•
•
•

Comprehensive forest-practices code or legislation;
Uniform cross-tenure forestry regulation;
Multi-program regulations (i.e. application of several environmental laws of general
application); and
Single-Act integrated natural resource management.

Option 1. Comprehensive forest-practices code or rules
The simplest option, and one that could be introduced quickly, requiring relatively little
impact on the existing suite of legislation for public and plantation forestry in NSW, is
the enactment of specific-purpose private forestry legislation, i.e. a Private Forests Act.
Although NSW already has provisions that specifically apply to PNF in particular
situations in the form of the protected lands provisions, the need to expand and improve
upon these provisions was recognised in 1995 by Dr Hannam of DLWC, who proposed
an ecologically-oriented Private Forests Act. 104

Self-regulation and co-regulation models are explored later in Chapter Thirteen.
Department of Land and Water Conservation (NSW) (1998) Natural Resource Management under the NZ Resource
Management Act: Implications for NSW, DLWC, Sydney at 23. Another school of thought is to emphasise the role of
defective political and agency will power to confront problems. Even with the best legislative framework
implementation may still be ineffective. However an improved statutory framework will make implementation and
enforcement easier. (see Chapter Thirteen).
103 This is aside from the other policy options, which include: incentives and stewardship payments, voluntarism (eg
voluntary conservation agreements unaccompanied by incentive payments), pure self-regulation, education
programs, correction of perverse economic incentives.
104 Hannam (1995) “Environmental Law and Private Property Management in New South Wales”, paper presented to
2nd Annual Defending the Environment Conference, Australian Centre for Environmental Law, University of Adelaide, 2021 May 1995, Published Conference Proceedings, 223-250 at 250.
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102

Briefly, the approach would be to have a Private Forests Act contain the broad principles,
with specific details contained in a Forest Practices Code (a Regulation under the Act),
which in turn would require preparation of THPs. A compulsory forest-practices code105
applying to private land was recommended by the NSW ESFM Expert Working
Group,106 and agreed to in the RFA for North-East NSW.107
This model for law reform is likely to fail on several counts. First, the achievement of
ESFM goals (such as ‘maintain the full suite of forest values’) would not be guaranteed,
as Forest-Practices Codes are Codes for forestry and logging, and rarely resemble
comprehensive ecological protection Codes.108 A Forest-Practices Code would be
unlikely to give a high priority to nature and biodiversity conservation, but instead place a
priority on timber production.
Secondly, this model for law reform neglects to address the proposition (above) that
there are considerable benefits in integrating forestry legislation across tenures. Still, if
comprehensive regulation for PNF were to be introduced, ideally one would ensure that
such a law would incorporate explicit objectives in relation to biological diversity, land
degradation, greenhouse gas sinks, protection of catchments and water quality.109 In this
sense such a law would amount to more than a Forest Practices Act, and would contain
elements of an ecological protection law.

Option 2. Uniform cross-tenure forestry regulation
This model, of uniform cross-tenure forestry regulation, would involve legislation and
regulations in order to amalgamate the requirements for forestry activities in public and
private forests (and perhaps, with some modifications for plantations) in NSW. As
discussed above, a uniform framework of laws for both private and public forests has the

Note that the word “Code” does not imply a voluntary code of practice with which compliance is optional. In
Tasmania, compliance with the Code of Forest Practice is not voluntary. Failure to observe provisions of the Code
amount to a breach of the Forest Practices Act 1985. This is the case because Forest Practices Plans must be prepared
in accordance with the Code, and s.21(c) states that it is an offence for a landowner to cause forestry operations to
take place in contravention of a certified forest practices plan.
106 Independent Expert Working Group, (1998) above n 4 at 76, Recommendation 3.26.
107 Upper N-E RFA (2000), above n 2 at 20, clause 57.
108 Some claims have been made that the British Columbia Forest Practices Code provides sufficient protection for
biodiversity: Fenger, M. (1996) “Implementing biodiversity conservation through the British Columbia Forest
Practices Code”, 85 Forest Ecology and Management 67-77. However, there is no space here to evaluate the validity of
such claims.
109 This approach to native vegetation conservation law in general was suggested in Anton, D. (1999) “ The Draft
Framework for the Management and Monitoring of Australia’s Native Vegetation”, 56 Impact 5-6 at 6.
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benefit of simplicity. In particular it will reduce complexity for regulated parties and thus
a higher degree of familiarity with requirements would result.
Its disadvantage involves failure to provide for the specialised circumstances of each
tenure and activity, to the extent that these differences are regarded as material. Further,
if it were to involve applying the level of regulation of public forestry to PNF, the private
land industry may have great difficulty in complying given the complexity of the
Integrated Forestry Operations Approvals conditions applied to public forestry. It must
be recognised that there exists an implicit in-kind subsidy (by way of regulatory and
bureaucratic compliance assistance) of public forestry by the Forestry Commission and
other agencies, that assists companies operating on public land to comply with applicable
legislation.

Option 3. Modify present approach of multi-program regulations
Another approach is to continue to regulate PNF under the present broad regulatory
framework. This involves applying specific-purpose statutes aimed at particular
environmental problems rather than a single Forest Practices Act. The multi-Act approach
is described in the USA as multi-program regulation.110 Its advantage is that it applies
specialised legislation to address specific environmental issues such as biodiversity
protection and pollution prevention. The danger of such a multi-program approach is
that it can degenerate into a complex and conflicting mess in which overall policy
objectives are not clear and where responsibilities are confused. This approach was
critiqued earlier in this Chapter, and Part Two provided some evidence of these types of
difficulties in NSW during the study period.
The reformed version of this model involves applying existing specific purpose statutes
but in a more coordinated, integrated and effective manner, in the form of ‘integrated
natural resource management legislation’. Instead of one specific forestry Act, a number
of general-purpose Acts continue to be applied, but with improved statutory methods of
inter-agency coordination, such as concurrence provisions.
Legislation for integrated NRM applies more or less uniformly across a number of
sectors of industry that affect the environment, allowing a more effective, coherent and
110

Ellefson, P.; Cheng, A.; Moulton, R. (1997) above n 16.

ecologically-based approach. The difference from the present multi-Act approach and
integrated NRM is that a more holistic approach to environmental protection is taken.111
The inter-connections between decisions taken in one industry sector and the impacts
elsewhere are addressed. Under the sectoral approach, insufficient notice is taken of the
fact that actions taken in one industry may affect the environment in another sector. The
integrated approach addresses the potential for cumulative environmental impacts, an
issue that is not properly considered where there exists poorly-coordinated legislation
and policies, each addressing particular environmental issues.
The ideal model for integrated NRM legislation involves statutes being integrated via the
introduction of shared statutory objectives, linked administrative approvals, and uniform
appeal mechanisms and processes. This involves incorporating shared ESD principles
and objectives across all the legislation, and allocating these principles a high priority
within the legislative framework.
The Tasmanian Resource Management and Planning System (RMPS) is a good example
of the possibilities for the integration of legislation through the mechanism of shared
statutory objectives. The main features include common statutory objectives including
ESD, and a common appeals tribunal. Yet the Tasmanian model for PNF is not included
as the Forest Practices System stands outside the RMPS. That PNF system has different
statutory objectives to the RMPS, a different appeals system, and is protected by a
number of exemptions from aspects of Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation.112

The introduction of integrated NRM principles in NSW legislation
The introduction of an integrated NRM approach to PNF in NSW would not be an
isolated step, as there has already been a substantial trend towards integrated approaches
to environmental management in recent NSW legislation. These include:
regional planning provisions under Part 3 of the EPAA;
the integrated development approvals process under the EPAA (Part 4, Division 5); and
integrated catchment management under the Catchment Management Act 1989.

Jänicke, M. (2003) "Environmental Policy Integration: The Easy Idea, that Is All but Easy to Implement", paper to
International Conference on Environmental Policy Integration and Sustainable Development, 19-20 November,
ANU, Canberra.
112 For example, members of the public have no right to access THPs for private land under the FOI Act (Tas).
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The most recent example of efforts by NSW legislators to create integrated NRM
systems has been the inclusion of a specific statement within the objects clause of the
new Water Management Act 2000 (NSW). One of its objects is “to integrate the
management of water sources with the management of other aspects of the environment,
including the land, its soil, its native vegetation and its native fauna.”113 On the other
hand it can be argued that when it comes to the integration of procedures and systems,
that Act does little.

Streamlining v. integration
Reforms aimed at streamlining legislation must be distinguished from those aimed at
integration of a legislative framework. Streamlining involves simplification of legislation,
and an effort to reduce duplication and overlap between regulatory requirements. The
challenge in reforming the law in this area is to rationalise and streamline the legislative
framework without an associated reduction in environmental protection standards or
public participation rights.114
In relation to public forestry and plantation forestry, the NSW Parliament has taken steps
to streamline legislative requirements.115 Approvals for public forestry were reformed by
the Forestry and National Park Estate Act 1998, creating a system of integrated forestry
approvals (above p.12).116
Another example of the “one-stop shop” approach to approvals in the forestry arena is
the Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999, applying to plantation forestry only. Plantation
operations on authorised plantations and exempt farm forestry are not subject to the
provisions of Parts 4 and 5 of the EPAA, and thus the potential requirement for local
government approvals has been removed.117 The operation of EPIs such as LEPs is
Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s.3(f). Whether the WMA contains sufficient mechanisms to achieve this
objective is a question which must be addressed elsewhere. Another example is the Catchment Management Act 1989
(NSW), which attempts to deal with water quality issues on a holistic basis, using the tool of Total Catchment
Management, defined as the "coordinated and sustainable use and management of land, water, vegetation and other
natural resources on a water catchment basis.” (s.4).
114 The number of agencies and laws involved is only one indicator of the adequacy of the legislative framework adequate consideration of environmental values is another - and it is doubtful that the Tasmanian legislation is
superior in this respect. Questions are raised by litigation such as Giles, Weston & Dudley v Break O’Day Council & T.
Denney TAS RMPAT No. J115/2001, 23 July 2001 (‘Dudley’).
115 Other forestry legislation enacted in recent years to provide special exemptions for sections of the forestry industry
from selected provisions of NSW environmental laws has included Timber Industry (Interim Protection) Act 1992 and
Timber Plantations (Harvest Guarantee) Act 1995.
116 Forestry and National Park Estate Act 1998, s.25,26,27.
117 PRA, s.47(1); 47(2)(a),(b).
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restricted,118 as are TPOs.119 Likewise, authorised plantations are exempt from specified
provisions of seven other environmental laws.120 In addition, open standing provisions
have been removed and replaced by a power for Ministerial civil enforcement.121
Further, the NVCA also played its part in streamlining NSW law in relation to
environmental requirements in two respects. It reduced the role of local government,
through the RVMP process.122 It also excluded the TSCA’s licensing provisions that
would have applied in those instances where the RVMP did not require development
consent.123
These examples show that there have been attempts to introduce principles of integrated
NRM into NSW legislation. However some of the amendments involved have been
motivated more by a desire to streamline existing laws than to create integrated
legislation for ESD.124

Specific reform proposals for NSW under existing legislation
Present arrangements could be greatly improved by identifying a “lead agency” with
expertise in PNF matters, with provision for the effective and efficient coordination and
implementation of statutory responsibilities by all agencies involved. The present de facto
lead agency, DLWC,125 could be explicitly granted a mandate for regulating PNF, and the
responsibility for addressing a broader range of issues arising from PNF whilst dealing
with applications for consent to conduct PNF operations. The lead agency would be
PRA, s.47(2)(c). A debate took place over a proposed amendment which would have prevented clearing in areas
zoned environment protection under an LEP. It was rejected by government members who argued that the NVCA
states that an RVMP must provide for the same level of environmental protection as that provided by an EPI.
Hansard, Legislative Council, 30.11.99, p.124.
119 PRA, s.47.
120 PRA, s.47-53; excluding the operation of the NPWA , TSCA, Heritage Act 1977, Rivers and Foreshores Improvement Act
1948, Soil Conservation Act 1938 (Part 2A), Fisheries Management Act 1994, Local Government Act 1993, s.124.
121 PRA, s.57.
122 This may not be a bad thing in terms of removing additional layers of regulation, which may not have contributed
greatly to increased environmental protection. Nevertheless, given the exemptions under the NVCA, planning law
has provided an important safety net in some local government areas.
123 NVCA, s.20(1)(a).
124 Similarly, the “integrated development” reforms of the EPAA in 1997 streamlined the systems for approvals under
8 separate Acts with the development consent process under the EPAA. Where development consent is required
for a development and one or more other permits or approvals are also required under eight specified Acts, (EPAA,
s.91(1)) then the consent authority must forward a copy of the DA to the other approval body. That body is
required to give the consent authority “the general terms of any approval proposed to be granted by the approval
body in relation to the development.” EPAA, s.91A(2), 92(2). The regulatory body retains its capacity to refuse to
grant approvals, as long as it responds to the request of the consent authority within the designated time limit.
125 DLWC was amalgamated with the former Department of Urban Affairs and Planning in May 2003 to form DIPNR
the Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources. This thesis refers however to DLWC, as that
was the agency at the time of writing, and during the study period January 1998- December 2002.
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required to consult with other agencies including the NPWS, DUAP and local
government, EPA, and NSW Fisheries. Under this model, the main approval would be
granted in the form of development consent under Part 4 EPAA by DLWC under the
NVCA. The scope of the PNF exemption would be drastically curtailed, only being
applicable to very small, low-risk, non-commercial operations, as in Tasmania. Further,
this model could make use of planning instruments such as RVMPs in order to achieve a
measure of integration. If RVMPs universally required consent for PNF, then their
exclusion of the operation of LEPs (i.e. local government planning controls) would pose
no problems in terms of diminution of standards.
If a curtailed PNF exemption were to be retained, an associated notification mechanism,
as proposed in Chapter Six should be put in place. This would require those seeking to
rely on a restricted PNF exemption to notify regulators who would at least retain the
option of requiring consent. The notification approach is applied in most States in the
United States to private forestry (at a minimum).126
Further, more use could be made of the existing concurrence mechanism in the
EPAA.127 Under this mechanism, specialist agencies not having primary carriage of the
approvals process remain in a position to comment upon and ultimately veto any
unacceptable proposals for development. DLWC could be required to take greater
account of threatened species issues by reason of making it the consent authority, rather
than the Minister (see Chapters Six and Seven). This step would have the function of depoliticising the approvals process and of granting a concurrence role to NPWS regarding
threatened species (rather than a mere right to Ministerial level consultation).128
A key question is whether local government should have any role in the approvals
process. At present there is unnecessary potential for overlap between the developmentconsent requirements of local government under LEPs and those of the DLWC under

Alaska, California, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington. Some of these
jurisdictions do not attach to the notification requirement a requirement for submission and approval of a timber
harvesting plan (THP): Connecticut, Idaho, Maine (for smaller operations less than 50 acres), New Mexico.
127 EPAA, s.79B. This was recommended by Independent Expert Working Group, (1998) above n 4 at 46, 152.
128 This was the position under the former SEPP 46, which was abandoned under pressure from rural interests keen to
reduce the influence of NPWS in the approvals process.
126

the NVCA. However, RVMPs, once made, will cut local government out of the
picture.129

INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Another aspect of law reform concerns the institutions called upon to implement
legislation, particularly in relation to any new statutory framework. So far, only minor
institutional reforms have been made in NSW at the time of writing in relation to PNF
forestry.130 An Office of Private Forestry was established in November 1999, in order to
implement the Plantations and Reafforestation Act and to encourage investment in the
private forest sector in NSW.131 The main intent has been to provide extension services
to forest owners, and to raise the profile of PNF within government, rather than to
assume or coordinate regulatory roles.
An important general principle that can be applied to improve the institutional
framework is to separate forest management from forest regulation.132 The ESFM Working
Group identified difficulties for agencies such as NPWS and DLWC that carry out both
regulatory and extension and education roles. It wrote: “Regulatory responsibilities can
lead to confrontation which undermines the extension role…this tension could be
leading to a reluctance to implement… regulatory responsibilities”.133 To this end, the
Group recommended the creation of an Office of the Forest Regulator, and a separate
Office of the Forest Manager (applying across all tenures).134
In terms of the identification of institutions for specific regulatory models, the choice is
broadly between a “mega-department” on the one hand, or on the other coordinating the
decision-making of a number of specialist agencies which supplement and oversee the
This is unless local government makes a special application which is approved, in order to have its LEP provisions
apply in place of the RVMP. Hurrell, J. (1998) “Clearing Controls And Rural Councils : Growth Opportunity Or
Role Reversal?” 3(1) Local Government Law Journal 135-141 at 140-1. Against proceeding totally under RVMPs, are
arguments that local government is democratically elected, as opposed to RVMCs. If this view is preferable, then
PNF could be regulated under LEPs and REPs instead of under RVMPs. This would involve, leaving the regulation
of PNF to local government, something which raises other issues of certainty and dependability. An alternative is to
amend the legislation so that neither the RVMP provisions nor the LEP provisions apply to PNF at all. Instead, one
set of approval requirements could be applied to PNF throughout NSW under the NVCA. There would be room in
this case to take into account (as do the DLWC ‘Best Operating Standards’ for PNF) the regional variations
involved in management of coastal and tablelands forests, river-redgum forests in the South West, and cypress pine
forests in the North West).
130 In July 2003.
131 The OPF is now situated within the Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources.
132 Independent Expert Working Group, (1998) above n 4 at 42.
133 Independent Expert Working Group, (1998) above n 4 at 42.
134 Independent Expert Working Group, (1998) above n 4 at 151-152.
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decision-making of the lead Department where necessary, e.g. where the PNF proposal
involves a moderate-to-high degree of environmental risk.
One argument in favour of retaining a number of agencies is that there is a need for
specialist agencies - such as the NPWS, with expertise in threatened species protection
and management - which can act as a strong advocate for conservation which may
otherwise not be given significant weight. The multi-agency approach would require less
radical reform than the introduction of one single natural resource management statute
which would replace existing legislation and administrative agencies. It would be
necessary merely to introduce a system by which one “lead agency” would be identified
to deal with PNF matters. Further, if linked approval and concurrence processes are built
in, the difficulties in achieving integrated natural-resource management under a multi-Act
system may not be as great as imagined.
However under the single-agency approach, employing ‘mega-departments’, the danger
exists that biodiversity concerns will be allocated lower priority than timber-production
objectives, upon the merger of specialist wildlife agencies with forest-management
agencies. The retention of specialist agencies is important as it ensures that particular
ecological issues will have a ‘voice’ in decision making. Still, with the multi-agency
approach, a danger remains that the objectives of achieving integrated natural resource
management and creating a less-convoluted regulatory process may not be achieved. To
some extent these problems can be addressed by ensuring inter-agency coordination in
approvals processes, eg. by concurrence mechanisms and integrated licensing
mechanisms.
The argument frequently presented in favour of industry-specific legislation is that it is
necessary that only those with a detailed knowledge of the industry (e.g. foresters) should
be regulating it. Clearly one needs to have a specialist agency with specific expertise in
forestry matters, but it is not automatically the case that this approach is only open to a
stand-alone forestry agency. Other agencies are perfectly capable of employing staff with
background and expertise in forestry, and expertise in management of the environmental
impacts of forestry operations.

ESSENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
Ultimately, questions of ideal institutions and statutory arrangements are probably of
lesser importance than those of content of legislation. All models, if they are to deliver
ESFM outcomes, must contain sufficient specific environmental-protection requirements
Thus it is necessary to discuss the content of legislation required to achieve ESFM. These
questions of content are perhaps more important than the mechanisms of the law. The
pervasive challenge is to ensure that law reforms do not result in less environmental
protection. Changes must require ESFM, not just an elegantly-streamlined legal form.

Restricting Exemptions
As a general principle, any legislative framework for PNF will be ineffective in achieving
ESFM outcomes if it does not apply uniformly to the majority of logging operations. In
particular, issues will arise if either the law is subject to many exemptions, such as the
NVCA, or the law is patchy in its coverage or application - as is currently the case with
LEPs under the EPAA. It is impossible to delegate the decision as to what amounts to
ESFM to industry itself, as the concept of ESFM is highly contested and subject to many
interpretations.
The key case in point is the PNF exemption, discussed in Chapters 5 & 6. The continued
operation of the exemption in its present form enables the logging of high-conservationvalue (HCV) forest where it exists on private land, without any approval requirements.
Part Two showed that the fall-back positions of the LEP or the section 91 licensing
provisions of the TSCA were frequently not applied in the study regions during the study
period. In order to adopt a precautionary approach to the environmental risk associated
with PNF, it will be necessary to curtail the availability of the exemption or to repeal it
altogether.

Suggested approval process – Timber-Harvesting Plans
In place of an exemption (or, representing a slight improvement, a notification
requirement) it would be preferable to require all commercial PNF operations to seek
development consent from DLWC, and as part of this process to submit a timberharvesting plan (THP) for approval before operations may lawfully proceed. Such planpreparation is a standard approach to forestry management in many jurisdictions, even

on private land, both in Australia and internationally.135 THPs typically contain a
description of the forest to be logged, its location, the volume of timber to be extracted,
the method of logging, the purpose of the logging, the location of roads, log dumps and
snig tracks, and the proposed restocking approach. Such plans require approval before
operations may lawfully proceed. As we have seen, Tasmania requires preparation and
approval of Forest Practices Plans for all but the smallest-scale non-commercial
operations.136
Yet if the legal framework for PNF is to be sufficient to enable attainment of ESFM
standards, it must require more than just preparation of a THP. The plan must require
more than cursory attention to environmental matters, more than a ‘tick the box’
approach. This is the danger with a document whose prime purpose is to facilitate,
document and plan timber-gathering. It must contain genuine environmental protection
conditions, which could be derived from an ESFM Forest Practices Code with
appropriate links to specialised legislation and agencies.137
THPs would be subject to specified minimum standards including requirements for
vegetation and habitat surveys, and requirements for vegetation retention, particularly
retention of hollow-bearing habitat trees and for forest connectivity across tenures.138
Control of the loss of habitat trees in forestry operations could be achieved through the
threat abatement process in the TSCA.139
In NSW, the Smith Report into the PNF exemption proposed a new regime for
oversight of PNF involving a two-part system of approvals - both timber-harvesting
plans, and a longer-term PNF management plan. The first requirement would be that
timber-harvesting must take place in accordance with an approved Plan. Such a Plan
could only be prepared by licensed forest-planning consultants, and would include
See Wilkinson (1999) above n 12 at 43-60. California requires detailed THPs for all private forestry. Ellefson, P.;
et.al. (1997), above n 16 at 195-209.
136 On a broader level of analysis the approach of requiring THPs has similarities to requirements for production of a
‘native vegetation management plan’ under native vegetation law in SA. Native Vegetation Act 1991 (SA), s.28(3)(b),
requires all applications for consent to clear vegetation to be accompanied by drawn up in accordance with
guidelines issued by the Native Vegetation Council. The property planning approach is also reflected in provisions
for preparation and approval of property management plans under the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (NSW).
However, such plans would not amount to a genuine approval requirement, as it provides an exemption to the
licensing requirements and offence provisions of that Act.
137 All the above comments are pertinent to the recently released DLWC document, “Best Operating Standards for
PNF”, proposed the use of “operational plans”, essentially THPs by another name. DLWC (2001) above n 3 at 3.
138 Independent Expert Working Group, (1998) above n 4 at 76.
139 Independent Expert Working Group, (1998) above n 4 at 66.
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prescriptions for environmental protection and maintenance of all forest values. THPs
would be merely part of a more detailed PNF Management Plan (PNFMP) also requiring
DLWC approval. This plan would involve more detailed assessment of a broader range
of environmental and silvicultural factors over a longer time horizon. Approval of
further Harvesting Plans in the future would be subject to satisfactory completion of
post-harvest monitoring of conditions laid out in the first harvesting plan.140 Similar
approaches are applied in New Zealand.141
An important aspect of THP preparation requirements is to ensure that the content of
THPs is of sufficient quality and accuracy. Under a Code of Practice in NSW, all
commercial-scale PNF operations could be required to submit THPs prepared by
licensed forest-planning consultants.142 Such THP plans would be subject to a
requirement for development-consent approval by the regulatory agency following multiagency review to include matters such as threatened species assessment.143 Such interagency review, and also in some circumstances, public review, of THPs for proposed
PNF operations is applied in Washington State, USA. This approach of inter-agency
review was also recommended by the NSW ESFM Expert Working Group which
suggested that THPs be reviewed utilising the EPAA’s concurrence mechanism.144

Ecological Code requirements
Hannam, in proposing an ecologically-oriented Private Forests Act suggested that it must
require maintenance of ecological integrity of private forests, and address questions of
appropriate silvicultural practice such as restocking, regeneration and road-building. He
argued that it should contain detailed environmental assessment provisions, which take
account of selective and integrated logging as well as outright vegetation clearance.145
Further improvements would involve ensuring that a Private Forests Act incorporates
explicit objectives in relation to biological diversity, land degradation, greenhouse gas
sinks, protection of catchments and water quality.146 In this sense such a law relating to
Smith (1999) above n 4.
Ministry of Forestry New Zealand (1997) Indigenous Forestry: Sustainable Management: A Guide to Plans and Permits, MAF
Indigenous Forestry Unit, 38pp.
142 Associated with this type of requirement is a requirement that all forestry operations must be carried out only by
certified foresters and forest supervisors. This approach applies in Connecticut: see Ellefson (1997) above n 16.
143 DLWC (2000) Summary of Comments on Desktop Audit of Exemptions (Stage 1 Review of Exemptions), Comments by
DLWC and RVC only, internal unpublished document, 115pp.
144 Independent Expert Working Group, (1998) above n 4 at 45.
145 Hannam, I. (1995) above n 104 at 250.
146 This approach to native vegetation conservation law in general was suggested in Anton, D. (1999) above n 109 at 6.
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the conservation of forests on privately-owned land would be more than simply a Forest
Practices Act, but also would contain elements of an ecological protection law.
Notably the ESFM working group recommended that the preparation of THPs must be
subject to strict guidelines regarding systematic flora, fauna and habitat surveying as a
baseline for plan preparation. Other contextual controls directed at maintaining forest
connectivity across tenures, and meeting CAR reservation targets for inadequatelyprotected forest types were also recommended. The report recommended that THPs be
based on a Code specifying minimum standards relating to the silvicultural method, the
length of rotation, and regeneration, as well as biodiversity, soil and water requirements.
147

One approach is to ensure parity of PNF standards and prescriptions for threatened
biota with those for public land forestry. In public forests, the NPWS require searches by
qualified persons for trees of particular fauna value prior to logging, including for nests
and roosts. The principle of requiring the same threatened species protection
prescriptions or conditions on private land as in public forest would involve more
rigorous and detailed requirements relating to a far wider range of species.148 By contrast,
DLWC’s best operating standards for PNF contain only some generalised exclusions
from particular habitat types, e.g. rocky outcrops. They are not as rigorous as the
standards applied to public forestry.
The Code must contain the following elements, if it is to amount to an ESFM Code
rather than a logging Code: minimum tree retention rates, and rotations, as well as
constraints on clearfelling; steep-country logging149, protection of old-growth forest; and
a comprehensive series of exclusion zones for specific fauna and flora species on a par
with prescriptions applied on public land.
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The preparation of such plans needs to be

subject to strict guidelines regarding systematic flora-, fauna- and habitat-surveying as a
Independent Expert Working Group, (1998) above n 4 at 13.
In N-E NSW within public forests the National Parks and Wildlife Service (1999) requires pre-logging surveys for
threatened species be undertaken, exclusion zones (varying from 20m to 300ha) be established: for nests and roosts
of 11 separate birds, all subterranean bat-roosts, all tree bat-roosts, and all flying fox camps; around records of 6
other animal species; around specified habitat for 15 animal species; and around 213 plant species. Upper North East
Integrated Forestry Operations Approval, Terms of Licence under the TSCA 1995: Upper North East Region, Appendix B.
149 As well as constraints on the use of cable logging technologies that are typically employed to facilitate steep-slope
logging: see Prest, J. (1997) “An Environmental Plus? The Introduction of Cable logging in NSW”, 18(3) Bogong 6-8.
150 Pugh, D. (2001) above n 3 at 13 : “In NE NSW, the NPWS requires that pre-logging surveys for threatened species
be undertaken and that exclusion zones (varying from 20m to 300ha) be established: for nests and roosts of 11
separate birds, all subterranean bat-roosts, all tree bat-roosts, and all flying fox camps; around records of 6 other
animal species; around specified habitat for 15 animal species; and around 213 plant species.”
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baseline for plan preparation. The DLWC ‘best operating standards’ for PNF fail to
contain these specific requirements, the incorporation of which would be necessary to
achieve ESFM on private land.151

Old-growth forest logging restrictions
The protection of old-growth forests is a central requirement in a regime for ESFM of
native forests. This importance was recognised by the RAC Inquiry which concluded
that:
Logging of old-growth forest ... potentially violates the precautionary principle of sustainable
development in that an irreplaceable resource is being destroyed. Although the ecological
attributes of old growth may be regenerated in the long term (a century or more), the values
152
associated with the pristine attributes cannot be replaced.

Sustainable-yield requirements
If ESFM objectives such as “maintain the full suite of forest values” are to be achieved it
is necessary to ensure that PNF is subject to requirements regarding minimum treeretention. This issue is an important one in the PNF context given the evidence
(although inconclusive) concerning harvesting patterns. Smith, the DLWC’s private
forestry consultant wrote: “Historically private property forestry has been dominated by
high intensity exploitative harvesting as a precursor to land clearing or land sale. There
has been little focus on regeneration silviculture and management of private forests to
provide an ongoing income stream.”153 Similarly, Wilson (1995) in his survey of the
impact of the river redgum industry in NSW identified a substantial proportion of ‘once
over’ logging on private land involving ‘maximum economic utilisation’ of stands with
little long-term view to silvicultural or environmental considerations.154
This problem could be corrected with an explicit legislative limit on harvesting, that is, up
to maximum sustainable yield (preferably, maximum ecologically-sustainable yield), as in
Victorian legislation applying to public lands and British Columbia.
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However, given

the lack of inventory documentation surrounding private forests this requirement may
Pugh, D. (2001) above n 3 at 13.
Resource Assessment Commission (1992) above n 66, Vol 1 at 28.
153 Smith, A. (1999) above n 4.
154 Wilson, N. (1995) The Flooded Gum Trees: Land Use and Management of River Red Gums in NSW, Nature Conservation
Council of NSW, Sydney, at 51.
155 Forests Act 1958 (Vic), s.52D which provides for Ministerial review of sustainable yield rates every 5 years or lesser
intervals if deemed necessary. See also s.52A. These sustainable yield limits must be taken into account when
granting harvesting licences: s.52C. British Columbia Forest Act, section 28 (1)(g). This provision that timber harvesting
must be limited to the maximum annual sustainable yield was recently removed.
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well prove impossible in the short term. Recently proposed DLWC standards contain no
minimum retention rates and no constraints on clearfelling.156

Adequate biodiversity-surveying requirements
Another central requirement in a regime for ESFM of native forests is adequate
protection for threatened species of fauna and flora. The legislative framework must take
sufficient precautionary measures because there are numerous threatened species that
exist on private forested land.157
The issues with identification of threatened species are most crucial in relation to
threatened plants, as their distribution is poorly known, and they are difficult to identify.
As was discussed in Chapter Nine, it is unlikely that landowners will have full knowledge
of the threatened species that occur on their properties Further, given the economic
incentives to conceal the existence of threatened species it would be optimistic to assume
that landholders would declare the existence of such species even if furnished with
sufficient information. On this basis, if the ESFM target of maintaining the “full suite of
forest values” is to be achieved, it is necessary to require surveys by qualified and
accredited botanists of properties on which PNF is proposed.158 There are no legislative
controls at present to ensure that biodiversity surveys are conducted by suitably qualified
and accredited ecologists.159 Further, neither the NVCA nor DLWC’s proposed
standards for PNF require threatened species surveys to be conducted only by qualified
experts. One solution would be to require independent audit or oversight of threatened
species assessments, for example of proponents’ 8-part test documentation.160
It may be argued that sufficient protection exists in the operation of the TSCA through
the NVCA, and, where the NVCA does not apply, through LEPs, or section 91
licensing.

However in view of the gaps in coverage due to exemptions and

implementation deficits, this is unlikely to be sufficient.

Pugh, D. (2001) above n 3 at 7.
The N-E NSW CRA identified 215 fauna species as being of conservation concern. Of these, expert panels
identified 102 as having logging posing a significant threat to their regional populations, with 138 threatened by
clearing, 34 threatened by the loss of large logs and 33 requiring hollow-bearing trees. Pugh, D. (2001) above n 3 at
p.16.
158 Pugh, D. (2001) above n 3 at 17.
159 Chapter Nine discusses the effect of recent amendments to the TSCA which require accreditation for those
preparing SIS but not for those preparing 8-part test documentation.
160 Independent Expert Working Group, (1998) above n 4 at 63.
156
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Legislation can provide for a more strongly-precautionary approach if it requires
surveying before and monitoring after approval of a logging operation.161 Post-logging
monitoring enables comparison of actual performance with the requirements of
conditions attached to development consent. It is unlikely that the application of the
development consent process under the EPAA and NVCA will be sufficient to ensure
that such monitoring will take place on a routine basis.

Information- and inventory-gathering
Another problem in the PNF arena in NSW is the lack of inventory and management
information flowing to government.162 At present there is insufficient documentation of
PNF. Although NSW law already contains a requirement that all timber coming from
PNF operations be branded or marked as coming from private property,163 it appears to
be the case that neither timber processors nor the Forestry Commission have sufficient
incentives to compile accurate and comprehensive data in relation to PNF. Parsons, a
forestry consultant to the Rural Industries R&D Corporation recounts the following
observations of industry insiders:
According to Dyason (pers. comm. 1997) estimated [sic] that actual removals [from private
property] may be underestimated by as much as 50%. About three quarters of sawmills on the
north coast of New South Wales obtain timber from private native forests (O'Neill
pers.comm.1997).164

With better regulation there would be better documentation and therefore enhanced
capacity to make judgements about the extent of PNF activity. Better inventory
information would enable evaluation of the sustainability and cumulative impact of
PNF.165 It would also enable monitoring of the practices and compliance of private
forestry contractors. According to Wilson “The potential for contractors to deliberately
undervalue timber taken from properties (a practice that, it has been suggested, is
currently occurring) may be reduced.”166

Deville, A.; Harding, R. (1997) Applying the Precautionary Principle, Federation Press, Sydney, at 72.
Pers.comm., Dr Ross Florence, ANU Forestry (School of Resource and Environment Studies), 14.10.03.
163 Forestry Regulation 1999 (NSW), cl. 61.
164 Parsons, M. (Fortech Pty Ltd) (1999) Native Forests on Farms, RIRDC Publication No. 99/21, Rural Industries
Research and Development Corporation, Barton, ACT, 44pp, at <http://www.rirdc.gov.au/reports/AFT/AAC22A.doc> at p.17. Mr. Robert Dyason is a forest owner and forest policy commentator, and member of Australian
Forest Growers and Mr. Mark O’Neill is a consultant forester and principal of Northern NSW Forestry Services.
165 Wilson, N. (1995) above n 154 at 51.
166 Wilson, N. (1995) above n 154 at 51.
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CONCLUSION
Building upon the analysis presented in Part Two, this chapter has reviewed the existing
NSW legislation applying to PNF against forest-specific evaluation criteria. On this basis,
the standard of the present legislative framework for PNF is not considered adequate to
facilitate ESFM, principally because of failures to provide adequately for the
“conservation of the full suite of forest values” and failure to apply the principles of
ESD.
Four possible models for reform of PNF regulation were considered. This included a
Forest Practices Act and Code; a conventional multi-Act framework; a multi-Act system for
integrated natural resources management; and a single-Act approach to integrated natural
resources management.
In relation to the first model, it was argued that mere introduction of a Forest Practices
Act and Code which applied to private land, whilst representing an improvement, would
be insufficient to achieve ESFM in NSW. The main reason is that such a Code is likely to
over-emphasise timber-production objectives, whilst paying insufficient attention to
detailed environmental-protection requirements.
Regarding the second model, the multi-Act strategy, it was agreed that there is an urgent
need to rationalise and clarify the present multi-Act legal framework for PNF, which is
convoluted. Arguments for streamlining the legislative framework were examined and
considered to be sound, but only where they do not involve a diminution of
environmental-protection and public-participation requirements. However, it was argued
that a number of recent exercises in this vein in NSW have involved exclusions of
various provisions of environmental laws that have enabled public participation in the
administration of environmental law.
In order to resolve some of the issues arising from the complexity of the existing
legislation, a number of measures were suggested. Principal amongst these was for
legislative drafters to make greater use of the Part 4 EPAA development consent process
(including a requirement for THP preparation for all PNF) and its associated
concurrence provisions, whilst clearly identifying a ‘lead agency’ for PNF matters in
NSW.

However, it was argued that either the third or fourth law reform options, of multi-Act
or single-Act integrated natural-resources management legislation, are probably the most
appropriate vehicle for delivering ESFM. Whether they in fact deliver ESFM depends on
what they contain. As argued earlier, questions of ideal mechanisms perhaps are of lesser
importance than those of content of legislation. All models, if they are to deliver ESFM
outcomes, must contain sufficient specific environmental-protection requirements.
There exist a number of essential components of a legal regime for ESFM on private
land. These include, first, a precautionary approach to decision-making, including
incorporation of the principles of ESD into all relevant legislation, particularly an
obligation to make decisions consistent with the precautionary principle. Secondly,
drafters of the new framework need to ensure that an integrated approach to naturalresources management is considered. Thirdly, comprehensiveness of coverage of the
PNF industry is a key aspect of future proposals, with removal of exemptions a priority.
Yet this is not the end of the story. The broader debate over how to improve
environmental regulation by replacing or complementing it with a range of quasiregulatory (i.e. information-based, market-based, property rights, and self-regulation)
measures is ongoing. Some commentators argue that the very decision to apply a direct
regulatory approach - as opposed to other approaches – is of limited effectiveness. For
example, the Australian Forest Growers have argued that various permutations of selfregulation systems will be a more effective means for balancing economic and
environmental outcomes than conventional regulation.167
Chapter Thirteen examines arguments that the regulatory failures revealed in Part Two
regarding NSW regulation justify moving to a policy of self-regulation. The theoretical
literature regarding the environmental regulation in the context of off-reserve
conservation is reconsidered in light of the findings of the case studies.
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Australian Forest Growers (1999) Promotion of private forestry in NSW: a policy paper, AFG, February, internet
publication accessed at <www.afg.asn.au>, on 10.10.2000.

Chapter Thirteen

REFLECTIONS ON REGULATORY THEORY
This chapter makes some closing remarks about the broader implications of the case
studies of PNF for environmental law and regulation. It is not an excessive generalisation
to state that the dominant approach to PNF in NSW during the study period was a halfhearted reliance upon conventional command regulation that was of limited effectiveness
in achieving ESFM.
In light of such findings, we must return to debates considered in Chapter Four about
the appropriate role for conventional regulation in achieving conservation objectives on
private land. When confronted with sub-optimal outcomes, many will suggest that
regulation be abandoned as ineffective in the PNF context. Yet in reconfiguring the
regulatory framework for PNF we need to be sensitive to the implications of this
particular context, especially the goal of biodiversity conservation on private land.
Also considered is the question of how conventional regulation can be modified to make
it more effective. For example, could greater levels of third-party enforcement be
encouraged? How viable would it be to apply ‘outcomes-based regulation’ or selfregulation alone, or in combination with command regulation?
Identifying likely issues with the application of complementary regulatory instruments to
PNF is a major task in reconfiguring regulatory policy. This Chapter also considers the
literature setting out preconditions for effective self-regulation. A suggested ‘ideal mix’ of
regulatory, self-regulatory, motivational and economic instruments for the PNF context
is presented.

REGULATORY FAILURES OR FAILURE TO REGULATE?
Part Two revealed a picture of poorly integrated laws, patchy implementation and
instances of defective enforcement in NSW applying to PNF. One way of explaining
these shortcomings is to apply the concept of regulatory failure. This is “regulation which

leads to outputs and outcomes which are perceived not to be in the public interest”,1 or
more simply, where legislation fails to achieve its stated objects.
If a conclusion is drawn that we have an instance of regulatory failure, the question can
be raised whether it follows ipso facto that conventional regulation should be dispensed
with. Few in the academic context actually go so far as to state this, most instead
suggesting that other instruments should be applied in combination with regulation.
However, it remains a political reality that self-regulation is often proposed as an
alternative to conventional regulation.2 Self-regulatory and voluntary compliance
standards frequently arise as an alternative to regulation.3 Industry lobby groups regularly
advocate the avoidance of “command and control” regulation in the environmental
context.4 In a recent policy document the NSW Farmers Association decried “command
and control measures…. [as] often inefficient, ineffective, and inequitable.”5 The PNF
industry in NSW has argued that government should avoid command and control and
should pursue voluntary and self-regulatory policy instruments.6
These critics of regulation may query why it is necessary to research how to improve
frameworks of conventional regulation. The answer is as follows. Rather than proceeding
from a starting assumption that “command and control is ineffective”, it is better to
conduct empirical research into the precise causes of regulatory failures, and to act
accordingly to address those causes. Multiple causes of regulatory failure were identified
in the PNF environment in Part Two. The inappropriate application of the tool of
conventional regulation to particular problems is only one potential cause (among
Lodge, M. (2001) Competition, Innovation and Regulation: The Regulatory State and Policy Failure: Regulatory Regimes in Britain
and Germany, Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation London School of Economics, Paper for the 51st Political
Studies Association Conference, 10-12 April 2001, Manchester, United Kingdom.
2 NSW Farmers Association (2003) “Farming Profits and the Environment”, The Primary Report, June, 4pp.
3 Grabosky, P., Gant, F. (2000) Improving Environmental Performance, Preventing Environmental Crime, Australian Institute of
Criminology, Canberra, Research and Public Policy Series, Report No.27 at 23. One academic writing for the
financial press advised her business readers that “introducing voluntary industry standards…can also pre-empt or
prevent further regulation”. Howard, E. (1998) “Keeping Ahead of the Green Regulators”, Australian Financial
Review, 16 December 1998, p. 8; Walker, L., Cocklin, C., LeHeron, R. (2000) “Regulating for environmental
improvement in the New Zealand forestry sector” 31 Geoforum 281-297 at 290, citing interviews with the
representative of the NZ subsidiary of US multinational Weyerhauser Ltd, stating that the impetus for selfregulation in that country has come from the desire to avoid the experience of the US forest industry with
regulation. It was stated that industry are “keen to avoid regulatory constraints that forestry companies in the Pacific
Northwest are facing”.
4 Schrecker, Ted (1990) “Resisting Environmental Regulation: The Cryptic Pattern of Business-Government
Relations”, in Paehlke, R., Torgerson, D. (eds.) Managing Leviathan: Environmental Politics and the Administrative State,
Belhaven Press, London, at 165-199; see also Doyle, T., McEachern, D., (2001) Environment and Politics, 2nd edition,
Routledge, London, at 163.
5 NSW Farmers Association (2003) above n 2.
6 Office of Private Forestry NSW (2002) Submission to the Private Native Forestry Reference Group: “As-of-right model for
private native forest regulation”, 9.5.02, 1pp. Garsden, R. (2002) Submission to the Private Native Forestry Reference Group:
Draft Exemption G1 – The Cyclist Analogy Model, Australian Forest Growers (NSW Branch).
1

many).7 A contrary viewpoint that must also be contemplated is that in many instances
regulation of PNF in NSW has not failed, as it has not been seriously or comprehensively
attempted.8 Instead of regulatory failure, an alternative picture of a failure to regulate can
be painted.
Regulatory failures in the PNF context in NSW have been largely due to the poor
organisation and design of the legislative framework, the deleterious effect of the
NVCA’s broad exemption for PNF, as well as patterns of ineffectual implementation
and enforcement of environmental laws.
Certainly, as Cane has observed, command regulation is “currently rather out of
fashion”.9 But is the present distaste for regulation merely a matter of fashion? To what
extent is it based on evidence? This is an important question. Worldwide, there is an
increasing demand that legislators and government regulatory agencies transcend the
political amnesia and ad hoc application typical of environmental policy, to apply a
strategy of evidence-based policy making.10 With the prevailing preference for market
and incentives approaches as superior to regulation, can we rely upon those methods to
achieve an equal or greater level of environmental protection? Those proposing the use
of market mechanisms or self-regulation also need to provide empirical evidence of the
contexts in which those approaches are effective.
Even if mechanisms such as economic incentives or self-regulation are introduced, there
is also a reasonable consensus in the literature that it will remain necessary to retain a
baseline of conventional command regulation (‘a regulatory safety-net’) to provide a
reliable and dependable regime for biodiversity protection.11 Particular difficulties

Lodge (2001) above n 1 at 4; citing Breyer, S. (1983) Regulation and its Reform, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Pers. Comm., Dr Tim Bonyhady, CRES, ANU, 20.2.2001, by telephone. In a different context, Farrier wrote in 1990:
“We cannot conclude that coercive legal regulation of vegetation destruction to protect wildlife habitats and plant
communities has failed, because such a policy has never been fully implemented [in NSW].” Farrier, D. (1990)
“Regulation of Rural Land Use: Coercion or Consensus?” 2(1) Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 95-124 at 123.
9 Cane, P. (2001) “Are Environmental Harms Special?” 13(1) Journal of Environmental Law 1.
10 Dovers. S.; Connor, R. (2004) Institutional Change for Sustainable Development, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 264pp;
Marston, G. and Watts, R. (2003) “Tampering with the Evidence: A Critical Appraisal of Evidence Based Policy”
3(3) The Drawing Board: An Australian Review of Public Affairs 143–163; Fazey, I., Salisbury, J. (2002) Evidence based
environmental management: What can medicine and public health tell us?, 24 June 2002, 29pp at 13-17, National Institute for
the
Environment,
Australian
National
University,
internet
published
at
<http://www.anu.edu.au/nie/publications/ebem_workshop_summary.pdf>.
11 Tasmanian Public Land Use Commission (1996) Inquiry into areas to be reserved under the Tasmania-Commonwealth Regional
Forest Agreement: Background Report Part F: Mechanisms for achieving conservation management on private forested land: a discussion
paper, Tasmanian Public Land Use Commission, Hobart, p.8; Haines, F.; Sutton, A. (1997) “Crime Prevention and
White Collar Crime: Some Lessons for Regulatory Theory”, ch. 6 in O’Malley, P.; Sutton, A., Crime Prevention in
7
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inherent in the task of biodiversity conservation discussed in Chapter Four, such as
scientific uncertainty, require preventative regulation.
As has been noted elsewhere, it is ultimately futile to characterise the regulatory policy
debate in ‘either/ or’ terms.12 A combination of conventional command regulation and
alternative approaches will probably provide a more successful conservation outcome
than either of these two mechanisms alone. It is widely agreed that pure self-regulation is
likely to fail (see Chapter Three). Most academic authors, even where they place different
emphasis on the issue and present different perspectives, still advocate a combination of
approaches. For example, Curran argues that it is necessary to offer incentives for
biodiversity conservation but that these should be offered alongside regulation and
education measures.13 Similarly, Pittock argues that whilst incentive approaches are
important, they are not sufficient to protect native vegetation. He writes: “despite any
number of voluntary measures and incentives, nowhere has the rate of vegetation
destruction in Australia been substantially reduced without a complementary regulatory
safety net to control the minority of landholders to persist with clearing.”14
Nevertheless, at this time, the attention of the majority of commentators has been
focused on the promise of new mechanisms - not how to make existing regulatory
frameworks more effective. For example, Curran devotes considerable time to exploring
the potential of tradeable biodiversity credits, and chooses not to explore the details
concerning issues of regulatory effectiveness, compliance and enforcement.15 Similarly,
other Australian commentary on mechanisms for improved biodiversity protection in
Australia, such as the highly influential report Reimbursing the Future, which explored the
potential of incentive and market mechanisms, spent comparatively little time analysing
the extent of regulatory failure and the reasons for it. That analysis of biodiversity policy
options, if only by the sheer weight of its emphasis and focus, clearly favoured the
application of voluntary and market-based measures over the regulatory approach. At the
same time as it recommended a combination of a ‘safety net’ of conventional regulation,
Australia: Issues in Policy and Research, Federation Press, Sydney 138-163 at 157; Gunningham, N, and Rees, J. (1997)
“Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective”, 19(4) Law and Policy 363-413, passim.
12 Gunningham, N., Grabosky, P. (1998) Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p.9.
13 Curran, D. (2000) “The Conservation of Biological Diversity on Private Property in NSW”, 17(1) Environmental and
Planning Law Journal 34-59 at 34.
14 Pittock, J. (1998) “'How will the new Native Vegetation Laws work ? a critique from the environmental lobby”,
Environment Defender’s Office (NSW) (ed.) Caring For the Land : Conference Proceedings, EDO, Sydney at 5; Robson,
D. (1998) “Exemptions and Codes of Practice under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997”, Environment
Defender’s Office (NSW) (ed.) Caring For the Land : Conference Proceedings, EDO, Sydney.
15 Curran, above n 13.

it recommended market-based solutions for biodiversity conservation.16 In relation to
this, Tulau made the incisive observation that:
[I]t is unclear in practice how the self-regulatory approach is to be reconciled with the
simultaneous recommendation for clearing controls.17

This question of how a regulatory ‘safety net’ is to be applied in conjunction with other
measures is generally glossed over in the literature (with some exceptions).18 The
difficulty is that environmental laws must specify the situations in which approvals are
required, and the situations in which they are not.19 In some instances, certain
instruments are inherently incompatible. It may not be possible to ‘have it both ways’. In
other cases, it may be possible to supplement regulation with mechanisms such as
compensation and/or stewardship payments, offering incentives for environmental
protection, whilst simultaneously mandating a bottom line of protection.20
Yet in order to progress such debates, we must consider issues concerning regulation and
self-regulation at a lower level of generality than merely debating in the abstract whether selfregulation or regulation should apply.21 The most appropriate mix of instruments will
depend on the particular context for which we are attempting to design regulatory policy,
and the particular threats and risks posed.22 Different cultural and ecological
considerations, as well as questions of the characteristics of the industry to be regulated
should suggest the combination of policy and regulatory instruments most likely to be
effective. This led Gunningham to ask, “how, in what circumstances, and in what
combinations, can regulation, and economic mechanisms (and other instruments) achieve
Young, M., Gunningham, N., Elix, J., Lambert, J., Howard, B., Grabosky, P., McCrone, E. (1996) Reimbursing The
Future : An Evaluation Of Motivational, Voluntary, Price-Based, Property-Right, And Regulatory Incentives For The Conservation
Of Biodiversity, Biodiversity Series, Paper No.9., Parts 1&2, Commonwealth Department Environment Sport and
Territories, Canberra at pp.72, 147. See e.g. General Recommendation 18.
17 Tulau, M. (1997) From SEPP 46 to the Native Vegetation Conservation Bill 1997 : A Case Study in Regulatory Realignment,
unpublished thesis submitted for Masters in Environmental Law, Macquarie University, p.61.
18 The notable exception is Gunningham and Grabosky (1998) above n 12, at p. 422-448, where a table and detailed
consideration of compatible and incompatible instrument combinations is presented.
19 This raises a fundamental problem with Braithwaite’s approach of tailoring regulatory strategy to each particular
entity (ie. firm) being regulated: where self-regulation or regulation can be applied according to a pyramid strategy
based on past performance. This is that the approach runs foul of the rule of law and principles of consistency of
the law. There is a legal difficulty in proposing that one have different versions of the law for different actors.
20 Farrier D, (1995) “Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives for Management or Compensation for Lost
Expectations” 19(2) Harvard Environmental Law Review 303-408; Farrier, D. (1995) “Policy Instruments for Conserving
Biodiversity on Private Land”, in Bradstock et.al. (eds.) Conserving Biodiversity: Threats and Solutions, Surrey Beatty & Sons, Sydney,
at 337-359.
21 Gunningham argues: “Since there are unlikely to be any generally applicable ‘optimal mixes’, analysis which is located
at a much lower level of generalisation is likely to yield the most fruitful results.” Gunningham, N. (1996)
“Biodiversity: Economic Incentives and Legal Instruments”, ch.15 in Boer, Fowler, Gunningham (eds.)
Environmental Outlook No.2: Law and Policy, Federation Press, Sydney at 232-233.
22 Ayres, I., Braithwaite, J. (1992) Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, Oxford University Press, New
York; Gunningham, N., Young, M. (1997) “Toward Optimal Environmental Policy: The Case of Biodiversity
Conservation” 24(2) Ecology Law Quarterly 243-298 at 298.
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optimal policy outcomes?”23 Importantly, the objective here is not to draw ‘big-picture’
lessons for theory from the case studies of PNF regulation, nor to present a definitive,
‘last-word’ policy-package for PNF in NSW. What is appropriate in this context may not
be appropriate or applicable in other contexts.
The regulatory theorist Malcolm Lodge cautioned against “arguments which suggest that
institutional rearrangements will lead to a ‘perfect’ system”. He warned that under any
system, both regulators and regulated “actors have always the incentive to ‘drift’ or
‘shirk’, and therefore any regulatory system is bound to ‘failure’ ”.24 Therefore it is
important that whichever model is proposed, one eye is trained on the question of
systems for accountability; and that an awareness of the importance of implementation
and enforcement is maintained.

SELF-REGULATION AND ITS VARIANTS
Aside from advocacy of self-regulation that is politically and economically motivated (eg.
to reduce ‘red tape’ and ‘green tape’25 and compliance costs for industry), the academic
rationale for self-regulation is to assist environmental regulators operating within an
ongoing context of budgetary restraint to modify the regulatory process so as to make it
less costly to administer.
On this basis, it is often suggested that governments incorporate elements of selfregulation within an overall statutory framework. The application of self-regulation is
not an either/or question. Elements of self-regulation can be incorporated within a
regulatory framework, and the regulation of Tasmanian PNF is a case in point. The main
question is whether that approach will deliver ESFM with more certainty and
dependability, whilst addressing the economic issues involved with regulating productive
land uses.
The range of possible approaches to the intensity of regulation of PNF can be set out on
a regulatory continuum, ranging from pure self-regulation with no externally imposed

Gunningham, N. (1996) above n 21 at 232-233.
Lodge (2001) above n 1 at 4, 22.
25 This terminology is employed by the Association of Mining and Exploration Companies (Inc) (AMEC) (2003)
Briefing Note: Australia’s Mining Monthly AIG World Risk Survey “Australia the Best – Again! “ MARCH 2003
(refers
to
World
Investment
Risk
Survey
2002)
at
p.2.
Internet
published
at
<http://www.amec.asn.au/docs/papers/minerals/Briefing_Note_-_AIG_Survey.pdf>.
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requirements (i.e. exempt PNF), to ‘full regulation’.26 In between lie models of coregulation (self-regulation involving industry associations) and company-based enforced
self-regulation (see Chapter Three).
The three main aspects of the regulatory function that may be privatised comprise (i) the
rule-making function, (ii) the implementation of rules (such as through the application of
approval processes), and (iii) the enforcement of rules. There are a number of different
possible permutations. For example, in the Tasmanian forest practices system, the ruleimplementation function is privatised but the rule-making and enforcement functions
remain the responsibility of the public sector. The Tasmanian forest practices system is a
form of firm-level enforced self-regulation where self-regulatory aspects are integrated
within the framework of the Forest Practices Act. In particular, companies are entitled to
employ their own Forest Practices Officers (FPOs) who have the power to devise and
approve their own forest practices plans.
It would be inappropriate to allow industry to define its own version of acceptable rules
for PNF, and it would also be inappropriate to allow it to have primary responsibility for
enforcement. This is particularly the case in a context where there is a risk of ongoing
environmental consequences such as biodiversity decline and biodiversity loss.

PRECONDITIONS TO EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION
Could some form of self-regulation be applied in NSW to PNF yet still enable ESFM
goals to be achieved? Some may suggest a shift to a Tasmanian-style system,
incorporating substantial elements of self-regulation. However, we need to examine the
factual pre-conditions necessary to create a climate in which self-regulation approaches
might produce the same or better environmental results than conventional regulation.27
The literature describes certain factual circumstances that tend to favour industry acting
to voluntarily establish systems of industry –association-administered self-regulation
(described in Chapter Three as co-regulation). According to Gunningham and Rees, this
At its extreme ‘Full regulation’ would entail a complete prohibition on an activity. One step less than this is to allow
an activity with consent and subject to conditions of consent.
27 Buckley (1994) set out a four part test that must be satisfied by proposed industry self-regulatory schemes if they are
to represent an improvement on conventional regulation. These are that the self-regulatory system must provide
improvements in four areas - the degree of environmental impacts, the rate of improvement in environmental
performance, the cost of improving environmental performance and the equity of the distribution of those costs.
Buckley, R. (1994) “Environmental Self-regulation in Industry”, 11(1) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 3-5.
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type of voluntary self-regulation has as a necessary but not sufficient pre-condition for its
success, “a strong natural coincidence between the public and private interest in
establishing self-regulation”[emphasis added].28 Yet often in the environmental protection
arena, problems arise because a gap exists between industry self-interest and the public
interest. The empirical evidence suggests that steps to create a formal program of selfregulation will only be taken under external pressure.29
Certain tests are set out in the literature regarding whether a particular industry is suited
to the introduction of industry association-based self-regulation. These concern the
number of firms in the industry, their size, the stability and culture of the industry, as
well as the strength, capability and authority of industry associations.30 This form of selfregulation is most likely to work where there are few firms, particularly where the
industry is dominated by a small number of large firms, and where there are strong
industry associations and a business culture sympathetic to ensuring compliance with the
requirements of self-regulation schemes.31
The second precondition for effective self-regulation is the domination of each sector by
large firms, where the costs of exiting from the industry are high, because the entry and
investment costs at stake are considerable. This makes it difficult for fly-by-night
operators to enter the industry, and means that participating firms have a large
investment at stake, one they wish to protect from the reputation-damaging antics of
‘cowboy’ firms. In such a context, industry participants have an incentive to monitor
each other’s performance.32
However in the NSW PNF context, a significant proportion of landowners are only
temporary or part-time participants in the industry, with most private forests not being
Gunningham, N, and Rees, J. (1997) above n 11 at 406.
Gunningham, N, and Rees, J. (1997) above n 11 at 390.
30 Gunningham, N, and Rees, J. (1997) above n 11 at 390; Gunningham, N. Sinclair, D. (2002) Leaders and Laggards:
Next-Generation Environmental Regulation, Greenleaf Publishing, Sheffield, UK; Priest, M. (1997) “The Privatisation of
Regulation - Five Models of Self-Regulation”, 29 Ottawa Law Review 233-302 at 239.
31 Gunningham, N, and Rees, J. (1997) above n 11 at 392.
32 In this context, Grabosky, P., Gunningham, N. (1998) above n 12 at 400-401 recount Rees’ proposition that selfregulation worked in the US nuclear industry since Three Mile Island disaster because companies were “hostages of
each other” with the entire industry under threat of being closed down: Joseph V. Rees (1994) Hostages of Each Other:
The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, University of Chicago Press, May. Whether this claim about
the effectiveness of self-regulation in the nuclear industry is supported by the evidence is another question; see:
Riccio, James (2001) “The Voluntary Regulation of the Nuclear Industry” comments before the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's Regulatory Information Conference, March 14 2001, Capital Hilton Hotel, Washington, DC.
(Senior Policy Analyst, (Critical Mass Energy & Environment Program), Public Citizen.
<http://www.citizen.org/cmep/energy_enviro_nuclear/nuclear_power_plants/reactor_safety>.
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actively managed under formal forest management plans, but rather opportunistically
exploited as an alternative income source in times of drought or depressed commodity
prices.33 Thus the primary objective of many landholders intending to conduct forestry
may be to conduct it (or commission it) in order to supplement on-farm income, or as a
precursor to land sale or plantation development.
The third indicator of an environment in which industry self-regulation can work
effectively is where there is a history of effective cooperation between regulators and
industry and amongst industry members.34 There must be a well-organised industry
association that is receptive to environmental protection initiatives,

35

and willing to

36

develop a credible EMS and to promote its use. However in NSW PNF there appears
not to be a business culture sympathetic to strong industry self-regulation. The two
relevant industry associations, the Forest Products Association and Australian Forest
Growers are not sufficiently well organised, resourced, or willing to control their
members in favour of environmental protection. The likelihood of strong industryassociation action to control free-riding is unlikely. Nevertheless, there is such a strong
aversion to government regulation within the NSW PNF sector that a tightly-constrained
system of enforced self-regulation may seem attractive to industry if confronted with a
choice between that approach and tighter conventional regulation.
Will members of the industry be willing to participate in detecting breaches? The
likelihood of an honest and open partnership between industry and government in NSW
to enforce rules applying to PNF is slim. The adoption of a self-regulation-based strategy
for PNF could even be counterproductive. A regional DLWC Manager involved in
regulating PNF suggested that the introduction of self-regulation would feed existing uncooperative anti-regulatory private property rights ideologies amongst PNF owners.37 In
such a context, the finer points of subtle complementarity between instruments of
regulation and bounded self-regulation would be lost.

Thompson, D. (1999) Agroforestry from Existing Timber Resources on the Northern Tablelands, A report for the Rural
Industries Research and Development Corporation /Land and Water Resources Research and Development
Corporation /Forest and Wood Products Research and Development Corporation Joint Venture Agroforestry
Program, RIRDC Publication No 99/15, Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation, Barton, ACT.
<http://www.rirdc.gov.au/reports/AFT/99-151.pdf>, at p.66.
34 Priest, M. (1997) above n 30 at 301-302.
35 Gunningham, N. Sinclair, D. (2002) above n 30 at 36.
36 Gunningham, N. Sinclair, D. (2002) above n 30 at 57.
37 Interview, Mr. Rob Adam, DLWC Goulburn, 1.3.01, by telephone, notes on file.
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The likelihood of introducing a system of co-regulation where industry associations fulfil
enforcement and compliance roles should be dismissed as unrealistic in NSW. This is
largely because of the lack of a strong industry association willing to establish and
enforce significant environmental rules against individual member firms. This point is
established by the fact that the industry, under the leadership of the Forest Products
Association (FPA) engaged in some work in 1993 on a self-regulatory Code described as
a Draft Private Property Logging Protocol in negotiations with the precursor of DLWC.38
However, the draft it devised never came into force. In 1995, the EPA stated that the
protocol was still “being developed” and noted that the intention of the protocol was “to
promote standards and to self-regulate harvesting operations on private property”.39
However it appears this Protocol was never adopted by the industry in any systematic
way. Nor did government endorse it as a sufficient policy instrument for management of
PNF, instead electing to apply SEPP 46 and the NVCA to the industry, albeit with an
exemption for PNF.

Enforced self-regulation models in Forestry
However, there are other more limited forms of self-regulation that require
consideration. We must examine the appropriateness and viability of a much more
limited objective of introducing Tasmanian-style enforced self-regulation schemes to
PNF in NSW. In this case, we need to consider systems of enforced self-regulation
rather than industry-administered schemes of co-regulation. Under the Tasmanian forest
practices system, the application of self-regulation by forestry companies and landholders
employing licensed Forest Practices Officers who devise and approve their own Forest
Practices Plans, is bounded with a framework of external regulatory control enabling
prosecution of those found to have transgressed the requirements of the Forest Practices
Act.
For various reasons, a decision was taken in Tasmania to constrain self-regulation within
a context of external regulation. On one view this was done to devise a system with
sufficient credibility to be supported by the public as well as industry. According to
Bonyhady, it is more likely this action in 1985 was taken to introduce a system with just
sufficient rigour to forestall the enactment of Commonwealth controls on private
38
39

Forest Products Association NSW (1993) Draft Private Property Logging Protocol, FPA, Sydney.
NSW EPA (1995) New South Wales State of the Environment 1995, EPA, Chatswood, Section 24.3, “Management
Responses”, published electronically at <http://www.epa.nsw.gov.au/soe/95/24_3.htm>.

forestry, whilst remaining sensitive to requirements for industry profitability.40 The
Tasmanian Forest Practices Act contains an explicit commitment to self-regulation.41 It also
sets out offences such as harvesting and processing timber without a certified Forest
Practices Plan. The former Chief FPO, Mr. Witte, explained the choice of self-regulation
as one of deciding to utilise “existing expertise” within industry, instead of creating “a
major bureaucracy” in a small jurisdiction with limited budgetary resources.42 In favour
of this approach one can point to greater levels of industry ‘ownership’ of, and
participation in, the regulatory system,43 as opposed to the alienation and distance of
landholders and industry from it in NSW.44
Many of the preconditions set out in the literature for viable self-regulation relate to
whether the structure of the industry is amenable to the establishment of self-regulation
based on industry association (i.e., co-regulation).45 These tests are not immediately
applicable to an investigation of enforced-self-regulation. Still, there are a number of
relevant factors that touch upon whether the broad objectives of utilising indirect
governance and enlisting regulatory surrogates can be pursued effectively. One is
whether the expertise and resources necessary for self-regulation are within the industry.
On the whole, this is not the case. It cannot be credibly argued that the PNF industry in
NSW has sufficient knowledge, staff or internal processes to adequately address issues
relating to the conservation of threatened biodiversity or other complex ecological
questions.
Another marker of the viability of self-regulation set out in the literature is whether the
environmental issues arising in the particular industry context are few or numerous.46 In
the PNF context, they are numerous - one cannot express environmental performance in
Bonyhady, T. (1992) “Property Rights”, ch.3 in Bonyhady, T. (ed.) Environmental Protection and Legal Change,
Federation Press, pp.41-78.
41 The Forest Practices Act states that an objective of Tasmania’s statutory ‘Forest Practices System’ is to “achieve
sustainable management of Crown and private forests with due care for the environment, while delivering...(a) an
emphasis on self-regulation.” Schedule 7(a) Forest Practices Act 1985; see also. ss.4B, 4E, 37B Forest Practices Act 1985.
42 Chief Forest Practices Officer, Forest Practices Board, (1989) Letter to Port of Cygnet Municipality, 3 July 1989,
2pp; reproduced in Chief Forest Practices Officer (1994) Forest Practices Act 1985: A Guide for Forest Practices Officers,
Forest Practices Board, Tasmania.
43 Wilkinson, G. (2001) “Building Partnerships
- Tasmania’s approach to Sustainable Forest Management” In
International Conference on the Application of Reduced Impact Logging to Advance Sustainable Forest Management: Constraints,
Challenges and Opportunities, 26th February to 1 March 2001, Kuching, Sarawak, Malaysia, Compendium of Conference
Papers, 219-226.
44 Personal observation of the author based on attendance at meetings with landholders at ANU Department of
Forestry Workshop: The Evolving Legislative and Regulatory Environment for the Management of Private Native Forests in NSW,
21 February 2001, at Candelo, Bega Valley.
45 Priest, M. (1997) above n 30 at 239.
46 Gunningham, N. Sinclair, D. (2002) above n 30 at 36.
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simple numerical terms against an uncomplicated scale. Instead, performance must be
tested against a multivariate matrix of factors. In Tasmania, the complexity of
environmental and planning considerations is tested against 124 questions in the annual
audit of Forest Practices Plans (FPPs).47

SELF-REGULATION AND SMALL ENTERPRISES
One of the most problematic contexts for the application of self-regulation is where the
behaviour of numerous small and micro-sized enterprises needs to be controlled. This
issue was considered above and also in Chapter Three. These firms and individuals have
been identified as “amongst the least likely candidates for effective self-regulation”, as
they often lack environmental awareness or the resources to apply environmental
protection strategies.48
This problem emerges as a very serious one in the NSW PNF context because of the
large proportion of actors in the industry who are either individual landholders or very
small businesses. The configuration of the NSW PNF industry is almost the opposite of
the ideal conditions for industry self-regulation set out in the literature, of a small
number of large firms. Instead, there are numerous private forest owners, probably
running into the thousands. Hundreds of forestry contractors service this sector, and
scores of sawmills process timber from private lands.49
The broad position in the literature regarding difficulties with the compliance record of
small enterprises appears to be borne out by the evidence from the Tasmanian case study
(see Chapter Eleven, p.393). In Tasmania the small,
‘independent’ private property sector of the timber industry is the most problematic
sector for compliance with the FP Code according to the Forest Practices Board. The
Board has consistently stated in its Annual Reports that self-regulation by a number of
actors in the independent private property sector has not been satisfactory.50

Forest Practices Board Tasmania (2002) Annual Report 2001-2002, pp.59-65. Notably, this audit is an audit of the
extent of compliance with broad performance standards set by the FP Board, not of compliance per se. The audit is
not primarily intended as a means of detecting and punishing breaches. (p.20)
48 Gunningham and Grabosky (1998) above n 12 at 227.
49 See: Chapter Five, p.123.
50 PLUC (1997) Background Report Part G, Assessment of Ecologically Sustainable Forest Management Systems and Processes (Final
Report) Chapter 4: Monitoring and Compliance, p.102.
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The extent of compliance with regulations can be affected by other economic factors
such as the size of the enterprise and the size of its competitors, and whether the use of
subcontractors with firms operating at lowest-cost tendering is widespread within the
industry.51 Haines and Sutton’s research into compliance rates with occupational safety
laws in the Australian building industry suggested that the widespread use of
subcontracting and commercial pressures in that industry tended to cause cost-cutting
which reduced safety standards.52 Similar factors may operate within the PNF context,
but such questions would require further investigation.
The effectiveness of the regulation of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) could
be increased by incorporating a number of tools to exert additional pressure by means of
indirect governance and third-party involvement, by encouraging the generation of
‘supply chain pressure’ (p.28, below) and by facilitating the participation of third parties
such as NGOs in the compliance and enforcement process.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Regardless of the mix of policy instruments that is ultimately applied to PNF, a number
of economic issues arising within production contexts must be addressed when devising
biodiversity conservation policy. A perennial issue is how conservation measures can be
made an economically feasible aspect of land management. Landholders usually need to
obtain a viable economic return from their land. In this context, the challenges are to
encourage environmentally positive actions, whilst making the destruction of biodiversity
financially unattractive, and removing perverse economic incentives to destroy habitats.53
Some argue that biodiversity protection laws often create unintended incentives to
damage the environment.54 One US study of landholder behaviour in relation to the
effect of the Endangered Species Act 1973 referred to the impact of listing of the redcockaded woodpecker as endangered. It suggested that landholders adjoining known
Haines, F.; Sutton, A. (1997) above n 11 at 151-153.
Tanaka’s study of occupational health and safety standards within the Japanese nuclear power industry similar
showed that complex sub-contracting structures (with up to six layers of workers and companies involved) tended
to enable the evasion of standards. Tanaka, Yuki (1986) “Nuclear Power Plant Gypsies in High Tech Society” 18(1)
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 2-21; September, 2000; Nagamitsu Miura (2000) “Genpatsu Gypsies: The Hidden
Tragedy Of Japan's Nuclear Labor Force”, Professor of Philosophy, Department of International and Cultural
Studies, Tsuda College, Tokyo, Japan, internet published at <http://www.jca.apc.org/web-news/corpwatchjp/96.html>.
53 Further, it is also essential to reverse the perverse legal incentives to avoid investigating threatened species issues,
presently in place in s.118D NPWA (Chapter Nine).
54 Gunningham, N., Grabosky, P. (1998) above n 12 at 370.
51
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habitat areas would log their properties sooner than would otherwise be the case, in
order to reduce the likelihood of ‘invasion’ of their forested land by these migratory
threatened species.55 One NPWS staffer recounted an incident of land being burnt and
slashed by a landholder in order to remove the possibility of threatened flora existing on
a site, at the mere suggestion of a subsequent investigative visit by NPWS.56 Such
incidents suggest that some landholders perceive that they are not financially rewarded by
legislation to retain native vegetation and protect threatened species, but perceive that
they are penalised by restrictions on economic activity.
There are often strong incentives for landholders to conceal information regarding
biodiversity. This is a major barrier to introducing a system of self-regulation for PNF in
NSW consistent with the objective of ESFM. (Chapter Eleven presented evidence of a
tendency for under-reporting of biodiversity in Tasmania, see p.388
et.seq.).
This concealment conundrum was described in Chapter Four as the ‘first-mover
problem’.57 This describes the scenario where a landholder discovering a threatened
species on his/her property has a strong financial incentive to conceal this fact from
regulators, and government is at a disadvantage due to its lack of knowledge (as the
landholder has the ‘first move’). The policy challenge is to offer strong countervailing
incentives to encourage landholders to save this vegetation or species.
Where government is to consider sharing its regulatory responsibilities with industry in
some form of enforced self-regulation, then the threat of the first-mover problem to the
dependability of the system in protecting biodiversity is at its greatest.58 The incentives to
not report or to inadequately address threatened species issues under a self-regulatory
system are very powerful. The operation of the Tasmanian system is premised upon the
accuracy of the information presented in the FPP by the FPO. Chapter Eleven presented
examples of the difficulties with under-reporting of the ecological significance of forestry

Zhang, Daowei (1997) Endangered Species and Timber Harvesting: The Case of Red-Cockaded Woodpeckers, Forest Policy
Center Internal Working Paper Series No. 111, School of Forestry, Auburn University, Alabama, USA, 27 pp. at 1617. (http://sofserv.forestry.auburn.edu/forestpolicycenter)
56 Interview, Mr Gary Davey, Northern Directorate Manager, Coffs Harbour,
formerly Threatened Species Unit Manager, NPWS Northern Zone, 30.4.98 (by telephone, notes held by author).
57 Gunningham, N., Young, M. (1997) above n 22 at 286-7.
58 Gunningham, N., Young, M. (1997) above n 22 at 286-7.
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sites in Tasmania under self-regulation.59 In such circumstances, unless there is a strong
countervailing offer of a stewardship payment for landholders who conserve threatened
species habitat, both self-regulation and conventional regulation may fail to preserve
biodiversity.
Granting regulators better surveillance and monitoring capacity is also essential to
address the problem. Also, if government carries out adequate regional and local level
biodiversity surveys, it will be in a position to predict with more accuracy the land likely
to form threatened species habitat. Planning will also enable government to order a
prioritisation of actions to avert threats to biodiversity.60
We must also consider the possibility that provisions of non-environmental laws are
generating perverse incentives to destroy biodiversity.61 For example, such incentives may
be generated by the drafting of the Valuation of Land Act 1916, s.4 which states that “
‘Land improvements’ means: (a) the clearing of land by the removal or thinning out of
timber, scrub or other vegetable growths, (b) the picking up and removal of stone”, as
both of these actions involve the destruction of habitats.62 As a result, land valuers are
obliged to give cleared land a higher market valuation than vegetated land.
The NSW Expert Working Group on ESFM was of the opinion that present regulation
in NSW does not address disincentives to ESFM.63 There clearly is a need to offer
incentives and encouragement for ecological stewardship of private forests, particularly
in combination with environmental regulation of PNF. Offering incentives may enable
cooperation to be obtained by means of ‘the carrot’ rather than by relying exclusively
upon deterrence-based coercion.64

On this basis conservationists recommended that the responsibility for mapping rare forest types be transferred to
DPWIE. Graham, A. (2003) “Endangered Forest Types and Forestry Jobs: going, going…”, 286 The Tasmanian
Conservationist, February, 5pp., at <www.tct.org.au>, accessed 17.7.03.
60 Gunningham, N., Young, M. (1997) above n 22 at 286-7.
61 However some of these issues are being addressed to some extent in NSW. Land subject to conservation agreements
under the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 are exempt from all local government rates: Local Government Act 1993,
s.555(b1), as are areas of land held by the Nature Conservation Trust of NSW under the Nature Conservation Trust Act
2001; see Local Government Act 1993, s.555(b2).
62 See, further: Hyam, A. (1995) The Law Affecting Valuation of Land in Australia, 2nd edition, Law Book Company,
Sydney at 119-122.
63 Independent Expert Working Group (1998) Assessment of management systems and processes for achieving ecologically
sustainable forest management in NSW, A report undertaken for the NSW CRA/RFA Steering Committee, Resource
and Conservation Division, Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (NSW); at pp.98-101.
64 Best, C. (2001) America’s Private Forests: Status and Stewardship, Island Press, Washington at 129-132.
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In which circumstances should the carrot be offered? The question is essentially how
responsibility should be allocated to pay the future costs of actions for biodiversity
conservation. The introduction of regulatory controls on activities on private land raises
complex questions of the equity of allocation of costs between landholders and the
broader community.65
As a general principle, it is not appropriate to make payments to landholders as a result
of regulation of land use per se, for what in effect amounts to their ordinary obligations as
citizens to prevent environmental externalities that will affect their neighbours and the
broader community. Incentives regimes, if improperly designed, can offend the principle
that rewards should not be offered for actions that are a normal social obligation of
citizenship, that is, to act within the ecological constraints of the land. ANZECC
suggested that: “[f]inancial assistance should generally not be paid to landholders to meet
their duty of care…”66 According to the regulatory theorist Grabosky: “The idea of
monetising civic norms strikes one as no less preposterous than that of paying people to
obey the law. Citizens should not be rewarded for doing their duty, but rather punished
for failing to do so.”67
However, it is also evident that if there are community benefits from the protection of
biodiversity on private land, then the broader community is obligated to contribute to
some extent. It is argued that it is unfair to place the burden of compliance with
biodiversity conservation regulations on a small group. If the community derives a
benefit the community should pay, it is said, under the so-called ‘beneficiary pays
principle’.

68

In the words of one Cooma-Monaro farmer at a NPWS seminar on the

Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995, “if you want us to farm beetles, then you had
better pay us for it.”69
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Productivity Commission (2003) Inquiry into Impacts of Native Vegetation and Biodiversity Regulations (commenced April
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Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council (ANZECC) (2000) National Framework for the
Management and Monitoring of Australia's Native Vegetation, Commonwealth Department of Environment and Heritage,
Canberra, at 18.
Grabosky, P. (1993) Rewards and Incentives as Regulatory Instruments, Administration, Compliance and Governability
Program Working Paper No.13, August, RSSS ANU, Canberra, 43pp at 18.
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There is a point at which the duty of care of a landholder stops and actions for broader
public benefit begin. Thus defining the scope of a landholder’s duty of care enables us to
specify “the point at which the ‘polluter pays principle’ ends and the ‘beneficiary pays
principle’ begins.”70
Against such equity concerns must be balanced the need to apply the ‘polluter pays
principle’ to the problem of biodiversity loss. Private land conservation policy must also
take account of the fact that landholders derive private benefits from economic activity
that has, as a side effect, varying degrees of destruction of community resources such as
biodiversity and environmental services (eg. clean water, pollination services, and genetic
resources).
The ‘polluter pays principle’ is premised on the removal of hidden subsidies that give an
unfair competitive advantage to polluting industries.71 When applied to the biodiversity
context, (the ‘impactor pays principle’) it can be seen that those firms which destroy
habitat and are not required to pay to protect it are in fact being subsidised by the
community as they are making private profit with an associated social cost, which is
hidden and not paid for.
Given the need to encourage ongoing management of areas of private forest considered
important for conservation, an ideal mechanism is through stewardship payments for
providing ongoing conservation services to the community at large. However, such
payments should not be conceived of as compensation for lost opportunities (instead,
Farrier suggested a forward-looking payment for land management services), and should
commence only at a point beyond the normal duty of care of a landholder to the
community.72 However, in the PNF context we are often more concerned with questions
of the appropriateness of compensation for land-use restrictions as opposed to
management payments for land-use prohibitions. These issues, such as the impact of
wildlife protection prescriptions that lead to a loss of timber volume, are discussed
further below.
Industry Commission (1997) above n 68 at 72.
OECD, (1972) Recommendation of Council 26.5.72. on Guiding Principles Concerning International Aspects of Environmental
Policies, OECD Council, Paris; see also OECD (1975) The Polluter Pays Principle: Definition, Analysis, Implementation,
Paris.
72 Farrier D, (1995) “Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives for Management or Compensation for Lost
Expectations” 19(2) Harvard Environmental Law Review 303-408; Farrier et.al. (1999) Environmental Law Handbook, 3rd
edition, p.14.
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Public interest v private interest
A key test of systems of regulation for biodiversity conservation identified in the
literature is whether they meet tests of dependability.73 This entails whether a given
strategy can be relied upon to protect biodiversity. The literature suggests that the
dependability of self-regulation in securing environmental outcomes depends on the size
of the gap between the pursuit of private interests and the protection of the broader
public interest. Where there is only a small gap, voluntary instruments will be at their
most dependable.74 However, even in those situations, a regulatory safety net will be
required in order to control actors who are incompetent, intransigent or irrational.75
In Chapter Four, it was argued that in the PNF arena there may often be a significant gap
between the private interest of landholders and forestry companies and the broader
public interest in ecological protection. Young et.al. were of the opinion that “in the large
majority of circumstances, there is a considerable gap between the public interest in
biodiversity conservation and the private interests of individual land owners.”76 Usually
there is no economic incentive for a private landholder to take expensive action to
mitigate the effects of their actions on biodiversity.77 In the forestry context, an
expansion in the reach of environmental laws will usually cause a decrease in timber
volumes extracted. Without a shift to greater value-added processing of timber felled, a
tension exists between environmental-protection objectives and profit-maximisation
objectives. Thus there is usually a large gap between the natural self-interest of industry
members (timber-harvest maximisation (within limits) and profit maximisation) and the
public interest (environmental protection, maintenance of the full suite of forest values).
The literature also suggests that where participants in an industry are operating within
tight economic margins, the effectiveness of voluntary and self-regulatory approaches
will be compromised. In such a situation, smaller firms and individuals in particular will
be less willing to voluntarily reduce short-term returns for the sake of environmental
protection, unless faced with a credible threat of coercive regulatory action (see p.35,
Young et.al., (1996) above n 16 (Reimbursing the Future) at 113.
Young et.al., (1996) above n 16 at 113.
75 Gunningham, N., Young, M. (1997) above n 22; Young et.al., (1996) above n 16 at 113.
76 Young et.al., (1996) above n 16 at 113.
77 Similar debates have been canvassed frequently in relation to occupational health and safety - e.g. Gunningham, N.
(1984) Safeguarding the Worker: Job Hazards and the Role of the Law, Law Book Company, Sydney, at 270. “The plain fact
is that employers do not have an interest in minimising work hazards.”
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below).78 Given the lack of a level playing-field for PNF forestry vis-à-vis public native
forestry, and given the poor economies of scale of much PNF forestry, it is unlikely that
many PNF landholders and contractors will be willing to voluntarily make substantial
expenditures in favour of environmental protection.79

Public good conservation measures
Actions that extend beyond the duty of care were described as a “public conservation
service” in the National Framework for Management of Native Vegetation.80 There is likely to be
considerable difficulty in precisely drawing this dividing line. Thus there is a strong
argument that it is the responsibility of government to conduct and pay for regional
assessment of land for its conservation significance. To some extent this has been
undertaken with the RVMP process and the RFA process, but the extent to which
surveying was effective or sufficiently comprehensive on private land in either of these
processes is unclear.
Tasmanian legislation explicitly applies both conventional regulatory and economic
mechanisms to PNF. It provides for the payment of (backward-looking) compensation if
greater than 5-10% of the area of a compartment is reserved or excluded from logging
for the purpose of threatened species protection. Compensation is payable because to
require efforts above this threshold is defined as requiring landholders to exceed their
‘duty of care’ to the community for environmental protection.81 Compensation in this
instance can be considered backward looking as it does not constitute an incentive for
positive land management actions by landholders to alter their behaviour in favour of
nature conservation.
In some circumstances compensation provisions may have a counter-productive effect.
Research by the author into the implementation of Tasmanian statutory provisions that
contain compensation clauses provides an example. The research revealed that the
Gunningham, N. (1994) Environment, Self-Regulation and the Chemical Industry : Assessing Responsible Care, Occasional
Paper, Australian Centre for Environmental Law, Faculty of Law, Australian National University, at p.65.
79 Nevertheless this should not be taken as an indication that all PNF activity is economically small-scale or marginal.
One PNF sawmiller indicated to the author that a single operation of river redgum logging on private land in NSW
had produced timber that once processed would have a finished market value of around approximately $2 million.
Pers. Comm. Mr. Ken O’Brien, O’Brien’s Sawmills, and Riverina Freehold Forestry Management Group), 10.5.02,
PNF Reference Group meeting at DLWC, Bridge St., Sydney.
80 ANZECC (2000) above n 66 at 17.
81 Wilkinson, G. (1999) “Codes of Forest Practice As Regulatory Tools for Sustainable Forest Management”, paper
presented to the 18th Biennial Conference of the Institute of Foresters of Australia, Hobart, Tasmania, 3-8 October, at 43-60.
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regulatory agency, the Parks and Wildlife Service was reluctant to insist on a robust
threatened species management approach involving prevention of logging in critical
areas. The reason for this attitude was that such action would generate a statutory liability
to pay compensation, for which no funds are allocated in the agency’s budget.82 Thus the
preference is to allow logging to go ahead subject to management prescriptions, rather
than to insist on the exclusion of logging from an area, as that step would generate
liability for compensation.
One of the potential difficulties with incentives and stewardship payments is that the cost
of providing and then distributing rewards and incentives for conservation on private
land may far outweigh the cost of a negative, sanctions-based approach. Grabosky
recounts the observations of the Scandinavian philosopher Norregaard who argued that
the cost of rewarding one thousand obedient citizens would far outweigh the cost of
punishing one wrong-doer. Will sufficient financial resources be available for
implementing incentives approaches83 such as negotiation of management agreements
with landholders, payment of such management fees, and the surveying and research
work in order to best target the application of such techniques?
The difficulties of questions of allocation of responsibility between the landholder and
the broader community is aggravated by the lack of scientific certainty in relation to the
manner and extent of environment-protection measures required, particularly when
discussing biodiversity preservation. Legislators and policy-makers attempting to design
any effective system of incentives, self-regulation or conventional regulation for private
land activities must directly confront these problems.
Problems with duty-of-care approach - Inadequate content
One problem with the duty-of-care approach is the uncertainty inherent in the
mechanism as to exactly what obligations for environmental stewardship the duty of care
should encompass. Leaving that uncertainty unresolved would be incompatible with the
application of the precautionary principle. Under the duty-of-care approach, the
landowner making the decision is much more likely to err on the side of continued
82
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Interview, N. Lawrence, Botanist, Threatened Species Unit, Tasmanian Parks and Wildlife Service, 6.11.98;
Tasmanian Public Land Use Commission (1996) Inquiry into areas to be reserved under the Tasmania-Commonwealth Regional
Forest Agreement: Background Report Part F: Mechanisms for achieving conservation management on private forested land: a discussion
paper, Tasmanian Public Land Use Commission, Hobart, p.3.
Steinzor, R. (1998a) “Reinventing Environmental Regulation: Back to the past by Way of the Future” 28 (7)
Environmental Law Reporter 10361 at 10370.

income than on the side of threatened species protection. These difficulties arise
particularly under a system reliant upon self-regulation.
The Natural Resources Management Ministerial Council’s National Framework for the
Management and Monitoring of Australia’s Native Vegetation (2001) argued that “best practice”
legislation would contain a duty of care (‘DOC’) for sustainable native vegetation
management.84 The document suggests that such a DOC could “reasonably be expected
to include protection of endangered species and/or ecosystems, protection of vegetation
on land at risk of land degradation…protection of riparian vegetation…[etc]”.85
However, there is no guarantee that it would contain such a duty of care because in an
outcomes-based system, there is a danger of allowing stakeholders to capture the process
of devising codes of practice. Major problems with outcomes-based regulation include
defining the content of the duty of care, and determining which party is entitled to devise
the text of the duty of care. For example, in Queensland, the Queensland Farmers
Federation devised the Environmental Code of Practice for Agriculture under the Environment
Protection Act 1994.86 Not surprisingly, an inspection of the Code of Practice reveals that it
fails to restrict native vegetation clearing in any significant respect.87 This type of problem
is recognised in ANZECC’s National Vegetation Framework. It states that for best practice:
“Codes should be targeted at enhancing industry practices, rather than simply ‘codifying’
the status quo.”88 But in reality, they may tend not to do so.
The Tasmanian experience suggests that the application of a duty-of-care approach
combined with substantial self-regulation by industry under the Forest Practices Code is
that threatened species protection in timber-production areas may not be allocated a
high degree of priority over the competing interest of timber production. In other words,
the duty-of-care concept may not provide sufficient protection to threatened species.
National Resource Management Ministerial Council (2001) National Framework for the Management and Monitoring of
Australia’s Native Vegetation, Commonwealth Department for Environment and Heritage, at 59.
85 ANZECC (1999) Draft National Framework for the Management and Monitoring of Australia’s Native Vegetation, Australia
and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council, July, at 17.
86 Queensland Farmers Federation (1998) The Environmental Code of Practice for Agriculture, QFF, Brisbane, 28pp.,
Gazetted as an approved code of practice for the purposes of s.219(1) Environment Protection Act 1994 (Qld). Likewise
the Queensland Canegrowers Association wrote the Code of Practice for Sustainable Cane Growing (1998), the
Queensland Fruit and Vegetable Growers wrote the Code of Practice for Sustainable Fruit and Vegetable Production in
Queensland (1998), and the Australian Prawn Farmers Assoc. wrote the Environmental Code of Practice for Prawn Farming
(2001).
87 The counter argument is that all COPs in Queensland must be approved by the Minister. However this amounts to
little if the political agenda of the government in question is to devolve responsibility for regulation to the regulated
community itself.
88 ANZECC, (1999) above n 85 at 59.
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Under the Forest Practices Code, the scope of the duty of care of the landowner
encompasses the following actions. Firstly, it requires the reservation of soil and water
values to the standard required by the Code. Secondly, it requires the conservation of
other special values (such as threatened species) at a level equivalent to 5% of the gross
area of the property totally excluded from logging operations, or up to 10% of the
property where partial use is compatible with the protection of values (eg. under selective
logging operations).89 There is no evidence that the choice of these thresholds is based
on peer-reviewed scientific literature – rather, it is more likely that the choice has been
based on the political economy of the timber industry in Tasmania.
Similarly, in Victoria, according to Raff, no Interim Conservation Orders were made
under the Flora and Fauna Guarantee Act 1988 (Vic) during its first ten years of operation
because of the scarcity of funds to pay compensation under s.43 for the loss of
“hypothetical development rights”.90 Similarly, Bonyhady argued that the Hope Inquiry
into the National Estate in 1974 advised against the provision of an entitlement of
compensation for the imposition of heritage controls because “public authorities rarely
exercised

their

powers

to

avoid

the

expense

of

pay-outs…”91

RISK-BASED TIERING OF ASSESSMENT
One factor motivating academic proponents of the investigation of self-regulation is a
desire for the regulatory State to achieve better results within an ongoing context of
scarce resources. Another part of the solution to this perennial issue is to apply riskbased rationing of regulatory effort. This involves applying the most stringent regulation
to activities posing the largest environmental risk, and the least regulation (or
exemptions) to the lowest-risk developments. In some respects, this simply amounts to
making a decision to apply self-regulation to those sectors of industry that pose the least
risk, and to apply conventional regulation to the sectors associated with higher risks of
negative outcomes.

Forest Practices Code Tasmania (2000) p.52.
Raff, M. (1998) “Environmental Obligations and the Western Liberal Property Concept”, 22(3) Melbourne University
Law Review 657-692 at 659.
91 Bonyhady (1992) above n 40 at 51-52, cites Australia (1975) National Estate: Report of the Committee of Inquiry, Canberra,
AGPS, at pp.157-158.
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This proposed strategy has some parallels with Braithwaite’s recommendation to apply a
pyramid-based regulatory strategy. That approach relies upon an initial stance of trusting
industry. This is implicit in self-regulation, but conveys an explicit message of a
regulator’s firm intention to increase regulatory intervention in the event of failures of
low-intervention policies.92
The risk-based tiering approach does not necessarily entail self-regulation per se, but
involves a tiered assessment approach, where regulatory requirements are reduced for
‘low risk’ activities or for ‘proven performers’. This model is applied in the Plantations Act
and also the EPAA, under the complying development provisions. In that legislation,
complying plantations93 that comply with predetermined development standards can
expect automatic approval.94

Braithwaite, J. (1992) above n 126 at 93.
Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999, s.13.
94 Plantations and Reafforestation Act 1999, s.13(3).Complying plantations must meet the requirements of the Plantations
Code of Practice. Complying plantations are plantations whose establishment complies with relevant complying
development standards of the code of practice and for which an SIS is not required to be produced.
92
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Table 1 A continuum of possible models of
PNF regulation

Level
of Low impact,
environmental low
risk
environment
al risk
Stringency of Notification
approval
requirement
requirements
only, but no
assessment or
approval.
Only for lowvolume, lowarea
proposals or
where FSC
certification
has
been
obtained.

Medium

High

Very High

Forest
Practices Plan
(FPP)
and
development
consent
required

Consent
SIS.

Extent of self- Enforced
regulation
selfregulation

Full regulation
Consider
enforced selfregulation of
low-risk
proposals

plus Prohibited

Built-in
concurrence
requirement.
Approval only
of FPPs that
meet genuine
ESFM
standard;
subject
to
external expert
agency
(i.e.
NPWS) review

(endangered
ecological
communities, RFA
under-represented
vegetation
communities).

Full regulation

Two-track regulatory systems are applied in OH&S and pollution-control contexts.95
They place the onus of proof on companies in high-risk industries to show they deserve
the right to operate. In the OH&S context this is described as the ‘safety case’ approach
and is applied to the offshore oil and gas industry in Europe and Australia.96 The onusof-proof aspect of the model is unlikely to be applied in the forestry context.
Nevertheless, the key focus is how to free regulatory resources from the other, low-risk,
end of the regulatory spectrum, where exemptions and simple notification requirements
are applied. Legislation in several jurisdictions gives regulatory agencies discretion as to
which types of forest practices are subject to a mere notification requirement and which
are subject to stricter requirements according to the predicted escalation in
Gunningham, N. (2001) Options For Regulations To Interface With Environmental Management Procedures: Integration Of EMS
Into Legislation In The Oil And Gas Industry, paper for UNEP Mineral Resources Forum,
<www.mineralresourcesforum.org/docs/pdfs>, accessed 27.5.02.
96 Hopkins, A. (2000) Lessons from Longford: the Esso gas plant explosion, CCH, Sydney at 96-97.
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environmental hazard or risk. The suggestion is that the lowest-risk forestry operations
would operate under an exemption, subject only to a notification requirement without an
accompanying obligation to submit a FPP for approval.
In New Zealand forestry law, a risk-based tiering approach is applied to the availability of
exemptions on private forest land. A less onerous ‘sustainable forest management permit’
can be obtained in preference to a full-blown ‘sustainable forest management plan’, only
if the quantity of timber to be harvested by species is no more than 10% of the timber of
that species standing on the landholding.97 The permit option is also subject to a
maximum harvest volume of 500m3 (or less depending on the predominant species).
Further the permits remain subject to a series of statutory management prescriptions as
well as a sustainable-yield requirement that prevents approval for subsequent harvesting
until timber volumes have replaced that removed under a previous permit. Permits are
valid for 10 years but remain subject to a requirement to submit an Annual Logging
Plan.98
The approach of tailoring the level of approval requirements according to the likely
environmental impact of proposed forest operations is also applied (albeit to a somewhat
limited extent) in Tasmania where the Forest Practices Regulations 1997 provide that an
approved Forest Practices Plan (FPP) is not required where operations are low-volume
timber harvesting operations99 or for firewood-logging where certain types of higherimpact harvesting machinery are not employed. This exemption is not available on
certain areas of land classified as ‘vulnerable’ (e.g. streamside forest, high altitude
forest).100
A more thorough regulatory-tiering approach is applied in Washington State (USA)
where proposed forest operations are graded into four classes. Stricter requirements
apply to those classes of operations involving greater environmental hazards. For

Forests Act 1949, Part IIIA, introduced by Forests Amendment Act 1993; see also Ministry of Forestry NZ (1997)
Indigenous Forestry: Sustainable Management: A Guide to Plans and Permits, 38pp, at p.21.
98 Griffiths, A. (2002) Indigenous Forestry on Private Land: Present Trends and Future Potential, Technical Paper No 01/6,
Indigenous Forestry Unit, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Wellington, NZ, 19pp.
99 Forest Practices Regulations 1997, r.3(f), 5, provide that an approved FPP is still required for low volume timber
harvesting operations (“less than 100 tonnes for each property for each year”) or for firewood logging, when the
land is classed as ‘vulnerable land’. This category includes land that “is inhabited by threatened species within the
meaning of the TSPA 1995”.
100 r.3, 5 Forest Practices Regulations 1997.
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example, the strictest level of review applies to road-building and logging in steep-slope
or high-erosion-risk category areas, and aerial spraying of pesticides.101
In the PNF context in NSW, this approach of rationing of regulatory effort is applied, at
least on paper, by offering an exemption from the consent requirements of the NVCA
for certain forms of PNF - on the official interpretation, only for sustainable, selective
logging of private native forests.102 Other more intensive forms of PNF must obtain
development consent from the Department of Land and Water Conservation. However,
as the application of the PNF exemption is subject to self-assessment by the landholder,
who makes a decision as to its application, the availability of the exemption was not
constrained in most operational regions during the study period.
In general terms, in order to ensure maximum dependability, if a ‘light’ regulation or selfregulation strategy is applied to lower-environmental-risk situations, it would be advisable
to put several mechanisms in place. Firstly, regulators must ensure that at a minimum a
notification mechanism applies to all PNF logging, even exempt logging. Secondly,
agencies could be empowered by statute with a residual power to ‘call-in’ proposals, even
those operating under self-regulation. Finally, to minimise the risk to threatened
biodiversity and ecosystems, the revised regulatory framework should apply a
precautionary approach by requiring that sufficiently-detailed site assessment surveys by
qualified individuals take place prior to allowing clearing/logging.
Enabling the regulator to require prospective PNF operators to lodge an environmental
compliance bond prior to commencing logging, particularly in higher risk situations, can
strengthen the strategy of risk-based tiering of assessment. The performance bond
represents an application of the ‘polluter pays’ principle. At the commencement of
operations a bond is lodged in a government trust account. If harvesting is completed in
accordance with required environmental standards the monies are refunded.103 This
approach ensures that social costs can be internalised by private actors. This mechanism
is applied in relation to private forestry in British Columbia, Sweden, Finland
See generally: Forest Practices Act, Chapter 76.09 of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW). Forest Practices
Rules, Chapter 222 WAC, Stewardship of Non-industrial Forests and Woodlands (Title 76.13 RCW). See also
Salmon Recovery Act Section 101 chapter 75.46 RCW, Forestry Riparian Easement Program for small private forest
landholders, added to chapter 76.13 RCW to enable the state to acquire easements.
102 See Chapter Six.
103 Richards, M. (1999) Internalising the Externalities of Tropical Forestry: A Review of Innovative Financing and Incentive
Mechanisms, European Union Tropical Forestry Paper No.1, Overseas Development Institute, London UK, and
European Commission, Brussels.
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(previously), and in the United States in Idaho, Nevada, and California.104 This
requirement may or may not be attached to a requirement for approval of a THP.

ADDITIONAL COMPONENTS OF AN OPTIMAL REGULATORY MIX
There are a number of other options and approaches that could be applied to
supplement traditional regulation in order to improve the effectiveness of the regulatory
framework for PNF in NSW - whilst avoiding the dangers of ‘smorgasbordism’.105

Strategic selection of regulatory targets: regulating the entire supply chain
An important aspect of law reform for PNF in NSW is to make a decision to regulate
timber contractors and processors as well as landholders, that is, the entire supply chain
(see Chapter Eleven, above). This step gives regulators the opportunity to select the most
appropriate and strategic targets for efficient regulatory attention.
In NSW, there is significant scope for applying provisions similar to those in Tasmania,
whereby timber contractors and processors are subject to the provisions of a Forest
Practices Code making it an offence to process timber produced without a forest
practices plan.106 A similar approach is applied in New Zealand.107 Under the Tasmanian
system, compliance is enhanced, and ‘free-riding’ restricted because of the decision to
regulate the entire supply chain. This arrangement recruits additional parties into the
process of encouraging improved compliance, as the fate of participants in the regulatory
system becomes linked to the actions of others.108

Ellefson, P.; Cheng, A.; Moulton, R. (1997) “Regulatory Programs and Private Forestry: State Government Actions
to Direct the Use and Management of Forest Ecosystems”, 10 Society and Natural Resources 195-209.; Westland
Resource Group (undated) A Review of the Forest Practices Code of British Columbia and Fourteen other Jurisdictions: a
Background Report, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, Ministry of Forests, Crown Publications Inc., Victoria, British
Columbia.
105 Gunningham and Grabosky (1998) above n 12.
106 The FP Act regulates all aspects of the timber supply chain including the land owner, logging contractor and timber
processor. It regulates forestry undertaken by persons deemed to be a “responsible person”. This includes a person
carrying out (or causing to be carried out) forest practices, a timber processor, the owner of the land or a person to
whom the owner has formally, under seal, assigned his or her responsibilities. FP Act, s.17(1). In practice, FPPs are
countersigned by the landowner, logging contractor, and the buyer of the timber.
107 This is achieved by prohibiting the milling of indigenous timber at sawmills unless the timber has been obtained
from operations in accordance with a registered sustainable forest management plan, i.e. registered by the Registrar
of real property for a term of 50 years. Forests Act 1949 (NZ), s.67C(1)(a), 67D(1)(b), (3). Also discussed in Williams,
D. (ed.) (1997) Environmental and Resource Management in New Zealand, 2nd edition, Butterworths, Wellington, at p.184.
108 Witte v B.E. Arnold, Supreme Court Tasmania, No.A84/1996, per Underwood J (conviction of a timber processor
for dealing in wood produced without an FPP).
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Encouraging supply-chain pressure
A related technique, applied by the private sector of its own volition, involves larger
players in an industry exerting ‘supply chain pressure’ on their suppliers and customers to
achieve environmental and quality targets. In the industrial pollution control context,
major firms place pressure on their suppliers to lift their environmental performance,
requiring that they meet certain predetermined standards, particularly environmental
certification such as ISO 14001 or compliance with the ‘product stewardship’ aspects of
the chemical industry’s Responsible Care program.109
For governments, encouraging and facilitating private firms to exert ‘supply-chain
pressure’ is a promising method of exerting additional, third-party pressure for
compliance with regulations.110 In the forestry context, this would theoretically involve
timber processors demanding that suppliers only provide logs that have been produced
according to high standards of ecological sustainability, or to some lesser standard e.g.
compliance with a Forest Practices Code. Supply-chain pressure can work especially in
instances where there is vertical integration of industry (i.e. company ownership of all
levels of production and processing).111
However, it is doubtful there is significant scope for encouraging the private sector to
apply supply-chain pressure within the NSW PNF industry. It would require timber
processors to exert commercial pressure on suppliers to ensure ecologically-sustainable
standards of production, to the point where they would be willing to exclude noncomplying suppliers from access to processing facilities and markets. Yet in Chapter
Four we saw that many small-to-medium-sized sawmills process timber from private land
only. It appears that these mills have difficulty in obtaining sufficient supply from public
forests due to larger processors monopolizing the available public supply. In such a
situation of uncertain supply it is unlikely that smaller processors will be willing to be
highly selective about the sources of their raw materials.

Gunningham and Grabosky (1998) above n 12 at 223.
The introduction of supply chain pressure was recommended by Gunningham and Sinclair (2002) as a means for
dealing with the problems raised by regulating SMEs in the vegetable growing industry in Victoria; above n 30 at 93.
111 Gunningham and Grabosky (1998) above n 12 at 277.
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Using external pressure to improve the effectiveness of regulation and self-regulation
Gunningham and Rees (1997) believe that self-regulation cannot usually work effectively
without a backdrop of strong and adequately-enforced direct regulation.112 They argue
for an enforced self-regulation strategy rather than pure self-regulation, in the course of
investigating methods for the State to support stronger systems of self-regulation.113
Without a natural coincidence between public and private interests, it is argued that for
such self-regulation efforts to be effective, a range of external pressures must be
deployed in an attempt to create a link between public and private interests.114 This can
be achieved by introducing supply-chain pressure, public shaming, external regulation,
encouraging the involvement of public interest groups (NGOs) through effective
statutory mechanisms, as well as third-party pressure from the financial and insurance
industry.115
It is important to ask whether the industry is susceptible to public or consumer pressure.
In other words, will shaming strategies work? This presupposes that the industry has a
high public profile and that consumers are in a position to differentiate between a
product derived from ESFM and an unsustainably produced product. Further, it assumes
that sufficient consumers value compliant behaviour by industry to generate enough
market pressure to cause industry and firms to alter their behaviour. Where firms have
no direct connection with the public and have no public image to protect, they will be
less susceptible to strategies based on exposing environmental performance to the
public.116 Small firms are likely to be the least reputation-sensitive, and the least
susceptible to consumer pressure relating to environmental management.117 Although
there are many consumers concerned about unsustainable forest management, there are
many impediments to the free flow of information about environmental standards in
PNF operations. In sum, there are a considerable number of barriers to consumer
labelling or consumer pressure amounting to effective mechanisms to increase the
integrity of self-regulation systems.

Similarly, Gunningham and Sinclair (2002) above n 30 at 204 argue for co-regulation not self-regulation.
Gunningham, N, and Rees, J. (1997) above n 11 at 406.
114 Gunningham, N, and Rees, J. (1997) above n 11 at 390.
115 Gunningham, N, and Rees, J. (1997) above n 11 at 393.
116 Gunningham (1994) above n 78 at 65.
117 On this basis Gunningham and Sinclair (2002) above n 30, Chapter Three suggest that SME’s “may need concrete
specification standards.”
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Using regulatory surrogates
An important strand of the regulatory ‘re-invention’ literature discusses means of
encouraging ‘regulatory surrogates’ to engage in acts of indirect governance, thereby
reducing the regulatory load on government .This method could be employed to address
the issue of the performance of small- and medium-sized enterprises (‘SMEs’). It is
particularly relevant where governments are seeking to make systems of industry selfregulation more effective.
The two most commonly identified regulatory surrogates in the literature include third
parties in the financial/insurance sector and environmental groups. The question in the
PNF context is whether there are readily identifiable third parties with commercial power
who can act as regulatory surrogates in exerting supply-chain pressure.118 Although in
regulating certain other industries it may be practicable to suggest that banks and
insurance providers play a role in exerting pressure for improved performance, it is
unlikely that this particular strategy could be readily applied to the NSW PNF context.119
This is due to the limited extent of hands-on involvement of these participants within the
PNF industry (which appears to be dominated by SMEs).120 Perhaps more importantly,
assumptions that they would be willing to demand improved environmental performance
of the industry are also questionable.
Other regulatory surrogates are likely to be more willing to play a greater role in ensuring
environmental improvements in the PNF sector. Principally this role could fall to public
and non-government organisations (NGOs) and individual members of the public.121
The need to make a significant role available for public participation, in order to bolster
the effectiveness of regulatory systems (particularly those involving elements of self-

Gunningham and Sinclair (2002) above n 30 at 36.
Gunningham and Sinclair suggested that the environmental performance of SMEs in the crash repair industry could
be improved by encouraging third parties in the financial sector and the insurance industry to exert pressure, given
their substantial pre-existing financial power over SMEs (i.e., in paying for smash repairs). Gunningham and Sinclair
(2002) above n 30 at 58.
120 Although banks may be often mortagagees of land used for PNF, they are unlikely to be held to be in a position of
responsibility to direct and control detailed aspects of land use decisions.
121 In terms of dealing with problematic SMEs, Gunningham and Sinclair concluded following their case study of the
vegetable growing industry that it would be beneficial for government to take deliberate steps to empower the
community to become an active participant in the process of environmental improvement in that industry.
Gunningham and Sinclair (2002) above n 30 at 93.
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regulation) is acknowledged in the regulatory literature.122 In NSW there are few formal
legal barriers to third-party law enforcement, at least in terms of commencement of
proceedings. However, for a number of reasons, policy-makers need to be realistic about
limits on the possible contribution of third parties to the enforcement of PNF legislation.
There are also non-legal and cultural barriers to participation and litigation, primarily the
expense and financial risk associated with running third-party proceedings. Significant
barriers still exist in relation to litigation in terms of rules relating to security for costs
and undertakings as to damages.123 There are also practical and technical barriers to
involving the public in enforcement tasks, principally regarding access to information
about PNF activity. It may be possible for NGOs with sufficient motivation and
resources to employ remote-sensing data and GIS technology to gather information
about PNF activity and to cross-match this with records of PNF approvals, in order to
detect unauthorised activity. However, without a certain measure of tacit encouragement
from government and a certain level of acceptance by industry of such monitoring, this
method is unlikely to form a significant part of any PNF enforcement strategy. The
rights of third-parties to perform the oversight role need to be both guaranteed and then
respected by the regulatory State. If it is seriously contemplated that third parties are to
play an important role in ensuring the integrity of modified regulatory regimes, it is
important that they be adequately resourced and assisted by government to fulfil this
role. Otherwise propositions by Braithwaite and others in this context will remain merely
of theoretical, rather than practical, interest.124
However significant political barriers to the introduction of measures to facilitate thirdparty involvement in compliance-enforcement actions, in the form of industry resistance
to the involvement of the public, must be considered. In NSW, private-forest owner
organisations have expressed an explicit desire to exclude the operation of FOI laws and
Braithwaite, J. (1992) “Responsive Regulation for Australia”, ch.6 in Grabosky, P. and Braithwaite, J. (eds.) Business
Regulation and Australia’s Future, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 81-96 at91; Gunningham, N.,
Grabosky, P. (1998) Smart Regulation, Oxford University Press at 197-205.
123 Johnson recounts that when the barefoot environmentalist litigant Al Oshlack sought an injunction to prevent the
Iron Gates development at Evans Head in coastal Northern NSW his application was refused because he was
unable to provide security for costs. The site, comprising areas of rainforest, coastal wetland and threatened species
habitat, was subsequently razed in breach of the conditions of the development consent. Johnson, J. (1998) “Civil
Enforcement of Environmental Laws in Australia”, 5th International Conference of INECE, Monterey, California,
November, Vol. 1, pp. 435 - 444. Full text at <www.inece.org>. Nevertheless there is an emerging ‘public interest’
jurisprudence. In other , related litigation, in Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1993) 82 LGERA 222 Stein J held that
the nature of proceedings to challenge the validity of a development consent on the basis of the likely impact of a
development on endangered fauna was enough to amount to special circumstances, warranting displacement of the
usual rule that costs should follow the event. This decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal ((1996) 39
NSWLR 622). However, the High Court allowed the appeal (Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72).
124 Braithwaite (1992) above n 126 at 93.; Gunningham and Sinclair (2002) above n30 at 51.
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public oversight.125 In Tasmania, third-party enforcement and FOI provisions have been
excluded from the ambit of the Forest Practices System. It would be necessary to remove
statutory barriers to public participation, particularly regarding appeals against PTR
designations, and regarding industry exemptions from FOI legislation. Significant
barriers to third-party involvement in the enforcement process in Tasmania are generated
by the fact that FPPs and the data used to compile them are not available for inspection
by the public. These plans are protected from FOI requests. FPPs need to be at least
centrally registered, or preferably centrally located and available for public inspection, in
order for the public to play a regulator role (e.g. bringing civil enforcement proceedings).
Taken together, these issues suggest limits to the applicability of the third-party approach
advocated by commentators such as Braithwaite.126
Corporate environmental-reporting mechanisms are another instrument of indirect
governance raised in Chapter Three, which could be theoretically be applied in the PNF
context to improve the performance of modified regulatory systems. However, investordisclosure requirements would have an impact in relation only to large publicly-listed
forestry companies that operate in Tasmania (eg. Gunns), and to a lesser extent in NSW
(eg. Boral), to the extent that these companies are engaged in PNF.
Transparency and disclosure requirements will increase the pressure on companies to
take action to address their social and environmental performance, but only to the extent
that the type of information they are required to disclose is significant, and genuinely
revealing in relation to environmental performance. Proposals to make directors
personally liable for the actions of their companies, and to democratise shareholder
powers are important, but again have more role in relation to the actions of large publicly
listed companies, which at this stage play only a limited role within the PNF context in
NSW.
However, transparency can be encouraged in other ways, principally by government
taking steps to make enforcement information available. Firstly, this can be done by
Australian Forest Growers (2002) A Three Tier Option for an Exemption for Private Forestry: Submission to PNF Reference
Group, 8.5.02, 6pp. which states that in relation to PNF operations under all three proposed regulatory tiers “The
notification will not be placed on the public record by the authority and will not be available to FOI
applicants.”pp3-5. Note also that the NSW Farmers Association argued for the exemption of farm vegetation
management plans from public scrutiny under amendments to the Native Vegetation Conservation Act made in
December 2003: see Hansard.
126 Braithwaite, J. (1992) “Responsive Regulation for Australia”, ch.6 in Grabosky, P, Braithwaite, J. (eds.) Business
Regulation and Australia’s Future, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 81-96.
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introducing requirements for agencies to publish details of enforcement action and
decisions for that action. Secondly it can be done by encouraging a culture of respect and
compliance for FOI laws. Thirdly, government can assist independent efforts to ensure
compliance with environmental legislation by making raw data such as remote-sensing
information available, against which compliance checks could be made.

Timber certification as a non-regulatory governance strategy
One of the means for expanding the range of environmental governance tools is to
encourage certification and labelling of timber products. Falling within the broad
category of information-based instruments, certification is a form of non-regulatory
governance by civil society.127 According to Meidinger: “the methods used by
certification programs closely resemble law, since they rely on the public promulgation of
generalized rules and the definition of special organizational responsibilities for
determining compliance.”128 Government regulatory agencies could encourage firms to
gain credible certifications as a means of targeting their enforcement efforts on
uncertified firms, by making the (perhaps risky) assumption that certified firms will be in
compliance with environmental laws.129
The main question at this point is what action can legislators take to encourage the
uptake and membership of certification schemes? In particular, a key question is how to
get SMEs involved in seeking ESFM certification? It may be possible to appeal to the
self-interest of small firms and landholders at this point, where they may be able to make
greater profits and access new markets if they obtain FSC certification. It was argued
earlier that a limited “ESFM only” exemption for PNF within the NVCA might have the
potential to create an incentive for the pursuit of ESFM in the industry. Those who
adopted certified ESFM practices would be spared the development-consent process.
However a major and outstanding issue in relation to certification concerns its content. If
the industry self-certifies its sustainability, without external verification of claims, the
potential exists for major deception of the public, motivated by corporate marketing
127 Meidinger,

E. (2003) “Forest Certification as a Global Civil Society Regulatory Institution”, in Meidinger, E., Elliott,
C., and Oesten, G. (eds.) Social and Political Implications of Forest Certification, Forstbuch Verlag, Remagen-Oberwinter,
Germany, at 293-329. Other examples of information based policy include corporate environmental reporting,
toxics release inventories and community right-to-know legislation, and industry education and training measures.
128 Meidinger, E. (2003) at 293.
129 Meidinger, E. (2003) at 316.

priorities.130 Any proposed system for certification of PNF operations would have to be
subject to credible third-party certification as to the content of environmental
protection.131 Certification as to the process employed (such as whether an EMS is in place,
as in the case of ISO 14000 series certification) should not be taken as automatically
securing sufficient environmental improvements to warrant regulatory exemptions. U.S.
environmental groups have launched a major campaign in response to the American
Forest & Paper Association’s Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI), on the basis that it
represents a deceptive public-relations illusion.132

THE ROLE OF ENFORCEMENT
Another factor affecting the viability of any regulatory system is the extent to which it is
feasible to detect and punish non-compliant behaviour. There are significant difficulties
in identifying, monitoring and detecting non-compliant behaviour in the PNF context.
This is due to (i) the complex nature of biodiversity conservation issues, (ii) the
remoteness and difficulties in accessing private lands, (iii) low visibility of activities on
private land, and (iv) cultural difficulties in accessing private land for inspections.
However as discussed earlier in Chapter Eight, the statutes all provide access provisions,
and problems of detection are not insurmountable and can be partially addressed with
existing technologies for aerial photography and remote sensing.133 The US Forest
Service and the US EPA both use remote sensing for law enforcement purposes.134
“Clearly, by the evidence of past practices, the forest products industry is not sufficiently objective or motivated to
set standards which will ensure the continuing existence of healthy forest lands for our children or their children.
We need objective standards without self interest involved in setting the bar. We will be using FSC [Forest
Stewardship Council], not SFI {Sustainable Forest Initiative] products for certified Green Built homes.” Bruce
Hammond, Hammond Fine Homes, Cotati CA, Board Member, US Green Building Council, Redwood Empire
Chapter. <http://www.dontbuysfi.com/action/>.
131 As opposed to the process of environmental management systems applied by the enterprise (as in ISO 14000 series
certification).
132 It is claimed that the “SFI does not protect old growth forests, does not protect roadless areas and U.S. public
lands, does not protect forests from conversion to tree-farms and urban sprawl, does not adequately restrict
clearcutting, and does not consistently protect and help recover imperiled species…“Despite all this, the logging
industry wants the public to buy wood with an ecolabel that they have given themselves. It is the fox guarding the
henhouse. Loggers call it the Sustainable Forestry Initiative, or SFI. We call it the Same-old Forest Industry.”
<http://www.dontbuysfi.com/action/>.
A review by the NRDC concluded that by comparison with FSC
certification, “The SFI lacks many components necessary for credible certification.” Natural Resources Defense
Council (2002) Forest Certification Programs: A Comparison of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Sustainable
Forestry Initiative (SFI) of the American Forest & Paper Association (AF&PA), NRDC, Washington DC., April, at p.1.
133 Carterra data from the IKONOS satellite has a panchromatic band with a spatial resolution of 0.82 m, and
multispectral spatial resolution of 3.28 m. Both Landsat 5 and 7 have a spatial resolving power of 30 m. Therefore
anything 30 m x 30 m is technically detectable. However processing usually reduces the resolution, 1: 25,000 is
achievable but 1: 100,000 resolution is more common. Fallen timber produces a different spectral signature to
canopy. A 30-50% reduction in forest canopy would be detectable in remote sensing data at the finer resolutions.
See further: Behn, G., McKinnell, F. H., Caccetta, P. and Verne, T. (2000) “Mapping Forest Cover”, Proceedings of the
10th Australasian Remote Sensing and Photogrammetry Conference, paper no 97, pp. 190-203; Lucas, R. M., Tickle, P. K. and
Carter, J. (1998) “A proposed framework for the inventory and monitoring of Australia's forest biomass”, in
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Both empirical evidence and logic suggest that without external monitoring or
enforcement, self-regulation systems are at grave risk of failure. A survey by the Canadian
Federal Environment Department found that industry sectors relying upon selfmonitoring or voluntary observance had a compliance rate of 60%. Industries subject to
federal regulation and a consistent inspection regime had a 94% compliance rate.135
It is necessary, because of the strong incentives to evade rules with regards to
biodiversity conservation, to have strong enforcement when applying self-regulation.136
Yet external compulsion is likely to be considered by many industry participants to be
incompatible with their understanding and expectations of the operation of systems of
self-regulation.
Methods of co-regulation and modified forms of self-regulation depend on a strong
enforcement response and attitude in order to maintain their credibility. As Hopkins
argues: “the key issue in making the regulatory system more effective is not the style of
regulation, but the ability of inspectorates to enforce it.”137
A key factor in determining the effectiveness of self-regulation in Tasmania is the
magnitude of the deterrence effect generated by enforcement and compliance activities.
The Tasmanian system employs conventional regulatory methods for punishment and
does not rely heavily on internal systems for self-correction of behaviour such as internal
company procedures. It uses a combination of neighbour and FPO reporting to detect
Proceedings of the Ninth Australasian Remote Sensing and Photogrammetry Conference (paper 193) p. 5101; Michener, W. K.
and Houhoulis, P. F. (1996) Identification and Assessment of Natural Disturbances in Forested Ecosystems: the role of GIS and
remote sensing, Third International Conference on Integrating GIS and Environmental Modelling; Walker, J., Jupp, D.
L. B., Penridge, L. K. and Tian, G. (1986a).”Interpretation of Vegetation Structure in Landsat MSS Imagery: A case
study in disturbed semi-arid Eucalypt woodlands: Part 1. Field Data Analysis”, 23 Journal of Environmental Management
19-33; Walker, J., Jupp, D. L. B. and Penridge, L. K. (1986b) “Interpretation of Vegetation Structure in Landsat MSS
Imagery: A case study in disturbed semi-arid Eucalypt woodlands. Part 2. Model-based Analysis”, 23 Journal of
Environmental Management 35-57.
134 However Markovitz notes the existence of a number of evidentiary barriers to the acceptance of such evidence.
Markowitz, K. (2002) “Legal Challenges and Market Rewards to the Use and Acceptance of Remote Sensing and
Digital Information as Evidence” 12 Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 219-264 at 228-9.
135 Pacific and Yukon Regional Office of Environment Canada (1998) Enforcement v Voluntary Compliance: An
Examination of the Strategic Enforcement Initiatives Implemented by the Pacific and Yukon Regional Office of Environment Canada
1983 to 1998, Environment Canada, North Vancouver BC., cited in Gunningham and Sinclair (2002) above n 30 at
155.
136 Regulatory reform efforts towards greater self-regulation and self-monitoring will require higher levels of
enforcement, monitoring and deterrence if they are to secure greater levels of environmental protection, according
to Levin (1999) Chief of the Massachusetts Environmental Crimes Strike Force, speaking on the basis of experience
with environmental prosecutions and enforcement efforts in the US. Levin, M.(1999) “Environmental Law
Enforcement and Deregulation”, 33(3) New England Law Review 633 at 637.
137 Hopkins, A. (1999) Managing Major Hazards: the Lessons of the Moura Mine Disaster, Allen & Unwin, p.131.

breaches, as well as incidental detection through the annual audit of selected Forest
Practices Plans (FPPs). Offences on private land are relatively frequently detected and
punished, as compared with NSW.138 Tasmania’s enforcement system relating to
privately-owned land is more highly tailored to the forestry context, and is more detailed
than the system applicable in NSW. For example it applies systems of warnings and
suspensions of FPOs for offences such as the approval of a deficient or misleading
FPP.139
If a system of self-regulation were introduced in the NSW PNF context, its effectiveness
would turn upon the strength of the deterrence effect generated by ongoing conventional
enforcement techniques and upon the integrity of any auditing process. The same
considerable practical difficulties in relation to funding of compliance-monitoring activity
and auditing of PNF would be confronted as under the present regulatory approach.

For example in Forest Practices Board v Watson, an individual was fined $1500 plus costs for cutting firewood on
private property on an area reserved from harvesting under a FPP in order to protect habitat of a threatened species
of stag beetle: Forest Practices Board (2002) Annual Report 2001-2002, p.27.
139 Chief Forest Practices Officer (1994) Forest Practices Act 1985: A Guide for Forest Practices Officers, Forest Practices
Board, Tasmania, at p.6.
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CONCLUSION
The journey of investigation documented in this thesis into the application of
environmental laws to private native forestry in NSW was sparked by concerns about the
adequacy of environmental regulation during an earlier research project by the author. A
review of NPWS documents in the mid-1990s concerning the implementation of
threatened species legislation revealed that regulation of the PNF industry was superficial
and haphazard. It indicated an intent to avoid imposing requirements on the industry to
produce Fauna Impact Statements, statutory documents that would have considered the
possible impacts of logging on endangered fauna.1
Subsequent preliminary research for this thesis also revealed documentation suggesting a
low level of regulatory control of the industry. The NSW State of the Environment Report of
1997 stated that: “private forests [in NSW] are not generally managed for long term
sustainability [of timber production].”2 Other documentation was uncovered suggesting
poor standards of forestry within the PNF sector.3
The objective of this thesis was to test the hypotheses that emerged from such
background information - that legislation applicable to the PNF industry was inadequate
for the achievement of ESFM, and that the legislation was inadequately implemented.
The research task was made challenging by the general lack of comprehensive primary or
secondary sources surrounding the industry and particularly the lack of published
material concerning the question of the compliance of the PNF industry with
environmental laws.

1

2
3

This was achieved by the NPWS employing the dubious means of granting authorities to kill species under s.171 of
the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 rather than by following the more conventional process of licensing of such
activities under s.120. See Prest, J. (1995) Licensed to Kill: Endangered Fauna Licensing Under the National Parks and
Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW) Between 1991-1995, Occasional Paper, Australian Centre for Environmental Law, Australian
National University, Canberra.
New South Wales Environment Protection Authority (1997) New South Wales State of the Environment, EPA,
Chatswood, at 199.
One DLWC officer described “the generally low level of forest management skills and opportunistic approach to
timber harvesting common in the [private] industry.” DLWC (2000) Summary of Comments on Desktop Audit of
Exemptions (Stage 1 Review of Exemptions), Comments by DLWC and RVC only, internal unpublished document, at 63,
Comments by DLWC Officer No.12 (Compliance Officer), Sydney-South Coast Region.

The primary step of the investigation involved solving the puzzle of exactly which
legislative provisions applied to the industry and in what circumstances. That in itself was
a considerable undertaking – given the tangle of laws applying to the industry that had
built up incrementally over time. The Expert Working Group on ESFM described the
applicable law as “complex, confused and inconsistent.”4 The investigation also involved
politely requesting, and later, persistently seeking, information and documentation
relating to the application of environmental legislation to the industry. This involved a
large number of interviews, and review of a wide range of legal and inter-disciplinary
sources, seeking the available fragments of information that had been published
regarding the industry. One of the problems encountered was the political sensitivity
aroused by seeking information aimed at such a research hypothesis.5
The lack of readily-available data about policy questions surrounding PNF was primarily
due to the overwhelming focus of all players on questions of public forest management.
Private forests have been the forgotten forests, usually placed in the ‘too-hard basket’ by
policy-makers, legislators, conservationists and foresters.6 As Dr Hannam of DLWC
observed: “the majority of political interest, financial and human resources are heavily
biased towards the public forest area.”7
Private forests have been seen in the past as less significant in both conservation and
economic terms than public forests. However, the picture of NSW private forests as the
forgotten forests is changing as their commercial importance is underlined by restrictions
on public-forest timber supply, and as their ecological significance is explored and
increasingly highlighted by environmentalists. Sawmillers have typically turned to private
forests to augment their wood supply when access to public forests has been restricted.
Independent Expert Working Group (1998) Assessment of management systems and processes for achieving ecologically sustainable
forest management in NSW, A report undertaken for the NSW CRA/RFA Steering Committee, Resource and
Conservation Division, Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (NSW); Forests Taskforce, Department of
Prime Minister and Cabinet (Cth), Canberra.
5 The response sometimes was that the data did not exist, or was not available; that to make it available was not in the
public interest, and that a request for it under Freedom of Information legislation was inappropriate. Other officers
hinted that they wished to talk more about the subject but were not in a position to provide greater details, or
provided information only on condition of anonymity. See further Chapter One.
6 Note that this title was applied by Calder, M., Calder, J. (1994) The Forgotten Forests: A Field Guide to Victoria's Box and
Ironbark Country, Victorian National Parks Association, 120pp. (This book is now in a 2nd edition as Victoria's BoxIronbark Country: A Field Guide) on the basis that they are no longer the forgotten forests following the creation of a
number of national parks and reserves. See also The Age (2001) Editorial “The forgotten forests' last stand”,
30/08/2001 where the leader writer suggested “The woodlands are archetypal Australian bush, part of a cultural and
literary heritage….”.
7 Hannam, I. (1995b) “Environmental Law and Private Property Management in New South Wales”, paper presented
to 2nd Annual Defending the Environment Conference, Australian Centre for Environmental Law, University of
Adelaide, 20-21 May 1995, Published Conference Proceedings, 223-250.
4

The contribution of private forests increased in the late 1990s to the point that
production in the Upper North-East and Lower North-East regions of NSW was
described as “reaching the limits of sustainable yield.”8 As much as 50 per cent of wood
production in the Upper North-East is now coming from private native forests. 9 Yet at
the same time private forests are home for unique and threatened biodiversity. They also
include remnants of a number of under-protected forest ecosystem-types (56 such foresttypes in the Upper N-E and 85 in the Lower N-E) that should be preserved to create a
comprehensive, adequate and representative reserve system.10
But with private forestry largely out of the spotlight of government and environmentalist
attention, the development of the law applying to these forests has been characterised
both by inertia and piecemeal development. There has been a long-standing reluctance to
interfere with private property rights. Chapters in Part Two also revealed that difficulties
in regulating PNF arise because of politico-cultural issues, as well as practical problems
of access. Regulators have been hesitant to concern themselves greatly with questions of
sustainability of PNF activity or with strongly implementing existing legislation intended
to regulate the industry.
Yet against this background of difficulties, there are recent Commonwealth and State
government commitments to ESFM in the Regional Forest Agreements and the
international arena which specifically refer to the sustainability of private forestry. The
Commonwealth’s withdrawal from regulating PNF, and growing public demands for
ecological sustainability in the sector have made it crucial to improve State laws
governing PNF.

Centre for Agricultural and Regional Economics Pty Ltd (‘CARE’), Gillespie Economics, Environment and
Behaviour Consultants (1999b) Regional Impact Assessment for the Lower North East CRA Region: A Project undertaken as
part of the NSW Comprehensive Regional Assessments, Project numbers NL 08/ES & NA39/ES, Published by Resource
and Conservation Division of Department of Urban Affairs and Planning and Forests Taskforce of Department of
Prime Minister and Cabinet, p.78. In the UNE, the production of timber from private native forests was estimated
to have been at 200,000m3/pa in 1997/98 which according to CARE and “industry analysts”, “would be close to
the sustainable yield of private sector forests”.
9 Centre for Agricultural Economics, Gillespie Economics, Environment and Behaviour Consultants (1999) Regional
Impact Assessment for the Upper North East CRA Region: A Project undertaken as part of the NSW Comprehensive Regional
Assessments, Project numbers NU 12/ES & NA39/ES, Published by Resource and Conservation Division of
Department of Urban Affairs and Planning and Forests Taskforce of Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet,
p.70
10 Commonwealth of Australia and State of NSW, Regional Forest Agreement for North East NSW (Upper NE and Lower
NE) (the Commonwealth, Canberra, 2000)(hereafter ‘NE RFA’), Table 1 “Percentage Reservation Status of Forest
and Non-Forest Ecosystems in the Upper NE Region based on Vegetation Modelling to Establish the pre-1750
extent of Forest Ecosystems in the Region”, contained in Attachment 1(a): Comprehensive, Adequate and
Representative Reserve System for Upper NE Region, pp.41-63.
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It is in this context that this research project has sought to investigate the adequacy of
the development and implementation of environmental legislation. As argued earlier,
empirical research is not often carried out by environmental lawyers, with the result that
much Australian environmental-law literature typically fails to go beyond a black-letter
analysis of the statutory framework or discussion of broad principles and concepts of
environmental law and policy.
It has been found that the present regulatory system applying to PNF in NSW largely
fails to ensure sustainability in terms of timber production terms or ecosystem
protection. There is good reason to believe that the present regulatory framework in
NSW is inadequate to achieve these objectives. The law is highly fragmented and
complex, with responsibility for administration spread across a large number of agencies
– a situation detrimental to the effective supervision of PNF operations. Excessively
broad exemptions, and in some instances, inadequate requirements for ESFM are also
contributing factors.
This thesis has also demonstrated that the existing regulatory framework, even where
adequate, is often sporadically, or inadequately, implemented and enforced in practice in
relation to private forestry, particularly in NSW. The hypothesis that most PNF was
unregulated ‘in practice’ during the study period was found to be largely accurate.
In summary, primarily due to the operation of the PNF exemption, PNF is not
adequately regulated under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (‘NVCA’).
Frequently local government does not regulate it under Local Environment Plans
(‘LEPs’). Where neither of these controls apply, research revealed that the safety net
mechanism of licensing under the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (‘TSCA’) is
infrequently applied.
In detail, in relation to implementation of the NVCA, it was found that all PNF logging
outside protected land in the North Coast and Hunter regions claimed the PNF
exemption, regardless of the type of logging. The mass-exemption of much of the PNF
industry during the study period amounted to a de facto form of self-regulation.11 The ill-

11

A DLWC internal memo upon the introduction of SEPP 46 (NSW’s first attempt at broadscale vegetation clearing
controls), answered the question “Why Regulation?” by stating: “The substantial documentation on the rate of past
clearing and modification of native vegetation generally indicates that self-regulation has failed.” DLWC (1995b).

defined and excessively-broad PNF exemption clause in the NVCA requires reform
before that Act can adequately provide for ESFM.
In relation to the provisions of Environmental Planning Instruments made and
administered under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act by local government, in
some cases these still play an important ‘safety net’ role given the broad scope of the
NVCA’s PNF exemption, and the widespread use of that exemption. Yet the case study
revealed a decision by the majority of local councils surveyed (64.5 per cent) not to
regulate PNF in the General Rural Zone (1a). In the North Coast and Hunter regions,
where the PNF industry is most active, local councils tended not to regulate the industry
(North Coast Region, 84.2 per cent; Hunter Region 61.5 per cent). On this basis it can be
said that, during the study period, the EPAA, as applied by local government, failed to
exert sustained and consistent pressure for ESFM outcomes.
This thesis also explored the administration of the TSCA by the National Parks and
Wildlife Service in instances where neither the NVCA nor the EPAA were applied by
DLWC or local government. The licensing data available suggests that to date, the TSCA
has had only minor impact on the PNF sector in NSW. First, there have been very few
operators licensed, and fewer than one would expect given the patchy coverage of Part 4
EPAA requirements across NSW. Second, in every instance of licensing there was a
finding that logging was not likely to significantly affect threatened species or their
habitat. Therefore the Species Impact Statement and Ministerial consultation processes
under the TSCA were never activated, and thus no detailed survey of sites proposed for
PNF was performed under the ambit of the licensing regime.
Considerable research was conducted regarding the Tasmanian system for regulation of
PNF. However it was found that the Tasmanian Code does not amount to a Code for
the ecologically sustainable management of forests. The Code is biased towards timber
production objectives, and appears to take insufficient account of ecological impacts
such as destruction of habitat (e.g. tree-bearing hollows). It permits clearfelling and
replacement of native forests with plantation monocultures. The sustainable
development objectives applicable to other industries are not applicable to most aspects

Questions and responses on native vegetation management and protection issues for staff. Internal Memo, 11
August 1995.

of forestry operations in Tasmania. This anomaly cannot be explained away by the need
for specialised regulation of forestry.

Applying a socio-legal studies perspective
The thesis then explored how such patterns of implementation of laws can be explained.
An inter-disciplinary approach, considering the implications of the broader context of
economic and political forces for law reform provides more answers than merely looking
at the shortcomings of the legal framework itself. As Bernstein (1955) suggested, it is
helpful to see the application of the law in its broader context. He wrote: “Above all,
regulation is a process which is neither isolated in relation to the general political and
economic environment nor self-contained in its evolution.”12
Although conventional analysis suggests that the law arises as an outcome of the will of
society expressed through the Parliament, environmental laws also have a symbolic
political meaning. The mere passage and existence of legislation carries meaning about
the collective intention of society (and the degree of concern of particular legislators) to
resolve pressing issues.13 It appears that often less importance is placed on questions of
its effectiveness in practice.

The role of enforcement
The enactment of environmental laws is part of a process of attempting to alter
‘community values’14 about land-use practices that have the potential to cause
environmental damage. However such change does not arrive overnight. There is a
danger - summarised by the cynical phrase “the light-switch theory of regulation” - in
merely enacting legislation and then expecting that that action, alone, will resolve social
or environmental problems.15

Ibid at 281.
J. (1990) “The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation” 17 Ecology Law Quarterly 233-316.
14 Ingleby, R.; Johnstone, R.(1995) “Invocation and enforcement of legal rules”, in R. Hunter, R. Ingleby and R.
Johnstone (eds.), Thinking About Law: Perspectives on the History, Philosophy and Sociology of Law, Allen & Unwin, Sydney,
pp.157-173.
15 Comments made by Banks in delivering paper: Banks, (2001) “Forest Regulation - Acquisition of Property on Just
Terms?” in Country Conferences Pty Ltd, (ed.) 2nd Australasian Natural Resources Law & Policy Conference (Focus on
Forestry), Country Conferences Pty Ltd, Perth, WA.
12

13 Dwyer,

These offences are socially constructed, and the criminal law serves to indicate the
seriousness with which unwanted conduct is regarded by the Parliament.16 But it is
difficult for regulators to apply rules that are not broadly accepted by the regulated
community. As we have seen, the rural community resists regulation on private land.
Environmental offences are created by statute, and suddenly, activities such as the
clearing of native vegetation - once considered ‘routine’ – are described as an
environmental crime overnight. Even with a lengthy phase-in period there is often
limited support for environmental laws in the rural context, where the reasons for the
enactment of such laws may not have been well-communicated or -understood. Yeager’s
observation of regulatory implementation issues in the US seems also to hold true in
Australia. He wrote: “While true of law generally, the process of implementation is
particularly uncertain and dynamic when the statutory guidance is culturally novel –
threatening long established patterns and relations.”17
To a certain extent, improving the environmental performance of the PNF industry will
require the application of non-regulatory techniques to alter the decision-making of
participants in the industry. Techniques such as education campaigns and incentives fall
broadly within the headings of information-based instruments and inducements. Yet
such ‘soft’ techniques for behaviour change, although vital, must take place within a
context of the threat of coercive action by government to ensure compliance. Threats
and inducements must be perceived as real, not as mere bluff. Education and stakeholder
communication initiatives are usually a useful complementary tool at this point as they
can explain and make more palatable the prospect of coercive enforcement.18 Similarly,
the effectiveness of education campaigns is increased against a background of stringent
enforcement activity against those blatantly evading regulatory requirements.19
A broader aim of this thesis has been to explore some of the limits of the law in altering
behaviour to achieve ecological sustainability. The case studies raised the question of why
In relation to forestry law in British Columbia, Pendleton argues that the enactment of statues creating such
environmental crimes is a process of social construction: “The normative basis for defining organizational
behaviour as deviant depends on a social process. The process is based on the interactions between accusers,
organisations and interested audiences, which create organisational crime as a socially constructed reality. Central to
the defining process is the construction of a shared meaning that redefines organisational behaviour that was
previously ignored or considered acceptable, as wrong.” Pendleton, M. (1997) “Beyond the Threshold: The
Criminalization of Logging”, 10 Society and Natural Resources 181-193 at 182.
17 Yeager, P. (1991) The Limits of Law: the public regulation of private pollution, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, UK,
369pp. at 176.
18 Gunningham, N., Grabosky, P. (1998) Smart Regulation, Oxford University Press, pp.298-299.
19 Ibid, pp.427-431
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there were such difficulties with implementation and enforcement. It appears the
difficulties were due to a combination of shortages of agency resources and political
pressure to avoid prosecution of environmental offences.20 However, apart from overt
political direction to agencies (in relation to enforcement of the NVCA by DLWC),
there were other pressures at play, particularly relating to the application of relatively
novel and contested laws in the rural primary-production context.
Some difficulty arises from the fact that environmental offences are morally ambiguous.
Much of the emphasis of environmental laws is on appropriate control of activities rather
than on outright prohibition.21 Breaches of environmental law in the rural context are
often perceived as minor or technical breaches. They are seen as neither criminal in
nature nor morally reprehensible. Landholders may view environmental impacts as
minor, unproven or as an unintended by-product of economically-beneficial activities.22
In such a context, it is inherently difficult to secure high levels of voluntary compliance,
particularly where that compliance would come at an economic cost to the landholder.
Enforcement remains a crucial aspect of the implementation of environmental laws.
Without it, the regulated community may perceive compliance as optional, and
environmental laws will remain mere words on paper.23 As stated in a Canadian ruling
about occupational health and safety standards: “if the regulations were not enforced by
the use of sanctions, they would come to be perceived not as regulatory requirements but
merely as statements of aspiration.”24 There will always be a section of the regulated
population which will not comply without pressure - and environmental laws will have
little credibility in that community without enforcement. If regulations and the agencies
enforcing them are perceived as weak, the rate of compliance will remain low.25 Further,
without compliance activity, the important function of reminding the community about
Operational (i.e. non-legislative) factors affecting the extent of enforcement using the criminal law include the
agency’s perception of its functions; the accountability of the agency; the existence of a formal enforcement policy;
the existence of an informal enforcement policy, culture, attitudes at officer level; the methods for detecting
offences; the nature of the regulated community; the availability of administrative and civil enforcement options.
Another factor is agency decisions about how to allocate resources between detection, site visits and extension work
and formal prosecution actions. Rowan-Robinson, J., Watchman, P., Barker, C.(1988) "Crime and Regulation",
Criminal Law Review 211 at 215-217.
21 Hawkins put it this way: “the issue is not whether to allow pollution, but how much pollution to allow.” Hawkins,
K.(1984) Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution, Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK, p.10.
22 Hawkins, K.(1984) above n 21 at 206-207.
23 Environmental Law Institute (USA) (1993) Practical Approaches to Implementing Environmental Laws: Getting to Here from
There, ELI, Washington DC, at 1.
24 D Saxe, (1990) Environmental Offences: Corporate Responsibility and Executive Liability, Canada Law Book Co., Aurora,
Ontario at 26, cites Re Industrial Hygiene Decision No.167 (1975) 2 W.C.R. 234 at 252.
25 Ercmann, S. (1996) Enforcement of Environmental Law in United States and European Law: Realities and
Expectations”, 26 Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 1213.
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rules is lost. As Brennan J said in Walden v Hensler, enforcement involves both primary
and secondary deterrence purposes - educating both the offender and the community
about the law, “so that the law will come to be known and obeyed”.26
Some of the limits of the law are prescribed by the social, economic and political context
within which the particular law has been created and is enforced. Yeager argued that “the
most basic limits to law's effectiveness are institutionalised in enduring structures of
social relations in a political economy.”27 One aspect of this is that agency discretion and
negotiation by field officers with the regulated community play a crucial role in day-today regulatory implementation.28 It has been observed that:
Enforcement officials…are the gatekeepers to the regulatory process. But they do not work in a
vacuum or free from constraints – they operate within varying political, social, legal and
organizational parameters.29

Although offence provisions provide a point of leverage for regulators to extract greater
environmental performance, it has been observed that such “workers act to minimise
role strains”, i.e. the extent of conflict associated with enforcing the law.30 For regulatory
officers based in Australian rural communities, the difficulty of living within small closeknit communities, often hostile to environmental regulations must be taken into
account.31 Empirical studies have shown that often the enforcement process involves an
exchange relationship in which a soft touch and patience in enforcement is often traded
for good-faith efforts at compliance.32 These issues have not been explored in depth in
this thesis, and the Australian rural context represents an important direction for further
research.
Ambiguous provisions such as the PNF exemption place agencies such as DLWC in a
position where they must bargain with the regulated community over the meaning of
particular legislative requirements.33 If officers do not have a strong bargaining position
to begin with, it may become extremely difficult to secure compliance. The regulator is
Walden v. Hensler (1987) 163 CLR 561, Brennan J at 570.
Yeager above n 17.
28 Hawkins, K.(1984) above n 21 at 10.
29 Hutter, B., and Lloyd-Bostock, S. (1997) “Law’s relationship with social science: the interdependence of theory,
empirical work, and social relevance in socio-legal studies”, ch.1 in Hawkins, K. (ed.) The Human Face of Law: Essays
in Honour of Donald Harris, Clarendon Press, Oxford, at 35-6.
30 Laurence Ross(1989) “Sociology and Legal Sanctions”, ch.2 in Friedland, M. (ed.) Sanctions and Rewards in the Legal
System: A Multidisciplinary approach, Univ. of Toronto Press, Toronto, p.48.
31 Farrier, D. (1990) “Regulation of Rural Land Use: Coercion or Consensus?” 2(1) Current Issues in Criminal Justice, July,
95-124 at 120.
32 Yeager (1991) above n 17 at 39; Hawkins (2002) Law As A Last Resort : Prosecution Decision Making In A Regulatory
Agency, Oxford University Press, Oxford; Hawkins, K .(1984) above n 21.
33 Yeager (1991) above n 17 at 39-40.
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required to bargain in good faith in order to avoid creating a backlash against the
regulatory scheme.34
Many regulatory agencies find themselves caught in a position where there is a conflict
between their role in meeting and accommodating the demands of industry, and their
broader role of serving and protecting the public interest.35 The neo-liberal agenda of
marketisation of government functions has introduced an additional complicating factor
into this equation relatively recently. There is a trend within regulatory practice to
describe industry as the ‘client’ or ‘customer’ of the regulatory agency. DLWC has
adopted this approach in the implementation of the NVCA, issuing a document entitled
‘Customer Service Guarantee’, relating to the timelines for processing of clearing
applications.36 There are dangers in this approach of describing regulatees as ‘customers’.
There may be confusion of roles between that of regulator and extension officer,
resulting in a reluctance to displease the ‘customer’ when exercising regulatory functions
such as inspections.37 The thesis suggests that the institutional solution is to separate
roles and responsibilities between the regulator and the service provider, by creating an
Office of the Forest Regulator separate to extension services (above, p.432).

The re-invention of regulation
A major theme traversed in this thesis has been the movement to re-invent and
reconfigure regulatory policy, to broaden the range of policy responses and instruments
beyond conventional regulation. The challenge in reconfiguring regulatory policy for
PNF is to determine the potential for novel combinations of instruments that might

Interview, Mr. G. Davey, Threatened Species Unit Manager, Northern Zone, NPWS, 30.4.98.
Gunningham, N. (1974) Pollution, Social Interest and the Law Martin Robertson & Co, London, argued that the former
Alkali-Inspectorate was caught between 2 roles, serving the public and serving industry. (p.65.)
36 The Director-General’s foreword to the DLWC Staff Guidelines for assessing clearing applications under the NVCA
raises with staff the importance of “professional customer relations” and the preliminary section contains a box
headed “Customer Service – Top Ten Helpful Hints”. DLWC (1999) Staff Guidelines for the Assessment of Clearing
Applications under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997, DLWC NSW, Parramatta, at 7.
37 Leadbeter talks of the dangers of the SA EPA adopting a client or customer focus in their enforcement of
environmental laws, citing the SA Coroner's report into the Garibaldi meat contamination incident. The Coroner
wrote: “I must say I have some difficulty with the concept of a regulatory authority describing the occupier of
premises to be inspected as a customer...it implies a relationship of service which is inappropriate...there will be
times when the 'customer' will be displeased by an environmental officer's actions... The public has a right to expect
that an environmental health officer will not be daunted by that.” SA Coroner (1995) Report into the Death of Nicki
Robinson, Inquiry No 19 of 1995. Delivered 28 Sept, at p.131. Cited in Leadbeter, P. (1999) “Recent Trends and
Developments in South Australian Environmental Law” in Leadbeter, P., Gunningham, N., Boer, B. (eds.),
Environmental Outlook No.3: Law and Policy, Federation Press, Sydney, 146-164 at 162.
34
35

appropriately supplement (but not replace) conventional regulation, whilst enabling the
goal of ESFM to be achieved.
The debate over regulation is focussed on proposals for more devolved policy methods
such as systems of self-regulation and market mechanisms. There is a prevailing
scepticism about the role of conventional regulation, which is often rejected as
ineffective and inefficient. There is a focus on the economic impacts of regulation at the
expense of ecological considerations.
Yet it is also commonly stated in the Australian literature that there is a need for a
‘bottom line’ of precautionary regulation in order to ensure the achievement of
biodiversity conservation objectives. Thus it is important to ask how regulation can be
improved – and not just to improve rates of compliance, but to encourage firms to
improve their performance beyond compliance.
As we have seen, the alternative of self-regulation frequently proposed, especially by
industry, and particularly in the case of Tasmania, is by no means without shortcomings.
In NSW, the ‘alternative’ of self-regulation of PNF, is in many ways the present reality.
The breadth of the PNF exemption under the NVCA has created a situation of de facto
self-regulation on areas of private land that are not classed as protected land.
Even if self-regulation is bounded by substantial external regulation, in this particular
context it is unlikely to provide the answers that many would like it to. The literature
suggests that the introduction of self-regulation measures, even limited forms of selfregulation, depends on a series of special preconditions being present in order for them
to be effective.38 It appears from this review of PNF in NSW that few of these special
factors exist at present. Peculiar difficulties - explored in Chapter Four in relation to offreserve biodiversity conservation, and in relation to Tasmanian regulation of forestry in
Chapter Eleven– are associated with the goal of biodiversity conservation. Difficulties are
also associated with the task of regulating a large number of small enterprises, and with
barriers to public participation and third-party enforcement. These place serious limits on
the promise of self-regulation of PNF. With such constraints, most self-regulation
38

Self, Peter (1994) The Missing Conditions Of Effective Regulation – An Alternative Perspective, ANU RSSS Working Paper;
Administration, Compliance & Governability Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National
University, Working Paper No.24 at 43-55.

models (other than very tightly-constrained forms of enforced self-regulation applying to
activities of low environmental significance) are likely to represent high-risk policy,
especially if we intend to achieve goals of ensuring ESFM. Self-regulation systems are at
considerable risk from powerful financial incentives for non-compliance and underreporting of threatened biodiversity.
Investigation of self-regulation strategies for application to the PNF arena in NSW must
proceed cautiously for several other reasons. Firstly, given the biodiversity-conservation
objectives, there is a reasonable consensus that such a strategy must ultimately rely upon
a safety net of regulation. Secondly, problems of enforcement and implementation that
beset conventional regulation are likely also to affect the application of alternative policy
instruments. Such real-world problems are virtually unavoidable. Self-regulation strategies
must address the problem of self-interest. Regardless of the mix selected on the
continuum between pure command regulation and pure self-regulation, practical
difficulties in relation to funding, monitoring and auditing will remain.
The Tasmanian example of forestry self-regulation does not offer an appropriate
alternative for NSW as it was found to contain insufficient safeguards for ESFM, and
insufficient measures to counteract the strong incentives to under-report threatened
species matters. This was illustrated in the ‘giant velvet worm case’ which revealed
failures by self-regulating Forest Practices Officers to include adequate threatened species
prescriptions.39 When combined with the existing Tasmanian statutory secrecy
provisions, the system of self-regulation can create an environment in which external
review, evaluation and critique are unwelcome. In such a context, conditions are created
in which it is possible, or even expected, for participants to turn a blind eye to breaches
of the Act and Code.40

F. Giles, J. Weston & T. Dudley v Break O’Day Council & T. Denney TASRMPAT No. J115/2001 (referred to as
‘Dudley’). 23 July 2001. The case also concerned failure to detect rare forest types that had conservation priority
under the RFA. Dudley illustrates the necessity that regulations provide expert biodiversity agencies with an active
review role. Otherwise persons with inadequate training, knowledge and resources will be left the task of identifying,
reporting and preserving threatened species, when it is not in their economic interest to do so.
40 The Australian literature on indirect governance appears to fail to consider the implications of the strong Australian
cultural trait of reluctance to inform authorities about misdemeanours committed by one’s colleagues, workmates
and associates, i.e., the cultural prohibition on “dobbing on your mates”. In a small, close-knit rural community it is
unrealistic to expect that landholders will ‘dob in’ their neighbours, or that logging contractors will report their
industry compatriots to regulatory agencies for instances of failure to abide by environmental regulations. This
question requires further sociological research.
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A combination of risk-based tiering of regulation with other policy actions and
instruments such as removal of perverse incentives and payment of private landstewardship payments is required in order to create an ideal regulatory mix for PNF.
Conventional regulation will require adaptations of this type in order to improve its
effectiveness. Further improvements can be achieved by expanding regulatory education
and extension efforts and the introduction of positive measures for participation by
regulatory surrogates, principally the public and NGOs.

An optimal mix of regulatory policy for private native forestry in NSW would entail:
•
•
•
•
•
•

constraining the application of self-regulation measures to very small-scale operations
of low-environmental-risk, and only within a broader framework of external
regulation;41
encouraging the up-take of forestry certification as to the content (not process) of
industry sustainability requirements (e.g. FSC certification) by enabling such
operations to self-regulate, subject to an annual random auditing regime.
introducing measures to enable and encourage the exertion of supply-chain pressure,
combined with measures to regulate the entire supply chain in the industry;
offering financial incentives and other inducements for biodiversity conservation and
for positive land-management actions to private landholders, in order to overcome
existing countervailing incentives to destroy biodiversity;
conducting a compliance-education strategy for the industry (as outlined in Chapter
Nine regarding the TSCA); and
evaluating the introduction of a strategy to encourage public participation in the
regulation of PNF as a means of exerting indirect governance pressure.

As suggested earlier, ensuring compliance in the PNF context, although it involves
particular difficulties, is neither technically impossible nor prohibitively expensive. We
must be wary of simplistic arguments that findings of implementation deficits indicate a
need to reject regulatory approaches altogether. Such suggestions appear a little like
abandoning a car that has stopped because we have neglected to fill it with fuel.42 Before
saying that we cannot afford to fill the regulatory vehicle with enforcement fuel, we must
check for, and test, dubious assumptions that other approaches are relatively free of
cost.43
Sufficient, intelligent enforcement and adequate funding applied in a strategic manner are
necessary requirements regardless of the mix of incentives, regulation or self-regulation
applied. If there are inadequate resources to enforce regulations, it is likely that there will
also be inadequate funds to provide sufficient monetary incentives to convince
landholders and their contractors to log sustainably.44 Further, without auditing and

As discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight on the NVCA, and Chapter Twelve, the appropriate threshold is to
ensure that exemptions from forestry regulation only apply to operations involving a small area of land (eg. Less
than one hectare), or a small volumes of timber (less than 100 tonnes).
42 The counter-argument is that the cost of filling the regulatory vehicle is too high for governments faced with severe
fiscal constraints. It is possible to respond that costs of providing incentives or of auditing self-regulation systems
may also be equally considerable. The costs of continued biodiversity loss to future generations may be even greater.
43 For example, a recent OECD report (2003) on voluntary agreements by industry with environmental regulators
argued that such approaches to environmental protection are often resource-intensive for both industry and
regulators. OECD (2003) Voluntary Approaches for Environmental Policy: Effectiveness, Efficiency and Usage in Policy Mixes,
OECD, Paris at p.76-80. The report states that the costs for Intel and Merck to enter into Project XL agreements
with the US EPA exceeded $500,000 each and involved negotiations in excess of 17 months.
44 There was evidence of a strategy of avoidance of action that would trigger the compensation provisions in
Tasmanian legislation. See Chapter Eleven, interviews with Naomi Lawrence, Botanist, Parks and Wildlife Service.
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enforcement of rules surrounding incentives regimes, there is a danger that such
mechanisms will be ineffective.
The issue of the adequacy of resources for implementation will not go away simply if we
adopt alternative policy tools in order to tackle the issue of biodiversity conservation on
private land. The late American legal sociologist Laurence Ross was close to the mark
when he argued: “The legal system provides no exceptions to the truism that the things
we want are not free.”45 Commitment to the objective of achieving ESFM in the PNF
industry is what has been lacking to date. The problem has been placed in the ‘too-hard
basket’, largely due to the practical and political difficulties associated with regulating the
use of private land.

45

Laurence Ross (1989) “Sociology and Legal Sanctions”, ch.2 in Friedland, M. (ed.) Sanctions and Rewards in the Legal
System: A Multidisciplinary approach, Univ. of Toronto Press, Toronto, p.47.
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APPENDIX 5.1 OVERVIEW OF PRIVATE NATIVE FORESTS AND
FORESTRY IN NSW
INTRODUCTION
This Appendix briefly sets out much of the available background information about
private forests and forestry in NSW. Information about private forests is required in
order to establish the significance of the conservation task involved. Secondly,
information is required about the characteristics of the private native forestry (PNF)
industry in order to be in a position to regulate it effectively.

SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIVATE NATIVE FORESTS IN NSW
This section briefly sets out the various ways in which private native forests in NSW are
of significance. In summary, private forests: (i) represent important habitat for much of
NSW threatened biodiversity1, (ii) constitute a significant proportion (about 35%) of the
2

total area of native forests in NSW, (iii) comprising 46% of the area of commercial
3

forest types in the NSW Upper and Lower North-East RFA Region, and (iv) make a
4

sizeable contribution to total hardwood sawlog production (35% in the same region).

Furthermore, private forests have importance for conservation objectives, as many
forest ecosystem types are not adequately represented within the nature reserve system
on public lands.

1

2

3

4

5

5

EPA NSW (1997) New South Wales State of the Environment 1997, Chatswood, NSW at 196; Resource Assessment Commission
(1992) RAC Forest and Timber Inquiry Final Report, Canberra: the Commission, p. 89; National Forest Inventory (1998)
Australia’s State of the Forests Report 1998, Bureau of Rural Sciences, Canberra, ch 3 & p. 167.
EPA NSW (1997) above n 1 at 196; Resource Assessment Commission (1992) above n 1 at 89; National Forest Inventory
(1998) above n 1 at ch 3 & p 167.
Northern NSW Forestry Services & Bureau of Rural Sciences (1999) Private Forest Management Intent Survey: Northern NSW CRA
Regions (a report undertaken for the NSW CRA/RFA Steering Committee, Project # NA 47/ES, Resource and Conservation
Assessment Commission (NSW), Sydney, p 5.
Bureau of Rural Sciences/State Forests of NSW (1999) A Report on Forest Wood Resources for the Upper and Lower North East NSW
CRA Regions: undertaken for the NSW CRA/RFA Steering Committee, RACAC (DUAP), Sydney, Project Number NA/52/ES at
42. See also Forestry Commission NSW and Margules Groome Poyry, The Economic Impact of the New South Wales Timber
Industry (Margules Groome Poyry, Sydney, 1995), pp A-6 & B-17.
Commonwealth of Australia and State of NSW, Regional Forest Agreement for North East NSW (Upper NE and Lower NE) (the
Commonwealth, Canberra, 2000), Table 1 “Percentage Reservation Status of Forest and Non-Forest Ecosystems in the
Upper NE Region based on Vegetation Modelling to Establish the pre-1750 extent of Forest Ecosystems in the Region”,
contained in Attachment 1(a): Comprehensive, Adequate and Representative Reserve System for Upper NE Region, pp.4163.
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OVERVIEW OF PRIVATE FORESTS AND FORESTRY IN NSW

Data gaps regarding the private forest estate
NSW EPA's State of the Environment Report 1997 cited among the “Information needs”
regarding forests in NSW, the need for information about the “[e]xtent of forest and
logging on private land and extent of forests in western and central NSW.”6 In NSW
considerable gains have been made in filling some of the data gaps about the private
forest estate and the PNF industry, particularly since the RFA process (1996-2000) and
through the Bureau of Rural Science’s National Forests Inventory and the NSW State of the
Environment Report.

Tenure of forests in NSW
The three main sources of information regarding the tenure of forests in NSW are the
Commonwealth Government’s National Forest Inventory (1998), EPA (1997) and
Resource Assessment Commission (1992). According to the National Forest Inventory
(1998) (Australia’s State of the Forests Report), 38.69% of NSW are privately owned.
According to the NSW State of the Environment Report (1997) 35% of NSW forests are
privately held.

7

The RAC (1992) stated that 36% of NSW forests were privately

owned.8 The differences in these figures derive largely from the varying definitions of
‘forest’ and of ‘privately owned’.9 The NFI and RFA processes have defined private
forest to exclude leasehold tenures. McElhinny argues that this approach is inconsistent
with the Montreal Process and leasehold should be included within the definition of
privately owned because leaseholders still have a very substantial capacity to affect and
influence the condition of forests on land they hold.10

6

EPA NSW (1997) above n 1, Section 2.11.
EPA NSW (1997) above n 1.
8
EPA NSW (1997) above n 1 at 196; Resource Assessment Commission (1992) above n1 at 89; National Forest Inventory
(1998) at ch 3 & p 167.
9
For example in EPA NSW (1997) above n1, Forest is defined as having a potential stand height of 20 m or more (or cypress
pine in commercial production) and a minimum crown cover of 30%. Areas are net areas and exclude non-forest (e.g. heath,
swamp, cleared).
10
McElhinny writes: “This approach is at odds with the Montreal Process, which includes leasehold land under the category of
private forests. This broader definition reflects the fact that while management options available under leasehold title are more
restricted than options available under freehold title, in both tenures the landowner retains a major influence over the
condition of the forest resource.” McElhinny, C. (2000) Private Native Forest Inventory Within the Context of a Continental Sampling
Framework: a discussion paper prepared for the National Forest Inventory Steering Committee, Department of Forestry, ANU, Canberra.
7

3

APPENDIX 5.1

OVERVIEW OF PRIVATE FORESTS AND FORESTRY IN NSW

4

FIGURE 1
TENURE OF FORESTS OF NSW PROPORTION OF NSW FOREST ON PRIVATELY HELD LAND
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EPA NSW (1997) above n 1 at 196.
RAC (1992) above n 1 at 89.
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Figure 2 presents the findings of one of these reports, the NSW State of the Environment
Report, in graphical terms.
FIGURE 2: TENURE OF FORESTED LAND IN NSW

State Forests
22%

Private land
35%

National Parks
19%

Other Crown
24%

Source: EPA (1997) State of the Environment Report 1997, p.196.
Figure 2 shows that of the total area of native forest13 within NSW, 35% is held on
private land, 23% within state forest, and 25% on "other crown land". The other 17%
of forest is within national parks and reserves.14
When compared with other jurisdictions, NSW has a relatively high proportion of its
native forests held freehold. The National State of the Forests Report found that 38.7% of

13

This chart does not include plantation forests. Forest is defined as having a potential stand height of 20m or more (or cypress
pine in commercial production), and a minimum crown cover of 30%. Areas are net areas and exclude non-forest (eg. heath,
wetland, cleared).
14
The EPA NSW State of the Environment (1997) report cites as its source the Forestry Commission 1978, except statistics for
State Forests updated 1994, 1995. Forestry Commission of NSW (1978) Review of FORINS (Forest Resource Inventory System), by
F.G. Hoschke & R. H. Squire, Interim Report 1976, Technical Paper No.30, Forestry Commission of NSW, Sydney.
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NSW forests were private forests, 15 compared to 27.6% of Tasmanian16 and 14.2% of
Victorian Forests.17 However the picture is more complicated as a greater proportion of
Tasmanian private forests than NSW private forests are commercially viable.
Figure 2 does not indicate which types of forest are within which tenures. The State of the
Forests report, produced for National Forest Inventory, breaks down the tenure data
according by categories of “closed forest”, “open forest”, and “woodland” forests. In
terms of closed forests, in NSW private tenure is significant (18.9%), but less so than state
forests or nature reserves. In terms of open forest in NSW, private land is extremely
important (45%), and holds more of this forest type than either state forests or national
parks. In terms of the total area of woodland forest in NSW, private land is very important
(34.4%), but not as important as leasehold tenures (46.6%).

18

This information is

summarised in Figures 3 to 5 below.

15

National Forest Inventory (1998) above n 1, Chapter 3 : ‘Size, Distribution and Tenure of the Forest Estate’, p.167.
National Forest Inventory (1998) above n 1, Chapter 3 : ‘Size, Distribution and Tenure of the Forest Estate’, p.171.
17
National Forest Inventory (1998) above n 1, Chapter 3 : ‘Size, Distribution and Tenure of the Forest Estate’, p.36.
18
National Forest Inventory (1998) above n 1 at 36.
16
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FIGURE 3: NSW CLOSED FOREST BY TENURE
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Source: Australia’s State of the Forests Report 19

19

National Forest Inventory (1998) above n 1 at 36.
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FIGURE 4: NSW OPEN FOREST BY TENURE

Source: Australia’s State of the Forests Report 20
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National Forest Inventory (1998) above n 1 at 36.
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FIGURE 5: NSW WOODLAND FOREST BY TENURE

Source: Australia’s State of the Forests Report 21
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In NSW a small proportion of the moist coastal and tableland eucalypt forests and
rainforest are privately held. On the other hand it shows that a greater proportion
(approaching 40%) of drier forest types are privately owned (freehold). This EPA data
appears to be consistent with the findings of the National Forest Inventory. While a
higher percentage of the drier forest types are on private land, the proportion of some
of these forest types which are commercial forest types or are commercially viable is
much lower than for the coastal forests. Of the low and western eucalypts, an estimated
90% is either not economically feasible or is reserved, according to Forestry
Commission data.22

TABLE 1 : PERCENTAGE OF FOREST TYPE
PRIVATELY OWNED IN NSW, JUNE 1996 23

Forest Type
Rainforest
Blackbutt
Moist coastal eucalypts
Dry coastal eucalypts
Moist tableland eucalypts
Dry tableland eucalypts
Low dry eucalypts
Western box – gum – ironbarks
River red-gum
White cypress pine

Percentage of total forested area on
privately owned land
12.41 %
28.06%
28.41
36.5%
16.04 %
37.8%
34.3%
40.3%
37.7%
34.7%

This thesis has only examined in detail the issue of commercial timber harvesting on
privately held land within the Eastern Division, and does not examine the data
regarding regulation of PNF operations in the Central or Western Division in detail.
The majority of logging in the Central West is in the cypress pine forests, and Ironbark
forest communities around Dubbo.24 In the Western Division forestry operations are
22

New South Wales. Environment Protection Authority (1995) New South Wales State of the Environment, EPA, Chatswood, Table
3, in Forestry Chapter.
23
NSW EPA (1997) above n1 at Table 2.28. ‘Privately owned’ does not include “Other Crown Timber Lands” some of which
may be held leasehold.
24
Howling, G. (1997), Remnant Vegetation in the Central West Catchment: Issues and Options for the Future, Central West Catchment
Management Committee, Orange, NSW, 244pp. at 119 cites R.Irvine, State Forests, pers.comm.
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primarily cypress pine harvesting and sleeper cutting operations, including River Red
Gum logging.25

COMMERCIAL IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE NATIVE FORESTS
This section explores the relative importance of PNF to total native forest logging
output in NSW. Whilst the PNF industry produces a smaller volume of sawlogs and
pulplogs than operations on State forests, it produces a significant proportion of total
output, particularly in the Upper and Lower North East of the State.
The main points are:
• PNF production has been traditionally around 25-33% of total sawlog production;
• In the UNE region, PNF has recently increased to around 50% of total sawlog
production and there are questions about the sustainability of such a rate of logging;
• Private production has tended to increase when access to public forests is restricted.
A study published in 1999 found that PNF makes a 35% contribution to total sawlog
production in NSW.26 Another study (1996-1997) stated that private property provided
33.7% of hardwood sawlog production and 12.5% of hardwood pulpwood
production.27 An earlier study found that between 1984 and 1995 private production
ranged between 26.7% and only 17.7% of total sawlog production.28 It has not been
possible to obtain more recent state-wide data from official sources (because of the
cessation of publication of these statistics).29 Although NSW law requires sawmills to
record the source and volume of all timber processed,30 such requirements are
25

Wilson, N. (1995), The Flooded Gum Trees: Land Use and Management of River Red Gums in NSW, Nature Conservation Council of
NSW, Sydney.
26
Bureau of Rural Sciences/State Forests of NSW (1999) above n 4.
27
Forestry Commission NSW (1997) Annual Report 1996-7, p.83.
28
Forestry Commission NSW and Margules Groome Poyry (1995), The Economic Impact of the New South Wales Timber Industry,
December, Margules Groome Poyry, Sydney, pp A-6, p.B-17. According to Watson “log supplies from private property had
steadily declined in the two decades following World War II, dropping from supplying half the cut to less than a third.”
Watson, I. (1990) Fighting over the Forests, Allen & Unwin, Sydney at 7.
29
State Forests of NSW (1999) Annual Report 1998/9, SNFNSW, Pennant Hills, ceased to provide data relating to private
property logging, instead only providing yield data from State Forests: see p.75. The main primary data source regarding PNF
production are ‘sawmill returns’. All sawmills in NSW are required to be licensed by the Forestry Commission. Under the
licence terms, the sawmill is required to submit fortnightly returns to the Commission specifying logs received from each
source.
30
Further, it is a requirement that private property timber be branded. Forestry Regulation 1999 (NSW), cl.61(1)
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approximate and unreliable. 31
Apart from supplementing the supply of sawlogs, private forests are also important as a
source of thinning logs, veneer, poles, piles, girders, salvage logs and pulpwood. 32 They
are particularly important as a source of supply of poles and mining timber. A 1998
survey by the forestry consultants Fortech concluded that PNF was particularly
important as a source of poles, piles and girders (25%) and mining timber (42% of total
state production).33

Regional variations in importance of PNF
There are important regional variations in the importance of PNF in NSW. Private
production is most important in the UNE and LNE, less important in the Southern
Region and least important in the Eden CRA region.34 Despite these variations, a
significant proportion of sawmills, particularly small and medium sized mills, in each
region rely exclusively on PNF.

PNF in Northern RFA regions
The privately owned forests of Northern NSW35 have typically supplied around one

31

State Forests itself stated that statistics it supplied regarding the volume of timber harvested on private property must be
regarded as “approximate, as not all private mills keep accurate records of timber processed.” : Bureau of Rural Sciences/State
Forests of NSW (1999) above n 4 at 42. See also RAC (1992) above n 1, Vol.2A at G38. McElhinny (2000) above n 10 at 11
states “Annual estimates of quota sawlogs harvested on freehold land are prepared by State Forests of NSW. These estimates
are based on data supplied by sawmills and do not provide an estimate for other wood products such as pulp and firewood.
The method is likely to be biased towards under-estimating the sawlog resource harvested on freehold land and cannot be
assigned a level of accuracy”.
32
Northern NSW Forestry Services Pty Ltd (2000) The Private Hardwood Forest Resource in Northern NSW, A report for the
Northern Rivers Regional Development Board (NR Regional Plantation Committee), accessed on 3.8.01 Internet URL
<www.nrrdb.com.au/privateforestry/pri_hdw.htm>. Thompson, D and Centre for Agricultural and Resource Economics
(1999) Agroforestry From Existing Timber Resources On The Northern Tablelands, Rural Industries Research and Development
Corporation, Publication no 99/151, Project no. CAR-1A, Barton, Canberra.
Parsons, M. (Fortech Pty Ltd) (1999) Native Forests on Farms, RIRDC Publication No. 99/21, Rural Industries Research and
Development Corporation, Barton, ACT, 44pp, at <http://www.rirdc.gov.au/reports/AFT/AAC2-2A.doc>.
34
Commonwealth Department Of Primary Industries And Energy (1998) A Report on Forest Wood Resources and Wood Based
Industries in the Eden CRA Region: A report undertaken for the NSW CRA/RFA Steering Committee, contributions from Bureau Of
Resource Sciences, Australian Bureau Of Agricultural And Resource Economics, project number NE 05/ES, March 1998.
Data on sawlog production in the Eden Region was unavailable, according to a 1996 report. (p.58) However there were 8
sawmills in the region in 1995-6 which obtained private property logs. (p.62) In 1997-98, only 5% of the projected total log
intake of mills sourcing logs from the Eden CRA region is expected to be from private property (p.63) A sawmill survey put
the volume of private property logs from the Eden Region processed by hardwood sawmills in 1995-96 in the Region at a
mere 1604m3 which was 1.5% of the total sawmill throughput in the Region. (p.63). The volume of pulpwood processed at
Eden by H.D.A. fell from 51000 tonnes in 1994 to 1800 tonnes in 1997, allegedly because of the impact of SEPP 46 in
restricting private property logging. (p.29).
35
Defined as the area of land North of Newcastle to Queensland border and West to the ridgeline of Great Dividing Range.
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third of the timber utilised by the sawmills in the Region.36 A 1998 survey revealed that
in the LNE region alone, more than half the mills processed nothing but private timber.
There were “78 mills that solely processed private property resource” of a total of 146 sawmills.37
Official data released during the RFA process showed that in 1997 PNF contributed
35% of the production of sawlogs and veneer logs in the UNE and LNE regions.38
However there is more recent evidence that in the North-East private forests are
presently considerably more important. Sawlog production from PNF in the North
Coast Region was estimated at 50% of total sawlog production according to a senior
DLWC protected lands manager in November 2000.39 This estimate was corroborated
by the work of RFA forestry economics consultants (1999) who concluded that in the
UNE “it is likely that the proportion of wood supplied from private property is
approaching 50 percent of the wood used.”40
The contribution of private forests to total timber production has increased since the
mid 1990s, to the point that production in the UNE and LNE has been described by
RFA consultants as reaching the limits of sustainability.41 In the UNE, it was estimated
that the level of production “would be close to the sustainable yield of private sector
forests”.42 Similar observations were made about the LNE. The researchers stated:
“further substitution [from PP forests] is unlikely because the limit of private wood supply
36

Northern NSW Forestry Services (2000) Identifying the Available Forest Resource in Northern New South Wales and the Potential
Investment Opportunities over the Next 5 Years, A project undertaken for the Northern Rivers Regional Development Board Inc. &
the New England - North West Regional Development Board Inc. May 2000 Northern NSW Forestry Services P.O. Box
245 CASINO. 2470 Supported by the Federal Department of Industry Science and Resources. Internet publication at
<www.nrrdb.co.au/privateforestry>.
37
Centre for Agricultural Economics, Gillespie Economics, Environment and Behaviour Consultants (1999) Regional Impact
Assessment for the Lower North East CRA Region: A Project undertaken as part of the NSW Comprehensive Regional Assessments, Project
numbers NL 08/ES & NA39/ES, Published by Resource and Conservation Division of Department of Urban Affairs and
Planning and Forests Taskforce of Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, p.78.
38
This data was provided by State Forests of NSW to Bureau of Rural Sciences/State Forests of NSW (1999) above n31 at 42.
39
Interview, Mr B. Attwood, Vegetation Resource Manager, interview, in person, Grafton DLWC Office, 23.11.00. Notes on
file with author.
40
Centre for Agricultural Economics, Gillespie Economics, Environment and Behaviour Consultants (1999) Regional Impact
Assessment for the Upper North East CRA Region, A Project undertaken as part of the NSW Comprehensive Regional
Assessments, Project numbers NU 12/ES & NA39/ES, Published by Resource and Conservation Division of Department of
Urban Affairs and Planning and Forests Taskforce of Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, at p.70. According to
Northern NSW Forestry Services (2000) above n 36: “The most recent data suggests that the private hardwood forest
resource in northern NSW is contributing between 270,000 and 280,000 cubic metres of sawlogs, thinnings, veneer, poles,
piles, girders and salvage logs to the annual forest industry log intake.”
41
Centre for Agricultural Economics (1999) above n 37 at 78.
42
Centre for Agricultural Economics (1999) above n 37 at 78. In the Upper N-E, the production of timber from private native
forests was estimated to have been at 200,000m3/pa in 1997/98 which according to CARE and “industry analysts”, “would
be close to the sustainable yield of private sector forests”.
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has been reached.”[emphasis added]43
Whilst some believe that present levels of production cannot continue sustainably,
others have argued that logging on private land could increase beyond present levels.
Certain PNF consultants have asserted that there exists a large under-utilised forest
resource in Northern NSW.44 For example, O'Neill (1998) argued that only one third of
the potential total annual yield from private property hardwood forests is utilised for
sawlogs,45 and only 2% of a potential annual yield of 890,000m3 of pulpwood is
utilised.46 At present the importance of private property in the UNE region for
pulpwood (woodchip) supply is low, largely because there is limited export woodchip
infrastructure47 and no large scale pulpmills.

PNF in Southern RFA Region
In the Southern regions of NSW, PNF is of lesser importance to total native forest
wood production. In 1997-98, 21.1% of hardwood logs processed at sawmills in the Southern
RFA Region were from private forests.48 However, for many smaller mills, private native

forests are a critical resource. Small and medium sized sawmills in the Southern region
purchased most of their hardwood logs from private land forest operations - 69% of the intake
of medium sized mills according a 1999 survey).49 Further, seven mills of a total of 22 relied

43

Centre for Agricultural Economics (1999) above n 37 at 83.
Northern NSW Forestry Services (2000) above n 36.
45
1,640,000 m3 potential yield/pa is estimated by O'Neill, M. (1998) “The Private Hardwood Forest Resources of Northern
NSW”, 129-137 in Dyason, R., Dyason, L., Garsden, R. (eds.), Plantation and Regrowth Forestry: A Diversity of Opportunity,
Australian Forest Growers Biennial Conference Proceedings, Lismore, NSW, 6-9 July 1998.
46
Studies by Northern NSW Forestry Services in 1994 and 1996 revealed a total net area of 703,000 ha of productive private
forests in the coastal and tablelands regions running from Newcastle north to the Border: O'Neill, M. (1998) above n 45.
47
Apart from export facilities at Tea Gardens (near Newcastle), and Brisbane.
48
“Approximately 114 700 cubic metres of hardwood State forest logs were delivered to sawmills from the Southern NSW RFA
region in 1997-98. In addition, the mills obtained a further 30 700 cubic metres of hardwood logs from private forests.”
ABARE (1999) Sawmill Survey: Southern Region A project undertaken for the Joint Commonwealth NSW Regional Forest
Agreement Steering Committee as part of the NSW Comprehensive Regional Assessments, project number NS 21/ES,
RACAC (NSW) and PM&C (Commonwealth), at p.7. In total, hardwood log purchases in the region were around 166,400
cubic metres in 1998/99. Wood supply contracts between State Forests of NSW and the timber industry currently provide
83,603 cubic metres per annum of quota quality sawlog. Total log supply commitments for the region are of the order of
180,000 cubic metres for 1999/2000. In addition to the supply of timber from State forest, approximately 15,000-20,000 cubic
metres of sawlog comes from the region’s private forests. ABARE (1999) Sawmill Survey: Southern Region A project undertaken
for the Joint Commonwealth NSW Regional Forest Agreement Steering Committee as part of the NSW Comprehensive
Regional Assessments, project number NS 21/ES, RACAC (NSW) and PM&C (Commonwealth), at p.7.
49
ABARE (1999) Sawmill Survey: Southern Region A project undertaken for the Joint Commonwealth NSW Regional Forest
Agreement Steering Committee as part of the NSW Comprehensive Regional Assessments, project number NS 21/ES,
RACAC (NSW) and PM&C (Commonwealth), at p.8. Survey undertaken in November 1999.
44
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exclusively on private land in 1997/98.50 Private property is of lesser importance for
pulpwood production - supplying 8.8% of Southern Region production in 1994/5.51

Future importance of PNF
Potentially the rate of logging of private forests in NSW could increase. This may arise
as a result of three factors. In the first case, private forests will become of increasing
importance as additional areas of State forests and other Crown land are added to the
nature reserve system. A substantial report by economic consultants to the Forestry
Commission in 1995 predicted that, with further restrictions, sawmillers will “turn to
the private property resource for an increasing proportion of their supplies.”52
Empirical research has confirmed these predictions. It shows that when restrictions
have been placed on timber supply from public land, the industry has sought access to
privately owned lands. Research undertaken by interviewing sawmills in LNE and UNE
for the RFA process revealed that when access to public forests was restricted in 19956 due to the Interim Forest Assessment (IFA) and Deferred Forest Areas process, 53
sawmills in both regions augmented their wood supply with timber from private land. 54
With the restriction in supply from public land, there came a “substantial increase [in
private property production] since the implementation of the IAP agreement.”55 A
survey of a substantial proportion of North-East sawmills showed that between 199495 and 1996-1997, in the UNE there was a 65% increase in harvest from private
property, and in the LNE there was a 23% increase.56

50

Southern CRA/RFA: Background Report, RACAC (NSW) and PM&C (Canberra), at p.19.
Forestry Commission NSW and Margules Groome Poyry (1995), The Economic Impact of the New South Wales Timber Industry,
December, Margules Groome Poyry, Sydney, p.B-17.
52
Forestry Commission NSW and Margules Groome Poyry (1995) above n 51.
53
The joint Commonwealth-State Deferred Forest Areas process was one of the first stages towards the completion of the RFA
process, in which areas of production forest on public land were set aside as Deferred Forest Areas (DFAs). In NSW, the
DFA process was implemented in the form of an Interim Forest Assessment. This was an interim protection measure for
areas which were under consideration for inclusion in the Comprehensive Adequate and Representative (CAR) reserve system
of forests. The IFA involved an agreement between Commonwealth and NSW which came into effect in July 1996, restricting
wood supply from public forests by up to 35%. Statement to House of Representatives by the Hon PJ Keating, MP, 30
November 1995 at p.6; Centre for Agricultural Economics (1999) above n 37 at 13, 94. It also increased the security of supply
to timber processors by introducing (10 year) long term wood supply agreements.
54
Centre for Agricultural Economics (1999) above n 37 at 78; Centre for Agricultural Economics (1999) (Upper North East
Regional Impact Assessment Report) above n 40 at 69.
55
Centre for Agricultural Economics (1999) above n 37 at 78; Centre for Agricultural Economics (1999) (Upper North East
Regional Impact Assessment Report) above n 40 at 69.
51
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However, a shift to private forestry may only be short term for two reasons. One, it
may not be possible to sustain over the longer term. As we have seen, in the UNE in
1997/98, private timber production was estimated to be close to its maximum
sustainable yield.57 Two, the broader trend over a longer time scale, according to some
sources, has been that yields from private property have shown a declining trend.58
A second factor is that forested private land will also become of increasing importance
in terms of the future expansion of the plantation forest estate, because of the superior
economics of forested sites.59 Three, private native forests may achieve increasing
importance as carbon sinks.60 The advent of carbon rights trading as a response to
human induced climate change has contributed to the present acceleration of the rate
of plantation establishment and intensification of native forest uses on private and
public lands throughout Australia. In NSW, Parliament has moved to facilitate carbon
trading by enacting the Carbon Rights Legislation Amendment Act 1998 (NSW).
A further illustration of the importance of PNF is that private forests of high timber
production value are being acquired by State Forests in order to facilitate their
harvesting.61 In the NE RFA $18m was allocated for the purchase of private land
and/or timber rights in order to supplement supplies from public forests.62 During the
Southern RFA process in 2000, the Forest Products Association (FPA) lobbied for

56

The sample of sawmills represented 25% of the industry in UNE and 15% in the LNE, in work by the Centre for Agricultural
and Resource Economics. Centre for Agricultural Economics (1999) above n 37 at 71; Centre for Agricultural Economics
(1999) (Upper North East Regional Impact Assessment Report) above n 40 at 70.
57
Estimated at 200,000m3/pa in 1997/98: Centre for Agricultural Economics (1999) (Upper North East Regional Impact
Assessment Report) above n 40 at 78.
58
Forestry Commission NSW and Margules Groome Poyry (1995), The Economic Impact of the New South Wales Timber Industry,
December, Margules Groome Poyry, Sydney, p.B-17.
59
In fact the economics of plantation establishment dictate this, according to the representatives of one woodchip export
company : Mitchell, P. (Harris-Daishowa Australia Ltd) (1998) “Harris Daishowa's Plantation Programme in Victoria and
NSW” in Dyason, R., Dyason, L., Garsden, R. (eds.), Plantation and Regrowth Forestry: A Diversity of Opportunity, Australian Forest
Growers Biennial Conference Proceedings, Lismore, NSW, 6-9th July 1998. It was evident from field work in Tasmania that
plantation forests are often established on areas of existing native forest in preference to establishment on areas of already
cleared agricultural land, for economic reasons.
60
Wylnko, B. (2001) “Can a Forest Fit inside a Greenhouse ?”, in Country Conferences Pty Ltd, (ed.) 2nd Australasian Natural
Resources Law & Policy Conference (Focus on Forestry), Perth, W.A, Country Conferences Pty Ltd.
61
In relation to a parcel of old growth forest on private land in the Hunter Valley, the Wilderness Society wrote: “The old
growth forest which we are trying to protect was private land until State Forests purchased it with some of the $18 million
dollars of taxpayers money given to the woodchip industry under the terms of the RFA. The purchase of Stroud Mountain
demonstrates that State Forests have targeted private land with old growth forest.” Wilderness Society (2001) “Forest Rescue
To Halt Old Growth Logging North of Newcastle, NSW”, Media Release, 19 February 2001.
62
NE RFA, p.132. “Subject to availability of suitable land, New South Wales will spend the allocated $18 million between 1999
and 2004 to purchase Private Land and/or timber rights to provide approximately 180,000 m3 of High Quality Large Sawlogs
and Large Veneer Logs for the Upper North East and Lower North East regions within the term of this Agreement.”
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additions to the State Forest estate by purchases of 2500ha of Southern private
forests.63

The proportion of commercially viable forests on private land
The degree of expansion of production from private forests will depend on a
combination of physical, economic and political factors. Some private forests are not
considered at present to be economically viable, and thus are inappropriate for logging,
e.g. because they are low grade forest in commercial terms, or excessively remote,
physically inaccessible or too steep to log using conventional techniques. The future of
such forests will also depend on the future price of, and demand for hardwood timber,
regulations applying to steep slope logging e.g. cable logging;64 as well as the direction
of government policy on public and private land such as RFA conservation quotas.
Regardless of the total area of forest in private hands, the more crucial factor dictating
logging is the proportion of commercially valuable forest in private hands. According to
the NSW State of the Environment Report 1997 some 40.47% of private forests in NSW are
estimated to be ‘commercially available’ with the rest being uncommercial forest types
or remote forests or steep terrain.65 This report states that private native forests amount
to 52.5% of the total area of NSW forests which are commercially available for
harvesting.66 According to RFA research, private forests constitute 46% of the total
area of commercial forest types (i.e. timber species) in the Upper and Lower NE CRA
regions.67

Non-sawlog PNF
Apart from the harvesting of timber for saw logs, there are a number of other potential
commercial uses of private native forests which are likely to expand in coming years.
63

The FPA argued for the purchase of “2500ha of timbered private property adjoining state forests for about $5 million, which
could be funded from the NSW Environmental Trust Fund.” Pacey, L. (2000), “Timber Industry Pushes for Bigger Sawlog
Quota”, Canberra Times, 27.5.00, p.C7.
64 Prest, J. (1997) “An Environmental Plus? The Introduction of Cable logging in NSW”, 18(3) Bogong 6-8.
65
EPA NSW (1997) above n 1 at 196, Table 2.28.
66
State forests (34.9%) and other Crown timber land (12.5%) make up the total area. EPA NSW (1997) above n 1 at 196, Table
2.28.
67
Some forests contain species not presently commercially sought after. This data was provided by State Forests of NSW to
Bureau of Rural Sciences see Bureau of Rural Sciences/State Forests of NSW (1999) above n 4 ; cited by Northern NSW
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Although technological improvements will lead to milling of a greater range of timber,
at some point firms will seek to find broader markets for timber which is presently too
small, or of poor quality or misshapen to be useful to the saw log industry. These
markets include woodchipping, firewood68, charcoal plants, biogas energy plants,
electricity generation plants and even steel smelting.69 In order to facilitate the burning
of forest biomass for electricity generation, the Natural Resources Legislation Amendment
(Rural Environmental Services) Act 1999 was enacted. All these uses of private native
forests have potentially adverse effects on threatened species and biodiversity and other
environmental values, if not properly managed.
A large volume of wood is removed annually from the most threatened wooded
ecosystem in Australia – the temperate woodlands. Firewood logging targets the drier
forest areas for this timber which is denser and has a greater heating value.70 In 1992
the RAC estimated that approximately 6 million tonnes of firewood are consumed in
Australia annually, but accurate figures are hard to obtain because of the decentralised
nature of the firewood industry.71 Some of this logging is for charcoal production,
which has been on a relatively non-intensive scale, apart from a recent proposal for
harvesting of 120,000 tonnes of timber from forests in the Central West for a charcoal
plant near Dubbo, to supply a proposed silicon smelting plant at Lithgow.72
Already, firewood cutting is described as one of the ‘major threatening processes’
affecting native vegetation in two of NSW’s IBRA bioregions, the South Western
Slopes, and the New England Tablelands.73 In a recent report, the CSIRO examined the
scope and ecological impact of the firewood logging industry. It concluded that the
“limited evidence indicates that firewood harvesting in dry forests and woodlands

Forestry Services & BRS (1999) Private Forest Management Intent Survey: Northern NSW CRA Regions, A report undertaken for
the NSW CRA/RFA Steering Committee, Project No. NA 47/ES, at 5.
68
Benson, J. (1999), Setting the Scene: The Native Vegetation of New South Wales, Background Paper No.1, Native Vegetation Advisory
Council, Sydney at 18.
69
Wright, P. (1999), “Cleaning up the forest flaw”, Environment NSW, December 1999, at p. 5.
70
Traill, B. (2000) “Woodlands, Wildlife and Firewood - the Ecological Consequences of our Current Firewood Industry”, in
Doyle, J. (ed.), A Burning Issue, Victorian National Parks Association conference, June 8-9, 2000, Bendigo, Victoria, 3pp.
71
RAC (1992) above n 1, Vol.1, at 248.
72
Nature Conservation Council NSW (1999), Letter to the Hon. Bob Debus, NSW Minister for the Environment, 5 May.
73
Benson (1999) above n 68 at 18.
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occurs at rates well above a sustainable level.”74 The report used the limited available
evidence to infer that “firewood collection has an impact on the whole spectrum of
biodiversity.”75 It also concluded that “up to 70% of firewood that is purchased is
collected by unregulated means, including legal collection from private property and
illegal collection from state forests, nature reserves, roadsides and other public land.
The actual proportion may be even higher because firewood merchants with premises
can be supplied by small, unregulated operators”76 The report found some evidence
that the majority of collected firewood was harvested from private land, as “State forest
department permit sales account for less than 10% of the firewood market; therefore
the majority of collected firewood is unregulated, and over 80% of it is obtained from
private land. It is difficult to find out how much is collected illegally.”77 (As a postscript,
amendments to the Native Vegetation Conservation Act in December 2003 introduced
regulatory controls on certain firewood harvesting.78

CONSERVATION IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE FORESTS IN NSW
Back in 1992, the National Forest Policy Statement (NFPS) advanced a solid rationale
for private forest conservation:
“As well as containing significant timber resources, native forests on private
lands contain some ecosystems and species that are not well represented in
nature conservation reserves. They also help to maintain environmental and
aesthetic values and basic ecological processes, and under conditions of climate
change they may provide refuges or corridors for the movement of native
79
species.”

However, there is an identifiable body of opinion, particularly amongst foresters, that
most private forests in NSW are regrowth or ‘degraded’, and therefore are of minimal
conservation value. These commentators argue that the only appropriate management
of such forests which have been ‘high graded’, ie. progressively selectively logged over
74

Driscoll, D., Milkovits, G., Freudenberger, D. (2000) Impact and Use of Firewood in Australia, CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems,
Lyneham, ACT, 24 November 2000, p.30. The “total amount of firewood used in Australia {annually} was between 6 and 7
million tonnes.” (p.3)
75
Driscoll, D., Milkovits, G., Freudenberger, D. (2000) above n 74 at 29 states: “Several plant communities are probably
threatened by firewood collection, and a wide-ranging assessment like that done in Victoria would be valuable. Forest Red
Gum (E. tereticornis) has been extensively cleared on the New South Wales south coast and now occurs mainly on private
property. It could be further degraded by timber removal for Firewood.”
76
Driscoll, D., Milkovits, G., Freudenberger, D. (2000) above n 74 at 24.
77
Driscoll, D., Milkovits, G., Freudenberger, D. (2000) above n 74 at 23.
78 Native Vegetation Act 2003, s.46 allows for the making of a regulation to control commercial firewood harvesting.
79
Commonwealth of Australia (1992), National Forest Policy Statement: A New Focus for Australia’s Forests, Canberra, p.26.
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several generations, is for them to be clearfelled or heavily logged in order to improve
stand quality by providing an environment for proper regrowth. It is argued that on
many sites the forest is ‘locked up’ by an excess of unthrifty, bent stems which prevent
the growth of higher quality sawlog timber.80
Even where these authors admit that some old growth forest (OGF) exists, their
prescription often remains logging. One forestry consultant, O'Neill, states that a
substantial area of old growth forest exists on steep or remote sites on private land. He
writes “The higher site quality New England forests will typically contain a range of tree
sizes, often including an overstorey of overmature, defective trees.” This is, of course,
forester’s code for OGF. The treatment suggested for this “low quality wood” is
logging for woodchips.81
Whilst it may be true that “a significant proportion of the private hardwood forests
[are] generally of a young age” 82, there are also significant areas of OGF83 and high
conservation value (HCV) forests on private land. In 1997, the NSW EPA stated, on
the basis of data supplied to it by the Forestry Commission, that “perhaps only 35% of
forests on private property …has been logged.”84 A more detailed study undertaken by
Environment Australia (1999) during the NSW Comprehensive Regional Assessment
(CRA) process aimed to identify potential areas of natural National Estate significance
in the forests of the Upper North-East (in accordance with the Australian Heritage
Commission Act 1975 (Cth)).85 This research showed that private forests are of
conservation significance in many respects. For example, in relation to OGF, 641,470
80

O'Neill, M. (1998) above n 45; Mott, I. (2001) “What, Exactly, is a Lawful Forestry Purpose?” in Country Conferences Pty
Ltd, (ed.) 2nd Australasian Natural Resources Law & Policy Conference (Focus on Forestry), Perth, W.A, Country Conferences Pty Ltd,
at 111-117.
81
O'Neill, M. (1998) above n 45 at 135.
82
O'Neill, M. (1998) above n 45 at 132.
83
Old-growth forest can be defined in several ways. The NFPS defined old-growth forest as ‘forest that is ecologically mature
and has been subjected to negligible unnatural disturbance such as logging, roading and clearing’. Joint Australian and New
Zealand Environment and Conservation Council (ANZECC) and Ministerial Council on Forestry Fisheries and Aquaculture
(MCFFA) National Forest Policy Statement Implementation Sub-Committee (JANIS) (1996) Proposed Nationally Agreed Criteria
for the Establishment of a Comprehensive, Adequate and Representative Reserve System for Forests in Australia, Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet (Cth), Canberra stated, ‘old-growth forest is ecologically mature forest where the effects of disturbances
are now negligible’.
84
EPA NSW (1997) above 1 at 197.
85
Note that the Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975 has been repealed by the Australian Heritage Council Act 2003. See also
Environment Australia (1999) Identification, Assessment and Protection of National Estate -Part A Natural Values: Upper North Eastern
NSW CRA Region, a Project Undertaken for the Joint Commonwealth NSW Regional Forest Agreements Steering Committee As Part of the
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ha was identified in the UNE region, including 134,786 ha on private land (even on the
basis of a 100ha minimum patch size). This amounted to 21% of total OGF in the
region (see: Table 3). Further, of the total areas identified as having indicative national
estate significance for remnant vegetation and rare OGF, 50.9% was on private land
(see: Table 5).
TABLE 2 : INDICATIVE AREAS OF NATIONAL ESTATE VALUE ON PRIVATE LAND IN
THE UNE CRA REGION

Area (hectares) on private Percentage
of
total
land
identified area on all
tenures
Indicative national estate 32,141
50.9%
significance for remnant
vegetation and rare old growth
forest86
Old-growth
forest
of 134,786 (private land)
21% of total area
indicative national estate
12.8% on leasehold Crown
value87
82,411 (leasehold Crown land (82,411 ha).
land)
National Estate centres of 255,937 hectares
41.2%
species endemism88
Environments important as 199,793 ha
38.5%
refugia for the conservation
of environmentally sensitive
species
Areas important for species 69,566 ha
36%
of fauna with disjunct
populations
Indicative significance for 51,002 ha
52.7%
vegetation
community
richness89
National estate significance 73,204 ha
38.8% of total area (being the
on the basis of Habitat
majority land tenure for this
richness. 90
category)
Significant national estate 364,489 ha
42.4%
91
natural landscape values

Forest attribute

The data in these tables contradicts the argument that only a small proportion of NSW
NSW Comprehensive Regional Assessments, project numbers NA 59/EH, NA 65/EH, February, joint publication of RACAC &
Forests Task Force, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Sydney and Canberra.
86
Environment Australia (1999) above n 85 at 39-41, Table #15.
87
Environment Australia (1999) above n 85 at 21-24, Table #7.
88
Environment Australia (1999) above n 85 at 26.
89
Environment Australia (1999) above n 85, Table 17, at 44.
90
Environment Australia (1999) above n 85.
91
Environment Australia (1999) above n 85, Table 4, at 19.
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private forests are of environmental significance.92
TABLE 3: LAND TENURE OF INDICATIVE NATIONAL ESTATE OLD-GROWTH FOREST93

Tenure
Approximate Area (ha)
94
National Park, PMP 1.3 or 229,155
Nature Reserve
State Forest
175,519
Private Land
134,786
Leasehold Crown Land
82,411
Other Crown Land
19558

Proportion of Total (%)
35.7
27.4
21
12.8
3

TABLE 4 : LAND TENURE OF INDICATIVE NATIONAL ESTATE CENTRES OF
ENDEMISM95

Tenure
Approximate Area (ha)
National Park, PMP 1.3 or 191,311
Nature Reserve
State Forest
116,190
Private Land
255,937
Leasehold Crown Land
38,850
Other Crown Land
16,832

Proportion of Total (%)
30.8
18.7
41.2
0.3%
0.15%

TABLE 5 : LAND TENURE OF INDICATIVE NATIONAL ESTATE REMNANT VEGETATION
AND RARE OLD-GROWTH FOREST IN THE UPPER NORTH EAST RFA REGION OF NSW
96

Tenure
Approximate Area (ha)
National Park, PMP 1.3 or 9,823
Nature Reserve
State Forest
12,006
Private Land
32,141
Leasehold Crown Land
5,769
Other Crown Land
3,165

92

Proportion of Total (%)
15.6
19
50.9
9.1
5

Statements made by Mott above n 80 in delivering paper; Similarly, Banks, (2001) “Forest Regulation - Acquisition of Property
on Just Terms?” in Country Conferences Pty Ltd, (ed.). 2nd Australasian Natural Resources Law & Policy Conference (Focus on
Forestry), Country Conferences Pty Ltd, Perth, WA. at 96, argues that only 3% of the private forests in SE Queensland are
oldgrowth.
93
Environment Australia (1999) above n 85 at 23. According to the report these findings were based upon the CRA old-growth
forest data set, being the version supplied to the Environment and Heritage Technical Committee. That data was not field
validated at the time of writing the National Estate report. (p.11.)
94
“PMP 1.3” is the State Forests of NSW Preferred Management Priority Classification for areas reserved as Flora Reserves and Forest Preserves
(Forestry Commission of NSW 1993).
95
Environment Australia (1999) above n 85 at 26.
96
Environment Australia (1999) above n 85 at 39.
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POLICY OPTIONS FOR PRIVATE FOREST CONSERVATION
National policies for conservation of private forests were first articulated in the NFPS
in 1992. That document expressed the goals of ensuring “that private native forests are
maintained and managed in an ecologically sustainable manner, as part of the
permanent native forest estate.”97

Inclusion of private forests in reserve system
How are key forest types on private land to be conserved? A distinction must be drawn
between reservation strategies and management based strategies which are implemented
within a production context. This section addresses the question of reservation and
quasi-reservation of private forests.
Reservation is defined here to include secure management agreement. The traditional
definition of reservation only covers acquisition. The dictionary definition of reserve is
of “a tract of public land set apart for recreation, or for a special purpose such as a
nature reserve.” (Macquarie Dictionary, 1982).
Certain forest ecosystem types are ‘under-represented’ and ‘under-target’ within the
public land estate, and therefore conservation of remnants of these forest types on
private land are essential for the creation of the CAR reserve system. To meet the
JANIS targets, the reservation of many ‘under-represented’ forest types on private land
was necessary in Tasmania98 and in NSW, particularly the NE RFA regions, because of
shortfalls in their reservation on publicly owned land.99 In the UNE, there were 56
forest ecosystem types identified as a priority for conservation on private land. In the

97

Commonwealth of Australia (1992) above n 79 at 5; reiterated in Commonwealth of Australia (1998) Australia’s National Report
to the Fourth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Environment Australia, Canberra, p.29.
98
Senator Hill, answer to questions in Hansard of Senate Estimates hearing, 10 February 1999, Senate Environment, Communications,
Information Technology and the Arts Legislation Committee Hansard, p.42.
99
Commonwealth of Australia and State of NSW (2000) Regional Forest Agreement for North East NSW (Upper NE and Lower NE),
March 2000, Table 1 “Percentage Reservation Status of Forest and Non-Forest Ecosystems in the Upper NE Region based
on vegetation modelling to establish the pre-1750 extent of Forest Ecosystems in the Region” contained in Attachment 1(a)
Comprehensive, Adequate and Representative Reserve System for Upper NE Region at pp.41-63. See also Table 1 “Private
Land priorities for the Upper North East CAR Reserve System”, Table 2, “Private Land priorities for the Lower North East
CAR Reserve System”, in Attachment 2, “Private Land Conservation”, at pp.70-73.
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Lower North East (LNE), 85 such forest types were identified.100 In the Southern
region most targets for conservation of around 200 forest types were met from public
land with less need to examine the private estate.101 Still, 30 forest types were listed as a
private land conservation priority following identification by an expert panel. In
particular, 15 of these were listed as a ‘Very High Priority” with a 100% reservation
target set, and not met on public land.102 In the Eden region, 7 forest types were listed
as a private land priority.103 (A listing of these forest types is provided below in Tables
6, 7 & 8.)

Private forests conservation in the RFA process
The available policy options for private native forest management and conservation in
Australia are politically constrained by the content of Regional Forest Agreements.
Although not fully binding in a legal sense, these set the context for future policy
making.104 First, in relation to the creation of the CAR reserve system, the RFAs suggest
that private native forests should only be included within the reserve system after the
option of filling reservation targets from public native forests has failed. This approach
maintains the policy adopted in the NFPS of 1992.105 For example, the NE RFA states:
“Provision is also made in the JANIS Reserve Criteria for inclusion of Private Land in
the CAR Reserve System, with the agreement of landholders, where the Criteria cannot be
met from Public Land.” [emphasis added]106
Thus in the NSW RFAs, governments agreed that the private component of the reserve
100

Commonwealth of Australia and State of NSW (2000) above n 99, Attachment 2, “Private Land Conservation”, Table 1
“Private Land priorities for the Upper North East CAR Reserve System”, Table 2, “Private Land priorities for the Lower
North East CAR Reserve System”, at pp.70-73.
101
Interview, Mr Paul Packard, Manager, Conservation Assessment and Data Unit, NPWS, Southern Directorate office, 23.1.01.
(by telephone).
102
Southern RFA, Attachment 2, Table 1, pp. 57-58, Clauses 53-58 of Agreement. As a generalisation, the exception were
certain rainforests, coastal swamp forests, riparian forests, tablelands dry shrub forests and South West Slopes woodlands
where ecosystems such as white box woodlands were insufficient on public land to meet targets. Interview, Mr Paul Packard,
Manager, Conservation Assessment and Data Unit, NPWS, Southern Directorate office, 23.1.01. (by telephone).
103
Eden RFA, Table 1 of Attachment 12, p.76. Three of these forest types were listed as ‘very high priority’ for conservation.
104
Whether these political agreements are legally binding is one question, but diverging from the content of RFAs may be
politically difficult for governments. See Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee (1999) Report
On The Provisions Of The Regional Forest Agreements Bill 1998, February, Chapter Eight, Constitutional and Legal Issues, at
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/rrat_ctte/rfa/report/index.htm>.
105
Commonwealth of Australia (1992) above n 79 at 7-8.
106
North-East RFA, cl 2, Attachment 1(a), p. 41.
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system should only be achieved using voluntary mechanisms of conservation.107 The
primary tool envisaged for the completion of the private reserve system in the NE RFA
was to place it “under secure management arrangement by [voluntary] agreement with
private landholders”.108 The range of agreements specified included: “Voluntary
Conservation Agreements; landholder initiated agreements; non-contractual voluntary
agreements; fee for service; voluntary acquisition; fixed term common law contract; in
perpetuity common law contract; community grants; property management plans;
voluntary land and water management plans.”109 The mechanisms listed in the NE RFA
are overwhelmingly voluntary and non-regulatory.110
Back in 1992, on the question of acquisition of private property, the NFPS said that
acquisition of private forest should occur “preferably by agreement of landowners”. This
left the door open for compulsory acquisition as a last resort.111 The NFPS stated that
“Purchase of private land for reservation purposes is appropriate in cases … where
complementary management practices on those private lands are unlikely to adequately protect those
conservation values...”112 This implies that voluntary conservation approaches on private
land may sometimes be insufficient to achieve a secure reserve system. However, the
RFAs took a more reverent attitude to the acquisition of private property. The NE
RFA states bluntly: “Both Parties agree that in complementing the CAR Reserve
System on Public Land, conservation on Private Land can only be voluntary.”113
This divergence in approach between the RFAs and the NFPS raises doubts about the
adequacy of the private reserve system, which fall into three categories - inadequacy,
delays, and impermanence of reserves. In terms of delay, a target was set in 1992 in the
NFPS for conserving and managing old-growth forests, and forested wilderness was an
agreed commitment by Governments to complete the reserve system on private land by

107
108
109

North-East RFA, Clause 56.
North-East RFA, clause 2, p.2.

North-East RFA, Attachment 2, clause 5 (pp.70-71).
North-East RFA, Attachment 2, Clause 5, p.70.
111
Commonwealth of Australia (1992) above n 79 at 9.
112
Commonwealth of Australia (1992) above n 79 at 7-8. [emphasis added]
113
North-East RFA, Attachment 2, Clause 2, p.70. Further Cl.56 of the agreement itself states: “All conservation mechanisms
for the establishment of the Private Land component of the CAR Reserve System will be voluntary.”
110
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1998.114 This objective has not been achieved at present.115 Further delay is likely also if
the NPWS maintains a protocol of not approaching private landholders to purchase
properties, but instead waiting for them to contact NPWS.116
The text of the NSW RFAs tends to overlook the question of the permanence, security
or quality of private land reservation.
impermanence

and

inadequacy

of

Yet concerns about the potential for

private

reserves

were

expressed

by

a

Commonwealth/State Committee on the implementation of the NFPS in 1996. This
warned:
“a covenant should be binding on successors in title, and ... appropriate management intent should
be demonstrated before the area concerned could be considered to be part of the CAR reserve
117
system.”

The RFAs themselves appear to be the source of another constraint on the creation of
adequate private reserves. For example, in the NE RFA, a promise was made as
follows:
“New South Wales confirms that the CAR Reserve System has been established through this
Agreement …and that conservation levels achieved in that reserve system will not subsequently be
118
used as a basis for preventing timber harvesting being carried out on Private Lands...”

This clause inserts a contradiction into the RFA with its empty assertion that the
reserve system had already been created. The clause prevents compulsory acquisitions to
add to the private reserve system. The same clause later states “this is not to be
interpreted as preventing voluntary conservation measures to protect CAR Values on
Private Land.”119
The impact of this clause on timber production areas on private land is open to
interpretation. One view is that it is only applicable where timber harvesting is
prevented by total exclusion of all harvesting from a parcel of land. On another
interpretation it may mean that timber harvesting may not be significantly restricted by
114

Commonwealth of Australia (1992) above n 79 at 9.
Unfortunately, space does not permit an examination of that question here.
116
Interview, Paul Packard, Manager, Conservation Assessment and Data Unit, NPWS, Southern Directorate office, 23.1.01. (by
telephone).
117
Joint Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council (ANZECC) and Ministerial Council on Forestry
Fisheries and Aquaculture (MCFFA) National Forest Policy Statement Implementation Sub-Committee (JANIS) (1996)
Proposed Nationally Agreed Criteria for the Establishment of a Comprehensive, Adequate and Representative Reserve System for Forests in
Australia, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (Cth), Canberra at pp.11-12.
118
North-East RFA, Clause 59.
115
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environmental laws, as that would amount to ‘prevention’ of harvesting (for part of a
site).120

PF conservation in production contexts
In relation to those areas of native forest on private land not selected for inclusion in the
CAR reserve system, the NFPS suggested a mix of policy and regulatory instruments :
“Sustainable management of private native forests will be encouraged through a
combination of measures that may include dissemination of information about and
technical support for forest management, education programs, conservation incentives,
land-clearing controls, harvesting controls, and codes of forest practice.”121 The National
Biodiversity Strategy suggested a non-regulatory approach - with priority given to
“providing private forest owners technical advice…and offering incentives.”122
Endorsement of a regulatory approach was evident in the NFPS’ agreement that Codes
of Forest Practice for public native forests were to be made applicable to private forests
in order to protect nature conservation values.123 On the other hand, the NFPS acceded
to continued permanent vegetation removal on private land, in a statement inconsistent
with its advocacy of a permanent forest estate. It stated:
“Governments acknowledge that private native forest owners may wish to clear
native forest for a range of economic uses. They agree that land clearing can be
permitted provided it complies with State and regional conservation and
catchment management objectives, relevant planning schemes and
124
legislation.”

In order to achieve such objectives the Statement did not require the application of
regulatory controls. It was simply stated that the measures to protect conservation
values from land clearing “may include legislatively backed controls.”125 Similarly, a close
examination of the NSW RFAs reveals that they do not contain measures to prohibit
119

North-East RFA, Clause 59.
Would the application of a fauna protection prescription which involved exclusion zones violate this clause of the agreement?
However clause 59 of the North-East RFA is expressed to be subject to clause 18 which states that the RFA cannot impose
obligations which are inconsistent with international or Commonwealth or State laws.
121
Commonwealth of Australia (1992) above n 79 at 11.
122
Commonwealth of Australia (1996) National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia's Biological Diversity, p.21.
123
Commonwealth of Australia (1992) above n 79 at 22. It was also agreed that the principles of forest practice established by
the Australian Forestry Council should be applied to “all public and private forests in Australia. Australian Forestry Council
(1991) “Forest Practices Related to Wood Production in Native Forests: national principles”, AFC Standing Committee,
unpublished, attachment to Commonwealth of Australia (1992) above n 79
at 10.
124
Commonwealth of Australia (1992) above n 79 at 26-28.
120
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permanent loss of forests to agriculture, or conversion of native forest to plantations.
The “basis” of the NE RFA was expressed to include “promoting the conservation and
management of the private forest estate.”126 In it, the NSW government made a
“commitment to the achievement of ESFM on Public and Private Land.”127 It also
promised the “ongoing review and subsequent implementation of its legislation, policy,
plans, Codes and Regional Prescriptions to ensure ESFM objectives can be achieved in
a more efficient regulatory environment”.128 Yet the NE RFA spoke in terms of
encouraging private land holders to improve practices, rather than regulating to ensure
this. It was agreed that “[t]he Parties agree to encourage private forest owners to ensure
that their management operations are consistent with ESFM practices.”129
The main elements of government policy regarding PF conservation of the past decade
contained in the RFAs and NFPS can be summarised as follows: (1) a broad emphasis
on a voluntary, non-regulatory approach to inclusion within the CAR reserve system (2)
a shrinking away from the stance of the NFPS that compulsory acquisition may be
necessary to achieve a private land reserve system; (3) a recognition of the need for
consistency between Codes of Forest Practice applying to public and private forests; (4)
a commitment to ESFM in private production forests; but (5) a reluctance to state that
a regulatory approach will be necessary in some instances.

125

Commonwealth of Australia (1992) above n 79 at 21.
North-East RFA, cl.7(d).
127
North-East RFA, cl. 46.
128
North-East RFA, clause 46, p.17
129
North-East RFA, cl.55.
126
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NSW FOREST CONSERVATION PRIORITIES ON PRIVATE LAND

TABLE 6 PRIVATE LAND PRIORITIES FOR THE UPPER NORTH EAST CAR RESERVE
SYSTEM130

Priority for voluntary protection of Forest Ecosystems
Forests
2 Alpine Gum
15 Brown Barrell-Gum
17 Candlebark
19 Central Mid Elevation Sydney Blue Gum
21 Lowlands Grey Box
22 Coast Cypress Pine
24 Clarence Lowlands Spotted Gum

73 Lowland Red Gum
74 Lowlands Scribbly Gum
79 Manna Gum-Stringybark
80 Manna Gum
81 Messmate
85 Mixed Moist Hardwood
87 Mixed Tableland Stringybark-Gum
OpenForest
93 Montane Stringybark-Gum
100 Northern Grassy Sydney Blue Gum

25 Coast Range Spotted Gum-Blackbutt
30 Diehard Stringybark-New England
Blackbutt
31 Dorrigo White Gum
36 Dry Grassy Tallowwood-Grey Gum
45 Dunns White Gum

112 Paperbark
114 Peppermint-Mountain/Manna Gum
116 Red Gum-Stringybark

47 Escarpment Redgum
50 Wet Bangalow-Brushbox
61 Grey Box-Ironbark
62 Grey Box-Northern Grey Gum
68 High Elevation Messmate-Brown Barrell
71 Ironbark
72 Low Relief Coastal Blackbutt

119 Richmond Range Spotted Gum-Box
120 River Oak
123 Roundleaved Gum
126 Sandstone Spotted Gum-Blackbutt
132 Snow Gum -Mountain/Manna Gum
138 Steel Box/Craven Grey Box
142 Swamp Mahogany

5 Banksia
18 Casuarina Woodland
66 Herbfield and Fjaeldmark

77 Mangrove
96 Natural Grassland
141 Swamp

143 Swamp Oak
145 Sydney Peppermint-Stringybark
149 Mallee-Peppermint mosaic
154 Wet Flooded Gum-Tallowwood
163 Yellow Box-Blakely's Red Gum
168 Rainforest
175 Orange Gum-New England BlackbuttTumbledown Gum
176 Orange Gum-Ironbark
177 Outcrop Orange Gum-New England
Blackbutt
179 Yellow Box-Broad-leaved Stringybark
183 Red Gum-Apple
186 Open Tumbledown Gum-Black
Cypress-Orange Gum
190 Yellow Box-Grey Box-Red Gum
195 Apple-Manna Gum woodland
196 Broad-leaved Stringybark-Apple Box
197 Broad-leaved Stringybark
198 Silvertop Stringybark
200 Broad-leaved Stringybark-Ribbon Gum

Non-Forest
199 Riparian Shrubland

Notes Accompanying Table 1
1.

The Forest Ecosystems listed and prioritised for the Upper North East Region in Table 1 have been identified as
priorities for voluntary conservation on Private Land, based on the following criteria:

•

Identification by expert panels convened during the UNE and LNE CRA as Forest Ecosystems of concern on Private
Land;

•

Ecosystems with 100% target set and not met, that have extant occurrences on Private Land;

•

Ecosystems with 60% target set and not met, that are ranked as highly vulnerable (CRA expert panel vulnerability
rankings 1 and 2, based on key threatening processes) or are more than 50% cleared, and have more than 50% of their
occurrence on Private Land;

•

Ecosystems with 15% target set and not met, that are ranked as highly vulnerable or are more than 50% cleared, and
have more than 50% of their occurrence on Private Land.

2.

It should be noted that these are priorities only for protection by voluntary conservation mechanisms.
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North-East RFA, Table 1 “Percentage Reservation Status of Forest and Non-Forest Ecosystems in the Upper NE Region
based on vegetation modelling to establish the pre-1750 extent of Forest Ecosystems in the Region” contained in Attachment
1(a) Comprehensive, Adequate and Representative Reserve System for Upper NE Region at pp.41-63. See also Table 1
“Private Land priorities for the Upper North East CAR Reserve System”, Table 2, “Private Land priorities for the Lower
North East CAR Reserve System”, in Attachment 2, “Private Land Conservation”, at pp.70-73.
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TABLE 7 PRIVATE LAND PRIORITIES FOR THE LOWER NORTH EAST CAR RESERVE
SYSTEM

PRIORITY FOR VOLUNTARY PROTECTION OF FOREST ECOSYSTEMS
Forests
2 Alpine Gum
3 Baileys Stringybark
7 Barrington Moist Blue Gum-White
Mahogany
8 Barrington Wet New England Blackbutt-Blue
Gum
11
Blackbutt-Sydney
PeppermintSmoothbarked Apple
14 Brown Barrell

87 Mixed Tableland Stringybark-Gum Open 168 Rainforest
Forest
89 Moist Foothills Spotted Gum
174 Orange Gum-Tumbledown Gum-Apple
90 Moist Messmate-Gum
92 Moist Shrubby Stringybark-Gum

175 Orange Gum-New England BlackbuttTumbledown Gum
176 Orange Gum-Ironbark

19 Central Mid Elevation Sydney Blue Gum

178 Outcrop Black Cypress-Tumbledown
Gum
97 Needlebark Stringybark-Large Fruited 177 Outcrop Orange Gum-New England
Blackbutt
Blackbutt
99 New England Stringybark-Blakelys Red 179 Yellow Box-Broad-leaved Stringybark
Gum
105 Nymboida Tallowwood-Turpentine
182 Apple-Black Cypress

21 Lowlands Grey Box

112 Paperbark

184 Tumbledown Gum-Ironbark

26 Coastal Flooded Gum

113 Peppermint

28 Cool Moist Messmate

114 Peppermint-Mountain/Manna Gum

186 Open Tumbledown Gum-Black CypressOrange Gum
189 Silverleaved Ironbark-Cypress

31 Dorrigo White Gum

116 Red Gum-Stringybark

190 Yellow Box-Grey Box-Red Gum

32 Dry Foothills Blackbutt-Turpentine

117 Red Mahogany

195 Apple-Manna Gum woodland

33 Dry Foothills Spotted Gum

120 River Oak

196 Broad-leaved Stringybark-Apple Box

34 Dry Grassy Blackbutt-Tallowwood

122 Rough-barked Apples

197 Broad-leaved Stringybark

41 Dry Open New England Blackbutt

123 Roundleaved Gum

198 Silvertop Stringybark

17 Candlebark

93 Montane Stringybark-Gum

47 Escarpment Redgum

124 Roundleaved Gum-Turpentine

200 Broad-leaved Stringybark-Ribbon Gum

48 Escarpment Scribbly Gum-Apple

132 Snow Gum -Mountain/Manna Gum

207 Hunter Spotted Gum-Ironbark

54 Grey Box-Red Gum-Grey Ironbark

134 South Coast Shrubby Grey Gum

208 Hunter Roughbarked Apple- Red Gum

56 Granite Mallee

135 South Coast Tallowwood-Blue Gum

224 Coastal Apple-Stringybark-Scribbly Gum

57 Highland Granite Stringybarks

139 Stringybark-Apple

225 Wyong Apple-Scribbly Gum

58 Gorge Grey Gum

142 Swamp Mahogany

70 High Elevation Open Spotted Gum

143 Swamp Oak

232 Watagan Spotted Gum-Ironbark-White
Mahogany
240 Roughbarked Apple-Redgum

72 Low Relief Coastal Blackbutt

146 Tallowwood

241 Ironbark-Redgum

73 Lowland Red Gum

149 Mallee-Peppermint mosaic

247 Coastal Bastard Mahogany Forest

79 Manna Gum-Stringybark

153 Wet Coastal Tallowwood-Brushbox

249 White Box-Ironbark-Red Gum

80 Manna Gum

154 Wet Flooded Gum-Tallowwood

250 Banksia Heath-Scribbly Gum-Apple

81 Messmate

162 Whitetopped Box

82 Messmate-Mountain Gum Forest

163 Yellow Box-Blakely's Red Gum

5 Banksia

64 Heath

125 Saltbush

18 Casuarina Woodland

77 Mangrove

199 Riparian Shrubland

Non-Forest

Notes Accompanying Table 2
1.

The Forest Ecosystems listed and prioritised for the Lower North East Region in Table 2 have been identified as
priorities for voluntary conservation on Private Land, based on the following criteria:

•

Identification by expert panels convened during the UNE and LNE CRA as forest ecosystems of concern on Private
Land;

•

Ecosystems with 100% target set and not met, that have extant occurrences on Private Land;
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•

Ecosystems with 60% target set and not met, that are ranked as highly vulnerable (CRA expert panel vulnerability
rankings 1 and 2, based on key threatening processes) or are more than 50% cleared, and have more than 50% of their
occurrence on Private Land;

•

Ecosystems with 15% target set and not met, that are ranked as highly vulnerable or are more than 50% cleared, and
have more than 50% of their occurrence on Private Land.

2.

It should be noted that these are priorities only for protection by voluntary conservation mechanisms.

TABLE 8 PRIVATE LAND CONSERVATION PRIORITIES FOR THE EDEN CAR RESERVE
SYSTEM

Priorities for the CAR Reserve System (Forest Ecosystems that require conservation on
Private Land)
Priority for voluntary protection of Forest Ecosystems
High Priority
Moderate Priority
Low Priority
Forests
20 Bega Dry Grass Forest
1 Dry Rainforest
22A Monaro Dry Grass
Forest
21 Candelo Dry Grass 71 Monaro Basalt Grass
Forest
Woodland
40 Riverine Forest
36 Dune Dry Shrub Forest
Non-Forests
23 Monaro Grassland
39 Northern Riparian Scrub
60 Floodplain Wetlands
Source: Eden RFA, Attachment 12, at p.76.

Please see print copy for Appendices 5.2 5.3

APPENDIX 5.4
CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO FOI REQUEST LODGED ON
DLWC (NOVEMBER 1997)

Freedom of Information Coordinator
Legal Services
Department of Land and Water Conservation

22 November 1997

Dear
This is a request for access to documents in the possession, custody, and control of the
Department of Land and Water Conservation pursuant to statutory rights of access
created by the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW). In addition to the details
contained in this letter please refer to the attached covering application form.
Documents requested
Please provide access to documents (defined as widely as in the Act) which fit the
following description:

Clearing on protected land
1. Documents which indicate the number of authorities granted “to destroy timber on
protected land” under s.21D of the Soil Conservation Act 1938 during the course of
commercial native forest harvesting on privately held lands classified as “protected
land” for the following years 1990-1, 1991-2, 1992-3, 1993-4, 1994-5, 1995-6, 1996-7,
1997-8.
2. Documents containing discussion, debate or information about consideration of
environmental factors, and the imposition of conditions on the grant of such authorities
in the decision making process leading to the grant or refusal of such s.21D authorities
in the private land logging context described in point 1.
3. Any documents containing consideration or discussion (most probably by DLWC or
EPA) of the policy and technical matters relating to the regulation of logging activity on
private land, where it would involve the use of ‘cable logging’ machinery (ie non-ground
based harvesting techniques such as hi-lead or skyline logging) to log steep slopes.
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This request category includes any documents from any source which discuss the
application of the protected lands provisions of the Soil Conservation Act on proposed
cable logging activity on private lands in NSW.
4. Documents which show the number of refusals of s.21D authority applications for
logging operations on privately held land (since 1990-1). Any documents which show
the reasons for those refusals, and documents which would indicate or from which
could be calculated the percentage of refusals which were based on environmental
factors as opposed to other factors.
5. Policy documents relating to any decisions to gazette exemptions to the general
prohibition on timber destruction on protected lands, under s.21C(2)(b) Soil
Conservation Act 1938 made since 1 January 1991. Included in this category of
documents requested is documents which contain consideration and discussion of the
policy justifications and other issues related to creating exemptions to the prohibition on
vegetation clearing on protected lands, where it relates to commercial logging activity
on privately owned or held land.
6. Documents referring to, or containing discussion of, the triggering of the operation of
the environmental impact assessment provisions of Part V of the Environmental
Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (‘EPAA’), by reason of the fact of applications for
s.21D authorities to clear protected lands under the SCA, during the course of
commercial native forest harvesting on privately held lands classified as “protected
land” since 1 January 1991.
7. Documents which indicate or from which can be calculated the total number of
directions issued under s.15A of the Soil Conservation Act 1938 relating to commercial
logging operations on private land in the Central and Eastern Divisions, since 1 January
1991.
SEPP 46 applications
8. Documents which provide details of the formal consideration made by the DirectorGeneral of the DLWC in his role as consent authority considering applications for
development consent under SEPP 46 to clear native vegetation on privately held lands
during the course of non-plantation commercial native forest logging.
9. Documents which discuss SEPP 46 applications by the Forestry Commission of NSW
(trading as State Forests) for development consent for native vegetation clearance on
land acquired for the purpose of plantation establishment. The documents will discuss
consent sought for clearing/logging activities on land either owned outright by State
Forests or part owned by State Forests or managed by State Forests as part of a joint
venture. [Documents in this request category do not relate to land falling within the
category of Crown timber lands defined in the Forestry Act 1916.] (Refer Hansard 22
October 1997, p.1155)
10.Documents, graphs or tables containing statistics, or from which statistics can be
compiled, which indicate the total number of SEPP 46 applications to clear made since
the Gazettal of the SEPP (in its various incarnations). I am also seeking documents
which indicate the purposes for which these applications related (eg for agriculture,
forestry, mining, rural residential, golf course establishment, plantation establishment
etc).
11.Documents which contain reference to DLWC refusals of consent to applications made
under SEPP 46 to clear native vegetation during the course of commercial native forest
harvesting on privately held or owned lands.
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12. Access is sought to documents which refer to efforts made by DLWC to seek the
concurrence of the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service, and the response of
NPWS in instances of applications made under SEPP 46 to clear native vegetation
during the course of commercial native forest harvesting on privately held or owned
lands which are affected by the operation of s.77A(2) Environmental Planning and
Assessment Act 1979 (EPAA), and any associated instances of refusal of concurrence,
or conditional concurrence by NPWS under s.79 EPAA.
13. Documents which indicate the DLWC’s role/consultative input in the Regional Forest
Agreement process (where it affects areas within NSW), where such documents
contain discussion of
- the Department’s views of the adequacy or otherwise of the regulatory regime applicable
to private land native forest logging; and
- the DLWC’s input into governmental consideration of the issues surrounding the
selection of private land areas for reservation in the Comprehensive Adequate and
Representative reserve system. This may involve correspondence with Commonwealth
agencies or with other State agencies.
14. Internal policy documents, guidelines, memos or manuals which indicate the criteria
upon which DLWC officers should refuse or approve SEPP 46 applications for
development consent for commercial native forest harvesting operations on privately
held land.
15. Internal policy documents, guidelines, memos or manuals which assist departmental
officers in the interpretation of the exemptions contained within SEPP 46 Amendment
No.2, in particular exemption (I) relating to commercial private land native forest
logging, which indicate the circumstances in which the exemption should be applied,
and the circumstances in which it will not be applicable to that activity.
16. Internal policy documents which contain discussion of the application of SEPP 46 and
NVCA to logging operations on privately owned and held land which provide raw
material to supply industrial scale export woodchipping operations conducted by
companies including Harris Daishowa, Sawmillers Exports Pty Ltd and Boral.
17. Any documents being, containing or discussing legal advice (either from Parliamentary
Counsel, Crown Solicitor or in-house legal advice of DLWC or NPWS) on the
interaction between SEPP 46 and the operation of the Threatened Species
Conservation Act 1995 (TSCA). Such documents may indicate or discuss how the
requirements of the TSCA and the EPAA affect the operation of SEPP 46 (in any stage
of amendment). In particular please supply documents discussing the modification of
clause 6 of SEPP 46 by s.77A(2) of the EPAA (relating to the additional consent
requirement of concurrence of the D-G NPWS or the Minister administering the TSCA).

18. Any documents containing details of investigations, or reference to investigations, of
alleged breaches of SEPP 46 in the course of forestry operations on private land.
Documents containing discussion of options for restraint of ongoing breaches, and the
Department’s options to prevent future breaches in the same or other locations.
Documents containing consideration of prosecution under the provisions of the Part 6
of the EPAA for breaches of SEPP 46.
Other documents
19.The Department's prosecution policy, being a document detailing the legal and policy
considerations to be considered by the Legal Section of the Department in its
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exercising its discretion to commence, defer or reject criminal prosecution as an option
in instances of alleged licence breach or similar violation of an authorisation or other
breach of environmental laws.
20. A listing or table or index of departmental file titles and numbers of active files held by
the branch or division handling environmental law compliance and law enforcement
matters, for all such files created and maintained since 1 January 1994.
Note on provision of documents
In order to assist the applicant and any Court or tribunal in the event of subsequent review
proceedings, please indicate when supplying the documents which numbered paragraph
of the request the documents relate to. Please provide a schedule indicating the document
identified, author, decision upon access, and statutory grounds relied upon for refusal of
access if any/if applicable.

Form of access sought
I request that you provide a photocopy of documents unless the estimated total of
processing charges exceeds $500.00. In that event, then please provide access in the
form of inspection (with liberty to make copies of documents).
Processing Charges
I seek a 50% reduction in processing fees and charges for the reasons outlined below.
This request is part of a wider research effort related to my postgraduate research studies
in law, the results of which will be of interest to the general public and the academic
community. I am a Master of Natural Resources Law (Hons) candidate at the Faculty of
Law, Wollongong University.
My research project relates in general to the implementation of government policies on
biodiversity conservation on privately held land in NSW and elsewhere. This research can
generally be described as being ‘in the public interest’ for the following reasons :
• It is not being undertaken for private purposes;
• It is not being undertaken for profit making purposes;
• The subject matter is one of contemporary public policy debate, ie relating to the
application of environmental laws for the conservation of native vegetation and the
protection of the environment. This subject is a matter of considerable interest to the
general public, and to the academic community in particular.
• The results of my research will be published and accessible to the general public. I
have the capacity to make public the information sought. For example, previous
academic research I have conducted has been published by the Australian Centre for
Environmental Law based at the ANU.
I look forward to your decision on this application under the NSW FOI Act. If you require
any clarification of any aspect of this request do not hesitate to call me.

Yours sincerely

BA (Hons), LLB (Hons)
Master of Natural Resources Law (Hons) Candidate.
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Director-General Land and Water Conservation
Department of Land and Water Conservation

FAX
Attention:
Freedom of Information Coordinator
Legal Services

02 January 1998
Dear

RE : INTERNAL REVIEW OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION DECISION
I am writing to you to inform you of my decision to reduce the scope of my FOI request
(received in your office on 25 November 1997).
The background is as follows. I am writing in response to a telephone call of 13 January
1998 from of your office, and your letter of 2 December 1997 indicating
your refusal of my request. Also relevant is my request for an internal review of the refusal
decision (of 2 January 1998 by fax, with hard copy and cheque mailed later).
During our conversation of 13 January 1998 asked that I withdraw my FOI
request. I refused to agree to that request, but indicated my willingness to negotiate on the
details of the request. I maintain that position.
One of the grounds of refusal listed in that letter was the ‘substantial and unreasonable
diversion of agency resources’ allegedly involved in servicing the request.
In order to address that concern, I wish to advise you of my intention to delete seven of the
twenty paragraphs of my Freedom of Information request. They are the paragraphs
numbered as follows:
• 2
• 5
• 7
• 10
• 12
• 14
• 17
I look forward to your Department’s reconsideration of your decision on this FOI request. I
request that the presently active internal review process take the contents of this letter into
account.
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Yours sincerely

BA (Hons), LLB (Hons), GDLP
LLM (Hons) Candidate, University of Wollongong.
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Dr
Director-General Land and Water Conservation
Department of Land and Water Conservation

Attention:
Freedom of Information Coordinator
Legal Services

27 January 1998

Dear

RE : INTERNAL REVIEW OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION DECISION
I refer to your letter of 6 March 1998.
I am writing to you to reiterate my request for internal review under s.34 of the Freedom of
Information Act 1989 (NSW) of my FOI application on your Department relating to forestry
on private land in NSW.
On 2 January 1998 I wrote to your Department seeking internal review of your decision made on 2 December 1997 and received by me on 5 December 1997 - to refuse access
to documents requested. My letter was duly accompanied by the standard internal review
$40.00 application fee, in the form of a cheque.
One of the grounds of refusal listed in the Department’s letter of refusal of 2 December
1997 was, broadly, the ‘substantial and unreasonable diversion of agency resources’
allegedly involved in servicing the request.
I would like to make the following three points about my request:
1. You are aware that in order to address your concerns about the extent of the request, I
deleted seven of its twenty paragraphs.
2. The discussion with , which took place on 15 January 1998, at Parramatta,
whilst very useful, did not provide information of a sufficiently specific nature to meet
the needs of my Postgraduate research; to enable, for example, the formulation of
statistical data for publication.
3. I consider that the Department has failed to reasonably respond to my request to
indicate the precise manner in which the scope of the request could be appropriately
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narrowed in order to overcome your objection of “unreasonable diversion of agency
resources”. For example, there has been no response to my specific request, made on
2 January 1998, to “give me greater practical assistance in amending my application
[other] than to simply advise me to narrow the scope of the application. For example it
would be of assistance if you were to advise me which three sections of the application
are most likely to involve a substantial diversion of agency resources.”
In other words, if the Department were willing to indicate which particular paragraphs (of
the remaining thirteen) are the most burdensome in terms of agency resources, I remain
prepared to reconsider the terms of the request.
I look forward to your Department’s reconsideration of your decision on this FOI request.

Yours sincerely

LLM (Hons) Candidate, University of Wollongong.
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Ombudsman (NSW)

15 April 1998
Dear
Complaint re Freedom of Information Request on DLWC

Pursuant to s.12 Ombudsman Act 1974, I wish to make a complaint about certain decision
making by the Department of Land and Water Conservation (DLWC).
The decision making in question related to a request that I made recently to DLWC, pursuant
to the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW).
I ask that you subject the decisions in question to an investigation under s.13 and s.26 of your
Act.
The essence of my complaint about DLWC’s handling of my request is as follows:
•

There was unreasonable and perhaps unlawful resort to the ‘substantial and unreasonable
diversion of agency resources’ exemption [s.25(1)(1a) FOI Act] as a means of justifying
refusal to take substantial action to process my request.

•

Negotiation over the scope of the request did not secure any concessions from the
Department, despite reduction in the size of the request from 20 to 13 paragraphs.

•

The Department’s use of the related provision, s.25(5) of the Act, was cursory and not
genuinely directed at producing a win-win situation. In particular, subsequent to the
applicant’s reduction in the scope of the request, there was a failure to respond to further
and repeated requests to specifically communicate what else should be done to narrow the
scope of the request in order to resolve the Department’s objections. This failure tends to
give the impression that DLWC sought to abuse the exemption provision.

A chronologically ordered table of relevant documents is attached. Photocopies of the relevant
documents are also attached (as Attachments A to H).
If you decide to initiate an investigation or inquiry into this matter, I am most willing to make
verbal or written submissions. Please contact me on the numbers above for clarification of any
point.
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Yours sincerely
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Complaint re Freedom of Information Request on DLWC

As indicated overleaf, the following is the detail of my complaint against DLWC.
Summary of complaint
1. Unreasonable refusal to give access to any documents, and refusal on spurious grounds;
2. Unreasonable failure to provide adequate reasons for (1);
3. Unreasonable refusal to grant fee remission on ground of public interest as claimed;
4. Unreasonable failure to provide reasons for (3).
Detail of Complaint
Preliminary requirements
I contend that the following situation exists, providing sufficient reasons for commencing an
investigation:
• There are no circumstances justifying exclusion of an investigation [under s.12(1)
Ombudsman Act]
• Some decisions were contrary to law [s.26(1)(a)]
• Some decisions were unreasonable and unjust [s.26(1)(b)]
• For some decisions reasons were not given [s.26(1)(f)].

BACKGROUND FACTS
1. On 21 November 1997, I made an FOI request to DLWC.
2. On 2 December 1997, DLWC replied saying my request was refused.
3. On 2 January 1998, I applied for internal review of that decision.
4. On 3 April 1998, DLWC replied saying that the result of the internal review was that the
original determination had been upheld.
5. Additional correspondence took place between steps 3 and 4. In summary, this related to
negotiations with the Department over the scale of the request, my decision to narrow the
scope of the request, and discussion over whether and when the internal review process
had commenced.
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DETAIL OF COMPLAINT
Complaint One
It was (a) unlawful and (b) unreasonable for DLWC to refuse to provide access to (at
least some) of the documents requested.
I have a legally enforceable right under s. 16 FOI Act to gain access to the agency’s documents
(subject to other provisions of the Act).
My request was accompanied by the required application fee and in other ways met the
requirements of s.17 of the FOI Act.
I believe that the Department’s application of s.25(1)(1a) FOI Act was unlawful and
unreasonable for the reasons outlined below.
Background
On 2 December 1997, DLWC sought to refuse access on a number of grounds including
s.25(1)(a1) of the Act ‘substantial and unreasonable diversion of agency resources’. The section
reads as follows:
“the work involved in dealing with the application for access to the document would, if carried out, substantially and
unreasonably divert the agency’s resources”

Argument A
It was unreasonable to make blanket treatment of the entire request as an ‘substantial and
unreasonable diversion’.
Although this is a difficult matter of interpretation, (on which there is no reported NSW case
law) I believe the correct interpretation of section 25(1)(1a) requires a paragraph by paragraph
approach to be taken to a given request.
It is obvious that processing some paragraphs of any FOI request will involve more work than
that required for other paragraphs.
The Department’s responses show a failure to differentiate between the impact of different
portions/aspects/paragraphs of the request (Attachments B,F,H).
It is my contention that processing, for example, paragraphs 19 and 20 would have been
relatively straightforward, and would not have involved much effort. Therefore the
Department could, at the least, if it were acting reasonably, have considered providing access to
paragraphs of this nature.
It is necessary to interpret specific sections of the Act such as s.25(1)(1a) against the overall
purpose of the Act, of providing government information to the public, etc. Further, this
section must be interpreted against the requirements of s.25(5). [Discussed in further detail
below at pp.5-6.]
In order for the Department to establish that it had met the requirements of s.25(5) would at
least have involved indicating to the applicant which paragraphs of the request were most
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objectionable. The logical way to communicate this information would have been to tabulate
the response of the Department to the various paragraphs, indicating which paragraphs of the
request most severely had the potential to offend the requirements of s.25(1)(1a) of the Act.
Argument B
Even if it is found that s.25(1)(1a) requires a blanket approach to an FOI request, the decision
maker remains obliged to establish that the diversion of resources would have been both
substantial AND unreasonable.
Thus even if it DLWC had envisaged the diversion as ‘substantial’, the onus was on DLWC to
show that the scope of the request , as revised (reduced in scope by 35%, when judging by the
reduction in the number of paragraphs) remained ‘unreasonable’.
In my opinion, there was insufficient evidence provided by the Department to establish that
providing access to all documents within the ambit of the request would involve that type of
diversion of resources.
The possibility exists that the DLWC attempted to abuse section 25(1)(1a) as a means of
refusing to even commence the processing of request, and the process of identifying
documents.
There is a high probability that sufficient facts did not exist to justify reliance upon s.25(1)(1a).
No concrete evidence of the ‘unreasonableness’ of the request was provided in DLWC’s
correspondence. On the other hand, the Department provided:
• no evidence of efforts to contact regional offices.
• no evidence of attempts to search file registers or indexes at head office or regional offices.
• no effort to estimate the number of files involved.
• no effort to compile a list of the titles of possibly relevant files.
• no estimate of the number of folios on those files.
• no provisional estimate of the staff hours or costs to the Department likely to be involved,
even following the 35% reduction in scope of the request.
It is useful at this point to refer to the FOI case law from other jurisdictions in relation to
similar provisions. In Re Shewcroft, relating to the Commonwealth Act, the agency in question
was only able to uphold a claim of unreasonable diversion, after having made a genuine
estimate of the number of items and folios involved, and the likely time involved in examining
these, as well as the likely consultation time involved in considering any exemptions.1 In Re
SRB, the Commonwealth AAT only found an instance of unreasonable diversion, upon
evidence of there being 300 relevant files containing 22,500 folios.2 In my opinion the DLWC
has failed to provide similar evidence of such a resource effort required in this instance, and
cannot therefore reasonably rely upon s.25(1)(1a).
In order to discern the reasonableness or otherwise of the likely effort required of the
Department the case law suggests an approach of a weighing up of certain factors.3 Some
factors that I believe are relevant are outlined below:
Re Shewcroft and Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1985) 2 AAR 496 at 499.
Re SRB and Department of Health, Housing, Local Government and Community Services (1994) 19 AAR 178.
3 Re Shewcroft at 501.
1
2
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(a) The scope and purpose of the Act in providing open government
The Section 25(1)(1a) must be read against the statements in the objects clause which weigh in
favour of access to documents, such s.5(1)(a) and 5(3)(a) and 5(3)(b), including the statement:
“This Act shall be interpreted and applied so as to further the objects of this Act.”

(b) The size and resources of the Department
The Department’s claims that my request will substantially divert its resources must be weighed
against the fact that it is a large department by any person’s standards. According to the 1995-6
Annual Report it employs in excess of 4000 staff and expends an annual budget of $600
million.(Annual Report 1995-6, p.11). Furthermore, it is apparent that the Department has a
stand-alone legal section with the capacity and staffing to deal with FOI applications.
(c) The scope of the request
It is not the case that the request involves unduly complex matters spanning the length and
breadth of the Department’s portfolio responsibilities. Rather the request relates to a narrow
aspect of administration of two particular statutes. The request is not expressed in terms of
requiring “all” documents relating to the subject of protected lands provisions of the Soil
Conservation Act 1938 and former State Environment Planning Policy 46. On the contrary, it is for a
very narrowly defined subset of documents relating to this subject matter: specific numbers of
authorities and approvals and consents granted under the above legislation, only in relation to
commercial native forest harvesting on privately owned land in NSW.
(d) The nature of the request
The request (Attachment A) is neither unintelligible, illegible nor is it vague or unspecific. I
believe that its targeted nature is a factor in favour of a judgement of ‘reasonableness’ of the
request. Accordingly, the effort involved for the Department in dealing with the request,
would, all other things being equal, would tend to be less than that involved in processing less
clear or specific requests.
(e) Purported difficulties arising from the nature of the Department
In the letter of 3 April 1998, the DLWC refer to the difficulties involved in obtaining
documents from regional offices (Attachment H).
I consider this to be a spurious argument. As a Department with regional offices, the DLWC
must logically be equipped to cope with logistical and record keeping demands arising from its
day to day operations, not to mention its statutory obligations to comply with FOI and other
legislation.
(f) Rebuttal of potential argument relating to the relevance of information requested
It may be argued by DLWC that any information relating to the administration of the
protected lands provisions of the Soil Conservation Act 1938 and former State Environment
Planning Policy 46 (‘SEPP 46’) is now of little value. This is because the ‘protected lands’
provisions have been transferred to the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997(‘NVCA’), and
SEPP 46 has been repealed by that same Act.
However I believe that such an argument is of dubious value. This is because my postgraduate
research is a study of the administration of such legislation. As the NVCA is new legislation,
enacted in December 1997, there is unlikely to be a lengthy record of how successfully that
legislation has functioned. Therefore in order to examine the record of performance of
legislation administered by the Department it is essential to examine the documentation
relating to the legislation it formerly administered. Furthermore the new legislation, the NVCA,
essentially incorporates many of the same provisions and mechanisms as the former legislation.
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Therefore the performance of the previous legislative regime will provide a good guide as to
the likely performance of the new regime.
(g) Motives of the applicant, public v private interest
In Re Shewcroft, the Commonwealth AAT expressed a view that in determining whether the
diversion of resources was unreasonable, relevant factors included whether there existed
personal interest, a general public interest, or a clearly established “proper” motive. I believe
there is firstly evidence of a request in the public interest, based on university postgraduate
research, and secondly, I believe there is no question of any allegation of improper motives.
The inadequacies of the negotiations over scope
As a matter of fact, it would not be reasonable for the Department to claim that it had met the requirements of
s.25(5) of the Act as justification for its reliance upon s.25(1)(1a) to refuse the application.
Subsection 25(5) obliges an agency to undertake efforts to negotiate with an applicant prior to
resorting to s.25(1)(1a). It is evident from Attachment B that the DLWC sought to rely upon
s.25(1)(1a) in its refusal letter of 2 December 1997 prior to commencing negotiation. I put the
Department on notice of this in my letter of 2 January 1998 (Attachment C).
The following is a summary of relevant facts, some of which may be referred to in the
supporting documents:
The Department and I engaged in a process of negotiation involving both correspondence and
telephone conversations, over the scope of the request.
The DLWC suggested a meeting with Dr Hannam.
The meeting with Dr Hannam took place 15 January 1998 at DLWC’s Parramatta office.
No representatives of the Legal Section attended that meeting.
At no stage in that meeting did Dr Hannam indicate that he was acting on behalf of the Legal
Section in relation to the FOI matter.
During the meeting I asked Dr Hannam to provide me with copies of the documents listed in
the request. Dr Hannam stated that that was not possible.
That meeting, whilst useful, bordered on the general, and failed to provide sufficient specific
information of a nature which in my opinion would justify withdrawal of the request.
Although Dr Hannam did provide me with certain papers, these were copies of Hansard and
copies of articles he has published. However these items did not contain the specific
information that was requested in the FOI request.
Following the meeting, I reduced the scope of the application by seven paragraphs of twenty
(Attachment E).
The Department advised me that despite the narrowing of the request, in their opinion, the
request would involve a substantial diversion of agency resources.(Attachments F, H)
(I am prepared to sign a statutory declaration to the effect of the above.)
Further steps which I took in the negotiation process involved requesting that the Department
indicate to me the nature of the actions required in order to make the request less
objectionable. On 2 January 1998 I wrote to the Department as follows:
“I consider that the Department has failed to reasonably respond to my request to indicate the
precise manner in which the scope of the request could be appropriately narrowed in order to
overcome your objection of ‘unreasonable diversion of agency resources’. For example, there
has been no response to my specific request, made on 2 January 1998, to ‘give me greater
practical assistance in amending my application [other] than to simply advise me to narrow the
scope of the application. For example it would be of assistance if you were to advise me which
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three sections of the application are most likely to involve a substantial diversion of agency
resources.’ “
However, as can be seen from attachments D, F, and H there was a complete failure by
DLWC to respond to my request to identify which were the most onerous paragraphs in order
that I might consider deleting them from the request. Nor was there a response in terms of the
extent of scaling back of the request required – in terms of my request for the DLWC to
indicate the percentage to which the request must be cut.
On 20 March 1998 I reiterated this argument, writing:
In other words, if the Department were willing to indicate which particular paragraphs (of the
remaining thirteen) are the most burdensome in terms of agency resources, I remain prepared
to reconsider the terms of the request.
As can be seen from the reply of DLWC of 3 April 1998 there was no response to this request.
Accordingly, I believe that it would be unreasonable for the DLWC to assert that it has
satisfied the requirements of s.25(5) to negotiate with the applicant.
Other efforts at negotiation on my part
An additional effort that I made in order to lessen the burden of compliance for the
Department was my initial offer to accept access in the form of inspection if there was to be
substantial cost of compliance (Attachment A, p.4).
If the nature of the diversion involved in processing the request was related to photocopying
work, then provision of access in the form of inspection would have removed the need to
expend staff hours in photocopying documents.
However there was a complete failure to respond specifically to my request to provide access
in the form of ‘inspection’.
Complaint Two
There was an unjust failure to provide adequate reasons for the initial determination to
refuse to grant access to documents.
In order to examine this point it is necessary to work out when the formal refusal took place. It
appears that two refusals actually occurred. It is evident from the documents that one refusal
took place on 2 December 1997, and another on 6 March 1998.
Even if the entire package of DLWC correspondence is taken together, it is not clear to me
that the Department adequately communicated its reasons in compliance with s.28(2)(e)(ii), in
communicating… “Findings on any material questions of fact underlying those reasons
together with a reference to the sources of information on which those findings are based.”
It is my view that it did not do so because it had not commenced the process of making a list
of files and where those files were held.
In relation to the internal review determination, (Attachment H), again I contend that the
DLWC failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision. The letter of 3 April 1998 contains
no indication of what in particular was done in the internal review, apart from the act of
writing the determination letter. There is no evidence that any genuine additional effort was
made to reconsider the matter.
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Complaint Three
There was an unreasonable and unjust refusal to grant fee remission on claimed
ground of public interest.
The DLWC stated in letter of 2 December 1997
“No public interest benefit has been disclosed in the application as a basis for providing the
information therefore we cannot grant a reduction in fees for this application.”
I quote from my letter of 21 November 1997:
“My request can generally be described as being ‘in the public interest’ for the following
reasons:
It is not being undertaken for private purposes;
It is not being undertaken for profit making purposes;
The subject matter is one of contemporary public policy debate, ie relating to the application of
environmental laws for the conservation of native vegetation and the protection of the
environment. This subject is a matter of considerable interest to the general public, and to the
academic community in particular.
The results of my research will be published and accessible to the general public. I have the
capacity to make public the information sought. For example, previous academic research I
have conducted has been published by the Australian Centre for Environmental Law based at
the ANU.”

It appears that the DLWC provided no counter-argument or evidence to suggest why these
reasons would not justify ‘public interest’ status.
A further error was the Department’s failure to answer my request for 50% remission of the
internal review fee (Attachment C). Nor were reasons provided for this decision not to answer
this request (Attachment H).
Complaint Four
There was an unlawful and unjust failure to provide reasons for refusing to grant a fee
remission on the grounds of public interest.
I refer to arguments above under the heading ‘Complaint Three’.
Complaint Five Additional errors and potential defects in DLWC decision making.
Defective internal review determination
The internal review determination (Attachment H) contains errors of fact. It inaccurately states
that only five paragraphs were deleted from the request, when in fact, seven were deleted
(Attachment E).
2. Potential instance of lack of authority to make decision
The Act requires that internal review be conducted by the CEO of the organisation, or his/her
delegate. There is no indication in DLWC’s letter of 3 April 1998 that the Director of Legal
Services was the lawful delegate of Dr Bob Smith for purposes of internal review under the
FOI Act.
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APPENDIX 5.5
CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO REQUEST FOR
INFORMATION LODGED WITH THE NSW NATIONAL PARKS
AND WILDLIFE SERVICE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT 1989 (NSW)

Freedom of Information Coordinator
National Parks and Wildlife Service

Dear
This is a request under s.16,17 of the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW) for access to
documents in the possession, custody, and control of the National Parks and Wildlife Service
(‘the Service’) and the Director-General of the Service.
Documents requested
This request does not apply to documents created by or in the possession of regional offices
within the Central or Western Zone, or to documents created prior to June 1991.
Note that I am not seeking access to any documents which are already publicly accessible (eg held in public
libraries or available for sale).
Please supply copies of documents (defined as widely as in the Act, ie including electronic mail
messages, file notes, correspondence, Ministerial and internal briefings, memoranda and
circulars, minutes of meetings, etc) which fit the following description:
1. Documents which indicate, discuss or refer to the Service’s policy , proposed policy, or
policy options as to how the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 applies to, or should be
applied to, commercial scale forestry operations in native forest on privately owned land in
NSW , including the clearance of native forest and woodland in order to establish plantations
of native or non-native species (referred to hereafter as ‘private land forestry’).
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2. The following category of documents sought refer directly or implicitly to situations in which
development applications were made for private land forestry where the consent authority
under Pt IV Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (‘EPAA’) was a local government
authority:
2.1 Those documents which refer to ‘concurrence’ of the Director-General of NPWS (under
s.79B EPAA) being sought by consent authorities, for development applications which related
to private land forestry.
2.2 Those documents which contain reference to, or from which the following may be
calculated, in relation to development applications for private land forestry :
• The number of instances where the concurrence of the D-G NPWS was granted
unconditionally;
• The number of instances where concurrence was granted subject to conditions;
• The number of instances where concurrence was refused under s.79B(8) EPAA.
2.3 Documents containing reference to consideration of the factors listed in s.79B(5) EPAA by
the Director-General of NPWS during the course of concurrence decision making regarding
private land forestry proposals.
3. The following category of documents sought refer directly or implicitly to situations in which
development applications were made for private land forestry where the consent authority
under Pt IV EPAA was the Minister for Land and Water Conservation, in relation to
applications for development consent for the clearance of native vegetation under the Native
Vegetation Conservation Act 1997:
3.1 Documents which refer to, discuss, describe, or document instances in which consultation
with the Environment Minister was made under s.79B EPAA by the Minister for Land and
Water Conservation, regarding development applications for private forestry proposals.
3.2 In such instances of Ministerial consultation, any documents regarding the making of
statutory recommendations by the Director-General and the rejection (if any) of such
recommendations (if any), and the reasons for such rejection, made in accordance with
s.97C(6) EPAA.
4. Correspondence between NPWS and any Part IV consent authorities which discusses
private land forestry proposals. This catetgory of documents may include documents which
refer to the conduct of the ‘8 part test’ regarding threatened species (etc.) under s.5A EPAA.
5. Documents which contain reference to or discussion of the grant of s.91 licences (under the
Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (‘TSCA’)) to individuals or corporations (‘persons’)
engaged in private land forestry.
5.1 Documents which show, refer to, or from which may be calculated, the number of s.91
licences granted to persons engaged in private land forestry and the number of instances in
which licence applications were refused.
5.2 Documents which show, contain, discuss, or refer to licence conditions imposed upon the
grant of s.91 licences to persons engaged in private land forestry.
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5.3 Copies of s.91 licences granted to persons involved in private land forestry.
5.4 Documents which contain reference to or discussion of the grant of s.95 TSCA certificates
to persons engaged in private land forestry (to indicate that an activity was not considered likely
to significantly affect threatened species) (and therefore that an Species Impact Statement
(‘SIS’) was not required).
5.5 Documents in relation to private land forestry, which contain reference to, or discussion of,
‘determinations’ by the Director-General under s.95 TSCA (and notification of such
determinations) that proposed ‘actions’ by an applicant for a licence are likely to significantly
affect threatened species, populations or ecological communities, or their habitats.
6. Documents which refer to the issuing of, or contain, ‘Director-General’s requirements’
regarding preparation of SIS (to accompany s.91 licence applications or Pt IV EPAA
development applications) in relation to private land forestry.
Copies of any SIS prepared by, or on behalf of, companies and individuals engaged in private
land forestry.
7. Documents which discuss, debate, consider or refer to the awareness of the private land
forestry industry regarding its obligations under the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995, and
the question of conducting an industry wide education campaign regarding this matter.
8. Documents which discuss or consider the definition of ‘routine agricultural activity’ under
the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 in relation to private land forestry. Such documents
may refer to discussion of which circumstances in which this exemption is legitimately available
to private land forestry.
9. Documents which discuss or consider or refer to the impact of Regional Vegetation
Management Plans under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997, where their content relates
to private land forestry.
10. Documents which discuss, consider, or refer to NPWS contributions to the making of any
code of practice or proposed code, to be made under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997,
in order to regulate private land forestry.
11. Any documents being containing or discussing legal advice (either from Parliamentary
Counsel, Crown Solicitor or in-house legal advice of DLWC or NPWS or other legal advisers)
regarding legal issues involving or affecting private land forestry. These documents may include
discussion of the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 and the operation of the Threatened
Species Conservation Act 1995, and the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979.
Note on provision of documents
In order to assist the applicant and any review body in the event of subsequent review
proceedings, please indicate when supplying the documents, which numbered paragraph of this
FOI request the documents discussed relate to.
Form of access sought
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By photocopy; unless the estimated total of processing charges exceeds $200.00. In that case, I
seek access by inspection, with liberty to copy documents.
Processing Charges
I enclose a $30.00 cheque to cover the initial application fee.
Pursuant to s.67 of the Act, and the Gazetted guidelines made under that section, I seek a 50%
reduction in processing fees and charges for the following reasons : (1) financial hardship and
(2) public interest.
Financial hardship:
The imposition of fees in excess of $200 would be likely to cause me financial hardship as my
income (an Australian Postgraduate Award Scholarship) is only $300 per week, which leaves
me a low disposable income. Further details can be supplied upon request.
Public interest :
This request is part of a wider research effort related to my postgraduate research in Law. This
is a topic of interest to the general public and the academic community. I am a Master of
Natural Resources Law (Hons) candidate (100% by research) at the Faculty of Law,
Wollongong University.
My research relates to the implementation of environmental laws and government policies for
biodiversity conservation on privately owned land in NSW and elsewhere. This research can be
described as being in the public interest for the following reasons :
• It is not being undertaken for private purposes;
• It is not being undertaken for profit making purposes;
• The subject matter is one of general policy debate, ie the conservation of native vegetation
and the protection of the environment through the application of environmental laws,
which is a matter of considerable interest to the general public, and to the academic
community in particular;
• The results of my research will be published and made accessible to the general public. For
example, previous academic research I have conducted has been published by the Australian
Centre for Environmental Law at the Australian National University.
Conclusion
I look forward to your decision on this application under the FOI Act.
If you require any clarification of any aspect of this request do not hesitate to call me.
Yours sincerely

Master of Laws (Hons) Candidate
Centre for Natural Resources Law and Policy
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Centre for Natural Resources Law and Policy
Faculty of Law

Director-General
National Parks and Wildlife Service

BY FAX – (with original and cheque by mail)
9 July 1999
Dear
Re: Internal review of decision to refuse FOI request relating to private land forestry.
This letter seeks an internal review of decision making of 29 June 1999 by
Acting Manager, Executive and Strategic Services, to refuse access to documents requested
under the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW) on 31 May 1999, (addressed to Ms Janece
Whalan, FOI Coordinator).
I seek an internal review under s.34 of the Act, and I enclose a cheque for $40.00 to facilitate
that review.
The purported basis for refusal was s.25(1)(a1) of the Act, of substantial and unreasonable
diversion of agency resources.
As a gesture of good will and willingness to negotiate with the NPWS, at this point, I wish to
indicate:
(1) my availability to discuss the content and scope of this request at any time, either by
telephone or in person;
(2) my willingness to delete paragraphs 1, 5.3, 7, 8, 9, 10,11 of the request in order to narrow
its scope. Further, I wish to narrow the scope of the request by amending paragraph 4 to
insert the words “within the Northern Zone of NPWS” immediately after the words “Part
IV consent authorities”.
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(3) Therefore the only remaining paragraphs which I wish to access at this stage are 2 (in full),
3 (in full) ,4 (as modified) ,5 (as modified) , 6.
(4) Further, I intend to narrow the scope to only include documents which relate to either
legal or policy matters which are of State-wide application, and those documents relating to
private land native forestry operations within the Northern Zone of NPWS. Therefore this
narrowing of scope relates to the content of documents sought and not their physical filing
location [Which is most likely to be either at Head Office or within offices of the Northern
Zone].
In reducing the scope of the request I wish to retain the definition of ‘private land forestry’
previously contained in Paragraph 1 of the request. This stated that the overall scope of the
request was in relation to the administration of the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 as it
applies to, commercial scale forestry operations in native forest on privately owned land in
NSW , including the clearance of native forest and woodland in order to establish plantations
of native or non-native species.
At this point I wish to raise two additional matters relating to this request.
First is the failure of the FOI Coordinator to comply with obligations under s.25(5) of the Act
which “do not permit” an agency to refuse access “without first endeavouring to assist the
applicant to amend the application so that the work involved in dealing with it would, if carried
out, no longer substantially and unreasonably divert the agency’s resources.[.etc].”
At no point to date has the FOI Coordinator approached me, either by telephone or by letter
to attempt to have me revise the application. In other words, it is arguable that there is no legal
basis for the refusal of the request at this stage. In addition to the statutory obligation I refer the
Service to the Ombudsman’s Guidelines on FOI which refer to the obligation of the agency to
assist the applicant with their application.
Second is a matter of a more minor nature - the failure of the FOI Coordinator to notify me of
a decision within the required statutory time period for reply. The Act (s.24(2)) sets out an
obligation on an agency to make a determination within 21 days of receipt. However, even
assuming three business days for delivery of the letter, which was sent on 31 May, the reply was
due on 24 June 1999. Instead the reply arrived 30 June 1999, six days overdue. This, in
accordance with s.24(2) of the Act in effect amounted to a deemed refusal of the request.
In relation to public interest considerations and arguments for the release of the documents, I
refer you to my letter of 31 May 1999.
Conclusion
I look forward to your decision on this application under the FOI Act.
If you require any clarification of any aspect of this request do not hesitate to call me.
Yours sincerely
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File note: phone conversation with FOI officer NPWS Hurstville
3.9.99
1. stated that no submission had yet gone to the DG. I warned him of my
willingness to proceed to the tribunal next week if no reply by Wednesday. He promised a
reply by then.
2. He stated that he will be arguing in the submission for a 50% remission on the grounds of
public interest on processing fees, having reviewed the file and the case law.
3. B further made an informal offer of his willingness to trial the option of inspection of
documents at Coffs Harbour and that I could be given liberty to tag those files in which I
was interested.
4. We discussed the element of consultation involved with 3rd parties in this request and I
Indicated to him that in my estimation there were approximately 40% of documents which
would involve consultation with local councils. He indicated that many councils had a
poor relationship with NPWS and would be likely to cause delay during the consultation
process. This raised for me the importance of approaching councils directly, either through
FOI or through a simple letter.
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File note: phone conversation with FOI officer NPWS Hurstville
13.9.99
1. Having received Barrack’s letter dated 6.9.99, at the Faculty office on Mon 13 September in
hard copy, I decided to call to discuss the contents.
2. I indicated to my unhappiness with the estimation of fees contained in that letter
($1270), stating that I would like to see a more detailed description of the documents available.
3. I indicated my congratulations to for having decided to grant a 50% remission
on the grounds of public interest.
4. As I was actively considering the option of proceeding to the Tribunal I asked if the
offer of an on-site inspection of documents was still on offer. Although his reply was vague
and wandering, stated that the offer was no longer available, with words to the effect
that such an approach was no longer practicable.
5. admitted during this telephone conversation that the Service had experienced
some difficulty in coming to a decision regarding this matter because of words to the effect that
“we haven’t had the detailed documentation on hand here at the Ministerial Office in order to
make a decision and for the Director-General to look at..” I asked for clarification of whether
this was because had not sought copies of the documents to be sent to head Office
at Hurstville. stated that this was the case, that all of the documents were at
Northern Zone office in Grafton, and further admitted that he had not travelled to Grafton in
order to inspect the files himself.
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File Note: telephone conversation with Acting Manager, NPWS Northern Zone.
24 September 1999.
1. I rang to attempt to negotiate access to the documents. He wasn't aware of the matter and he
stated that he would have to discuss it with his staff. Nevertheless, I informed him of the details of where the
matter it is at, at present.
2. In particular, I indicated to him my willingness to negotiate on this matter. I stated my willingness to discontinue
the litigation if NPWS was to provide satisfactory information. I indicated to him that the easiest way to resolve
this whole matter was for him to provide me with the documents. This way it would be a win win situation. I also
raised with him the option of me inspecting documents in person, as I stated that I would be in Coffs Harbour
twice during the next fortnight.
3. indicated that he had to discuss the matter with his staff, and could not provide any guarantees.
However, my impression was that it was a cordial and productive conversation.
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University of Wollongong
Wollongong NSW 2500

Freedom of Information Coordinator
National Parks and Wildlife Service

30 September 1999

BY FAX
Dear

RE: SCOPE OF FOI REQUEST RE PRIVATE LAND FORESTRY
Further to our recent telephone conversations, I am supplying with this letter a modified copy
of my request under the Freedom of Information Act 1989 which shows in a single document all
the deletions and clarifications in scope made to the request orginally made on 31 May 1999.
That document is attached to this letter, which is being sent by fax.
I trust that this action will simplify the task faced by NPWS in processing the request.
Yours sincerely,
[Signed]
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[30 September 1999]

University of Wollongong

Freedom of Information Coordinator
National Parks and Wildlife Service

31 May 1999 [SHOWING AMENDMENTS AS AT 30.9.99]
Dear
This is a request under s.16,17 of the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW) for access to
documents in the possession, custody, and control of the National Parks and Wildlife Service
(‘the Service’) and the Director-General of the Service.
Documents requested
This request does not apply to documents created by or in the possession of regional offices
within the Central or Western Zone, or to documents created prior to June 1991.
Additional clarification of scope supplied 9 July 1999: “only include documents which relate to either
legal or policy matters which are of State-wide application, and those documents relating to
private land native forestry operations within the Northern Zone of NPWS. Therefore this
narrowing of scope relates to the content of documents sought and not their physical filing
location [Which is most likely to be either at Head Office or within offices of the Northern
Zone].”
Additional clarification of scope supplied 23 July 1999
“Where the request refers to documents discussing ‘private land forestry’, I seek only those
documents which refer to or discuss “commercial scale harvesting and removal of timber from
native forests on privately owned land which falls within the Northern Zone of operations of
the NPWS. “ In other words, the focus of the request is on logging, not the broader range of
activities which may fall under the heading of ‘forestry’.”
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Additional clarification of scope supplied 23 July 1999
I am no longer seeking access to any documents which refer directly to applications under the
TSC Act (or related provisions of the EP&A Act) in relation to the logging of native forest as
an adjunct to the establishment of, or activities within timber plantations (either hardwood or
softwood) on privately owned land in NSW.
Note that I am not seeking access to any documents which are already publicly accessible (eg held in
public libraries or available for sale).

Please supply copies of documents (defined as widely as in the Act, , file notes,
correspondence, Ministerial and internal briefings, memoranda and circulars, minutes of
meetings, etc) [BUT NOT including electronic mail messages, [deleted 23.7.99]] which fit the
following description:
1. [Deleted].
2. The following category of documents sought refer directly or implicitly to situations in which
development applications were made for private land forestry where the consent authority
under Pt IV Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (‘EPAA’) was a local government
authority:
[Pars 2-2.3 Amended - 23.7.99] The request is narrowed to apply only to NPWS administrative role in
relation to concurrence or consultation regarding Part IV consents in those local government areas falling within or
partly within the Northern Zone of NPWS administration in which in logging or intensive silvicultural
management requires development consent under the Local Environment Plan or Tree Preservation Order made
under the LEP, particularly where those councils require consent within the Rural 1(a) Zone. These councils
include: Bellingen, Byron, Severn, Maclean, Nambucca, Hastings, Cessnock, Great Lakes, Uralla, and may
include Kempsey, Coffs Harbour.
2.1 Those documents which refer to ‘concurrence’ of the Director-General of NPWS (under
s.79B EPAA) being sought by consent authorities, for development applications which related
to private land forestry.
2.2 Documents sufficient to identify in relation to development applications for private land
forestry :
• The number of instances where the concurrence of the D-G NPWS was granted
unconditionally;
• The number of instances where concurrence was granted subject to conditions;
• The number of instances where concurrence was refused under s.79B(8) EPAA.
Summary statistics are sought rather than the full detail of every matter relating to each
application.
Summary statistics showing Name
[To provide within 28 days///]
2.3 Documents containing reference to consideration of the factors listed in s.79B(5) EPAA by
the Director-General of NPWS during the course of concurrence decision making regarding
private land forestry proposals.
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[Not Pressed at this stage – NPWS to provide relevant file list and brief indication of number
of folios captured at this stage.]
3. Documents relating to Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997
The following category of documents sought refer directly or implicitly to situations in which
development applications were made for private land forestry where the consent authority
under Pt IV EPAA was the Minister for Land and Water Conservation, in relation to
applications for development consent for the clearance of native vegetation under the Native
Vegetation Conservation Act 1997:
Sufficient to identify
Who by
Date of decision
3.1 Documents which refer to, discuss, describe, or document instances in which consultation
with the Environment Minister was made under s.79B EPAA by the Minister for Land and
Water Conservation, regarding development applications for private forestry proposals.
Summary statistics are sought rather than the full detail of every matter relating to each
application.
Summary statistics showing Name
[To provide within 28 days///]
3.2 In such instances of Ministerial consultation, any documents regarding the making of
statutory recommendations by the Director-General and the rejection (if any) of such
recommendations (if any), and the reasons for such rejection, made in accordance with
s.97C(6) EPAA.
4. [//////
Correspondence between NPWS and any Part IV consent authorities [within the Northern
Zone of NPWS] which discusses private land forestry proposals. This category of documents
may include documents which refer to the conduct of the ‘8 part test’ regarding threatened
species (etc.) under s.5A EPAA.
5. [Deleted, 23.7.99 and 24.9.99]
5.1 [Deleted 23.7.99 and 24.9.99]
5.2 [ Deleted 23.7.99 and 24.9.99]
5.3 [Deleted 23.7.99 and 24.9.99]
5.4 [Deleted 23.7.99 and 24.9.99]
5.5 [Deleted 23.7.99 and 24.9.99]
6. Documents state the number of instances in which refer to the issuing of, or contain,
‘Director-General’s requirements’ regarding preparation of SIS (to accompany s.91 licence
applications or Pt IV EPAA development applications) in relation to private land forestry.
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Copies of any SIS prepared by, or on behalf of, companies and individuals engaged in private
land forestry.
7. [Deleted 9.7.99].
8. [Deleted 9.7.99].
9. [Deleted 9.7.99].
10. [Deleted 9.7.99].
11. [Deleted 9.7.99].
Note on provision of documents
In order to assist the applicant and any review body in the event of subsequent review
proceedings, please indicate when supplying the documents, which numbered paragraph of this
FOI request the documents discussed relate to.
Form of access sought
By photocopy; unless the estimated total of processing charges exceeds $200.00. In that case, I
seek access by inspection, with liberty to copy documents.
Processing Charges
[Further paragraphs as per original letter of 31.5.99]
Conclusion
I look forward to your decision on this application under the FOI Act. If you require any
clarification of any aspect of this request do not hesitate to call me.
Yours sincerely
[Signed]

Master of Laws (Hons) Candidate
Centre for Natural Resources Law and Policy

15

APPENDIX 5.5 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST CORRESPONDENCE WITH NPWS

ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS TRIBUNAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES
GENERAL DIVISION

Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997

Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW)

Application for review of decisions under the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW)

FILE NO. [

]
APPLICANT:

RESPONDENT: (MR BRIAN GILLIGAN) DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL
PARKS AND WILDLIFE SERVICE NSW
DATE OF APPLICATION: 20 SEPTEMBER 1999
ADDRESS FOR SERVICE:
UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG
WOLLONGONG NSW 2500
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ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS TRIBUNAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES
GENERAL DIVISION

Application for review of decisions under the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW)

FILE NO. [

]
APPLICANT:

RESPONDENT: DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL
PARKS AND WILDLIFE SERVICE NSW
DATE OF APPLICATION: 20 SEPTEMBER 1999

TABLE OF ATTACHED DOCUMENTS
IDENTIFIER
LABEL CODE

AUTHOR

A

Applicant

WHAT

DATE
PREPARED
31 May 1999

Application
B

Respondent

C

Applicant

D

Applicant

E

Applicant

F

Respondent

G

Respondent

Refusal
of
Application under
s.25(1)(1a)
Application
for
Internal Review
Revision of scope of
request
Print-out of E-mail
message to reiterate
request to initiate
internal
review
process
E-mail reply to
request to reiterate
request to initiate
internal
review
process
Reply to internal
review application

29 June 1999
9 July 1999
23 July 1999
24 August 1999

25 August 1999

6 September 1999
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and Admission of
deemed refusal of
internal review
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ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS TRIBUNAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES
GENERAL DIVISION

Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997

Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW)

Application for review of decisions under the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW)

FILE NO. [

]
APPLICANT:

RESPONDENT: DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL
PARKS AND WILDLIFE SERVICE NSW
DATE OF APPLICATION: 20 SEPTEMBER 1999
ADDRESS FOR SERVICE:
UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG
WOLLONGONG NSW 2500

EMAIL:
6. DECISIONS TO BE REVIEWED
A. Deemed refusal of application for internal review, or alternatively, failure to make a decision on the
application for internal review within the required time period.
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Date of decision: 6 September 1999, as admitted by the respondent in its correspondence of
that date.
Decision maker:Freedom of Information Coordinator, NPWS.
Relevant attached document identifier label code: G
Relevant provision: s.34(6)
B. Failure to provide reasons for failure to make internal review decision within the statutory deadline.

Date of decision: 6 September 1999, as omitted from the correspondence of the respondent of
that date.
Decision maker: Freedom of Information Coordinator.
Relevant attached documents: G
Relevant provisions: s.34(6), 28(2(e).
C. Failure to adequately search for, locate, identify, collate, and communicate regarding documents (ie to
specify and tabulate them), being documents the subject of the application for access and now being
the subject of the application for internal review.

Date of decision: 29 June 1999 and 6 September 1999.
Decision makers : Acting Manager, Executive and Strategic Services, NPWS
(29 June 1999); Freedom of Information Coordinator (6 September 1999).
Relevant attached documents: B,G.
Further particulars:

Failure to conduct an adequately rigorous search for documents; in that there was an apparent
failure to:
• specify file names and file identifier numbers of relevant files that were located.
• indicate the total number of relevant files.
• Indicate the total number of relevant folios.
• List the title and date of production of folios falling within the scope of the request.
• indicate amount of time spent on search for relevant documents.
• indicate methods used to search for documents.
• Indicate efforts made to consult with other relevant agencies regarding relevant documents.
D. Decision to charge a processing deposit of $1270.00 ( despite belated 50% remission on grounds of
public interest) arising from a failure to base the estimate of processing time on a rigorous search for
relevant documents.

Date of decision: 6 September 1999.
Decision maker: Freedom of Information Coordinator.
Relevant provision: s.34(7)(a)(iv),s.53(3)(a)(iv)

Relevant attached documents: G.
Further particulars:

The estimate of processing time, and therefore the advance processing deposit demanded by
the respondent, was unreasonable, in that it was based on a failure to conduct an adequately
rigorous search for documents; in that there was:
•

an apparent failure to specify file names and file identifier numbers of relevant files that
were located.
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•
•
•

an apparent failure to indicate the total number of relevant files.
an apparent failure to Indicate the total number of relevant folios.
A verbal admission by the FOI Officer that Northern Zone staff had not attempted or
commenced the process of actually ‘tagging’ and identifying documents.

This failure to conduct an adequate preliminary search caused an overestimation of likely
processing charges.
E. Unreasonable decision to charge a processing deposit representing the entire amount (100%) of the
estimated processing charges, and failing to take into account in that decision either the limited
financial means of the applicant or the public interest nature of the application.

Date of decision: 6 September 1999.
Decision maker: Freedom of Information Coordinator.
Relevant attached documents: A, G.
Relevant provision: s.53(3)(a)(iv), Under s.34(7)(a)(iv) of the Act, the processing charges
required are unreasonable.
F. Decision to refuse access to the documents requested on the grounds of s.25(1)(1a) of the Act ( ie.
alleged ‘substantial and unreasonable diversion of agency resources ’)

Date of decision: 29 June 1999
Decision Maker: Acting Manager, Executive and Strategic Services, NPWS.
Relevant attached documents: B
Relevant provision: 34(7)(a)(i), 53(3)(a)(i).
Related sub-decision:

Failure at a later stage to review or overturn the decision to refuse access on this ground, despite multiple reductions in the scope of the request
made by the applicant.

Date of decision: 6 September 1999.
Decision maker: Freedom of Information Coordinator.
Relevant attached documents: D,E,G.
G. Failure to adequately observe the requirement contained in s.25(5) of the Act to assist or consult the
applicant to seek alteration of request prior to refusing the request on 29 June 1999 on the basis of
s.25(1)(1a) of the Act.

Date of decision: 29 June 1999
Decision Maker: Acting Manager, Executive and Strategic Services, NPWS.
Relevant attached documents: B, D.
Relevant provisions: s. 25(5).

H. Refusal to offer a 50% remission of the initial application fee, despite application on grounds of
public interest and financial hardship.

Date of decision: 29 June 1999
Decision Maker: Acting Manager, Executive and Strategic Services, NPWS.
Relevant attached documents: B
Relevant provision: s.53(3)(a)(iv).
I. Failure to supply reasons for refusal to offer a 50% remission of initial application fee.

Date of decision: 29 June 1999
Decision Maker: Acting Manager, Executive and Strategic Services, NPWS.
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Relevant attached documents: B
Relevant provisions: s.28(2)(e), 34(7)(a)(iv),(v).
J. Failure to offer a 50% remission of the internal review fee paid by the applicant.

Date of decision: 6 September 1999.
Decision maker: Freedom of Information Coordinator.
Relevant attached documents: G
Relevant provisions: s. 34(7)(a)(iv),(v).

K. Failure to supply reasons for that refusal to grant a 50% remission of the internal review fee paid by
the applicant.

Date of decision: 6 September 1999.
Decision maker: Freedom of Information Coordinator.
Relevant attached documents: G
Relevant provisions: s.28(2)(e).
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7. REASONS FOR APPLICATION:

Global reasons for application:
Section 6 of this application ‘Decisions to be Reviewed’ sets out a number of grounds on
which this application is based.
The reasons of the applicant for seeking review of the decisions specified above include, but
are not limited to the following:
1. To challenge the unreasonable refusal of the respondent to provide access to documents
on the basis of s.25(1)(1a) despite the substantial reductions in the scope of the request
made by the applicant during the negotiating period.
2. To challenge the unreasonable failure of the respondent to provide adequate reasons for its
failure to provide access to documents described in the request.
3. To challenge the Respondent’s error of law inherent in its failure to abide by statutory
processing deadlines imposed by the Act, ie., that procedures that were required by law to
be observed in connection with the making of the decision were not observed.
4. To challenge the failure of the Respondent to take account relevant considerations in
exercising its decision making powers under the FOI Act; including:
i. the public interest in release of the documents (including as argued in the original
application of 31 May 1999);
ii. the scope, purpose and objects of the Act, which include the extension as far as possible
the rights of the public to obtain access to information held by Government,
iii. the objects of the Act, which include the need to facilitate and encourage, promptly and
at the lowest reasonable cost, the disclosure of information held by Government;
iv. the need to pursue the objects of the Act including the objective that the Act be
interpreted and applied so as to further its objects;
v. the purpose for which the legislation was enacted, as specified in the Second Reading
Speech, including the objectives of enshrining and protecting “three basic principles of
democratic government, namely openness, accountability, and responsibility…”
5. Enforcement of the applicant’s statutory and legally enforceable right of access to
government documents held by the Respondent that is generated by the Freedom of Information
Act 1989, in particular by subsections 5(1)(a), 5(2)(b), 5(3), and 5(4) of that Act.
6. That the decision of the Respondent to require payment of a substantial processing deposit
of $1270.00 is harsh and oppressive, having regard to its magnitude and the limited means of
the applicant, and unreasonable having regard to the inadequate nature of the means used to
derive the estimate of likely processing costs. Further, that the decision of the Respondent to
require this amount as an advance processing deposit may have been designed to persuade the
applicant to withdraw or suspend the request.
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7. Failure of the Respondent to provide reasons for its decisions which include findings on
material questions of fact, and reference to the sources of information on which findings are
based which contain sufficient or adequate particularity. For example, failure to adequately
describe the documents held by the Respondent which are relevant to the scope of the request,
by including file names and numbers, and adequate descriptions of folios or documents
contained on those files, including dates, authors, addressees, etc.
8. The applicant reserves the right to provide additional reasons for the application and further
and better particulars of the reasons set out in this application and any other reasons, as this
matter progresses towards hearing, and at the time of hearing of this matter.
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Orders of the Tribunal sought :

1. That the Tribunal set aside the decision of the respondent agency on the internal review
matter (the decision of 6 September 1999) and also the decision of the respondent agency
on the initial application (the decision of 29 June 1999), and to substitute its own decisions
which it considers correct and preferable.
2. That the Tribunal require the respondent to, within a reasonable period of time, being 14
days from the date of its decision, adequately search for, locate, identify, collate, and
communicate to the applicant regarding relevant documents (ie to specify and tabulate
them), being documents the subject of the amended application for access.
3. That the Tribunal require the respondent to, within a reasonable period of time, being 14
days from the date of its decision, provide access to the documents which are the subject
of the amended application for access to documents, either by inspection in person at the
Head Office of the NPWS, Hurstville, or by provision of photocopies of documents,
subject to such other exemptions and requirements for consultation with third parties set
out in the Act as are reasonable .
4.

That the Tribunal make such general and specific declarations as are appropriate regarding
the obligations of an agency subject to the Act to assist an applicant in regards to narrowing
the scope of a request that an agency believes falls within s.25(1)(1a) of the Act, in terms of
communicating with an access applicant the aspects of a request which require most
amendment so that an application no longer attracts the operation of that subsection of the
Act.

5. That the Tribunal make such general and specific declarations as are appropriate regarding
the obligations of an agency subject to the Act to locate and identify documents the subject
of a request in such circumstances as apply in paragraph 4 above.
6. That the Tribunal make such declarations as are appropriate regarding the obligations of an
agency subject to the Act to respond in a timely manner to applications for access to
documents under the Act, and applications for internal review under the Act, within the
time periods required by the Act, having regard to s.5(3)(b) of the Act.
7. That the Tribunal make such declarations as are appropriate regarding the entitlement of an
agency to demand payment of processing deposits under s.21 of the Act, in particular
regarding the magnitude of such deposits relative to the estimated final processing charges.
8. That, having regard to Document B in particular, the Tribunal make such declarations as
are appropriate regarding the obligations of an agency to endeavour to make accurate
estimations of processing charges so that the potential for agencies to employ inflated
estimations of processing charges for inappropriate and collateral purposes of unreasonably
dissuading bona fide applicants from continuing with their requests for information is
reduced.

25

APPENDIX 5.5 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST CORRESPONDENCE WITH NPWS

9. That the Tribunal make such declarations as are appropriate regarding the obligations of an
agency to provide an adequate statement of reasons for decisions made under the Act, in
particular such declarations as are appropriate regarding what type of statement will
constitute an adequate statement of reasons.
10. Such other declarations regarding the achievement of the objects of the Act, including the
enforcement of the rights of access of the public to information at the lowest possible cost,
having regard to s.5(3)(b) of the Act.
11. Such additional orders as the Applicant may seek during the hearing of this matter.
12. That the Tribunal make an order requiring the respondent to pay the applicant his
reasonable costs in making this application and bringing these proceedings.
13. Such additional orders that the Tribunal sees fit to make.
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Submissions on Jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear the application.

Summary
The application for review by the Tribunal is valid in that the following preconditions have
been met, and the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the matter.
1. The preconditions relating to a valid application under s.17 of the Act have been met.
2. The preconditions relating to a valid application for internal review under s.34(2) have been
met.
3. The preconditions relating to a valid application for review by the Administrative Decisions
Tribunal under have been met (s.53,54)
Further particulars
1. Section 53(1) of the FOI Act 1989 provides jurisdiction upon the Tribunal to hear this
matter.
2. This application to the Tribunal is made within the time period required by s.54(a) of the
Freedom of Information Act 1989. That section requires that application be made within 60
days after notice of the decision is given to “the access applicant”.
3. As the decision to be reviewed is a deemed refusal of the application for internal review, no
actual notice of the decision has been given to the application. However, for the purposes
of this application, it is submitted that deemed refusal of the application took place on 23
July 1999, fourteen days after the date of application, being 9 July 1999, following s.34(6) of
the Act.
4. If this approach to construction of s.54(a) is taken, the application to the Tribunal is
required to take place by or on the 21 September 1999, 60 days after the 23 July 1999.
5. This application was prepared on 20 September 1999 and was sent by courier to reach the
Tribunal on 21 September 1999 accompanied by the required filing fee of $50.00 .

Signed

20 September 1999
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Centre for Natural Resources Law and Policy
Faculty of Law

Director-General
National Parks and Wildlife Service

ATTENTION: FOI COORDINATOR
BY FAX
24 September 1999
Dear
Re: Matters relating to FOI request relating to private land forestry.
This letter seeks to accomplish two main objectives, being:
A. Notification of a third round of reductions in scope of request made by Applicant.
B. Notice of Application to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal for review of deemed
refusal to grant access to documents.
(A) Notification of a third round of reductions in scope of request made by Applicant.

I wish to advise of a further reduction in the scope of the Freedom of Information request as
set out in letter of date 31 May 1999 and modified by my correspondence of 9 July 1999 and 23
July 1999.
Please note that this is the third reduction in the scope of the request so far, and goes some way
to remedying the situation caused the National Parks and Wildlife Service to form the view that
it was necessary to apply s.25(1)(1a) of the Act (ie ‘substantial and unreasonable diversion of
agency resources’).
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The reduction in scope is, in essence, to remove from the request all material relating to s.91
licensing under the TSC Act 1995.
Therefore the following paragraph copied from my previous letter advising of reductions in
scope of this application is removed from the request. That paragraph read:
“In relation to paragraphs 5-5.5 which seek documents relating to the administration of the licensing provisions of
Part 6 of the TSCA as they apply to private land forestry. The request is further narrowed to involve only those
documents which refer to applications under the TSCA for s.91 licences or s.95 certificates relating to the granting
of:
(i) licence NZ06 (or TS06) to Mr Peter Mather, relating to the ‘selective logging’ operations on Portion 13,
Iluka Rd, Woombah.
(ii) Documents relating to the granting of a s.95 TSCA certificate (No. NZ 025) to Mr S. Williams for
‘selective logging under NVC exemption’, address stated : 285 Shephards Lane, Coffs Harbour.”
Having regard to the reductions in scope of the request contained in this letter, I request that
NPWS agree to a reduction in the size of the advance deposit required by that letter. In
addition I request that you have regard to the objects of the Act, in particular s.5(3)(b).
In addition, in order to more readily facilitate your granting access to the documents, I am
prepared – if requested - to devise a document which will indicate the scope of the entire
application as modified to date, ie. a document which reflects all the reductions in scope that
have made as a concession to NPWS demands.
(B) Notice of Application to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal for review of deemed refusal to
grant access to documents.

I wish to advise of my application lodged 21 September 1999 at the Registry of the NSW
Administrative Decisions Tribunal for review of decisions made by the NPWS in relation to
my Freedom of Information application. A full set of documents relating to this application will
be sent with the copy of this letter sent by post.
I would like to express my sincere regret at having to resort to proceeding to the Tribunal, and wish to state that it
is not my intention to engage the Service in a confrontation, as I would like to gain access to the documents with
the minimum of inconvenience to all parties. From my viewpoint, I consider that I am seeking
information which many would regard as relatively simple statistical information which
arguably should be compiled by the agency in any event, if only for its own planning and review
purposes.
I would ask that you note my genuine efforts to negotiate this matter, which included an offer
to delay commencement of proceedings in the Tribunal (made on 23 July 1999 at a meeting
with NPWS officers at Hurstville, including Paul Packard) pending attempts to resolve the
matter by negotiation. Such efforts at negotiation, my willingness to reduce the scope of
application, and availability for negotiation (which has included making my mobile number
available and email available ), indicate that I am not fixed on a particular course of action
Nevertheless, I have reluctantly decided to I have decided to exercise my rights under the
legislation to take this action as I believe the response of NPWS to concessions that I have
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made so far have been inadequate and insufficient to convince me that NPWS is making a
geniune effort to find a way to resolve this matter so that both parties get their objectives met
at minimum cost in terms of time and resources.
In particular, I have decided to apply for review of decisions made, to the Administrative
Decisions Tribunal, because of :
(1) the insistence on a large processing deposit based on what appear to be “back of the
envelope calculations” not based on a geniuine attempt to locate and identify materials,
resulting in an over-estimation of processing time.
(2) the requirement to pay 100% of estimated processing charges as a deposit before further
action;
(3) the apparent withdrawal of the offer made by telephone by Mr Bart Barrack, FOI
Coordinator, NPWS, on 3 September 1999 to provide access to the documents in the form of
inspection at the Coffs Harbour Northern Zone Office of NPWS (refer to file notes made by
the applicant);
(4) the failure of the NPWS to respond to this relatively simple request for statistical
information in a timely fashion, or at least by the date required by the legislation.
Further and better particulars of my application to the Tribunal (in addition to those supplied
with this letter) will be provided closer to the hearing date.
The option remains open for the NPWS to contact me by telephone to discuss this matter.
Yours sincerely

BA(Hons), LLB(Hons), G.Dip. Legal Practice
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File note: telephone conversation with NPWS, 25.8.99.
1. returned my call in relation to my request that the internal review process be commenced.
2. stated that there was a problem in determining the internal review. He admitted "we have a deemed
refusal".
3. stated words to the effect that "we don't have detailed documentation on hand down here for the DG
to look at", indicating that there was a problem in devising a ministerial submission or at least a submission to the
DG because the documents were in possession of the Northern zone office. To me this indicated that no
comprehensive search for documents had yet been carried out. If some kind of search had been carried out, there
would at least have been a table of documents for the DG to examine.
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ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS TRIBUNAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES
GENERAL DIVISION

Application for review of decisions under the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW)

FILE NO. [993217]
APPLICANT:
RESPONDENT: DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL
PARKS AND WILDLIFE SERVICE NSW
DATE OF APPLICATION: 20 SEPTEMBER 1999

TABLE OF ATTACHED DOCUMENTS
IDENTIFIER
LABEL CODE

AUTHOR

A

Applicant

WHAT

DATE
PREPARED
31 May 1999

Application
B

Respondent

C

Applicant

D

Applicant

E

Applicant

F

Respondent

G

Respondent

Refusal
of
Application under
s.25(1)(1a)
Application
for
Internal Review
Revision of scope of
request
Print-out of E-mail
message to reiterate
request to initiate
internal
review
process
E-mail reply to
request to reiterate
request to initiate
internal
review
process
Reply to internal
review application

29 June 1999
9 July 1999
23 July 1999
24 August 1999

25 August 1999

6 September 1999
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H

Applicant

I

Applicant

J

Applicant

K

Applicant

L

Respondent

M

Applicant

N

Applicant

O

Respondent

P1

Applicant

P2

Applicant

P3

Respondent

Q

Applicant

and Admission of
deemed refusal of
internal review
File Note of conv.
With B. Barrack of
NPWS
File Note of conv
with B. Barrack of
NPWS
File Note of conv
with B. Barrack of
NPWS
Email message to
B.
Barrack
of
NPWS
Reply to Email
message
File note of Conv
with Mr Diacono of
Northern
Zone
regarding possiblity
of negotiation over
documents.
File
note
of
telephone
conversation with
B.
Barrack
of
NPWS
regarding
application to AD
Tribunal
Letter to Applicant
regarding
further
reductions in scope
and payment of
advance deposit
Fax
to
NPWS
indicating
the
request as amended
to date.
Fax stating that
document sent to
clarify the request
as amended did not
constitute a “new”
request.
Letter responding to
P1, P2, making
promise of revised
estimate
of
processing time.
File Note of phone

25 August 1999
3 September 1999
13 September 1999
22 September 1999
22 September 1999
24 September 1999

30 September 1999

29 September 1999

30 September 1999

30 September 1999

1 October 1999

11 October 1999
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R

Applicant

S

Tribunal

conv with J. Whalan
of
NPWS
documenting
request
for
summary statistics
and offer to further
reduce scope of
request.
File Note of phone 11 October 1999
conv with J. Whalan
of NPWS indicating
that no summary
statistics exist.
Receipt of Filing 27 September 1999
Fee and advice of
date of Directions
hearing
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ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS TRIBUNAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES
GENERAL DIVISION

Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997

Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW)

Application for review of decisions under the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW)

FILE NO. [993217]
APPLICANT:
RESPONDENT: DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL
PARKS AND WILDLIFE SERVICE NSW

NOTICE OF DISCONTINUANCE
Please be advised that on the initiative of the applicant, the application which forms the subject
of these proceedings is discontinued immediately. The application referred to is the application
made to Administrative Decisions Tribunal on 20 September 1999 for review of decisions
made by the Respondent.
Signed
Date : 26 October 1999
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LIST OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED
Anonymous DLWC officer,
Head Office, in person,
6.10.00.
Anonymous
DLWC
Vegetation
Management
Officer, Hunter Region
(Taree Office), 23.3.00, by
telephone,
notes
with
author.
Anonymous high ranking
Northern Directorate staff
member, 22.10.99.
Anonymous
officer,
Threatened Species Unit
officer,
Northern
Directorate, NPWS, Coffs
Harbour, by telephone,
23.1.00.
Anonymous high ranking
Southern Directorate staff
member, 8.6.00;
Anonymous
landholder,
Nimmitabel, NSW 10.9.97,
by telephone. Notes on file
with author.
Anonymous,
ex-DLWC
officer, Parramatta, 27.9.00,
notes on file with author.

Commonwealth
officers
Cameron Slatyer,
NSW Team, Forests Task
Force,
Environment
Australia, 10.3.99, Canberra,
in person.
18.8.99, by telephone.

NSW Government
Alf Said, NSW Office of
Private Forestry.
Jonathon Clark, Office of
Private Forestry NSW,
19.10.01 (by telephone).

Gary Davey, Northern
Directorate Manager, Coffs
Harbour,
formerly Threatened Species
Unit Manager, NPWS
Northern Zone.
30.4.98, 10.10.99,
22.10.99; 25.10.99, 18.10.02.

Andrew
McIntyre,
Threatened Species Unit
Manager
Northern
Directorate, 22.10.99.

Mr Andrew McIntyre, Mr
John Martindale, NPWS.
Northern Zone TSU staff,
25.10.99.

Anonymous Vegetation
Management
Officer,
Hunter Region, 23.3.00,

Andrew Steed
NPWS
Northern Zone, 16.6.00,
Armidale.

Bob Attwood, Vegetation
Resource Manager, , in
person, Grafton DLWC
Office, 5.10.99, 13.10.99,
24.4.00., 23.11.00. 29.11.00.
(in person, notes on file).

Hugh
Daneke,
Joint
Venture plantations officer,
State Forests of NSW, in
person, ANU Farm Forestry
Symposium., 28.2.00.

Bruce
Thompson,
Voluntary
Conservation
Agreements
Officer,
Department of Land and
Water
Conservation,
Parramatta, by telephone.)
31.8.99,
Dan Lunney, NPWS,
Hurstville, 30.12.01 (by
Telephone, notes on file
with author).
Dr Gül Izmir, DeputyDirector General, DLWC.
Dr Ian Hannam, DLWC,
Parramatta
Office,
in
person. 15.1.98, Notes with
author.

John de Groot, Resource
Office Economist, Sydney
South
Coast
Region,
DLWC,
in
person,
Canberra, 28 February 2000.
Jonathon Clark, Office of
Private Forestry (NSW),
19.10.01, by telephone.
Stuart
Little
Senior
Environmental
Planner, Natural Resources
Planning
Branch,
DUAP/DIPNR
Juliana Matthews, DUAP
Queanbeyan 1.8.97
Leanne Wallace, DLWC
Executive,
Bridge
St,.
18.6.02, 26.6.02
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Lisa Corbyn, Deputy
Director-General,
Environment
Protection
Authority, NSW, 21.9.98.
notes on file with author.
Dave Robson,
NPWS
regional
TSU
manager,
18.6.01,
by
telephone.
Phil Redpath,
North
Coast
(Grafton), 31.3.99

DLWC
Region

Peter Wright, DLWC,
29.6.00,
following
discussions with Mr Peter
Houghton, Manager, Land
and
Vegetation
Unit,
Sustainable
Land
and
Coastal
Management
(Information and Planning),
DLWC.
Paul Packard, Manager,
Conservation Assessment
and Data Unit, NPWS,
Southern Directorate office,
23.1.01. (by telephone).
Phil
Craven,
Project
Officer, NPWS, Southern
Directorate, Queanbeyan,
14.4.00.
Phil
Gibbons,
Conservation Assessment
and Data Unit, NPWS
Southern
Directorate,
23.1.01. by telephone].
Phil Redpath, ecologist,
DLWC Grafton (North
Coast
Region
Office),
31.3.99, 13.10.99.
Robert Adam, Resource
Officer
(Program

Coordination),
Sydney/South
Coast
Region, 1.3.01, 14.4.00.
Samantha
Hampton,
Environment
Protection
Unit,
Conservation
Assessment and Planning
Division, NSW National
Parks and Wildlife Service,
Hurstville. (by telephone). ,
19.9.99.
Steve Gowland, DLWC
Hunter, 17.3.00.
Tanya Stacpoole, exNPWS Southern Zone,
telephone , 26.6.97, 17.4.98;
22.9.03.
Mitch Tulau, DLWC,
Kempsey, numerous.
Tim Wilkinson DLWC
SEPP 46 officer, 7.10.97,
Sydney-South Coast region,
Wollongong office.

Local government
A.
Alliston,
Dungog Shire
31.3.98.

Planner,
Council,

and Planning, Boorowa SC,
5.11.99.
Craig Filmer, Strategic
Planner,
Harden
SC,
4.11.99.
Daniel McNamara, Senior
Town Planner, Bellingen
Shire Council, 28.9.99.
Daris Olsauskas, Senior
Town Planner, Bellingen
Shire Council, 3.4.98.
David Casson, Manager,
Land Use Planning, Scone
SC, 5.11.99.
David
Kitson,
Planner,
Ballina
Council, 3.4.98.

Town
Shire

David Seymour, Strategic
Planner,
4.1.02
(by
telephone). Eurobodalla
Elizabeth
Downing
Strategic
Planner,
Shoalhaven City Council,
4.1.02, by telephone.
Felicity Saunders, Strategic
Planner, Wingecarribee SC,
5.11.99.

B.Webster, 31.3.98, Uralla
SC.

Gerard
Tuckerman,
Environment Officer, Great
Lakes Council, Forster,
NSW, 5.9.97 , 16.7.02.

Brian Gibson,
Planner,
Muswellbrook

Glen Handford, Great
Lakes Shire Council, 5.10.99.

Senior
4.1.02.

Bruce Heise, Planner,
Gloucester SC, 31.3.98, by
telephone, notes on file with
author.
Colin Owers, Director,
Works, Technical Services

Jim Robinson, Strategic
Planner,
Severn
Shire
Council, 31.3.98
K. Maguire, Planner, Coffs
Harbour City Council,
31.3.98.
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Ken Trethewey, Director,
Environment
and
Community
Services.
Cootamundra (, 4.11.99)
Leanne
Fuller,
Development
Control
Planner, Hastings Shire
Council, by telephone,
31.3.98.
Mark Innes, Strategic
Planner, 30.1.02, Kempsey
Shire Council.
Bo Moshage, Planner, Port
Stephens Shire Council,
3.4.98.
Dennis Spur, Manager,
Environmental
Services,
5.11.99. (Hume SC)

Kyogle
Shire
31.3.98, 24.9.99.

Council,

Sean Meyers, 5.11.99,
Manager, Planning Services,
Parry SC.
Sharon Cooper, Strategic
Planner, Shellharbour SC,
4.11.99.
Steve Enders, Strategic
Planner.
Hawkesbury
4.11.99
Tim McLeod, Strategic
Planner, Wollondilly SC,
4.11.99.
Tony Jones, Environmental
Services Manager, Barraba
SC, 4.11.99.

Paul Johnston, Strategic
Planner, Yass SC, 4.11.99.

W.Burgess,
Strategic
Planner, Greater Taree,
31.3.98.

Paul Montgomery, TPO
Officer,
Byron
Shire
Council, 16.4.98.

Wayne
McDonald,
Strategic Planner, Cowra SC,
5.11.99.

Peter Reynders, Strategic
Planner, Snowy River Shire
Council, 3.4.98.
R.
Forbes,
Cessnock Shire
31.3.98.

Planner,
Council,

Rob
Pitt,
Strategic
Planning/Development
Control
Co-Ordinator,
Environmental
Services,
Kempsey Shire Council, by
telephone, 5.10.99, 5.3.02,
notes on file.
Scott Turner, Director,
Planning and Environment
and Community Services,

Conservationists
Greg Hall, NCC NSW
representative on Manning
RVMC,
Elands,
by
telephone, 13.2.01, 27.11.01,
by telephone.
Tim
Holden,
Policy
Director,
NSW EDO,
member
of
NVAC,
27.11.01, by telephone
(notes with author).
Jim Morrison, resident in
Casino area, by telephone,
11.2.98
(re Mt Pickapene)
Noel Plumb, NPA, 23.7.97

Indra
Esguerra,
Mt
Jerrabomberra Preservation
Society, Canberra, 21.2.2000,
12.4.00.
Susie Russell,
9.6.2000.

NEFA

Margaret Blakers, former
staff member Office of the
Commissioner
for
Environment,
Victoria,
10.11.99.
Alec Marr
The Wilderness Society,
Canberra, 23.11.99
Anne
16.9.97

Reeves,

NPA,

John Corkill
NEFA, 2.12.97.
Jim Morrison
NEFA
Paul Kravcenko
NCC
Dailan Pugh
NEFA
Kathy Ridge
NCC

Academics
Dr Fiona Haines
Senior Lecturer Department
of Criminology, Faculty of
Arts,
University
of
Melbourne
Prof Errol Meidinger
Law Faculty
University of Buffalo, NY
Carl Binning,
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Principal
Research
Economist,
CSIRO
Sustainable Ecosystems

Gaine Cartmill
NSW Forest Products
Association, 7.6.02.

Kim Booth, Deputy Mayor,
Meander Valley Council,
29.9.98;

Dr Ross Florence Visiting
Fellow
School
of
Resources
Environment and Society,
ANU
(formerly ANU Forestry)

Geoff Wilkinson Timber
Communities
Australia,
7.6.02.

Michael Lynch, Tasmanian
Conservation Trust, Hobart.

Dr Jüergen Bauhus Senior
Lecturer
School
of
Resources
Environment and Society,
ANU
(formerly ANU Forestry)
14.2.01, 24.5.02, 7.6.02,
18.6.02.

Bronwyn Petrie,
NSW
Farmers’
Association,
18.6.02.
Ken O’Brien,
Riverina
Forestry
Management
Group, 24.5.02.

Naomi
Lawrence,
Botanist,
Threatened
Species Unit, Tasmanian
Parks and Wildlife Service,
6.11.98, Hobart.

Tasmanian interview
subjects

Peg Putt, Green MHA for
Denison, 6.11.98, Hobart.

Prof Tim Bonyhady
CRES,
Humanities
Research Centre, ANU

Alistair
Tasmanian
Trust.

Dr Peter Kanowski
Head of Department
School
of
Resources
Environment and Society,
ANU
(formerly ANU Forestry)

Dr Hans Drielsma, CEO,
Forestry Commission of
Tasmania, 9 March 2001,
Perth.

Dr John Dargavel ANU
Visiting Fellow
School
of
Resources
Environment and Society,
ANU
(formerly ANU Forestry)
Dr Andrew Hopkins
Sociology, School of Social
Sciences
&
member
RegNet,
ANU

NSW Forestry
interests
Robert Dyason
Australian Forest Growers,
18.6.02

Michael Stokes, Faculty of
Law,
University
of
Tasmania, 16.8.98.

Graham,
Conservation

Evan
Boardman,
Environment
Resource
Officer, Local Government
Association,
Tasmania,
22.9.98.
Geoff Law, Office of
Senator
Bob
Brown,
3.11.98, Hobart.
Graham Wilkinson, Chief
Forest Practices Officer,
Forest Practices Board,
6.11.98
Ian
Whyte,
Chief
Executive, Forest Industries
Association
Tasmania,
12.11.98, Hobart.

Peter
Threatened
Network.

McGlone,
Species

Peter
Taylor,
Private
Forests Tasmania, Hobart,
6.11.98.
Prof. Gerry Bates, Faculty
of Law, Univ. of Sydney,
16.8.98.
Stuart Kaye, Lecturer,
Faculty of Commerce and
Law,
University
of
Tasmania, 8.10.98; 9.10.98.
Susan Gunter, Principal
Lawyer,
Environment
Defender’s
Office
Tasmania, 6.11.98; 13.11.98.
Tim Cadman, Native
Forest Network, Deloraine,
8.10.98, 10.11.98.

APPENDIX 6.1 MAP OF DLWC REGIONS

Source: DLWC (2003)

APPENDIX 6.2
REVISED PNF EXEMPTION IN RIVERINA HIGHLANDS RVMP
Schedule 4 - Description of exemptions
11 Private native forestry

(1) The clearing of native forest dominated by Alpine Ash (Eucalyptus
delegatensis), Mountain Gum (E. dalrympleana), Ribbon Gum
(E. viminalis), Eurabbie (E. globulous ssp. bicostata), Red Stringybark
(E. macrorhyncha), Broad Leafed Peppermint (E. dives) or Narrow
Leafed Peppermint (E. radiata) in the course of its being selectively
harvested on a sustainable basis or managed for forestry purposes
(timber production) consistent with the Guidelines For Sustainable
Harvesting of Dry to Moist Open Sclerophyll Forest within Riverina
Highlands of New South Wales, available from the Department of
Land and Water Conservation.
(2) Theminimumforest tree crown cover, after harvesting,must be at least
40% of what would be expected for an undisturbed site characterised
by similar tree species and in a similar location.
(3) The volume harvested must not exceed the equivalent of an average of
3 cubic metres per hectare per annum over a period of 20 years or
more.
(4) This activity may be carried out without consent only if the
Department of Land and Water Conservation has been given notice of
the proposed clearing prior to the commencement of clearing.
(5) Where the volume harvested will be more than 500 cubic metres of
product in total on any contiguous landholding in any one year period,
this activity may be carried out without consent only if a forestry
management plan documenting forest management practices and
harvesting operations has been prepared. If a forestry management plan
is required for any clearing but is not produced at the request of the
Director-General of the Department of Land andWater Conservation,
this item does not allow the clearing until after it is produced.

APPENDIX 7.1
INTENDED LAND USE ACTIVITY AFTER CLEARING BY REGION
FOR CLEARING CONSENTS - YEARS 2000, 2001, 2002 HUNTER, NORTH COAST, AND SYDNEY SOUTH-COAST

APPENDIX 7. 2
PROPORTION OF CLEARING APPLICATIONS
INVOLVING FORESTRY OR PLANTATION
DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH COAST, HUNTER AND
SOUTH COAST REGIONS

Percentage Of Total Clearing Applications Where Forestry Or
Plantation Development was the Intended Post-Clearing Land
Use In Year 2000 (Only)
DLWC
Region

Logging/
Forestry

Hardwood
plantation

Softwood
Plantation

Percentage
of
total
applications

North
Coast 53.77%
33.73%
0.06
87.5
Region
Hunter Region
57.15
23.4
0.0
80.56
Sydney-South
7.81%
6.74%
70.64
85.19
Coast
Source: Calculated from DLWC, 2000, Proposed land use for the area approved for clearing, for the period
1 January 2000-31 December 2000 (data published (2001) on DLWC internet site
<www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au>).

Percentage Of Total Clearing Applications Where Forestry Or
Plantation Development was the Intended Post-Clearing Land
Use In Year 2001 (Only)
DLWC
Region
North

Logging/
Forestry
Coast 55.36

Hardwood
plantation

Softwood
Plantation

Percentage
of
total
applications

23.94

5.16

84.86

16.27
0.0

0.0
45.01

56.9
89.32

Region
Hunter Region
Sydney-South
Coast

40.63
44.31

Source: DLWC (2001) Proposed land use - area approved for clearing, for the period 1 January 200131 December 2001 (data published (2002) on DLWC internet site <www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au>).

APPENDIX 7.2 PROPORTION OF CLEARING APPLICATIONS INVOLVING
FORESTRY WITHIN NORTH COAST, HUNTER. SOUTH COAST REGIONS

Percentage Of Total Clearing Applications Where Forestry Or
Plantation Development was the Intended Post-Clearing Land
Use In Year 2002 (Only)
DLWC
Region
North

Logging/
Forestry
Coast 81.22

Hardwood
plantation

Softwood
Plantation

Percentage
of
total
applications

0

0

81.22

0
0.0

0.0
0

52.77
49.78

Region
Hunter Region
Sydney-South
Coast

52.77
49.78

Source: DLWC, 2002, Proposed land use - area approved for clearing, for the period 1 January 2002-31
December 2002 (data published (2003) on DLWC internet site <www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au>).

APPENDIX 8.1
TABLE OF PROSECUTION RESULTS UNDER SEPP 461
Case
Name

Area cleared

Plea

Conviction

Locke &
Harrison2
Nunkeri
Pastoral Pty
Ltd3
Pye4

100ha

Guilty.

Yes
(s.556A Nil
Crimes Act)
Yes
$10,000 fine, regarded by judge as “lenient”, Consent orders $8525
consent orders for creation of wildlife for remediation
corridors of an area twice that cleared.
No
Discussion of onus of proof regarding
exemptions.

180ha of Coolabah and Guilty.
Blackbox
woodland
near
Walgett
64.5ha plus 171.2 ha clearing of
shrubs through blade ploughing
and burning.
Bungle
275 ha of mainly Coolibah Guilty
Gully Pty woodland near Walgett.
Ltd5
Ramke6
23.5ha forested vegetation near
Guilty
Kempsey by bulldozing.
Crawford7

Yes
Yes (s.556A)
Yes

Fine/Penalty

Consent Orders Costs
or
Property
Agreement
No
$12,000

$20,000 (reflecting a 50% reduction on Consent orders $40,000
mitigating grounds including submission to for remediation
remediation order)
Nil.
Consent orders $35,000
for revegetation
and remediation.
$10,000
No.

Sources: Original text of court judgments as reproduced at <www.austlii.edu.au> ; DLWC, Review of the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 Exemptions (Internal Draft Report), (2000). at 9; table
prepared by Dr Ian Hannam, Director Soil and Vegetation Compliance.
2 Director-General Department of Land and Water Conservation v Locke (1997) No. 50095 of 1997, Unreported, Talbot J.
3 Director-General DLWC v Nunkeri Pastoral Pty Ltd (1998) 98 LGERA 139, Land and Environment Court, No.50095 of 1996, Bignold J.
4 Director-General Department of Land and Water Conservation v Pye [1998] NSWLEC 301 (24 November 1998), Land and Environment Court, unreported, NO.50128-9 of 1997, Lloyd J.
5 Director-General Department of Land and Water Conservation v Bungle Gully Pty Ltd & Ors, unreported No.50081,50082,50083 of 1996.
6 Director-General Department Land and Water Conservation v Ramke [1999] NSWLEC 22., No.50071 of 1998, Talbot J, Land and Environment Court, unreported. At paragraph 21 of the judgement, His
Honour ruled: “In this case the Court finds that the environmental harm and consequences have been elevated by the prosecutor and at least two of its witnesses to a level which tends to suggest a
seriousness beyond that justified by an objective assessment.”. In relation to the penalty imposed: “The evidence of the defendant that he has no cash resources and that there is no real prospect of
him entering into any permanent gainful employment has not been disputed by the prosecutor. The means of the defendant and his ability to pay what otherwise might be an appropriate fine is a
relevant factor to be taken into account in determining the level of penalty.” At paragraph 56 the court held “Rather than moving to impose a token or nominal penalty, the charge will be dismissed
pursuant to s 556A of the Crimes Act. The dismissal is not to be seen as a lack of recognition of the seriousness of the offence. The defendant will nonetheless suffer a severe punishment by the
effect of the consent orders and the payment of costs.”
7 Director-General Dept Land and Water Conservation v Crawford, Land and Environment Court, unreported No.50042 of 1996, Talbot J, 3 April 1997.
1

Cameron8
Jones 9
Greentree 10
Prime
Grain Pty
Ltd 11
Limthono
Pty Ltd 12
Windouran
Pastoral
Company
Pty Ltd
Harris13

35ha
Coolabah
woodland Guilty
vegetation.
35ha of Coolabah woodland
Guilty
650ha of woodland vegetation NA
near Moree.

$10,000

Consent orders $15,000
for rehabilitation.
$7000
-

As above

Guilty

Yes
$3000
Charges
dropped
by
negotiation.
Yes
$7,000

As above

Guilty

Yes

$7,000

Clearing 240 ha of native Not
grasslands by ploughing (near Guilty
Moulamein)

Yes

$10,000

Consent orders Agreemen
for revegetation t (approx.
and remediation
$100,000).

As above

Yes

$2,000.

Consent orders

No.

Yes

$10,000.

Consent orders

No.

Yes

$5,000.

Consent orders

No.

Crawford14

As above

Rial15

As above

Dettman16

13.75 hectares
plantation
As above.

Ashenden17

Yes

for

Not
Guilty
Not
Guilty
Not
Guilty
olive Guilty
Guilty

Property
$52,000
agreement
and
consent orders
0

Yes. (Clearing $5,000.
contractor).
Yes.
No fine, entry into remediation order and Consent

$5000
costs.
orders $10,000.

Director General Dept Land and Water Conservation v Cameron, Land and Environment Court, Pearlman J., unreported No.50066 of 1997.
Director-General Dept Land and Water Conservation v Jones, [1998] NSWLEC 51 (1 April 1998), Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, Lloyd J, Unreported No. 50067/97.
10 Director General Dept Land and Water Conservation v Prime Grain Pty Ltd & Ors, unreported 50035,50036,50037,50038 of 1997.
11 Director-General Dept Land and Water Conservation v Prime Grain Pty Ltd & Ors, unreported 50035,50036,50037,50038 of 1997.
12 Director-General Dept Land and Water Conservation v Prime Grain Pty Ltd & Ors, unreported 50035,50036,50037,50038 of 1997.
13 Director-General DLWC v Harris, unreported No.50044 of 1996 Land and Environment Court, Talbot J.
14 Director-General DLWC v Crawford, unreported No.50045 of 1996, Land and Environment Court, Talbot J .
15 Director General Dept Land and Water Conservation v Rial (1998) 99 LGERA 130. Director-General Department Land and Water Conservation v Rial, Harris, Crawford, & Windouran Pastoral Company Pty Ltd 1998
99 LGERA 130.
16 D-G DLWC v Ashenden [1998] NSWLEC 283, (11 November 1998), Land and Environment Court, Unreported, No. 50085 of 1998, Bignold J.
8
9

(landowner)
Robson18
Newman19
Newman
Quarrying20
Holcombe21

7 hectares coastal vegetation in Guilty
Richmond River Shire Council
area, Northern NSW.
As above.
Guilty

Yes.

As above.

Yes. (s.556A)

Guilty

Yes. (s.556A)

Yes. (s.556A)

payment of prosecutor’s costs considered in “appropriate
mitigation.
penalty”.
No fine.
Entry
into As agreed
remediation order or taxed.
by consent.
na.
No
No costs
order
na.
No
No costs
order
na.
Costs as
taxed.
na.
Costs as
taxed.

Hunter
(see Waroo
Lands)
Ikaro Pty
Ltd22

Yes. (s.556A)

Orlando
Farms Pty
Ltd
&
Ors23
Waroo
329 hectares
(Lands) Pty
Ltd 24

Yes

Case at lowest end of spectrum of
seriousness – mitigating circumstancescharge dismissed.
$35,000 fine.

Yes

$2,500

No.

Guilty

D-G DLWC v Ashenden [1998] NSWLEC 283, (11 November 1998), Land and Environment Court, Unreported, No. 50085 of 1998, Bignold J.
D-G DLWC v Robson, Newman, and Newman Quarrying [1998] NSWLEC (unreported, 8 August 1998).
19 D-G DLWC v Robson, Newman, and Newman Quarrying [1998] NSWLEC (unreported, 8 August 1998).
20 D-G DLWC v Robson, Newman, and Newman Quarrying [1998] NSWLEC (unreported, 8 August 1998).
21 D-G DLWC v Ikaro Pty Ltd [1998] NSWLEC (8 December 1998), Bignold J.
22 D-G DLWC v Ikaro Pty Ltd [1998] NSWLEC (8 December 1998), Bignold J.
23 D-G DLWC v Orlando Farms Pty Ltd & Ors, unreported Nos 50040,50041,50042,50045-50053 of 1997.
24 D-G DLWC v Waroo Pty Ltd [1999] NSWLEC (unreported, 25 February 1999), No. 50099 of 1997, Talbot J.
17
18

$35,000
costs.
No.

$45,000

APPENDIX 8.2
SELECTED RESULTS OF PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE
PROTECTED LANDS PROVISIONS OF THE SOIL CONSERVATION
ACT (NSW) RELATING TO PRIVATE NATIVE FORESTRY
Case name

Prosecuted Under

Area cleared

Penalty imposed

Hannam v O’Connor & Soil Conservation Act 240 trees on protected $3000 and $1000 fines
Veness (1995)1

1938, s.21C

land in small scale respectively, payment of
timber

felling

professional

by prosecutors costs $8000.

timber

cutter and associate.
Hannam v De Wyse Soil Conservation Act, Destruction
(1998)2

s.19C

trees

on

land by fire.

of

24 Offence

proved,

protected penalty

no

(s.556A),

Consent

order

for

revegetation and fencing
off,

payment

prosecutors

costs

of
of

$10,000.
Hannam v Anderson 3

Simpson v Gatacre4

Soil Conservation Act Logging on protected Guilty plea, no penalty
s.21C
land.
imposed (s.556A Crimes
Act), consent order for
site
remediation,
payment of prosecutor’s
costs., ignorance of
defendant
regarding
protected land status
taken into account as a
factor in mitigation.
Soil Conservation Act Commercial
river $10,000 total fines for
s.21C
redgum
logging four
offences
of
operation
breaching
conditions
attached to authority to
log protected lands, plus
prosecutor’s costs.

Hannam v O’Connor [1995] NSWLEC 149 (14 September 1995), unreported decision of Land and Environment Court,
Pearlman J, No. 50025 of 1995.
2 Hannam v De Wyse [1998] NSWLEC 159 (25 November 1998), unreported decision of Land and Environment Court,
Talbot J, Nos.50041 of 1998 and 50069 of 1998.
3 Hannam v Anderson [1998] NSWLEC 91 (15 May 1998), unreported decision of Land and Environment Court,
Sheahan J, No.97/50086.
4 Simpson v Gatacre (1992) 74 LGRA 320, Stein J, 3 April 1992.
1

APPENDIX 8.3
EXAMPLE OF ENFORCEMENT DIFFICULTIES UNDER THE

NATIVE VEGETATION CONSERVATION ACT 1997
Email to author from anonymous DLWC officer 17.6.02

“I went out to a suspected breach out near Crescent Head the other day. It looked just
appalling, like they were building an airport out there, except that it included some steepish
slopes. They had cleared Crown Land and taken liberties along about 5 km of fencelines, like
about 30 m worth of liberties, including large trees that would definitely be 200+ years old. We
found these three guys responsible on horses, and they were like extras out of Deliverance - I
could almost hear the banjoes playing in the background. The trouble is that DLWC would
never hassle them about fencelines when the Act says ‘to the minimum extent necessary’,
which is maddeningly vague. Plus even if they went a bit too far, they can then add their 2 ha
on top of that, plus whatever other exemptions they can think of, and get a huge amount of
clearing done. This one was probably still a marginal breach of NVCA, plus Crown Lands Act,
and probably Rivers and Foreshores Improvement Act 1948.
But when we wouldn't even take on Mr X’s [name omitted] breach in upper Pappinbarra,
which was a massive 20 ha including rainforest and wet sclerophyll on very steep slopes…[sic].
There, it was argued that various exemptions cut the area down to ~15 ha, but it was still a
breach no matter which way you look at it. And of various Acts including NVCA and RFI Act.
Various blokes from this office went out to prepare a remediation plan, and Mr X said, well
you can stick that up your ----. And now we've apparently missed the 2 year court registration
limitation. The blokes here can't believe that nothing was ever done, but I heard that “all of the
Department's legal resources were being consumed by [the] Greentree [litigation].” In that
context there's no way that we are going to be interested in one like the Crescent Head matter
that I mentioned earlier.
On the issues of exemptions, one that concerns us is the 2ha exemptions should not apply to
certain forest types, such as rainforests and wet sclerophyll. The other thing we are having
trouble with is the 2 ha exemption in rural residential zoned land, where they are taking out
wildlife corridors and all sorts of things on this exemption. Because most local government
TPOs don't extend to [land zoned] rural-residential.”

APPENDIX 9.1 LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEP REQUIREMENTS
FOR PRIVATE FORESTRY IN RURAL 1(A) ZONE1
Is consent required for Forestry Caveats, exemptions and provisos
Council
(by DUAP regions, in Rural 1(a) Zone ?
1999)

North Coast Region2
Ballina

Yes3

Bellingen

Yes4

Byron

No7

Consent is not required for forestry
development within the Zone No 1 (b)Ru
Consent required even for small farm
forestry operations. Specific conditions
have been produced for protection of
habitats of particular threatened species.5
Tree preservation order in place, plus
specific clause in LEP.6
Consent is required in 1(e) Extractive
Resources Zone, 7(c) water catchment zone,
and 7(f1) Coastal land zones. In addition a
TPO is in force setting out strict clearing

controls which has been adopted by the
LEP.8

Casino9
Coffs Harbour
Copmanhurst

No10
No11
No13

No changes under draft LEP 1999.12
Clearing of vegetation in 7(a) wetlands
zone (the only EP zone) requires

Data for this table was collected using a combination of an of examination of hard copies of LEPs at DUAP's head
office, through interviews conducted in person, and by telephone, by letters addressed to strategic planners of relevant
councils, and by search conducted of LEPs available on Internet sites. The table is organised according to the regional
boundaries applied by DUAP the Department of Urban Affairs and Planning. A copy of a map showing the
boundaries is contained in Appendix 8.2. The key issue is that the regional boundaries used by DUAP are not
consistent with the regional boundaries employed by DLWC, which again are not consistent with the organisational
boundaries or zones employed by the NPWS. Maps indicating the DLWC and NPWS regional boundaries are
reproduced at Appendix 5.1 and 9.1 respectively. When seen together, this is another clear indication of the lack of
coordination between the approach taken by DLWC, NPWS and DUAP, and raises the question of why one set of
boundaries could not be employed by all three agencies.
2 Includes areas to which the North Coast REP applies , as defined in cl.3, North Coast REP 1988.
3 Ballina LEP 1987, cl. 8. Consent is required for forestry (falling within innominate use category) in both variants of the
1(a) zone: (a1) Rural (Plateau Lands Agriculture) Zone and Zone No 1 (a2) Rural (Coastal Lands Agriculture) Zone.
Version of LEP updated 20 October 2001. Accessed at <www.austlii.edu.au> on 7.12.01. Also: Interview, Mr David
Kitson, Town Planner, Ballina Shire Council, 3.4.98. (Indicated that at that time, consent was not required).
4 Bellingen LEP 1990, cl.9. ‘forestry’ requires consent in Rural 1(a) Zone. Interview, Mr Daris Olsauskas, Senior Town
Planner, Bellingen Shire Council, 3.4.98. In Zone 7(f) EP (Coastal Land) Zone, consent is required.
5 Interview, Mr Daniel McNamara, Senior Town Planner, Bellingen Shire Council, 28.9.99, in person, at Bellingen SC
Chambers. There is a TPO in force in the Shire applicable to 1(a) lands, as well as a specific clause in the LEP designed
to protect native vegetation from inappropriate clearing. The TPO only applies to trees in excess of 3 metres height.
6 Cl.34 requires consent for clearing within 50m of permanent streams.
7 Byron LEP 1988, cl.9. ‘forestry’ permitted without consent in Rural 1(a) Zone. However consent is required in 1(e)
Extractive Resources Zone, 7(c) water catchment zone, and 7(f1) Coastal land zones. In addition a TPO is adopted by
the Byron LEP 1988. Letter to author, Mr. D.Kanaley, Director, Environmental Planning Services, Byron SC, 22.10.99.
8 Interview, Paul Montgomery, TPO Officer, Byron Shire Council, 16.4.98.
9 Note that the Richmond River and Casino LGAs were recently amalgamated to form the Richmond Valley LGA.
10 Casino Local Environment Plan 1992, cl.9, ‘forestry’ permitted without consent in Rural 1(a) Zone.
11 Coffs Harbour City Local Environment Plan 2000, cl.9, ‘forestry’ permitted without consent in Rural 1(a) Zone.
12 Originally it was proposed that consent would be required for forestry in areas identified regionally significant
vegetation or koala habitat. Interview, K. Maguire, Planner, Coffs Harbour City Council, 31.3.98. However, in a letter
to the author dated 22.9.99, Council indicated that forestry is permissible without consent in the 1(A) zone under the
Draft LEP of 1999.
13 Copmanhurst LEP 1990, cl.9. Development consent is not required in Zone No 1(a) Rural (General). Zonal objectives
include “to encourage the protection and conservation of … forests of commercial value for timber production.”
1
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consent.
14

Glen Innes
Grafton
Greater Taree

No
No15
No

Hastings

No17

Kempsey

Yes

Kyogle

No

Lismore
Maclean

No23
No24

Nambucca

No

No program of shire-wide vegetation
mapping.16
Steep land zonings require consent for
forestry, forestry prohibited in habitat
protection zone.18
However, consent not required to carry
out forestry where in accordance with a
plan of management approved by State
Forests of NSW.19 A TPO is in force
but does not apply to Rural 1(a) zone.20
Forestry is prohibited in 7(b) Habitat
protection and 7(d) Scenic protection
zones.21
LEP in preparation. Operating under
IDO No.1.22
Clearfelling requires consent.25 Clearing
in 7(b) EP (Conservation/ Habitat)
zone permissible with consent, forestry
is prohibited. Forestry permissible with
consent in 7(e) EP (Escarpment/Scenic)
Zone.26
However, 4 caveats apply.27 In the
environment protection (vegetation
conservation) zone 7b forestry is

Glen Innes LEP 1991, cl.9. “Forestry” is permitted without consent in the Rural 1(a) Zone.
Grafton LEP 1988, cl.9. “Forestry” is permitted without consent in the Rural 1(a) Zone.
16 Interview, W.Burgess, 31.3.98. See Greater Taree LEP 1995, cl. 12. Development consent is required for forestry in the
Rural 1(a) Zone.
17 Consent not required for forestry in Rural 1(a1) zone. Hastings LEP 2001. Accessed at <www.austlii.edu.au> on
7.12.01.
18 Forestry is prohibited in Zone 7 (h) Environment Protection Habitat zone. In Zone 1 (a4) Rural Agricultural
Protection - consent is required for forestry on protected land, but not required on non-protected land: Hastings LEP
2001. Accessed at <www.austlii.edu.au> on 7.12.01. In ‘agricultural protection zone’, mapped with cross hatching,
applies to steeper land. Some vegetation mapping in progress to identify koala habitat is likely to lead to amendment of
LEP. Interview, L.Fuller, Hastings Shire Council, 31.3.98.
19 Letter from Kempsey Shire Council, 24.9.99 to author, on file with author. In an interview, 5.10.99, Mr Rob Pitt,
Environment Manager of Council stated that the requirement for consent was partly related to concerns that private
forests would be logged more intensively as restrictions on wood supply on public forest estate were progressively
tightened. Further, plantations are considered a form of “agriculture” and do not require consent, although DA’s are
encouraged for both planting and harvesting in order to provide plantation owners with a guarantee of harvesting.
Council does not require s.94 contributions for PNF operations, and is prepared to recognise existing use rights in the
forestry context.
20 Interview, Mr Mark Innes, Strategic Planner, 30.1.02, Kempsey Shire Council.
21 Interview, Mr Mark Innes, Strategic Planner, 30.1.02, Kempsey Shire Council.
22 Interviews, Mr Scott Turner, Director, Planning and Environment and Community Services, Kyogle Shire Council,
31.3.98, 24.9.99. No LEP is in place at time of writing and IDOs from 1976 and 1967 apply to all or part of the area.
One explanation given for not requiring consent was that such a step would be perceived as the first step towards the
politically unpalatable option of requiring development consent for agriculture.
23 Lismore LEP 2000, cl.30.2
24 Maclean LEP 2001, cl.43. “Forestry” is permitted without consent in the Rural 1(a) Zone; However cl.40(1) states that
both clearfelling and clearing of trees protected by a TPO require consent in this zone.
25 Letter from Maclean Shire Council, 29.9.99, on file with author. The definition of forestry employed is that contained in
the Model Provisions.
26 Maclean LEP 2001, cl.57.
27 Nambucca LEP 1995, cl.18. Consent must be obtained if slope exceeds 1:3, land identified as wildlife corridor or
DCLM mapped vegetation, or scenic backdrop, or within 300m of an identified watercourse. Consent must be
obtained for vegetation clearance or forestry on land within zones other than 1(a), 1(a2), 1(a3), 1(a4), 1(d). Clause 18(5)
states that in other zones, consent must not be granted unless council is satisfied of a number of economic and
environmental matters.
14
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prohibited but vegetation clearing is
permissible with consent.28

Nymboida29
Richmond River31
Tweed

No30
No32
No33

Ulmarra34

No35
(3/19 require consent)

Vegetation mapping is in progress, as
are amendments to LEP.

Hunter and Central
Coast Region
Cessnock
Dungog
Gloucester
Great Lakes
Greater
Council
Maitland
Merriwa

Taree

No36
No
No 39
Yes40
City No
Yes42

Exemptions permit clearing37
Forestry is addressed in 1(b),(c),(d).38
Except where clearing for bushfire
hazard reduction.
Forestry
requires
consent
in
environment protection zones.41
Tree preservation clause within LEP,
consent required.

No 43

Nambucca LEP’s Environment protection - vegetation conservation zone 7(b) - permits the “clearing of native vegetation” if
development consent is obtained. In this zone forestry (as defined in the Model Provisions) can also proceed if
development consent is obtained. Nevertheless an additional control exists in the form of a specific clause of the LEP
relating to vegetation protection. Clause 18 permits native vegetation clearance associated with forestry and agriculture
in all of the rural zones without consent except where (in summary) the land is steep, comprises a wildlife corridor, or
has particular scenic values. In these areas consent is required, but council’s discretion to grant that consent is
constrained by mandatory consideration of specified environmental factors
29 Note that Nymboida SC and Ulmarra SC were amalgamated in 2002 to form the Pristine Waters LGA. However a
check of Parliamentary Counsel’s NSW Legislation in Force <www.legislation.nsw.gov.au> on 25 November 2003
indicated that the Ulmarra LEP and Nymboida LEPs were still both in force at that time, and that no specific Pristine
Waters LEP had yet been made. Both plans at that date did not require consent for PNF in the 1(a) zone.
30 Nymboida LEP 1986, cl.9.
31 Note that the Richmond River and Casino LGAs were recently amalgamated to form the Richmond Valley LGA.
32 Richmond River LEP 1992, cl. 9. ”Forestry” is permitted without consent in the General Rural Zone No.1(a).
Clearing controls are provided in cl.17, 18 restricting clearing within Zones 7(b),(c).
33 Tweed LEP 2000, cl.11. (internet version accessed 18.2.01), also permissible without consent in rural 1(a) zone and
rural 1(b) agricultural protection zone.
34 Note that Ulmarra SC and Nymboida SC were recently amalgamated to form the Pristine Waters LGA.
35 Ulmarra LEP 1992, cl.9. Forestry does not require development consent.
36 Cessnock LEP 1989, cl.9. ”Forestry” is permitted without consent in the General Rural Zone No.1(a). Letter Ms T.
Davidson, Environmental Services Dept., Cessnock City Council, 18.10.99.
37 Clearing is permitted without consent for bushfire hazard reduction, clearing along fence-lines. Interview, R. Forbes,
Planner, Cessnock Shire Council, 31.3.98.
38 Forestry explicitly permitted without consent in 1(a) zone. Dungog LEP 1990, cl.9. Accessed at <www.austlii.edu.au>
on 7.12.01. Interview, A. Alliston, Planner, Dungog Shire Council, 31.3.98.
39 Gloucester LEP 2000, cl.11(1). Accessed at <www.austlii.edu.au> on 7.12.01. Interview, B. Heise, Planner, Gloucester
Shire Council, 31.3.98.
40 Interview, Mr Glen Handford, Great Lakes Shire Council, 5.10.99. Despite criticism from the industry, council requires
consent, and encourages land holders to lodge a DA partly in order to secure the right of future harvesting of trees.
Council does levy s.94 contributions for haulage of logs, and imposes requirements to conduct pre-logging surveys for
threatened species. See also Great Lakes LEP 1996, cl.8. Clause 10 provides for the making of tree preservation orders.
Also refer letter to author on file from Mr EJ Watts, Manager Business Support, Planning and Environmental Services,
date 29 October 1999: Three applications were received for PNF since January 1996 and all three were granted consent
subject to the imposition of special conditions. There was no finding of likely significant effect on threatened species
and accordingly no SIS was required and concurrence of the DG of NPWS was not sought.
28

41 Interview, 12.7.02, Mr Bruce Byatt, Strategic Planner, Greater Taree City Council, by telephone, notes on file. Council covers
37,000km2, the majority of which is rural area.
42

Maitland LEP 1993, cl.9, Accessed at www.austlii.edu.au on 4.1.02. Under cl.29, consent required to clear trees greater
than 3m in height.
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Murrurundi

No44

Muswellbrook

No45

Nundle
Port Stephens

Yes46
Yes47

Scone
Singleton

Yes49
No50
(5/13 councils require consent)

No TPO applies in rural areas.

TPOs in force restricting vegetation
clearance.48

Illawarra and South
Coast Region
Bega Valley
Bombala

Yes
No51

Cooma-Monaro

Yes52

Eurobodalla

Yes55

Kiama
Mulwaree

Yes56
Yes57

Tree Preservation Order may be made.53
Council advises parties to obtain
consent in any case.54
Consent not required for forestry in 1(a)
zone on Crown timber land under the
Forestry Act 1916. Clearing of native
vegetation in all zones requires consent.

Merriwa LEP 1992, cl.9. “Forestry” is permitted without consent in the General Rural Zone No.1(a).
Murrurundi LEP 1993, c.9. “Forestry” is permitted without consent in the General Rural Zone No.1(a).
45 Muswellbrook LEP 1985. Interview, Brian Gibson, Senior Planner, 4.1.02. Forestry is restricted in environmental
protection zones. LEP is under review and amendments projected to be in place September 2002.
46 Nundle LEP 2000, cl.9.
47 Port Stephens LEP 2000, cl.11.
48 Interrview, Mr Bo Moshage, Planner, Port Stephens Shire Council, 3.4.98.
49 Forestry in the 1(a) zone requires consent, as would any such activities in the 7(a) environment protection zone. Scone
LEP 1986, zoning table. There is no TPO in place, and there are no specific rules applicable to either firewood logging
or clearance of native vegetation for plantation establishment. A new LEP is on exhibition which will remove the
requirement for development consent for forestry, including plantation forestry in the 1(a) zone. Interview, 5.11.99, Mr
David Casson, Manager, Land Use Planning.
50 Singleton LEP 1996, cl.16.
51 Bombala LEP 1990, cl.9, Clause 12 is a special provision relating to clearing and forestry. Subclause 12(2) provides that
land may be cleared for the purpose of agriculture or forestry without consent. Subclause 12(6) indicates that this rule
prevails over any content of clause 9, the zoning table which at first instance appears to suggest that forestry in the
Rural 1(a) Zone would require consent. However, this subclause requires that the freedom from consent requirements
depends on satisfactory arrangements being made with council regarding control of soil erosion and bushfire and
maintenance of public roads.
52 Cooma-Monaro LEP 1999 (Rural), cl.8., consent is required in the Rural 1(a) zone and Rural Smallholdings zone 1(c).
53 Cooma-Monaro LEP 1999 (Rural), cl.10 (TPOs).
54 Cooma-Monaro LEP 1999. Forestry is prohibited within the Zone 7(d) Environment Protection (Scenic) Zone. Cl.21
provides additional protection for riparian corridors. Accessed at <www.austlii.edu.au> on 4.1.02. Council advises
parties to obtain consent in any case, “for their own protection”, against future changes in State environmental
regulatory requirements. Interview, Planner, 31.3.98.
55 Eurobodalla (Rural) LEP 1987, cl.11. Interview, David Seymour, Strategic Planner, 4.1.02 (by telephone). A TPO exists
but it only applies in Urban areas under the Eurobodalla (Urban) LEP.
56 Kiama Local Enivronment Plan 1996, cl.9; development consent is required for forestry in the Rural 1(a) Zone“tree
plantations and harvesting” require development consent, and vegetation clearance is prohibited in the 7(d) Zone :
Rural Environment Protection (Scenic). Similarly, “tree plantations and harvesting” and “clearing of vegetation”
require development consent in the 7(e) Rural Environment Protection (Hinterland) Zone.
43
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Shoalhaven

Yes58

Shellharbour
Tallaganda
Tumbarumba
Tumut
Wingecarribee
Wollongong
Yarrowlumla

Yes60
Yes61
Yes62
Yes63
Yes64
Yes65
No66
(12/14
consent)

TPO applies to all trees >3m in rural
areas, and all red cedars of any size.59

councils

require

Western Region
Balranald
Barraba
Bathurst
Berrigan
Bingara
Blayney
Boorowa
Cabonne
Conargo

No67
No68
Yes69
No70
No71
No72
No 73
No74
Yes75

Consent required for pine plantations
Consent required for pine plantations
Consent req. for “plantation forestry”

Mulwaree LEP 1995, cl. 9. Development consent is required for forestry in the Rural 1(a) Zone. However “tree
planting (including planting for the purpose of growing farm woodlots up to 10ha each, but not including planting for
the purpose of forestry)” does not require consent.
58 Shoalhaven LEP 1995, cl9. Interview, Duty Planner, 19.2.01, by telephone.
59 Interview, Ms Elizabeth Downing, Strategic Planner, Shoalhaven CC. On 4.1.02, by telephone.
60 Under Shellharbour LEP 1987, zoning table. Interview, 4.11.99, Ms Sharon Cooper, Strategic Planner.
61 Tallaganda LEP 1991, cl.9. In the General Rural 1(a) Zone, forestry requires consent, but consent is not required for
“tree planting, including planting for the purpose of growing farm woodlots or shelter belts of up to 10 hectares each,
but not including planting for the purpose of forestry.”
62 Tumbarumba LEP 1988, cl.9.
63 Tumut LEP 1990, cl.9.
64 Forestry is permissible with consent. Wingecarribee LEP 1990, zoning table. A tree preservation order is also in place,
but only applies to land in specific environment protection zones 7(a) or 7(b) and land mapped as an environmental
heritage area. The TPO only applies to trees greater than 6m in height and diameter 150mm at 1.2 m height. Interview,
5.11.99, Felicity Saunders, Strategic Planner.
65 City of Wollongong Local Environment Plan 1990, Zone 1 (Non-Urban), development consent is required. Forestry is
also permissible with consent in Zone 4(c) Extractive Industrial Zone, 6(c) Public Recreation Zone, 7(a) Special
Environmental Protection Zone (but only after advertising and satisfaction of clause 11 relating to special
considerations that must be satisfied prior to decision to grant consent.
66 Yarrowlumla LEP 1993, cl.10. “Forestry” and “tree farming” are both permitted without consent in the 1(a) Zone.
67 Balranald IDO, Interview Mr Roy Hetherington, Director, Infrastructure & Development, 28.10.03, by telephone.
Agriculture and forestry are as of right uses in the rural zone.
68 Barraba LEP 1991, However ancillary dwellings and pine plantations do require development consent in the 1(a) Zone.
There is no TPO in place either in the LEP or as a separate instrument. Interview, Tony Jones, Environmental Services
Manager, 4.11.99.
69 Bathurst LEP 1997, s.6, <www.legislation.nsw.gov.au>, s.6; reviewed 28.10.03.
70 Berrigan LEP 1992, cl.9. Development consent not required in the Rural 1(a) Zone for forestry other than pine
plantations. Reviewed at Austlii website 28.10.03.
71 Bingarra LEP 1994, cl.9. Development consent not required in the Rural 1(a) Zone for forestry “other than ancillary
dwellings and pine plantations.”
72 Blayney LEP 1998, s.9, <www.legislation.nsw.gov.au>, 28.10.03.
73 Boorowa LEP. There is no requirement for development consent for forestry in the 1(a) zone, nor is there a TPO in
place. There are no specific requirements relating to firewood logging. Interview, Mr Colin Owers, Director, Works,
Technical Services and Planning, 5.11.99.
74 Cabonne LEP 1991, cl.9 Development consent not required in the Rural 1(a) Zone for forestry other than “plantation
forestry”. Reviewed at Austlii website 28.10.03.
75 Conargo LEP 1987, s.8 <legislation.nsw.gov.au>, 28.10.03.
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Cootamundra
Coolah

Yes76
No77

Coonabarabran

No78

Coonamble

No79

Corowa
Cowra
Crookwell
Culcairn
Dubbo
Dumaresq85
Gilgandra
Greater Lithgow
Griffith
Gundagai
Gunnedah

Yes80
No 81
Yes82
Yes83
Yes 84
No86
No 87
No88
No89
No90
No91

Gunning
Guyra

Yes92
No93

However, consent is required for pine
plantations
However, consent is required for pine
plantations
However, consent is required for pine
plantations

TPO applies, agro-forestry and woody
weed clearance exempt.

Cootamundra LEP, Interview, 4.11.99, Mr Ken Trethewey, Director, Environment and Community Services. Forestry
proposals in the 1(a) zone are permissible with consent following public advertising. The requirement is in place as
forestry proposals would involve the use of chemicals outside normal agricultural practice. There is no TPO in place in
the shire. There is no firewood logging on a commercial scale, as the shire was extensively cleared over 100 years ago.
The issue of plantation forestry is not a live one in the area because it falls outside the normal rainfall limits, however it
may become a possibility with the building of a new pulp mill at Tumut.
77 Coolah LEP 2000, cl.9 Accessed at <www.austlii.edu.au>on 7.12.01.
78 Coonabarabran LEP 1990, cl.9. Accessed at <www.austlii.edu.au> on 7.12.01.
79 Coonamble LEP 1997, cl.9. Accessed at <www.austlii.edu.au> on 7.12.01.
80 Corowa LEP 1989, cl.9. Consent required for “private forestry”. Reviewed at Austlii website 28.10.03.
81 Cowra LEP 1990, forestry does not require development consent in the 1(a) zone, nor is there a TPO in place.
Interview, 5.11.99, Mr Wayne McDonald, Strategic Planner.
82 Crookwell LEP 1994, cl.7. Development consent is required for forestry in the Rural 1(a) Zone (as it does not fall
within the definition of agriculture.)
83 Culcairn LEP 1998, Only “tree farming” is permitted without consent in the Rural 1(a) Zone. By implication other
forms of forestry require development consent. Further the definition of forestry provided does not include the
planting of trees for purposes incidental to farming such as the planting of trees for windbreaks or firewood. Clause
26(2)(a) prohibits development, for purposes including forestry and sawmills, on land mapped as “environmentally
sensitive land”. Clause 26 prevents vegetation clearance on “environmentally sensitive land” by requiring development
consent, and requiring that consent only be given if 6 specific heads of environmental concerns are adequately
addressed.
84 Dubbo LEP 1997, Rural Areas cl.19, zone 1(a), consent is required for forestry, cl.31 zone 1(I) intensive agriculture,
consent is required for forestry. Reviewed at Austlii website 28.10.03.
85 Note that Dumaresq and Armidale LGAs were amalgamated in 2001.
86 Dumaresq LEP No.1, cl.9. (As at 30.7.01) Accessed at <www.austlii.edu.au> on 7.12.01.
87 Gilgandra LEP 1998, cl.8: Development consent not required in the Rural 1(r) Zone for forestry. Reviewed at Austlii
website 28.10.03.
88 Greater Lithgow LEP 1994, cl.9. Forestry other than ancillary dwellings is free from requirements for development
consent in the Rural 1(a) Zone.
89 Griffith LEP 2002, cl.10. Rural (1)(a), consent not required for forestry. Reviewed at Austlii website 28.10.03. Note that
under LEP 1994, cl.10, consent was required for forestry in this zone. Reviewed at Austlii website 28.10.03.
90 Gundagai LEP 1997, cl.7,8. Only designated development requires consent and nothing else. Reviewed at Austlii
website 28.10.03.
91 Gunnedah LEP 1998, Zoning Table: Zone 1(a). Further, clause 28 provides that a tree preservation order applies in the
LGA, requiring consent for the removal of trees, however it is subject to a number of exemptions, including a specific
exemption for agro-forestry projects.
92 Gunning LEP 1997, cl. 8. Consent is required for forestry in the Rural 1(a) Zone. In addition, special environmental
protection considerations must be applied in making consent decisions regarding land in the 1(a) Zone: cl.9,12.
93 Guyra LEP 1988, cl.9.
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Harden
Hay
Holbrook

No94
No95
No96

Hume

Yes 97

Inverell
Jerilderie
Junee
Lockhardt
Manilla
Mudgee
Murray
Murrumbidgee
Narrabri
Narrandera
Oberon
Parry
Quirindi
Rylstone
Severn

No98
No99
No100
Yes101
No102
No103
No104
No105
No106
No107
No 108
Yes 109
No110
No 111
No112

No TPO in force.

Consent required for pine plantations

However, consent is required for pine
plantations. Vegetation mapping in
progress, but only relating to roadside
vegetation.

Harden SC presently operates under an Interim Development Order, under which consent is not required for forestry
in the 1(a) Zone. However a Draft LEP in preparation is to propose that forestry in the 1(a) zone will require
development consent. There is no TPO in force. Firewood logging in this area with only 2% remaining tree cover is
controlled only informally by a policy of permitting cutting of fallen dead timber on road reserves, but prohibiting
cutting of standing dead timber. Interview, 4.11.99, Mr Craig Filmer, Strategic Planner, Harden SC.
95 Hay LEP 1988, cl.9, General rural 1(a) zone, consent not required for forestry. Reviewed at Austlii website 28.10.03.
96 Holbrook LEP 1970, Zoning table. Interview, Brett McGuiness, Manager, Environmental Services, 4.1.02. (by
telephone).
97 Hume LEP 2001, cl.15 (Rural (Agriculture), cl.16 Rural (Environment) zones. Accessed at <www.austlii.edu.au> on
7.12.01. Interview, Mr Dennis Spur, Manager, Environmental Services, 5.11.99. Stated that few applications, if any had
been received in relation to PNF.
98 Inverell LEP 1988, cl.9.
99 Jerilderie LEP 1993, s.9, <www.legislation.nsw.gov.au>, 28.10.03.
100 Junee LEP 1992, cl. 10. Forestry (other than ancillary dwellings and pine plantations) are permitted without consent in
the Rural 1(a) Zone.
101 Lockhardt LEP 1995, s.9, <www.legislation.nsw.gov.au>, 28.10.03.
102 Manilla LEP 1988, cl.9. Forestry (other than ancillary dwellings) is permitted without consent.
103 Mudgee LEP 1998, c.9. Forestry permitted without consent in the Rural 1(a) Zone.
104 Murray LEP 1989, cl.9. Forestry (other than pine plantations) is permitted without consent in the Rural 1(a) Zone.
Reviewed at Austlii website 28.10.03.
105 Murrumbidgee LEP 1994, cl.9, Forestry in accordance with a “vegetation management plan” approved by DLWC (cl.5).
Reviewed at Austlii website 28.10.03.
106 Narrabri LEP 1992, cl.9. Forestry is permitted without consent in the General Rural Zone No.1(a). (other than pine
plantations). Reviewed at Austlii website 28.10.03.
107 Narrandera LEP 1991, cl.9., Forestry is permitted without consent in the General Rural Zone No.1(a), except pine
plantations.
108 Oberon LEP 1998, cl. 9. Forestry is permitted without consent in the General Rural Zone No.1(a).
109 Parry LEP 1987, zoning table, development consent is required for forestry in the 1(a) zone. Forestry is defined as in
the model provisions. There is no TPO in place. No immediate plans to require s.94 contributions relating to roads.
Interview, Mr Sean Meyers, 5.11.99, Manager, Planning Services.
110 Quirindi LEP 1991, cl.9, Forestry is permitted without consent in the Rural Zone No.1(a). Reviewed at Austlii website
28.10.03.
111 Rylstone LEP 1996, cl.9. Forestry (other than ancillary dwellings or pine plantations) is permitted without consent in the
General Rural Zone No.1(a). Clause 24 provides for a tree preservation order for vegetation within certain specified
rural village lands.
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Snowy River

Yes113

Tenterfield
Uralla
Urana
Wagga Wagga

No115
Yes116
No117
No

Wakool
Walcha
Weddin
Wellington
Wentworth
Windouran
Yallaroi
Yass
Young

No119
Yes120
Yes121
No 122
No123
No124
No125
No 126
Yes 127
(16/59
consent)

Argued that benefits for landholder may
be associated with obtaining consent in
any case.114

Not required other than for ancillary
dwellings and pine plantations118

Consent required for pine plantations

councils

require

Under the LEP 1991, cl10. Accessed at <www.austlii.edu.au> on 7.12.01, private forestry does not require consent in
Zone 1(a) Rural (Agricultural Protection) Zone unless it is for a pine plantation. Also: Letter from Severn Shire Council
General Manager, 6.10.99. No changes are proposed in present redrafting of LEP. However, in an interview, Mr Jim
Robinson, Strategic Planner, Severn Shire Council, 31.3.98 suggested that development consent was required at that
time for private forestry. Mr Robinson admitted that some PNF operators in the Shire are operating without
development consent, but stated that Council lacks detection and enforcement resources.
113 Snowy River LEP 1997, Clause 8(3).
114 Interview, Peter Reynders, Strategic Planner, Snowy River Shire Council, 3.4.98.
115 Tenterfield LEP 1996, cl 9.
116 Two applications have been received since 1 January 1996, both were granted consent with conditions, and no SIS was
required. Source: Letter from Uralla Shire Council, 30.9.99 in reply to letter from author. The Requirement for consent
was suggested by consultants to council. Intensive agriculture requires consent. Main concern of planners is effect of
increased truck traffic associated with forestry on road infrastructure. Interview, B.Webster, 31.3.98.
117 Urana LEP 1990, <www.legislation.nsw.gov.au>, 28.10.03.
118 In Zone 1 (Rural). Wagga Wagga Rural Local Environment Plan 1991, clause 9, (development control table). Reviewed at
Austlii website 28.10.03.
119 Wakool LEP 1992, cl.9., Forestry (other than pine plantations) is permitted without consent in the General Rural Zone
No.1(a). Reviewed at Austlii website 28.10.03.
120 Walcha LEP 2000, cl.9. Interview, Mr Rob .Calligan, Planner, 31.3.98. Proposed requirement for consent relates to
environmental impact of plantation activity (eg. Use of herbicides), and to the impact on local infrastructure (esp.
bridges) of increased truck traffic associated with forestry.
121 Weddin LEP 2002, cl.10., consent is required for forestry within the rural 1(a) zone. Internet review of LEP at
<www.austlii.edu.au> on 28.10.03.
122 Wellington LEP 1995, cl.10. General rural 1(a) zone, consent not required for forestry. Internet review of LEP at
<www.austlii.edu.au> on 28.10.03.
123 Wentworth 1993, cl.9, zoning table, general rural 1(a) zone, consent not required for forestry except for pine
plantations. Internet review of LEP at <www.austlii.edu.au> on 28.10.03.
124 Windouran LEP 1999, s.9, <www.austlii.edu.au>, 28.10.03.
125 Yallaroi LEP 1991, cl.9. Forestry (other than ancillary dwellings and pine plantations) does not require development
consent.
126 Yass LEP 1987, cl.9. Accessed at <www.austlii.edu.au> on 7.12.01. Also: interview 4.11.99, Paul Johnston, Strategic
Planner, Yass SC, Development consent is not required for forestry in the Rural 1(a)n zone. A TPO is in place in the
shire, but only applies to clear-felling (50%> tree canopy removal) of areas of greater than two hectares. The extent of
operation of the firewood logging industry is unclear. Stated that in order to guarantee a right to harvest plantations or
wood-lots in the future, individuals are referred to the TPHG Act. Some persons undertaking farm forestry have
applied for development consent in any case, regardless of LEP requirements, in an attempt to safeguard harvesting
rights.
127 Young Local Environmental Rural Plan 1993, cl. 9. Development consent is required for forestry in the Rural 1(a1)
Zone. “Logging” requires development consent in the No.7(e) Rural Environmental Protection (Scenic) Zone.
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Sydney Region
Hawkesbury

Yes 128

Wollondilly

Yes 129

Footnote:
The methodology of selection of councils for survey was as follows. The survey aimed to
comprehensively review council provisions in the Eastern Division of NSW and to cover selected
councils within the Central and Western Division known to have a significant PNF industry activity.
Only 107 (i.e., 67.7%) of the total of 158 rural councils were reviewed. In particular, efforts were made
to review council requirements in areas along the Murrumbidgee and Murray Rivers (due to the river
red-gum industry) and Central West areas with cypress pine logging industry. A map is reproduced at
showing the councils reviewed as shaded in green. Those not surveyed remain marked in white. The
selection methodology was cross-checked by using overlay maps provided in the EPA’s NSW State of the
Environment Report 2001, showing local government boundaries against Maps 2.13 “Native Vegetation
Cover”, showing areas of forest and woodland (p.174), and Map 2.11 “ Native Vegetation Disturbance
in the intensive and extensive land use zones” (p.171) showing areas of vegetation cleared and uncleared.
These maps showed the significant areas of remnant native vegetation in NSW.
This survey applies Regional Boundaries as were in use by DUAP in 1999-2000, as indicated on the map
reproduced in Appendix 8.2. Note that the Regional boundaries applied by DUAP, the former
Department of Urban Affairs and Planning have been replaced in late 2003 by those applied by its
successor DIPNR the Department of Infrastructure Planning and Natural Resources. Those boundaries
can be reviewed at <www.iplan.nsw.gov.au>.
The research methodology employed involved a combination of approaches. A visit to the DUAP Head
Office library was conducted in 1998 and a number of LEPs were reviewed in hard copy. A later visit
was conducted in 1998 to the DUAP office in Queanbeyan to review selected LEPs and associated
maps. For others LGAs for which the LEPs were not available, it was necessary to conduct telephone
interviews with strategic planners. Later in the study period, it became possible to cross-check the
contents of LEPs as greater numbers of LEPs became available on-line at the Australian Legal
Information Institute website <www.austlii.edu.au>, under “NSW Consolidated Regulations”, and also
at the NSW Parliamentary Counsel’s web publication of NSW Legislation in Force at
<www.legislation.nsw.gov.au>.

Hawkesbury LEP 1989, Zoning table. Interview 4.11.99, Mr Steve Enders, Strategic Planner. Development consent is
required for forestry [standard definition from the model provisions] in the 1(a) zone and normally a flora and fauna
survey would be required to be conducted and results lodged with DA. Note that Hawkesbury SC is exempt from the
operation of the NVC Act, except for trees on protected land. A TPO applies to rural land, however this does not
apply to clearing for agriculture, and only protects trees greater than 4m. However, a draft LEP is under consideration
that will require development consent for clearance of all native vegetation, and therefore will protect understory
species.
129 Development consent is required for forestry in the 1(a) Zone. Wollondilly LEP 1991, Zoning table. Interview,
4.11.99, Tim McLeod, Strategic Planner. In order to obtain consent an applicant would be required to pass standard
DA requirements including conduct a flora and fauna assessment, consideration of visual impact, and issues relating to
erosion and sediment control. Further, a TPO applies in the shire to rural vegetation clearance. However as a separate
requirement applies for forestry, the TPO is only of relevance to other forms of vegetation clearance which are
becoming over time increasingly disconnected from traditional agricultural land clearance. No SIS have been prepared
for forestry but approximately 6-12 prepared for developments involving other forms of vegetation clearance.
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APPENDIX 9.3
COPY OF LETTER SENT TO SELECTED DUAP NORTHERN
REGION COUNCILS REGARDING PNF
[University of Wollongong Letterhead]
Faculty of Law
University of Wollongong
Northfields Ave
Wollongong NSW 2522
«Title» «FirstName» «LastName»
«JobTitle»
«Company»
«Address1»
«City»
«State» «PostalCode»
13 September 1999
Dear «Title» «LastName»
Re: Consent Requirements relating to Forestry on Private Land

I am writing to you to seek your cooperation with research that I am conducting at the
Centre for Natural Resources Law and Policy at the Law Faculty, University of
Wollongong, into the question of consent requirements for forestry activities on
privately owned land throughout NSW.
The question of private land forestry is gaining in policy importance given the ongoing
expansion of the plantation timber industry and farm forestry throughout NSW and the
possible expansion of the native forest harvesting industry on private land with
restrictions on access to State Forests as a result of the RFA process.
The results of the research are likely to be of interest to policy makers in local
government and selected State government agencies including DLWC, DUAP and
NPWS.
Therefore, your assistance in gathering this information is greatly appreciated, not least
because at present there is a lack of comprehensive information on the regulatory
framework (and its administration) affecting the private land forestry industry
applicable across NSW.
My research is under the supervision of Professor David Farrier, author of the
Environmental Law Handbook, (3rd edition, 1999), and Director of the Centre for Natural
Resources Law and Policy. I have attached a letter of introduction from Professor
Farrier.

My particular requirements in relation to information relate to the decision making of
your council under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 and the Threatened
Species Conservation Act 1995, in this particular context.
I have chosen to write to your council in particular, as I understand that as required by
the Local Environment Plan in your region, commercial forestry (including logging or
intensive silvicultural management ) on privately owned land within the General Rural
1(a) Zone is a development requiring consent under Part 4 of the Environmental Planning
and Assessment Act 1979.
The precise information that I seek is as follows:
1. A confirmation that private land forestry requires development consent under your
LEP in the 1(a) Zone.
2. Please elaborate or specify council’s policy reasons for this requirement. Are they
related to concerns over maintenance of roads and bridges, or over environmental
matters such as threatened species issues, landscape planning, water quality, soil erosion
control ?
3. Since 1 January 1996, how many development applications have been received by
your council for proposals involving timber harvesting on private land ?
4. In how many of these cases was consent granted with standard conditions attached ?
5. In how many cases was consent granted with the addition of conditions specific to
the forestry context ?
6. How many such development applications have been refused (if relevant) ?
7. In how many of the above instances has council determined that production of an
SIS was required (as a result of a finding of likely significant effect on threatened
species following application of the ‘8 part test’) ?
8. In these cases, what was the result of the concurrence process with the DirectorGeneral of NPWS ? (ie was concurrence granted, with conditions, or refused ?)
Your assistance in providing the above information is greatly appreciated. Again I wish
to stress that the results of this research will be of interest to local government and
selected State government agencies.
In order to assist your reply I have enclosed a self addressed envelope. If you require clarification of any
aspect of the above, please do not hesitate to contact me by telephone on (02) 4221 4866 (w) or (0412)
417 546 (mobile).
Yours sincerely
James Prest
Candidate, Masters of Natural Resources Law (Hons) (by research)

APPENDIX 9.4 QUESTIONS POSED IN SEMI-STRUCTURED
INTERVIEWING OF COUNCIL PLANNERS REGARDING
REGULATION OF PNF
After locating the interview subject and introducing the researcher and the research project the following questions
were posed.
Can you please state your name and role at the council ? Are you responsible for administering
the LEP or aspects of it ?
Does council have an LEP in place or is it operating under an IDO?
Are you aware of any private forestry activity within your LGA?
What are council’s requirements for consent, if any, for forestry in the rural 1(a) zone?
Are there specific controls placed on pine plantations or plantation forestry as opposed to
forestry?
What are councils reasons for requiring consent for PNF ( if that is the case)?
(If raised) Does council levy s.94 contributions for road maintenance associated with forestry?
What are council’s requirements for consent for forestry within environment protection zones?
If consent is required, are there any specific additional requirements of development applicants
eg. site specific species survey? Flora and fauna assessment?
Has the LEP requirements in relation to forestry changed recently, or are there plans to change
the LEP in this respect?
Does council have a TPO in place and how does this interact with requirements of the LEP?
Do additional provisions of the LEP in relation to environmentally sensitive or significant land
affect or modify the basic provision of the Plan in relation to PNF?
(If raised) How many applications for PNF have there been recently? Have any proposals been
required to complete an SIS (Species Impact Statement)? Does council have a programme of
vegetation mapping in progress?
Can you describe any compliance or enforcement activity undertaken recently in relation to
PNF? Does council have any education programme in place in order to inform private
landholders in relation to LEP requirements for forestry ?

APPENDIX 9.5. THE OUTCOME OF PROSECUTIONS UNDER S.76
EPAA BY LOCAL COUNCILS REGARDING UNAUTHORISED
VEGETATION CLEARANCE
Case name

Prosecuted Under

Fry v Patterson (1990)1

Breach of TPO, “Many
many
offence
under hundreds
of
s.126(1) EPAA.
significant and
mature trees were
felled”
s.76 EPAA, carrying 1.78 hectares of
out of development coastal vegetation
works (for which
consent is required)
without consent.
EPAA,
s.125, Clearing of native
clearing
without vegetation,
consent as required windrowing, area not
by LEP in 1(a1)zone specified
in
judgement.
Environmental Planning Clearing of native
and Assessment Act, vegetation,
s.125,
clearing windrowing (same
without consent as facts as North)
required by LEP in
1(a1) zone.
EPAA,
s.76A(1), Clearing
of
12
clearing in breach of mature native trees
TPO.
in
course
of
macadamia
plantation
establishment.

Ballina Shire Council v
Davfast Pty Ltd2

Bellingen Shire Council v
North3

Bellingen Shire Council v
Wollard4

Byron Shire Council v
Vos5

Area cleared

Penalty imposed
Total of $18,000 fines
(at a time when the
maximum penalty was
$20,000).
$30,000 fine plus
costs of prosecutor,
plus a remediation
order to satisfaction
of council.
Plea of guilty by
landowner, fine of
$3000,
costs
of
prosecutor.
Plea of guilty by
clearing contractor,
convicted, $750 fine
plus prosecutors costs
($5500).

Plea of guilty by
property owner, entry
into consent order
regarding
revegetation,
convicted,
$10,000
fine, pay prosecutor’s
costs.
s.76A(1), Clearing
of
12 Plea of guilty by
Byron Shire Council v EPAA,
clearing in breach of mature native trees clearing contractor,
Sommerville6
TPO.
in
course
of convicted, $5000 fine
macadamia
plus
prosecutors
plantation
costs.
establishment.
Byron Shire Council v Facts not contained Facts not contained Prosecution
failed.
Vigden CJ & Donna’s within judgement.
within judgement.
Permanent stay of
Beach Pty Ltd7
proceedings due to
1Fry

v Patterson, Land and Environment Court, unreported Nos.50076-50078 of 1990, 10 October 1990, Stein J.
Ballina Shire Council v Davfast Pty Ltd (1998) 251 NSW LEC, 9 October 1998.
3 Bellingen Shire Council v North, Pearlman J., Land and Environment Court NSW, 16 February 1999.
4 Bellingen Shire Council v Wollared, Pearlman J., Land and Environment Court NSW, 16 February 1999.
5 Byron Shire Council v Vos [1998] NSW LEC 322, No. 50128 of 1998 Sheahan J., 5 November 1998.
6 Byron Shire Council v Sommerville (1999) 97 NSWLEC unreported decision No. 50127 of 1999, 8 February 1999, Sheahan J.
7 Byron Shire Council v Vigden CJ & Donna's Beach Pty Limited [1999] NSWLEC 121 (1 June 1999).
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Cooper v Coffs Harbour EPAA, s.125
CC8

Ryde City Council v EPAA, s.125.
Calleija9
Ryde
CC
Compagnon10

v Breach
of
tree
preservation order,
offence under s.125
EPAA, plea of guilty.

Penrith City Council v Prosecution
for
Mathie & Camelot unauthorised
Grange Pty Ltd11
development (tree
clearing), removal of
over 240 trees, on
2.72ha area.

Penrith City Council v
Re-Gen Industries Pty
Ltd (2000) 107
LGERA 331, Talbot
J.

failure to file affidavits
in
support
of
summonses.
Earlier penalty of
$15,000 fine plus
$52,331 costs reduced
on appeal to $5000.

Breach of condition
of
development
consent for retention
of trees in course of
subdivision.
Felling of 15 mature Guilty plea, $15,000
riverfront trees.
fine,
entry
into
consent order under
s.126(3) EP&A Act.
Same facts as Calleija. Defendant
(contractor) mislead
by his principal as to
the existence of a
development consent;
s 556A Crimes Act
applied.
“offence is a serious $35,000 fine for each
one”,
involving defendant (property
“flagrant disregard of development
the
law, company and its
notwithstanding
principal director)
prior
discussions
with
council
officers,”
penalty
reduced due to
cooperation
with
prosecution (guilty
plea).
Prosecution
of Guilty plea.
landscaping/
Fine: $750.
clearing contractor Rejection
of
employed
by submission that no
property developer
conviction
be
recorded.

Prosecution
for
unauthorised
development (tree
clearing
without
development
consent), removal of
over 240 trees, on
2.72ha area. Offence
regarded
as
“not…trivial”.
Canterbury City Council Clearing of two large Plea
that
v Saad12
trees in breach of a conviction

no Fine
of
be imposed.13

$5000

Cooper v Coffs Harbour City Council , No 60751/96 (2 December 1997), Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of
Criminal Appeal.
9 Ryde City Council v Calleija (1998) 99 LGERA 360, Land and Environment Court NSW, Lloyd J, No.50081/97, 16 March
1998.
10 Ryde City Council v James John Compagnon [1998] NSWLEC 38 (16 March 1998), Land and Environment Court, Lloyd J,
No.50082/97.
11 Penrith City Council v Mathie & Camelot Grange Pty Ltd, Land and Environment Court (NSW), unreported, Nos. 50080
and 50082 of 1999, 25 February 2000 (judgment on sentence only).
12 Canterbury City Council v Saad ( 2000) 112 LGERA 107, Land and Environment Court NSW.
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specific condition of
development
consent, in an urban
context (townhouse
development).

recorded
rejected.
Offence
characterised
as
neither technical nor
trivial. Reference to
“element of general
deterrence in dealing
with
Significant breaches
of the planning laws”
Kuringai v Gumland Felling of 69 trees in Fine of $8000 was
Property Holdings Pty breach of a tree imposed.14
Ltd
preservation order
Hornsby Shire Council v Felling of 49 trees in Fines
totalling
15
Moit
urban bushland.
$40,000
were
imposed.
Kuringai
Municipal Clearing of 30 trees Plea
that
no $6000
fine
plus
16
Council v Beaini
on urban fringe conviction
be prosecutors costs of
adjoining
national recorded under s.10 $6500.
park in breach of Crimes
(Sentencing
TPO.
Procedure) Act 1999
rejected.

13 Canterbury City Council v Saad, Land and Environment Court NSW, Unreported No. 50022 of 2000; Bignold J.
(Judgment on Sentence), 28 February 2001.
14 Ku-Ring-Gai Municipal Council v Gumland Property Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] NSWLEC 39, Unreported, No. 50054 of 2000,
Land and Environment Court of NSW, Lloyd J.
15 Hornsby Shire Council v Moit, 2001 NSWLEC 50Unreported, Nos 50023 of 2000 and 50024 of 2000, Land and
Environment Court of NSW, 26 February 2001, Lloyd, J.
16 Kuringai Municipal Council v Beaini [2001] NSWLEC 35 Land and Environment Court of NSW, Unreported No.50028 of
2000, 1 March 2001, Bignold J.

APPENDIX 10.2

ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT ACT 1979
(NSW), SECTION 5A

Significant effect on threatened species, populations or ecological communities, or their
habitats
For the purposes of this Act and, in particular, in the administration of
sections 78A, 79C (1) and 112, the following factors must be taken into
account in deciding whether there is likely to be a significant effect on
threatened species, populations or ecological communities, or their habitats:
(a)
in the case of a threatened species, whether the life cycle of the
species is likely to be disrupted such that a viable local
population of the species is likely to be placed at risk of
extinction,
(b)
in the case of an endangered population, whether the life cycle
of the species that constitutes the endangered population is
likely to be disrupted such that the viability of the population is
likely to be significantly compromised,
(c)
in relation to the regional distribution of the habitat of a
threatened species, population or ecological community,
whether a significant area of known habitat is to be modified
or removed,
(d)
whether an area of known habitat is likely to become isolated
from currently interconnecting or proximate areas of habitat
for a threatened species, population or ecological community,
(e)
whether critical habitat will be affected,
(f)
whether a threatened species, population or ecological
community, or their habitats, are adequately represented in
conservation reserves (or other similar protected areas) in the
region,
(g)
whether the development or activity proposed is of a class of
development or activity that is recognised as a threatening
process,
(h)
whether any threatened species, population or ecological
community is at the limit of its known distribution.

APPENDIX 11.1
TASMANIAN PRIVATE FOREST COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST
This section provides detailed information about the forest communities being targeted by
the Tasmanian Private Forest Reserves Program.1 The priority species to be considered for
the CAR Reserve System are identified in Attachment 2 of the RFA.

Forest community reservation requirements, against JANIS criteria, on private
land, following the Tasmanian RFA
Forest
Community
Code
AD
AI
AS
BA
BF
BS
CR
DSC
F
G
GG
KG
ME
MO
NP
OV
PJ
PS
RI
RO
TI
V
VF
VW

1

Forest community requirements on private land
Forest Community Description

E. amygdalina forest on dolerite
Inland E. amygdalina forest
E. amygdalina forest on sandstone
E. brookeriana wet forest
Acacia melanoxylon forest on flats
Banksia serrata woodland
Callitris rhomboidea forests
E. viminalis/E. ovata/E. amygdalina/E. obliqua
damp sclerophyll forest
King Billy Pine with deciduous beech
E. viminalis and/or E. globulus coastal shrubby
forest on Holocene sand
Grassy E. globulus forest
King Island E. globulus/E. brookeriana/E.
viminalis forest
Melaleuca ericifolia forest
E. morrisbyi forest
Notelaea ligustrina and/or Pomaderris apetala forest
E. ovata/E. viminalis forest
E. pauciflora on Jurassic dolerite
E. pauciflora on sediments
E. risdonii forest
E. rodwayi forest
Inland E. tenuiramis forest
E. viminalis grassy forest
Furneaux E. viminalis forest
Wet E. viminalis forest on basalt

<http://www.pfrp.tas.gov.au/forest_communities/index.html>

Private Land
Area (ha)
Required to
meet Target
9133
13413
12419
1720
129
40
106
1565
21
452
2336
1808
216
20
97
6868
439
110
52
1358
25871
33369
24
3617

Appendix 11.1 Under-represented Forest Types in Tasmania on Private Land

Forest community old growth requirements on private land
Forest
Forest Community Description
Community
Code

AD
AI
AS
AV
BA
CR
DSC
DT
G
M+
ME
OT
P
PJ
R
RI
RO
SG
SO
TI
V
VW

E. amygdalina forest on dolerite
Inland E. amygdalina forest
E. amygdalina forest on sandstone
Allocasuarina verticillata
E. brookeriana wet forest
Callitris rhomboidea forests
E. viminalis/E. ovata/E. amygdalina/E. obliqua
damp sclerophyll forest
Tall E. delegatensis forest
E. viminalis and/or E. globulus coastal shrubby
forest on Holocene sand
Callidendrous and thamnic rainforest on fertile
sites
Melaleuca ericifolia forest
Tall E. obliqua forest
E. pulchella - E. globulus - E. viminalis grassy
shrubby dry sclerophyll forest
E. pauciflora on Jurassic dolerite
E. regnans forest
E. risdonii forest
E. rodwayi forest
E. seiberi on granite
E. seiberi on other substrates
Inland E. tenuiramis forest
E. viminalis grassy forest
Wet E. viminalis forest on basalt

Old
Growth
Area on
Private
Land

Area
required
to meet
target

9150
2600
1550
510
580
240
280

3104
2690
1800
72
630
30
720

%
Private
Land
needed
to meet
Target
34
103
116
14
109
13
257

4780
740

4672
392

98
53

5360

1920

36

120
3500
31020

156
5124
11624

130
146
37

450
370
10
550
100
380
6180
7580
30

590
1654
10
590
170
870
3242
7730
40

131
447
100
107
170
229
52
102
133

Source: DELM/DPWIE Private Forests Reserve Program (1998) Strategic plan for the private land component
of the CAR Reserve System, Hobart, Tasmania, 110pp., at pp.63-64.

APPENDIX 11.2
PRIVATE FORESTS RESERVE PROGRAM TASMANIA
- PROGRESS AT SEPTEMBER 2003
Negotiations Successfully Completed
Type of Security
Properties Secured (purchased)
Properties Secured (covenanted)
Properties Secured (management agreement)
Total properties secured
Negotiations Continuing
Activity
Under Assessment
Reviewed by CARSAG - not with negotiator
Assigned to negotiator - before first contact
Negotiator first contact - no plan drafted
Operations plan drafted - not yet agreed
Operations plan agreed - no formal offer made
Formal offer made - not yet agreed
Formal offer agreed - not approved by AC
Approved by AC - not yet approved by Minister
Approved by State Minister - not yet approved by
C'Wealth
Approved by C'wealth Minister - not yet secured
Total properties under continuing negotiation
Negotiations Not Continuing
Reason
Owner not interested
Rejected by Unit - insufficient values
Rejected by CARSAG - insufficient values
Owner interested - not prepared to commit at this
time
Owner interested - no financial agreement possible
Total properties not under negotiation
Total Properties
Source: Private Forests Reserve Program, Tasmania
<http://www.pfrp.tas.gov.au/progress/index.html>

Number
19
129
2
150
Number

Area
(ha)
5118
20695
478
26291

88
16
14
23
43
7
5
1
17
13

Area
(ha)
?
2480
747
2036
9041
736
810
13
3775
770

13
240

1433
21844

Number
231
169
20
63

Area
(ha)
24250
5161
2697
13791

40
523

4367
50267

913

98401

APPENDIX 11.3
DETAILED INFORMATION REGARDING PROPORTION OF TASMANIAN PNF
OPERATIONS SUBJECT TO SITE SURVEYING BY FOREST PRACTICES BOARD
SPECIALISTS

The percentage of PNF operations that have involved a notification to either FPB botanists or
zoologists can be calculated from data in the FPB Annual Reports. There were 413 plans
certified for PNF in 2000-1.1
Zoology
In 2000-01, there were 313 notifications (advice requests) regarding zoological matters for PNF.
(In other words 75.8% of operations requested advice from the Board regarding zoology.)
However, only 15.2% of all PP logging operations received a zoological site visit from the FP
Board.2 A similar percentage received a botanical field survey.3
In 2002 there were 404 plans certified. There were 311 notifications (advice requests) regarding
zoological matters for PNF. Approximately 30% of notifications were visited, thus 93 visits, so
approximately 23.1% of all plans involved a zoological site visit. 4
Botany
There were 63 field surveys conducted on private land in 2000-1 by botanists from the FP
Board.5 There were 414 private native forest harvesting plans certified, 6 and thus 15.2% of
these PNF operations involved a survey. In the following year, 2001-02 there were 404
harvesting plans certified for private forest harvesting, and 40 botanical surveys took place,
thus 10.1% of certified operations were subject to a botanical survey.7

Forest Practices Board (2001), Annual Report 2000-2001, p.12.
Calculations from Forest Practices Board (2001), Annual Report 2000-2001, p.12, 36. (413 plans certified, 313 requests for advice. 20%
led to a site visit, ie.62.6 visits, of total of 413 = 15.2%).
3 “About 90” field surveys were conducted by in 2000-1 by botanists from the FP Board, with 70% being on private land. Therefore
63 surveys related to private land. Of 413 certified operations on private land, this means 15.2% received a field survey from FPB
Botanists. Forest Practices Board (2001), Annual Report 2000-2001, p.32.
4 Forest Practices Board Tasmania (2002), Annual Report 2001-2002, p.40-41.
5 Calculation from figures provided in Forest Practices Board (2001), Annual Report 2000-2001, p.32. A similar number of site visits
(63, i.e. approx 20% of 313) were conducted by FPB zoologists in response to 313 requests for advice regarding private property
operations. (p.36)
6 Forest Practices Board (2001), Annual Report 2000-2001, p.12.
7 Forest Practices Board Tasmania (2002), Annual Report 2001-2002, p.14, 33.
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APPENDIX 11.4
LAW REFORMS TO TASMANIAN FORESTRY LAW SUGGESTED BY
EDO/PLANNING INSTITUTE CONFERENCE RESOLUTION, HOBART,
AUGUST 2002.
This conference calls upon the State Government to immediately reform the law regarding
forest practices in Tasmania, specifically by:
1. amending the definition of “works” in the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993
(LUPAA) to remove the exemption for forest practices as defined in the Forest Practices Act
carried out in state forests.
2. deleting Section 20 (7) (a) of LUPAA which exempts from planning control any forestry
operations conducted on land declared as a PTR under the Forest Practices Act.
3. deleting Section 51 (3) of the Threatened Species Protection Act 1995 (TSPA) which exempts
a person acting in accordance with a certified forest practices plan from requiring a permit
to kill, injure, catch, damage destroy or collect a listed taxon of threatened flora and fauna.
4. deleting Section 22 C (3) of the Forestry Act which allows that a forest management plan
may prohibit or restrict the exercise of any statutory powers in relation to the land to which
the plan applies.
5. amending the Forest Practices Act to reform the constitution or the Forest Practices Board
to ensure membership includes three community representatives who possess expertise
inland use planning, natural resource management and ecology.
6. amending the Forest Practices Act to remove the requirement for a separate Forest
Practices Tribunal. The role of the FPT is to be taken over by the resource management
and Planning Appeal Tribunal (RMPAT) appropriately resourced to undertake the
additional work.
7. amend the Forest Practices Act to provide for full public consultation and third party
appeal rights in relation to the PTR Reserve decision making process.
8. amending LUPAA by providing that forestry cannot be a permitted use, but only a
discretionary use, in a planning scheme.
9. amending LUPAA to provide that no planning scheme can exempt forestry from that
scheme.
10. that the Forest Practices Act be subject to the sustainable development objectives of the
Resource Management Planning System.
11. within the State Policy for the protection of agricultural land the definition of
agricultural land be amended to read "agricultural uses means animal and crop production
and does not include intensive tree farming and plantation forestry.
Source: EDO/Planning Institute of Australia conference, Unlocking The Gates - Public
Participation in Tasmanian Forest Management, held 23rd August 2002, Hobart.
<http://www.tased.edu.au/tasonline/edo/unlocking.htm>.

APPENDIX 11.5
PHOTOGRAPHS OF TASMANIAN PRIVATE NATIVE FORESTRY

NORTH FOREST PRODUCTS PLANTATION, MEANDER VALLEY, CENTRAL
TASMANIA (J.PREST, NOV.1999)

APPENDIX 11.5
PHOTOGRAPHS OF TASMANIAN PRIVATE NATIVE FORESTRY

GUNNS PTY LTD SURREY HILLS BLOCK NORTH WESTERN TASMANIA
PRIOR TO CONVERSION TO PLANTATION, SHOWING RAINFOREST (G.
LAW)

GUNNS TREE PLANTATION, INVOLVING CLEARFELLING OF RAINFOREST,
SURREY HILLS BLOCK NORTH WESTERN TASMANIA SOUTH OF BURNIE
(G. LAW)

